

Sustainable Africapitalism?
Grassroots Perceptions of
Maasai Mara Conservancies
and their
Relationship with Development

Crystal Heidi Anne Courtney

Ph.D. African Studies

The University of Edinburgh

2015

The University of Edinburgh

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

<i>Name of Candidate:</i>	Crystal Heidi Anne Courtney	<i>UUN</i>	s0898366
<i>University email:</i>	c.h.a.courtney@sms.ed.ac.uk		
<i>Address :</i>	59 Western Way, Ponteland, Newcastle upon Tyne		
<i>Post Code:</i>	NE20 9AP		

<i>Degree Sought:</i>	PhD African Studies	<i>No. of words:</i>	99,901
<i>Title of Thesis:</i>	Sustainable Africapitalism? Grassroots Perceptions of Maasai Mara Conservancies and their Relationship with Development.		


Integrated conservation and development projects have been widely promoted across Africa. These often involve public-private partnerships targeting tourism. Despite this encouragement, there are conflicting views regarding their impact. Conservancies have emerged bordering the Maasai Mara National Reserve in Kenya. These conservancies are the latest in a series of attempts by residents to capture benefits and developmental assistance from the safari industry. Drawing upon 19-months of fieldwork, the thesis examines the contentious relationship between conservancies and development through a case study of Olare Motorogi and Naboisho Conservancies. The thesis analyses diverging interpretations of development between and within stakeholder groups active in the study site. Three key development indicators are identified: basic needs, economic implications and livelihood security. These indicators are used to assess how the conservancies are perceived to be impacting upon development, what motivating factors for involvement are, and whether this affects society evenly.

Findings suggest that conservancies and their affiliated organisations are now widely seen as the main development actors within the study site. This is largely through the creation of community projects, income-earning opportunities and grazing schemes. The involvement of conservancy-based tourism businesses in these development initiatives suggests that inclusive business models are being adopted. There is still a degree of discontent regarding conservancies, especially within neighbouring communities. Successful project outputs do not always result in successful outcomes. Without steps to ensure that these outcomes are realised, community projects may be more beneficial for tourism marketing than they are for neighbouring residents. Significant disparities also remain in income distribution, although economic benefits accruing from the conservancies are now distributed more evenly than they were in previous community-based tourism attempts in the Mara. The most emotive issue amongst local residents is access to essential resources for the dominant livelihood, pastoralism. During the research period, more comprehensive grazing schemes were introduced which simulate communal grazing systems. These practices would otherwise have been lost following land subdivision. Some pastoralists maintain that fines for grazing illegally continue to outweigh other benefits, although others assess that they are beginning to see that conservancies can have a positive impact on their livelihood.

Conservancy businesses adopting more inclusive strategies constitute a more conscious form of capitalism. Motivations for this centre around the importance of place, and incorporate an Africonsconsciousness. As such, the conservancies exemplify Africapitalism, a new concept within the broader inclusive business arena. To date, the effectiveness of inclusive capitalism as a development agent has been inconclusive due to insufficient data. This thesis begins to address this broad literature gap, and also expands research on Africapitalism to a new industry. Although a positive relationship with development is widely perceived within the study site, the sustainability of the conservancies is questioned in the face of multiple prevailing threats. These challenges can be recognised and mitigated against, but the future of the Maasai Mara Conservancies – and their ability to continue being development actors – remains uncertain.

Declaration

This is to certify that this thesis has been composed by myself from results of my own work, except where stated otherwise. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Clémentine', is centered on the page.

September 2015

Acknowledgements

This Ph.D. was made possible through an ESRC 1+3 studentship that funded university fees, fieldwork expenses and language training as well as a living allowance. I am also grateful to my two supervisors, Dr. Thomas Molony and Dr. Joost Fontein, as well as the wider Centre of African Studies department at the University of Edinburgh for their support and guidance. Dr. Kenneth Amaeshi in the Business School permitted me to attend his MBA course on Inclusive Business Strategies. This was a totally new area for me and his insights were particularly useful for looking at the bigger implications of my research that are deliberated in chapter eight.

Before the research period began I undertook Swahili and Maa language training. I would like to sincerely thank KIU School in Dar es Salaam and The Oltopesi Cultural Centre in Mashuuru, Kajiado. In particular, Paul Murero went to great pains to bring me up to a competent level in Maa grammar and language. He also showed great interest in my research and assisted in preparing me for the next stage.

I would like to thank the Government of Kenya and Narok County Council for giving me permission to conduct my research. The conservancies included in this research have been particularly supportive. It is a very encouraging environment within which to undertake research as findings and results are genuinely cared about and acted upon. This project would not have been possible without the support of all of the stakeholders in the Mara. Thank you for inviting me into your lives, for the countless cups of tea and the patience in answering my never-ending questions.

I would like to especially mention Dickson Kaelo who first introduced me to the conservancy concept back in 2007 and has since nurtured my interest. My two research assistants, Resian Letuluo and Lorna Serseri, were indispensable. Their patience, and the thoroughness of their work is greatly appreciated. These two young women are an inspiration to girls across the Mara. The Soit family of Olesere also deserve a special mention here. From the moment that Teriano introduced me to her father, Rusei Ole Soit, he has been a constant source of support and guidance. He has permitted me to live within their village for three years and I am eternally grateful. I cannot imagine a better place to have lived throughout this research process.

Although next time perhaps I'll build a house that does not flood, or the walls crumble, every time there is a storm. *Ayeiu najo ashe oleng pooki ng'ai te Mara, itonini to ltau lai.*

Lastly, but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for all of the encouragement and patience over the last five years during this journey. In the Mara, Helen and Roelof Schutte, Rob and Sarah O'Meara, Dominic Sakat, Anna Banyard and the late George Vaulkhard kept me sane, especially in times of doubt or frustration. In the UK, Mhairi Thomson, Sarah Marriott and Emma Horsfall have remained loyal friends, keeping me on the straight and narrow. Their visits out to Kenya are memories that will stay with me forever. My family have blessed me with unwavering support throughout my academic journey. They have had faith in my ability and have trusted me despite the inevitable concerns brought by their youngest daughter deciding to move to Kenya and live in a mud hut. My mum deserves additional praise for the countless hours that she has spent proof-reading multiple versions of this thesis.

At the very beginning of my research period I was lucky enough to meet Niels Mogensen. As well as quelling my parents' concern about me living alone, Niels has become my best friend and I cannot imagine going through this Ph.D. process without him by my side. He has celebrated my successes and pulled me through the trying times. Academically, our countless debates about how to balance conservation and development aspects have enriched my research, as well as my view of the Mara ecosystem more broadly. His steadfast commitment and devotion to the lions in the Mara is inspirational.

Table of Contents

Declaration	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Tables and Figures	viii
Acronyms.....	x
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Introducing the Topic.....	2
1.2 The Study Site	4
1.2.1 Population Dynamics	7
1.3 Methodology	10
1.3.1 Participant Observation.....	11
1.3.2 Focus Groups	13
1.3.3 Semi-structured Interviews and Informal Discussions	15
1.3.4 Visual Ethnography.....	16
1.3.5 Quantitative Surveys	19
1.3.6 Challenges and Limitations of Methods Used	21
1.3.7 Ethical Considerations	22
2 The Maasai Mara Conservancies.....	27
2.1 Creation of Mara Conservancies.....	27
2.1.1 Structure of Mara Conservancies	34
2.2 Conservancies Literature Framework	39
2.2.1 Conservancies as Neoliberal Conservation.....	39
2.2.2 Conservancies and Community Involvement	43
2.2.3 Conservancies and Livelihoods	45
2.2.4 Conservancies linking Conservation and Development	53
2.2.5 Conservancies as a Tourism Business.....	54
2.2.6 Conservancies as Africapitalism	64
2.2.7 Literature Framework Conclusion	65
2.3 Research Questions	65
2.4 Thesis Structure	66
2.5 Anticipated Contribution to Knowledge	68
3 Interpreting Development	71
3.1 Stakeholders' Perceptions of Development	74
3.1.1 Male Community Members.....	75
3.1.2 Male Community Leaders.....	75
3.1.3 Female Community Members	76
3.1.4 Relatively Educated Maasai Women	76
3.1.5 Conservancy Managers	77
3.1.6 Tourism Industry.....	77
3.1.7 NGOs and Researchers	79
3.1.8 Discussion: Stakeholders' Interpretations of Development	80
3.2 Development Indicators	81
4 Community Development Actors	83
4.1 The State	84
4.2 Religious Organisations.....	90

4.3	Communities.....	93
4.4	Conservancy Landowners	101
4.5	Other NGOs.....	104
4.6	Tourists	105
4.7	Conservancy-Affiliated Organisations.....	111
4.8	Discussion - Koiyaki Development Actor Matrix.....	122
5	Conservancy-Affiliated Organisations' Projects.....	129
5.1	Increasing Incomes	130
5.2	Infrastructure and Maintenance.....	134
5.3	Satisfying Needs.....	138
5.4	Implications: The Importance of Positive Outcomes	142
6	Pastoralism.....	145
6.1	Direct Affects of Conservancies on Pastoralism	149
6.1.1	Resource Access	149
6.1.2	Human-Wildlife Conflicts.....	163
6.2	Changes in Livestock Holdings	171
6.2.1	Number of Livestock.....	171
6.2.2	Livestock Holding Composition	182
6.2.3	Changing Breeds.....	183
6.3	Concluding Discussion: Weighing Up Perceptions on Pastoralism	186
7	Economic Implications	193
7.1	Conservancy Benefit Streams	195
7.1.1	Rental Income.....	195
7.1.2	Employment	208
7.2	Role of Women in Conservancies	212
7.3	Participation and Power	214
7.4	Economic Land Use Analysis	220
7.5	Concluding Thoughts – Economic Implications	226
8	Conscious Capitalism	229
8.1	Private Sector Development	230
8.1.1	Creating Shared Value	233
8.1.2	Africapitalism.....	236
8.1.3	Bottom of the Pyramid	238
8.1.4	Partnership Approach.....	240
8.1.5	Transparency and Accountability	245
8.2	Neoliberal Conservation	248
8.3	Relative Benefits of Business' Involvement in Development.....	252
8.4	The Sustainability of the Conservancies	257
8.4.1	Reduction in Tourist Numbers.....	258
8.4.2	Increasing Land Values	259
8.4.3	Land Use Change Around Conservancies	259
8.4.4	Decreasing Tolerance of Wildlife.....	260
8.4.5	Unsatisfied Community Members and Increasing Demands	261
8.4.6	Increasing Livestock Numbers	262
8.4.7	Unsupportive Policies	263
8.4.8	Lack of Financial Transparency	263
8.4.9	Political Hijacking.....	264
8.4.10	Population Growth	264

8.5	Concluding Discussion.....	265
9	Conclusion.....	267
9.1	Key Findings	267
9.1.1	Research Question One	268
9.1.2	Research Question Two.....	270
9.1.3	Research Question Three	279
9.2	Contribution to Knowledge.....	280
9.2.1	Academia	280
9.2.2	Business	281
9.2.3	Study Site.....	282
9.3	Concluding Thoughts	283
	Bibliography	285
	Appendix 1. Focus Groups (FG)	305
	Appendix 2. Interviewees (I)	306
	Appendix 3. Camera Participants (CP)	312

Tables and Figures

Table 2.1 Literature Framework for the Thesis.....	65
Table 3.1 Stakeholder Categories	72
Table 6.1 Livestock Holding Calculation Results.....	174
Table 6.2 Modified Livestock Holding Calculation Results.....	176
Table 7.1 Conservancy Lease Payments 2012-2013.....	197
Table 7.2 Comprehensive Annual Conservancy Land Use Values (\$)......	223
Table 9.1 Literature Framework for the Thesis.....	270
Figure 1.1 Location of the Maasai Mara within Maasailand.....	4
Figure 1.2 Conservancies within former group ranches in the south-west of Narok District.....	5
Figure 1.3 Location of the conservancies within the former group ranches.....	6
Figure 1.4 Location of the study site and my house within the former Koiyaki Group Ranch and neighbouring large settlements.....	6
Figure 1.5 Population dynamic of Koiyaki in 1967.....	7
Figure 1.6 Population dynamic of Koiyaki in 1974.....	7
Figure 1.7 Population dynamics of Koiyaki in 1983.....	8
Figure 1.8 Population dynamics of Koiyaki in 1999.....	8
Figure 1.9 Homesteads within the study site portion of Koiyaki in 2013.....	8
Figure 1.10 Maasai Iloshon	10
Figure 1.11 Kijoolu Soit (right) and two other ladies smearing my house.....	12
Figure 1.12 Villages where focus groups were held.....	14
Figure 1.13 Resian Letolou with FG 10 in Enooronkon.....	15
Figure 1.14 Resian teaching a camera participant how to use a camera.	17
Figure 1.15 Schools within and bordering the study site.....	18
Figure 1.16 Sitting with teachers and school children drawing their pictures in Mbitin.....	19
Figure 2.1 Tourism partners' camps within the study site.....	36
Figure 2.2 Official and non-official camps	37
Figure 2.3 Olare Motorogi Conservancy Structure.....	38
Figure 2.4 Naboisho Conservancy Structure.....	38
Figure 3.1 Use of Term 'maendeleo' in Narok.....	73
Figure 4.1 Household dam in Olkuroto (CP 19).....	96
Figure 4.2 Oil drum positioned to collect rainwater (CP 9).....	97
Figure 4.3 Household Water Tank (CP 3).....	97
Figure 4.4 Selima Kumum. Class 7 student at Endoinyo e Rinka School. Conservancy picture showing the environment, wildlife and tourists.....	117
Figure 4.5 Sarah Fimer, Class 6 Student at Endoinyo e Rinka School. Conservancy picture showing new school dormitories, built with support of OOMT.....	117
Figure 6.1 My Future Home by Sawmei Nawisais STD 1 Mbitin School.....	147
Figure 6.2 Newly constructed fence in Olesere.....	149

Figure 6.3 “The best thing about the conservancy - my cows grazing inside”.....	160
Figure 6.4 Circular Maasai Village Design.....	166
Figure 6.5 An acacia branch fence (CP 4).....	167
Figure 6.6 An enclosure made of local posts (CP 1).....	167
Figure 6.7 Cedar post enclosure (CP 1).....	167
Figure 6.8 Goat killed inside an enclosure (CP 4).....	168
Figure 6.9 Chain link fencing in Olkuroto supported by OOMT.....	168
Figure 6.10 A light bulb in the Turere Lion Lights System.....	168
Figure 6.11 Comparison of coverage areas for household census and the former Koiyaki Group Ranch.....	175
Figure 6.12 The temporal change in livestock holdings in Koiyaki.....	178
Figure 6.13 Changes in Shoaat Numbers in Koiyaki 1977-2011.....	181
Figure 6.14 Hybrid bull grazing inside <i>olokeri</i> area (CP 5).....	184
Figure 6.15 Ostriches in tall grass inside the reserve.....	187
Figure 6.16 Multi-species compositions Naboisho Conservancy.	187
Figure 7.1 Kijoolu Soit showing two of her daughters how to make an <i>enkarewa</i> necklace.....	212
Figure 7.2 Differential returns (\$/hectare/year) for agricultural, livestock and wildlife production concessions in the ASAL districts	220

Acronyms

AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
BCE	Basecamp Explorer
BCFK	Basecamp Foundation Kenya
BoP	Bottom (or base) of the Pyramid
CBC	Community-based Conservation
CBT	Community-based Tourism
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CMF	Christian Missionary Fellowship
CMMF	Community Managed Micro-finance
CP	Camera Participant
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSV	Creating Shared Value
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
FG	Focus Group
GIIRS	Global Impact Investing Rating System
I	Interview
IFI	International Financial Institutions
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
KCT	Kicheche Community Trust
KES	Kenyan Shillings
KGS	Koiyaki Guiding School
KLWT	Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust
KWCA	Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
KWT	Kenya Wildlife Trust
LandCO	Naboisho Conservancy's Landowner Committee
LU	Livestock Units
ManCO	Naboisho Conservancy's Management Committee
MLP	Mara Lion Project
MNLP	Mara Naboisho Lion Project – incorporated into MLP in 2013
MMNR	Maasai Mara National Reserve
MMWCA	Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservancies Association
MNC	Mara North Conservancy
NCDO	Nkoilale Community Development Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OBC	Ortelo Business Corporation
OMC	Olare Motorogi Conservancy – OOC and Motorogi combined
OOC	Olare Orok Conservancy
OOMT	Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust

PC	Personal Communication
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
RA	Reference Adult
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Policy
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
TPCO	Naboisho Conservancy's Tourism Partner Committee
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organisation

1 Introduction

The Maasai Mara is the heart of Kenya's safari tourism industry. Here the "big five" roam free, living as they have done for centuries together with Maasai pastoralists. The Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR) is a huge draw for tourists but as a result it is under great stress – a very different image to those portrayed in wildlife documentaries. Wildlife is harassed, the environment is being persistently degraded and local Maasai people, who bear the brunt of conservation efforts, often do not see any of the profit. As one Maasai elder in focus group 22 in Mpuuai village explained:

We live with the wildlife and put up with the problems that they bring when they attack our cows. We have always lived with the wildlife but we are getting tired. The white people come to see the lions and pay a lot of money but what have we been given? Nothing. And the lions come on the land that we own. For us to continue accepting this we need to get some of the benefits that these white people bring; we need to start eating [getting some of the money]. We want this for us to continue and for development. If that doesn't happen, we do not want this conservation thing, we do not want the predators, we do not want the tourists driving over our land; we will not want any of it. We will see what these conservancies bring us and then we will decide what to do.

The community land bordering the MMNR is essential for wildlife dispersal (Reid et al., 2003). When it was subdivided as part of the national plan to individualise all land in Kenya, an opportunity arose to develop conservation areas through public-private partnerships between Maasai landowners and tour operators. The resultant conservancies - which aim to combine conservation, tourism and development goals - have increased in popularity over the last ten years and now cover 61% of the former Koiyaki Group Ranch (Bedelian, 2014). On a larger scale, there are now over 140 conservancies in Kenya (I 104).¹ Despite this proliferation, there is a lack of in-depth empirical assessments of such interventions, either for conservation or development outcomes (Hughes and Flintan, 2001; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Wilkie et al., 2006; Barrett et al., 2011; Ferraro, 2011).

This thesis examines perceptions of the relationship between conservancies and development in the Maasai Mara. To begin, this chapter will briefly introduce the topic and study site, detail the methodologies used. The following chapter will then detail the creation story of the conservancies in the Mara as well as their structure.

¹ This refers to interview number 104. The coding system will be explained in the methods section.

This chapter will then develop a literature framework for the thesis by examining the different components that make up the conservancy concept in this case study.

1.1 Introducing the Topic

The topic for this thesis was inspired by Duffy's (2002) book *A Trip Too Far*. I disagreed with her conclusion that tourism could not contribute to sustainable development because tourism is a capitalist industry. Simultaneously, calls for understanding development impacts from the grassroots level are increasing (Telfer, 2002, Le et al., 2012). In the context of the Maasai Mara, Duffy's simplistic and theoretical conclusion made me want to ask people directly affected by conservancies what their opinions are.

The focus of this thesis is to examine grassroots perceptions of development in order to explore what development means to the various stakeholders² active within the study site. This is essential to then assess the impact that conservancies are perceived to be having. The thoughts of multiple stakeholders were sought so that a broad base of opinions could be gauged. This includes tourism partners,³ camp managers, conservancy managers, community members (including community leaders, men, women and youth), NGOs and researchers.

Stakeholder theory illustrates that all stakeholders have intrinsic value and that the rights of one stakeholder must not be overwhelmed by the rights of others (Fennell and Weaver, 2005: 386). Whilst theoretically sound, this theory was not used for this research because of the sheer number of different stakeholders involved who all have vastly different objectives and values to their counterparts (as discussed by Robson and Robson, 1996). The use of stakeholder theory, which demands the inclusion of all, would have resulted in extensive networks that would have been unmanageable and thus it would have been more of a constraint than a catalyst (Fennell and Weaver, 2005: 386-7). Despite this, as noted above, multiple stakeholder groupings

² A stakeholder is defined as "any group or individual who can affect or who is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives" (Freeman, 1984: 25).

³ Tourism partners are the operators who are members of the conservancies and run camps within the conservancies. When referring to people, this term is used for camp owners or the country directors of companies that own these camps.

were engaged in this research. Theories that have influenced this research include political ecology and anthropology of development.

I chose to focus my study on conservancies because they are rapidly increasing in popularity across Kenya, but despite their widely advertised community-based approach and development role, these claims are to-date unsubstantiated. The Mara in particular was selected because it is a world-famous tourism destination. East African safaris draw in tourists through marketing permeated with a sense of encountering “nature in the raw”, particularly through emotive pictures of animals in their natural habitats (Norton, 1996; Bryman, 2004: 46-7). The Mara in particular has been the focus of the West’s fascination since the early part of the 20th Century, reinforced by Hollywood feature films like *Out of Africa*, nature documentaries such as BBC’s *Big Cat Diaries* and Disney films (ibid). Whilst such media can result in the disneyfication of African wildlife (see Beardsworth and Bryman, 2001; Rogers, 2012), it is undeniably a big pull for tourists.

Despite its economic importance nationally, tourism in the Mara ecosystem has received extensive criticism regarding its environmental impact and inequitable benefit distribution to local communities⁴ (Roe et al., 1997; Honey, 2008). Through a combination of local demands for direct benefits from tourism, operators’ desire to develop a different product in the area and conservationists⁵ vying to “save” part of the famous Mara-Serengeti ecosystem, conservancies have emerged. Conservancies in Kenya adopt various forms and structures, as will be discussed in chapter two. In the Maasai Mara the conservancies are formed through public-private partnerships whereby Maasai landowners collectively lease their land to tourism partners. This partnership has multiple aims. These include increasing and improving conservation, developing a higher quality tourism product and ensuring that benefits are returned directly to Maasai communities. Despite these admiral goals, the extent to which

⁴ The heterogeneity and complexity of “communities” is acknowledged, as well as difficulties in defining “local” (as discussed by Naguran, 1999). These issues will be discussed further in chapter three.

⁵ Here the term “conservationists” refers to the collective whose focus is on conservation. Whilst this may include some tourism professionals, not all gain economic benefits from conservation. The conservationists affiliated with the Mara are predominantly white Kenyans and expatriate males either in late twenties-early thirties or over sixty, but this is not exclusive.

conservancies influence development, in the opinion of those directly affected, is yet to be determined.

The conservancies represent a capitalist industry, but they are an example of businesses trying to undertake a more conscious and sustainable approach. As chapter 8 will discuss, the term Africapitalism is now being used for such attempts. In the broader sense, whilst this thesis examines grassroots perceptions of development, and the impact of conservancies upon this, it is simultaneously assessing grassroots perceptions of sustainable Africapitalism – hence the title of this thesis.

1.2 The Study Site

The conservancies and communities that make up the case study for this thesis are located within Maasailand. This area covers south-western Kenya and northern Tanzania and is where the Maasai people largely reside (see figure 1.1).⁶ More specifically, the study site is within the Maasai Mara ecosystem, Narok-West County, Kenya. Counties replaced districts following the devolution set out in Kenya's 2010 constitution.

From the 1970s until the 2000s, Narok District was subdivided into group ranches. Figure 1.2 shows the location of these group ranches (black borders) in the south-west of Narok District. The conservancies that form the study site for this research are within the former Koiyaki Group Ranch, which borders the Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR).



Figure 1.1. Location of the Maasai Mara within Maasailand (red shading)

⁶ Unless otherwise stated, all maps are made from Google Earth or ArcGIS by the author.




Figure 1.2 Conservancies within Former group ranches in the south-west of Narok District

In 2011-2013, when the research was undertaken, there were eight conservancies functioning in the former Olchorro Oirouwa, Lemek, Olkinyei and Koiyaki Group Ranches (see figure 1.3). Together these conservancies comprise over 90,000ha, which is over 60% of the area within the Maasai Mara National Reserve. During this time, another conservancy in the former Siana Group Ranch was under initiation.



Figure 1.3 Location of the conservancies within the former group ranches

More specifically, the study site (shaded yellow in figure 1.4) comprises Olare Orok, Motorogi and Naboisho Conservancies and their surrounding homesteads. This totals 542km². For the research period I lived in Olesere village. My house and nearby larger settlements are also located on figure 1.4.




Figure 1.4 Location of the study site (yellow shading), large settlements and my house (red house symbol) within the former Koiyaki Group Ranch.

The area around the north eastern tip of Naboisho Conservancy, to the east of my house in Olesere, was not included within the study site. This is for topographical reasons as it is the location of the Pardamat Hills, where access is very difficult and few people live. The border of the study site skims the western lower slopes of these hills. To the east of the Pardamat Hills there are more villages, including Enchorro Sidan and Ilkarkar, but these were deemed to be beyond the desired study area. Aside from this range of hills, the remainder of the study site is relatively flat savannah made up of a mosaic of grasslands spotted with acacia trees and bushes, especially along river courses. The area to the north of Motorogi Conservancy was also not included within the study site because residents in this area are mainly affiliated with Mara North Conservancy (MNC). Initially it was hoped that the research could cover the whole of Koiyaki Group Ranch. However, early into the research period it was decided to exclude Mara North Conservancy and its neighbouring communities so as to concentrate on a deeper, more thorough analysis around Olare Orok, Motorogi and Naboisho Conservancies.

1.2.1 Population Dynamics

The population dynamics of the study site have changed rapidly and significantly over time. Lamprey and Reid (2004: 1009-10) mapped out this change in and around Koiyaki Group Ranch. Their maps from 1967 (figure 1.5), 1974 (figure 1.6), 1983 (figure 1.7), and 1999 (figure 1.8) show this growth. The black dots represent homesteads and white dots temporary livestock camps.




Figure 1.5. Population dynamic of Koiyaki in 1967




Figure 1.6. Population dynamic of Koiyaki in 1974




Figure 1.7. Population dynamics of Koiyaki in 1983




Figure 1.8. Population dynamics of Koiyaki in 1999

From 1999 the population has continued to boom, with an estimated annual growth rate of 4.4% (Lamprey and Reid, 2004). The quantity of homesteads is increasing at a rate even higher than population growth due to the splitting up of settlements following land individualisation and in-migration. Bedelian (2014: 212) reports a 37.9% increase in homesteads in Koiyaki in the five years between 2006 and 2011.

Figure 1.9 shows the 228 homesteads mapped as part of the homestead census undertaken as part of this thesis⁷ in 2013. The continued proliferation of homesteads is clearly visible.




Figure 1.9 Homesteads within the study site portion of Koiyaki in 2013

The location of homesteads has also changed. Comparing figure 1.8 with 1.9 shows that some villages have relocated following the creation of the conservancies, especially those that were previously located inside Olare Orok. Habitation is restricted within conservancy regulations.

Residents within the study site are predominantly Maasai. Few ethnic groups have attracted as much attention as the Maasai. Yet although anthropologists have written volumes about the Maasai, they have failed to puncture the image created by more romantically inclined observers (Adams and McShane, 1992: 41). In his book “Through Masai⁸ Land” published in 1885, Thomson described his first encounter:

We soon set our eyes upon the dreaded warriors that had so long been the subject of my waking dreams, and I could not but involuntarily exclaim, ‘what splendid fellows!’ as I surveyed a band of the most peculiar race of men to be found in Africa (Thomson, 1885: 160).

The Maasai are a pastoral people and as such, livestock form the basis of their economic livelihood as well as being a critical element in ethnic self-definition

⁷ This will be detailed further shortly in the methods section.

⁸ Some write Maasai with just a single a, especially when referring to the national reserve. Grammatically, it should have double “aa”.

(Mwangi, 2006: 159). Over time, under trying times such as drought or disease, some Maasai periodically fell out of the pastoral enterprise (Waller, 2000). However, as soon as possible these individuals rebuilt their herds and switched back to the pastoral mode (ibid). Over the last few decades the Maasai have increasingly become confronted with formal markets, state intervention, immigrants, land pressures, and an engagement in agriculture, trade and formal employment (Mwangi, 2006: 159). In the face of these pressures, the Maasai appear to be adapting and diversifying as far and as fast as the economic, ecological and political environment will allow (Western, 2009: viii). Despite this, “being people of cattle” is still core to their self-identification (Mwangi, 2006: 159). As will be examined in chapters two and six, there are conflicting and contrasting interpretations of the environmental and economic implications of pastoralism.⁹

In terms of structure, the Maasai are divided into 12 sections or sub-tribes (see figure 1.10). The Maa term for these sections is *iloshon* in plural or *olosho* in singular. Each section occupies a specified territory (ibid). The study site is part of the “*Olosho loo lpurko*”, or the “Purko Maasai area”. The structure of Maasai society is based on these sections as each has its own autonomous political structure based on an age-grade system (ibid). Traditionally, power and influence were acquired through membership in age sets (ibid: 162), but wealth and education are increasingly becoming determining factors.

⁹ Pastoralism refers to the “extensive production of herbivorous livestock using pasture or browse in which herd mobility is a central management strategy” (Notenbaert et al., 2012) but many definitions are broader. This will be discussed more at the beginning of chapter six. In this thesis, the livestock keeping practices by residents within the study site are referred to as pastoralism.

primary data but secondary and tertiary data was also used to a minor extent. Secondary data was used to analyse how livestock numbers within the study site have changed over time, and tertiary to develop the literature framework for the study in chapter two. A major strength of conducting primary research is that the researcher has control over the collection process and thus is able to ensure the quality and appropriateness of the data (ibid). A variety of primary methods were used throughout the 19-month research period from September 2011 to March 2013, the majority of which were qualitative. To support this, quantitative surveys were used to establish rudimentary baseline data across the study site and to collect household and financial information. Qualitative techniques were favoured because of their in-depth nature (Bryman, 2004). The broad approach to this research was ethnographic, but within this, multiple data collection methods were utilised. For all methods used, access was gained to as wide a range of individuals who were relevant to the research as possible (as discussed by Bryman, 2004: 414). This enabled many different perspectives to be incorporated.

1.3.1 Participant Observation

Within participant observation there are multiple classifications. As I built a Maasai house, lived within a homestead and actively participated within communities in the study site, I would advocate that I fell into Gold's (1958) participant-as-observer category. I chose to undertake participant observation in this way so that I could be immersed within a community under investigation, rather than just visiting during the day. By doing this I was able to witness aspects of daily life that would otherwise have been missed, and I could take advantage of unexpected interview opportunities that availed themselves in my home-life. In addition to living in a homestead (which was home to one man, his three wives and their 18 children), the house building process was a useful way to integrate myself into the community. A dozen ladies helped by collecting wood and water, and by smearing the walls. One of these ladies, Kijoolu Soit, continued to help around the house throughout the research period, washing clothes and re-smearing the house when necessary (see figure 1.11). Her friendship provided a vital route through which the roles, responsibilities and challenges facing Maasai women could be discussed. Further, her companionship

opened the door for interesting in-depth informal conversations with her friends and family.



Figure 1.11 Kijoolu Soit (right) and two other ladies smearing my house.
Photo: C. Courtney

Nine months of language training in Swahili and Maa were undertaken prior to the research period. This was essential for participant observation and informal discussions. Two female research assistants were used during the fieldwork period: Resian Letuluo from March 2012 to June 2012 and Lorna Serseri from October 2012 to February 2013. Whilst Resian and Lorna assisted with formal data collection undertaken in Maa, the language training enabled a much deeper societal integration. Many vital snippets of information were gathered from informal conversations whilst giving people lifts, shopping or just sitting having a cup of tea. A grasp of the language also meant that I could understand interesting little comments made during focus groups. One such instance was when women whispered to each other that I know them too well and so they need to be careful what they say to me. This will be discussed in section 4.7.

Participant observations were not restricted to community settings. During the research period I also participated in several meetings, presentations and conferences of varying scales where observations were also made. Focus groups, semi-structured interviews, visual ethnography and three quantitative surveys were also undertaken.

1.3.2 Focus Groups

The focus group method is a beneficial way to gather a substantial amount of data about an area of interest (Cameron, 2005). Sometimes the power of the focus group comes with the interactions between participants who talk to each other, build consensus, or debate views because this adds richness to the data (ibid). Another reason why focus groups were chosen as one of the key methods for this study is that it worked well in Koiyaki during my previous research (Courtney, 2009).

In total 29 focus groups were held with community members in and around 11 villages in the study site (located on figure 2.12). Focus group respondents were not selected, convenience sampling was used (Bryman, 2004). Other than gender differentiation, the invitation was open and word was spread widely. Although a group of 10-15 was optimal, no-one was ever turned away from these sessions and FG 19 had 40 attendees. These sessions were used to discuss issues regarding development, the conservancies, and more specifically the role of the conservancies in development. Throughout the thesis references to specific focus groups are cited as FG followed by the session number(s). Details for each focus group can be found in appendix 1. In the majority of instances, the names of those focus group participants who made statements were not known. The group is referenced collectively rather than citing a specific individual's name.

women, discussions automatically ceased until they were sent on their way by the women. In total, 301 adults attended one of 29 outdoor focus group sessions, such as that in figure 1.13. Details for each session can be found in appendix 1. With permission gained from the participants, all focus group discussions were recorded via dictaphone and later transcribed in English. Key points and interesting phraseology were also noted in the original language, Maa.



Figure 1.13. Resian Letolou with FG 10 in Enooronkon. Photo: C. Courtney

1.3.3 Semi-structured Interviews and Informal Discussions

Interviews and informal discussions were used to engage in more specific and (usually) individual conversations with key informants. This enabled a depth of inquiry unattainable through observational methods (Russel and Harshbarger, 2003). Semi-structured interviews allow open and closed-lines of questioning, where discussions can diverge from specific inquiries and new questions can be added (Creswell, 2009). Individuals selected for interview were those who were knowledgeable in the specific area under investigation, for example head teachers, camp managers, community leaders. Snowball sampling was used to identify more interviewees throughout the research process. In comparison, informal discussions were often unplanned opportunities with individuals who mentioned something noteworthy for my research. Whilst formal permissions to quote comments were not made during these informal discussions, largely due to their informal nature as they may have taken place in passing, all participants were fully aware of that I was a

researcher, and what I was studying. If comments made were at all private or controversial, they have been made anonymous.

In total 105 interviews or discussions were held, ranging from brief conversations to five-hour marathons. Each semi-structured interview had its own unique pre-determined discussion points, although relevant tangents were welcomed. These sessions were normally recorded with a dictaphone and then transcribed in English word for word. Each interviewee was asked whether they were happy or not for the interview to be recorded, in the vast majority of instances this was approved. For informal discussions, interesting comments were noted by hand, either at the time or immediately after the discussion and typed up as soon as possible.

Interview/discussion sessions are coded using the letter 'I' followed by a number, for example (I 54). Within this thesis some interviewees are cited often, whilst others may not be mentioned at all. This reflects their varying degrees of relevance and expertise rather than ingrained bias. As names can be given for interviewees, but focus groups with Maasai residents are cited collectively, this may give the erroneous impression that the research favours these voices – many of which are white. Details for each interview/discussion can be found in appendix 2.

1.3.4 Visual Ethnography

Two innovative forms of visual ethnography were also trialled in this research. The first involved volunteers receiving brief training on using a basic digital camera (figure 1.14). These 23 individuals then took photographs relating to development, the conservancies, and how these issues affect their daily life. After 4-6 weeks I returned to collect the cameras and selected 20-25 of their images to discuss with them. Information or images from camera participants is coded CP followed by their number, for example (CP 6). Details of each camera participant can be found in appendix 3.



Figure 1.14. Resian Letoluo teaching a camera participant how to use a camera. Photo: C. Courtney

This method was chosen so as to deconstruct educational barriers and draw in shy participants. It succeeded in these aspects and also proved to be a great ice-breaker and enabled more detailed, private one-on-one discussions. In particular, female camera participants became much more confident and comfortable by participating in this project, which enabled a deeper probing into more delicate areas not discussed in focus groups. This included household finances, relationships, domestic violence, female circumcision, female health issues and contraception. Images resulting from this project are also used to visually demonstrate points made within this thesis. Participants in this camera project were volunteers from focus groups. Priority was given to those volunteers who were less vocal during the group sessions.

Visual ethnography can be used in a variety of settings for a variety of purposes (Pink, 2013). Uses to date include documenting the experiences of children living in Kenyan orphanages (Johnson, 2011), exploring perceptions of women's health in Canada (Wang, 1999) and the conditions, struggles and strengths of homeless people in Michigan (Wang et al., 2000). This method, which is also sometimes called photovoice, has previously been used to analyse interpretations of terms and concepts, such as mental illness (Fleming et al., 2009). However, it is not known to have been used to explore how development is interpreted, prior to this research.

The second visual ethnographic method was the creation and analysis of drawings by school children. In addition to interviewing the head or deputy head teacher at all nine schools within and bordering the study site (see figure 1.15), discussions were held with children at some of these schools.




Figure 1.15. Schools within and bordering the study site

These group sessions were usually made up of a boy and girl from each year at the school, selected by their class teachers. During the first trial discussion session, answers were hard to draw out because participants were too shy to speak openly, even in Maa. Subsequently, a participatory approach was taken. The children were asked to produce two drawings. The first was anything relating to the conservancies and the second was an image of what they would like their life to be like when they are older, detailing their house, job, family and possessions. Once the pictures were drawn (see figure 1.16.), I then discussed these with each person in the group. These discussions were a lot more forthcoming than the initial more formal attempts. Some of these images are used to support the discussion in chapters four and six.



Figure 1.16. Sitting with teachers and school children drawing their pictures in Mbitin. Photo: L. Serseri

For the analysis of the qualitative data, findings were translated (if necessary) and transcribed. Coding helped to reveal patterns and themes in the qualitative data (Creswell, 2009) which then formed the thesis and chapter structures. As Wolcott (1990: 35 cited in Silverman, 2006: 88) notes: “The critical task in qualitative research is not to accumulate all the data you can but to ‘can’ [get rid of] most of the data you accumulate”. It was essential to focus the extensive quantity of notes collected during this research project as they exceeded one million words. Coding software was considered but I decided to code the information manually as reading through all of my notes helped me to organise my thesis in my head and remind myself of the key information to include.

1.3.5 Quantitative Surveys

Three quantitative surveys were undertaken to support the qualitative findings. Having recognised that there was a lack of up-to-date rudimentary information on households within the study site, a census-like survey was arranged. This survey mapped 228 households within the study site (see figure 1.9) and asked basic information at each regarding inhabitants, livestock, type of structures and land ownership. The survey was undertaken by Dominic Sakat, assistant to the Mara-Naboisho Lion Project (MNLP) and was funded jointly by MNLP, Dig Deep UK, Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust (OOMT) and myself.

The second survey was a financial questionnaire sent to all parties who have put money into the study site as a result of the conservancies' presence. The purpose of this was to provide data to enable the calculation of more comprehensive economic land use values for comparison (see chapter seven). This survey was distributed to all camps, conservancy managers and NGOs active in the area. Contributors were asked specific questions regarding money entering the area including: land rental payments; wages; tips and donations; funding for community projects resulting from the conservancies, camps or conservancy tourists; locally sourced produce; and village visits by tourists. Information from this financial questionnaire is referenced by FQ followed by the name of the company/organisation.

Thirdly, during a short period of consultancy work for Basecamp Foundation Kenya (BCFK) in August-September 2012, a baseline survey of their community-managed microfinance (CMMF) project was undertaken. Raphael Kereto and Dominic Sakat collected the data which I analysed and presented in a report (Courtney, 2012). 79 women were included in this study, which assessed the characteristics of group members, current living standards, household finances, access to financial services, the role of women in society and development aspirations. Although the point of a baseline survey is to have a foundation from which to assess the impact of the project in the future, this survey provided informative data on living standards amongst women. Further, since women in both newly formed groups and groups that were over six months old were included in the survey, comparative analysis was possible to assess early indications of project impact.

The data from these three quantitative studies was analysed in excel where totals were calculated, differences were compared and interesting findings were identified. The analyses from these studies are presented and referred to throughout the thesis.

Multiple approaches were used to collect a vast amount of information for the purposes of this thesis. The rich complementary data generated facilitates a more complete analysis as employing different data collection tools allows for thorough triangulation to identify consistent themes. For example, overlapping results between focus groups and interviews grant further validity to the findings (Bernard, 2006). It also greatly increased participation in this research. The participatory techniques

were devised to be inclusive and particular attention was paid to ensure the representation of the less vocal (as discussed by Simpson, 2009: 203). It was considered especially important to include women, youth, the old, the young and the illiterate as perceptions from these strata of society are often not included, especially in shorter studies where researchers just rush between the most vocal male community leaders. As the study is focused on gathering grassroots perceptions, this must represent multiple stakeholders within the study site. The length of the fieldwork assisted in ensuring that the reach of this research extended beyond the dominant community elite. In other words, the combination of the methods used were highly effective in engaging the community members which helped me to embrace the complexity, recognise the multiple realities, and identify the main concerns and priorities within the communities. As with any period of research, there were aspects that worked out better than expected as well as challenges.

1.3.6 Challenges and Limitations of Methods Used

Often one of the most difficult components of qualitative, especially ethnographic, research can be gaining access to the relevant social setting (Bryman, 2004).

Although the study site conforms to what Hammersey and Atkinson (1995) would label a closed or non-public setting, this was not an issue within this research.

Having undertaken research in the area twice before, both gatekeepers and community members were very welcoming and happy to participate. I believe this was cemented by living with a well-respected family.

In line with Staddon (2014), from previous experience I was aware that there would be a certain amount of expectation that members would be directly rewarded for their participation in the research, like attending focus groups. At the beginning of each meeting I explained that I am a student carrying out research and I would like to listen to their thoughts. When questioned about what impact this could have, it was made clear that this cannot be assured, but that the research will be disseminated to all conservancy personnel and county officials. Following this introduction, no one ever left through dissatisfaction with a lack of compensation for participation.

Women especially were very happy to be included in the research. Nasuju Naurori (CP 12) and Faith Kereto (CP 9) specifically said that they were very pleased that

women were being given a voice. Faith explained at the end of FG 9: “researchers who have come before have only listened to the men.”

One minor issue encountered during discussions of development was in translation as there is no word for “development” in Maa. This challenge that was encountered, and how it was overcome, is elaborated upon in section 3.1 where the term is discussed in more detail.

The main methodological challenges were brought by the quantitative surveys rather than the qualitative research that formed the backbone of the data collection. Other people undertook the homestead census and CMMF baseline surveys. I suffered an accident, and I had to return to the UK for an operation, which meant that I was unable to conduct the CMMF survey personally. The homestead census survey would have been too time-consuming to undertake myself. This meant that I could not personally validate the data and I felt as though I missed some of the nuances that I would have picked up by conducting these surveys first-hand. While I thought that it would be relatively simple, the finance questionnaire also turned out to be a real challenge. Some participants responded immediately with their figures whereas for others it took 16 months of frustrating follow up communication to secure this information from their offices.

1.3.7 Ethical Considerations

As with all research there are ethical considerations, but these are eased by an overt or open approach (Bryman, 2004). I did not hide the fact that I was a researcher. It was acknowledged that research participants have the inherent right to privacy, respect, and self-determination (as discussed by Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). One of the main ethical issues in ethnography occurs when the research is printed. Once the information is in the public domain researchers have limited control over its use (ibid). Throughout this research the privacy of participants was protected at all times and participants were asked whether they would like to remain anonymous within the write-up. If this was requested, or if it was anticipated that any quote might have repercussions for the participant, their reference was made anonymous and written as (anon). The number after this, for example (anon 2), is used to differentiate between different anonymous sources.

Consideration is needed for the ethical dimensions of a researcher claiming to speak for others, particularly if they are from the global south (Kapoor, 2004). I have always been very conscious of this, and I have tried to present opinions in the same context in which they were expressed, however it is recognised that accounts from any other person will only ever be partial. My research assistants greatly helped in ensuring that quotes were given as accurately as possible. Reflexivity and interpretation in cross-cultural research is essential (Twyman et al., 1999). Reflexivity requires that anthropologists set themselves apart from fellow citizens and create a discontinuity between their accounts of the citizens and accounts of themselves (Gomm, 2008). One way in which ethnographic researchers must be reflexive is to continually reassess their positionality. This refers to the researcher's relation to the research subjects. Griffith (1998: 361) explains:

Where the researcher enters the research site as an Insider – someone whose biography (gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and so on) gives her a lived familiarity with the group being researched – that tacit knowledge informs her research producing a different knowledge to that available to the Outsider – a researcher who does not have an intimate knowledge of the group being researched prior to their entry into the group.

Issues of positionality are not limited to myself, they also apply to the research assistants. Whilst the two women who were chosen to assist with this research project are Maasai, they do not originate from within the study site. This was an intentional decision so that they would not be as affected by local politics, or especially drawn to – or influenced by – local leaders. It is acknowledged, however, that each assistant has her own specific positionality that will have unavoidably influenced the data that was collected as well as how this was interpreted and analysed.

Insider-outsider positions are not clearly delineated; it is more common to conceptualise these terms as two endpoints on a continuum of power, knowledge and self-understanding that shifts over time (Olson, 1977; Merriam et al., 2001; Rabe, 2003). It is especially common for researchers who conduct participant observation for a long period of time to move from an outsider towards more of an insider position (Rabe, 2003). Further, Labaree (2002) and Groves (2003) suggest that a

researcher can be simultaneously both an insider and an outsider, depending upon the context.

Within this research project I continually reassessed my status in each context. While my initial positionality was undoubtedly that of an outsider, these lines blurred throughout the research period and differed between stakeholders. Different aspects of my biography enabled me to relate to different people. Being female and working with female research assistants enabled me to relate to women in the focus groups, camera project and the community more generally through participant observation. As Faith Kereto said in FG 9:

We find it a lot easier talking to other women about these things, it means that we can speak freely and be honest. We appreciate that it is a woman coming to ask women about these things.

Similarly, being educated facilitated discussions with school children, young people and others who believe in the importance of education. For example, the homestead that I lived in was that of a friend I had made during my Masters' research who is pursuing a university education. Her father's pioneering commitment to educating his daughters meant that he was very happy to assist my research in any way that he could. Despite having no experience in the tourism industry, I achieved the greatest insider status with conservancy and camp employees. This was largely due to our having similar backgrounds and interests, the majority being educated, white and originating from Europe, Kenya or South Africa. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, my positionality was much more of an outsider with male community members, especially elders.

As discussed by Russell (1995), I found that the group under study decided the knowledge that was made available to me, depending on the insider-outsider status. For example, camp and conservancy employees would often mention interesting things to me in passing, blurring the line between friend and researcher. My latter role was often forgotten, despite the overt approach. In other instances, access was also granted because of my outsider status. Given that the communities I was working with had limited opportunities to sit down and talk to white people, especially women, it often felt as though I was being studied at the same time as I was asking questions. Merriam et al. (2001: 410) had a similar experience whereby

she was a curiosity for those whom she was studying, which facilitated access. This outsidership also allowed me to hide behind a cloak of ignorance regarding appropriate norms (as discussed by Spiegel and Mehlwana, 1997) and probe issues that an insider might have been too afraid to broach.

All positionings have “distinct assets and liabilities” (Merton, 1972: 33). No position is privileged to see the ‘real’ truth as “social experience and its perception are continuously ‘created’ by the social actors” (Cerroni-Long, 1994: 135). My positionality throughout this research was continually shifting depending upon context and time, and spanned much of the spectrum from insider to outsider. Instead of focusing on the difficulties of this, I tried to assess and exploit the benefits of my positionality in each situation.

2 The Maasai Mara Conservancies

This chapter introduces the conservancy concept and details the creation and structures of the conservancies under investigation. In order to create a framework for this thesis, it will then go on to examine literature pertaining to the key components within the conservancy concept in the Mara. This includes: neoliberal conservation, community involvement, livelihoods, linking conservation and development, and the tourism business. The potential association between conservancies and Africapitalism will also be introduced. Following this, the research questions, structure and contribution to knowledge for this thesis will be outlined.

2.1 Creation of Mara Conservancies

Following the successes of conservancies in Namibia and other Southern African countries, Kenya has adopted and adapted this conservation model. A conservancy can be defined as a “common property resource institution” (Hoole and Berkes, 2010), whereby individual landowners or communal members pool properties to create a singular trust where benefits from wildlife and tourism development are shared by participants (Sorlie, 2008). Conservancies in Kenya have a variety of participant structures. The conservancies in the Mara are examples of individual landowners with freehold tenure leasing their land collectively. Naibunga and West Gate Community Conservancies within the Northern Rangelands Trust exemplify conservancies on communal land. In addition, some Kenyan conservancies, such as Ol Pejeta and Laikipia, are on large swathes of private land owned by one or few (often white) individuals.

As previously noted, in the Maasai Mara, the emergence of conservancies was the result of the combination of local demands for direct benefits from conservation and tourism, operators’ desire to develop a high-quality tourism product and conservationists vying to “save” part of the famous Mara-Serengeti ecosystem. They are the latest attempt at a community-based conservation and tourism enterprise in the Koiyaki region. During group ranch land tenure wildlife trusts were formed, however, they lacked the capacity and structures for equitable benefit sharing which hampered their success and ultimately resulted in their demise (Thompson and

Homewood, 2002; Kaelo, 2009; Thompson et al., 2009). In terms of land tenure, it is now widely accepted that group ranches failed to meet their objectives (Mwangi, 2006). After much optimism, funds were withdrawn in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s calls were heard for their subdivision (Rutten, 1992: 79). Unlike previous changes in land tenure, the pressure to subdivide the group ranches largely emerged from within the Maasai communities themselves (Rutten, 1992; Mwangi, 2007). In the study site subdivision did not begin until after the new millennium and was completed in 2009.

The principle of subdivision was that all members should get an equal share of land close to where they live (Mwangi, 2007; Kaigil, 2009). Contrary to members' expectations, subdivision did not result in equal parcels (ibid). Corruption in the subdivision process favoured local elites, and enabled the wealthy to buy large areas cheaply (Rutten, 1992). Many prominent individuals, or those financially able, manipulated the process by allocating to themselves extra-large or multiple parcels, or by having their wives or children under 18 allocated plots and/or secured favoured locations (Galaty, 1999; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Lamprey and Reid, 2004; Mwangi, 2007; Honey, 2008; Bedelian, 2012). Data from livestock surveys reveal that there was a reduction in mean livestock holdings per household between 1998-2000 and 2004 (Thompson et al., 2009: 96-7). This would correspond with a reported spate of livestock sales prior to land privatisation in order to buy influence over the land allocation process or to pre-negotiate land redistribution between households – a process said to be dominated by the wealthier households (ibid).

Similarly, at an inter-ethnic scale, Western (2009: vii) suggests: "Kenya's solution of granting individual land titles to customary owners militates against pastoral communities in a free market economy where wealthier ethnic groups can secure loans to buy land from poorer ones". The introduction of a cash society and individual title deeds was a new notion for the Maasai, many of whom did not fully understand some concepts. Despite many issues within the land subdivision process, the elite may have benefited proportionally more, by continuing to financially drain the communal group ranch system if the land tenure had not changed. Further, these

transitional problems should not negate any benefits made possible by land individualisation.

The rapid transformation of land tenure into small parcels, each with an individual title deed, has been a major and fundamental change throughout the Mara area and is having major impacts on both land use and land values (Thompson et al., 2002; Thompson, 2002; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Homewood et al., 2004; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008). All wildlife in Kenya is owned by the state (Norton-Griffiths, 1996). Land is one of the few assets owned by local communities that can be used to negotiate favourable partnerships with tourism operators. This is why the nature of land tenure is so critical for this study. The structure of the conservancies within the study site is only possible because of the individualisation of land.

Those who had previously benefited from the wildlife associations, including the Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust (KLWT), initiated the process of conservancy development in the Mara (I 48). They were looking for an alternative way to benefit from conservation and tourism once they became landowners (ibid). To Norton-Griffiths et al. (2008: 411), conservancies offer an opportunity to strengthen the commercial relationship between the suppliers of wildlife on the one hand, and the suppliers of clients to view wildlife on the other. More specifically, conservancies have multiple objectives. According to Sorlie (2008), Thompson et al. (2009), and Hoole and Berkes (2010) these include:

- increasing conservation by protecting wildlife habitat and biodiversity outside of the MMNR;
- improving the quality of tourism experiences by securing exclusive high-quality habitat for top-end camps;
- securing land from onward sales to elite or non-Maasai;
- bringing Maasai landowners into partnership agreements, and;
- giving benefits of tourism directly back to the individual landowners and communities so as to diversify livelihoods and reduce poverty

Jake Grieves-Cook first introduced the conservancy concept into Kenya in 1997 (I 48). He began the first conservancy that brought together multiple indigenous landholders in Eselekei which borders Amboseli National Park (ibid). Grieves-Cook

explained that the aim was to put aside an area, which would be protected for wildlife and would recognise the landowners (I 74). This is in contrast to the status quo whereby tour operators pay for a few acres and use the surrounding area for game viewing free of charge (ibid). He believed that an area-wide approach would be more beneficial for conservation (ibid). Grieves-Cook also developed the first conservancy in the Mara, Olkinyei, which was formed in 2005. The following year he was also involved when OOC pioneered the way in Koiyaki (ibid).

Four individuals were crucial in the instigation of OOC in the former block two of Koiyaki Group Ranch. A former chief, Kipeen ole Sayialel, who owns a large parcel of land in the area, saw a need for landowners to directly benefit from tourism. He came together with Ron Beaton¹² and Dickson ole Kaelo¹³ to discuss ideas. Together with Jake Grieves-Cook,¹⁴ these four individuals developed the model for OOC (Sorlie, 2008; Bedelian, 2012; I 74). They sought to create a self-sustaining business model that would financially protect the local communities from fluctuations in the industry (I 48). The result was an agreement whereby the tourism partners would lease land from the landowners and guarantee a fixed income, regardless of tourist numbers (Sorlie, 2008; Kaelo, 2009; Bedelian, 2012). This idea came from farming whereby the amount paid to rent farmland is fixed and not reliant upon crop yields (I 48). Following initial discussions, Chief Sayialel took it upon himself to visit every homestead in the area, convincing other landowners of the benefits of the conservancy model (Sorlie, 2008; Sayialel, 2009).

Proposals for OOC received little objection from the wider tourism industry and its key beneficiaries because it was not seen as a threat; and because much of the area was not suitable for cattle grazing due to tsetse fly¹⁵ it was easier for landowners to lease it out (I 21; Bedelian, 2012). Landowners who agreed to sign the lease

¹² Ron is a white-Kenyan who had recently bought a 300 acres plot in the area for his retirement after 30 years in the farming and tourism industries. Ron also spear-headed the creation of Koiyaki Guiding School.

¹³ Dickson worked for the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and had worked with KLWT. Following his work creating OOC as a consultant he was later employed by BCFK as program manager to develop Naboisho Conservancy. In 2013 he became CEO of the newly formed Kenya Conservancies Wildlife Association (KWCA).

¹⁴ Jake is a white Kenyan who has been involved in Kenya's tourism industry for over 40 years, starting in the Maasai Mara in the early 1970s. He is managing director of Porini Camps.

¹⁵ Tsetse flies are vectors for trypanosomes which cause human sleeping sickness and animal trypanosomiasis.

agreement received a fixed monthly payment, determined by the size of their plot. In return there are restrictions in land use, including living and grazing on the land, and onward sales (Bedelian, 2012). Julius Kaleko in FG 26 explained some of the motivations behind landowners' agreeing to sign the conservancy's agreement:

The local people saw that the tourists usually come because of wild animals and these wild animals are staying on our land. So the community have sacrificed the land for the wild animals to stay there and they are accepting the disturbances that the wild animals have on the livestock. But for this we need to get something small... Before when we had associations the people didn't get money as now because the directors 'looked after' that money but it is good now that you just give out your bank details and then they put it direct in your bank.

OOC's initial contract was signed in May 2006 for 18 months at the rate of \$20 per hectare per year (Bedelian, 2012). The first payment was in cash, as an incentive for signing up on the day;¹⁶ following this were direct bank transfers (ibid). Despite the presence of tsetse, 450 pastoralists within 25 independent settlements were resident in the area and were assisted with transport to move for the creation of the conservancy (ibid: 9). Many of those who moved did not own land there (ibid) and so in all likelihood would have had to move anyway following land individualisation. Some of these families moved to their own allocated plots and others moved over the Talek-Aitong road to blocks three and four that, at that stage, had not yet been subdivided (ibid). Few people displaced by conservancies left the area altogether (Bedelian, 2014: 234). The cost of having to move settlements was a major negative noted in 2009/10 in Bedelian's (ibid: 139) study but it was not raised during this research project, perhaps as it was no longer an on-going issue.

Many OOC landowners were initially sceptical about the intentions of the new conservancy and did not sign up from the outset (ibid). Over time the number of landowners grew, but the conservancy intentionally remained relatively small to ease the management of any disagreements and local politics within the communities (ibid, I 81). Following this trial period, a five-year lease was signed and then in 2010 the tourism partners introduced a 15-year lease contract so that they could guarantee a longer-term investment (ibid). FG 13 discussed how their opinions of the conservancies changed over this period:

¹⁶ Subsequent conservancies have replicated this method.

When it was first being made we weren't sure of the idea of the conservancy because we thought that the white people were coming to take our land. But once it was set up we started to see the benefits and that we keep the land and so we have now agreed to increase the duration of the rent agreement.

The new contract was backdated by a few months, again making a strong incentive for landowners to sign-up (ibid). However, not all did sign up to this longer lease and some remain on the previous lease at a lower rate (I 81).

Amongst the landowners who have not signed up to the longer lease, there are a few who claimed that they were initially trapped into rental agreements. Men in Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14), as well some in Mpuaai (FG 22), alleged that they were not fully aware of the implications when they signed the conservancy agreement, particularly regarding the restrictions in grazing access. Initial reasons for joining conservancies included community pressure, coercion and a lack of alternatives if the allocated plot were located in the centre of a conservancy (Bedelian 2014: 103). Community meetings were held, in which leaders decided that land should be leased to the conservancies, and some landowners felt trapped by that decision (FG 14). The envelopes of cash given out on the sign-up day attracted others, but once the agreement had been signed they found that this amount was not as much as they had anticipated (ibid). These individuals, who are landowners in both OOC and Naboisho, said that if they remain dissatisfied when their current leases cease, they will not sign any more agreements and will return to their land (FG 14, 22).

Following the opening of the long-awaited Mahali Mzuri Virgin camp in Motorogi Conservancy in 2013, ties with its sister conservancy, OOC, tightened and the combined area was named Olare Motorogi Conservancy (OMC). The two conservancies have their own separate land holding companies and committees but share management; and camps in either conservancy can cross over freely for game drives. In March 2014 there were 292 members of OMC,¹⁷ whose land parcels make up an area of 12,764ha. For 2013, OMC landowners received KES 49,141,400 (over \$560,000)¹⁸ through rental payments.

¹⁷ This number is regularly increasing, not by new land being added to the conservancy but by the subdivision of plots, especially between sons when their father dies.

¹⁸ All currency conversions are made using xe.com at the current rate when writing and given to 2 significant figures.

Having seen the success of the concept in Olare Orok, the former group ranch chairman, Konana ole Kereto, approached Basecamp who have a camp in Talek (I 31, 48). He asked if they could help with the formation of a conservancy on block four of Koiyaki Group Ranch once land allocation was complete (ibid). This became Naboisho Conservancy. Having assisted with the setting up of Olare Orok, Motorogi and Mara North Conservancies, Basecamp Foundation invited Dickson Kaelo to become involved (I 48). The structure of Naboisho Conservancy largely replicates that introduced by OOC, with a few modifications, as will be discussed shortly in section 2.1.1. Although the creation process took a long time because of the delay in land subdivision, in some senses Naboisho was more straightforward to set up, as people were familiar with the concept (I 21; Bedelian, 2012: 8). Also, in the core area of Naboisho there were fewer settlements because the area had historically been heavily infested by tsetse fly¹⁹ (ibid). Following the completion of subdivision late in 2009, Naboisho Conservancy began in March 2010 and introduced a 15-year lease contract from the outset (Bedelian, 2012: 8). The managing director of Basecamp Explorer (BCE) (I 56) explained that for Naboisho, they focused on a much longer lease agreement from the outset so that they could invest more in the land and communities. He sees the achievement of this as proof that “we are together in this, because you do not agree to a long-term lease if there is no trust” (ibid). Following initial donor financing, the tourism partners took over the payments, ensuring its self-sustainability, as with the other conservancies in the area.

To date, eight conservancies have developed on the former Lemek, Olchorro Oirouwa, Koiyaki and Olkinyei Group Ranches collectively conserving over 90,000ha. This growth of conservancies can also be seen nationwide. In 2006 they were estimated to hold 40% of the country’s wildlife (Western et al 2006; Norton Griffiths 2007) and given their expansion it is likely that this will have increased further to date. In May 2014 there were 140 conservancies in Kenya covering 10 million acres (KWCA, 2014). At present, the only places where wildlife is holding its own or is actually increasing are those with the transparent payment of wildlife

¹⁹ No-one is sure why tsetse fly have decreased within the conservancies in recent years but it has been suggested that it is due to the clearing of shrub land by elephants, the removal of a constant livestock presence in the area and the increased popularity of spraying livestock.

revenues to landholders rather than to central government (Western et al., 2009; Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010: 369). For these reasons, conservancies are seen by many as the solution to wildlife conservation in Kenya (Norton-Griffiths, 2007; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2009; Western et al., 2009).

2.1.1 Structure of Mara Conservancies

Dickson Kaelo (I 48) sees the conservancies in Koiyaki as the next step in conservation in the Maasai Mara, following on from the wildlife associations. The leasing of land for the conservancies requires clear, strong land tenure. This is common in payments for ecosystem services (PES) more generally (Pagiola et al 2005). The foundation of each conservancy within the study site is a public-private agreement between tourism partners and a land holding company. These non-profit land holding companies hold each landowner's lease and are registered with the local land control board (Bedelian, 2012: 7). All land transactions must be approved within these companies (ibid) and each is presided over by between two and seven landowners who make up its shareholding board (I 81). This structure ensures that the ownership of land is retained within the landowners' own company. One of the reasons for this was that Kenya's Land Control Act does not permit any non-Kenyan citizens to own or lease agricultural land (NCLR 2010), which the Mara is classified as, and since the tourism investors are not all Kenyan citizens they are unable to hold the leases themselves (Bedelian, 2012: 7). This model gives the Maasai a strong position within the partnership. Lars Lindkvist (I 31), the executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation who were fundamental to the formation of Naboisho Conservancy, believes that it is empowering for the community to have a company that owns the land titles and thus become part of the business agreements (ibid).

The landowners and tourism partners each have their own committees for stakeholder-specific discussions and decision-making. Representatives from these committees come together regularly in ManCO²⁰ for Naboisho and OOC/Motorogi Management Committees in OMC. One issue is that the land committees are appointed without any election process and so are predominantly comprised of community elite (I 81; Bedelian, 2012: 7), who are often the same individuals as are

²⁰ ManCo is made up of three tourism partners, three representatives from LandCO and Lars Lindkvist of BCFK as chairman.

on the shareholding board. However, unlike the preceding wildlife associations, these committees are not involved in the distribution of land lease payments and only have one paid member, the community liaison officer. The only financial influence that landowners have is the distribution of the landowner community funds, comprised of agreed deductions from each landowner's monthly rental payments. On a return trip to the study site in March 2014 one informant (anon 3) revealed that a land committee had decided to increase landowner payments for this fund without consulting all landowners. This breaks the contractual agreement and potentially provides landowners with a reason to withdraw from the conservancy contract. In OOC and Motorogi the land holding company shareholders have decision-making control of these funds (I 81). In Naboisho, spending proposals are suggested by the landowners committee (LandCO) but must receive approval from the joint Management committee (ManCO) (I 21).

In OMC, the five tourism partners have their own non-profit management company, Olpurkel Ltd., which has a conservancy management contract from the land holding company. This company directly employs a conservancy manager, assistant manager and rangers. Olpurkel's shareholders (the tourism partners) have underwritten the financial agreement to pay the leases to the landowners (Bedelian, 2012), financed by a monthly bed fee. These fees and payments will be detailed in chapter seven. There are five tourism partners who have camps in Naboisho Conservancy. In addition, Porini from neighbouring Ol Kinyei Conservancy pay for 10 beds in Naboisho so that they can conduct game drives there. These six tourism partners underwrite the lease payments and have contracted a management company, Seiya Ltd. Basecamp Foundation acts as the secretariat for Naboisho Conservancy and they process the payments, receiving the bed fees from the tourism partners and distributing this to Seiya Ltd and the landowners (with the deduction for the landowners community fund). The locations of camps owned by the tourism partners within the study site are shown on figure 2.1. There are six camps marked within Naboisho as both Dorobo and Eagle View Camps are owned by one tourism partner, Basecamp Explorer. Whilst Olkinyei Conservancy (far right) is outside the study site, its camps are included on this figure as Porini is a tourism partner in Naboisho Conservancy. All three camps within Olkinyei are owned by Porini.




Figure 2.1 Tourism partners' camps within the study site (shown by yellow shading).

In Motorogi there are 15 plots not signed up, and in OOC there are six subdivided unsigned plots. Whilst some landowners do not want to sign up to the initiative, others hope to sell their plots or lease them directly to a camp. Following land individualisation, 14 land parcels (approximately 50 acres each) within OMC were sold to non-Maasai investors (Bedelian, 2012: 5). Consequently, several camps have been built within the conservancies and on their borders (see figure 2.2). Often the construction and design of the facilities are not in keeping with the conservancy concept. These camps are not members of the conservancy and are not allowed to conduct game drives within the area (I 81). They are only permitted access to and from their plot (ibid). This problem has now been eased by restrictions in the conservancy agreement regarding the onward sale of land, but it is still a fear that more camps and lodges may emerge on unsigned parcels (ibid).




Figure 2.2 Official (marked with circles) and non-official camps (marked by triangles)

Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust (OOMT) is a non-profit trust set up to channel donor funding to community development and conservation projects in the wider Mara area. Each tourism partner donates to OOMT \$5 per client staying in OMC per night. Naboisho does not have an equivalent trust; but most tourism partners have trusts or foundations that they support more informally. Basecamp Foundation is the main conservancy-affiliated actor in the communities bordering Naboisho Conservancy. In Naboisho the tourism partners also have their own \$100,000 annual project fund, 40% of which is used to pay expenses to record leases and the remainder is used to cover AGM expenses, water projects and other initiatives.

Figures 2.3 and 2.4 diagrammatically represent the extreme complexities between the multiple actors in OMC and Naboisho respectively. These diagrams highlight the links between stakeholders (green grouping boxes), companies and individuals (orange boxes), committees (purple boxes) and community outputs (yellow boxes) through their interconnecting money transfers (red arrows), contractual agreements (light blue arrows) and decision-making power (dark blue arrows). These figures are referred back to throughout the thesis when discussing links between stakeholders.




Figure 2.3 Olare Motorogi Conservancy Structure




Figure 2.4 Naboisho Conservancy Structure

2.2 Conservancies Literature Framework

The following section will review literature on the key formative components of conservancies in the Mara, namely: neoliberal conservation, community involvement, livelihoods, linking conservation and development, tourism business and Africapitalism. This literature will form the framework for the thesis and will be referred back to, expanded upon and discussed in relation to empirical findings in subsequent chapters.

2.2.1 Conservancies as Neoliberal Conservation

Conservation in Africa has been seen in many different forms over the last century. In the first half of the 20th Century, British colonial conservationists alienated African land (Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 92; Adams and Hulme, 2001:10; Adams and Hutton, 2007). They were motivated by romanticised Western social constructions of what “wild” Africa should look like and the belief that East Africa’s “natural” state is an unpopulated wilderness (ibid; Adams and McShane, 1992; Neumann, 1998). Following this, community-based conservation was encouraged – with differing degrees of success. As an example of a more recent approach, the conservancies within the study site comprise a public-private partnership between landowners and tourism partners with minimal state involvement – a form of neoliberal conservation.²¹

The conservancies in the Mara were created at a time of crisis in terms of uncontrollable tourism, wildlife declines, unsustainable land use, lack of benefits for locals, and imminent uncontrollable subdividing or selling of land (Bedelian, 2014: 240). According to the neoliberal view, in such times of ecological crisis, ‘submission to capitalism’ is justified to try to save the area (ibid; Büscher et al., 2012). The conservancies represent a hybrid approach combining aspects of fortress conservation (exclusion of people, resource use curtailed and herders caught and fined) and community conservation (community owned, partnership managed and

²¹ The term ‘neoliberal conservation’ is derived from literature on the neoliberalisation of nature (Brockington and Duffy 2010: 479).

grazing schemes) with neoliberal conservation (McCarthy, 2005; Bedelian, 2014: 240). They also contain elements of payment for ecosystem services (PES) (Osano et al., 2013).

A close relationship between capitalism and conservation is nothing new, but there is something new going on (Brockington and Duffy, 2010: 470). Neoliberal conservation is the latest stage in the long relationship between capitalism and conservation (Neumann, 1998; Brockington et al., 2008). Deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation are increasingly being heralded as the key to conservation success (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 437). Those concerned with conservation have never before been so enthusiastic about the potential for capitalist solutions to conservation problems, to the extent that today it would be a challenge to find conservation strategies untouched by neoliberalism (Brockington and Duffy, 2010). Arsel and Büscher (2012: 53) suggest that this is because new and innovative methods are necessary to respond to the many environmental problems the world is facing. Capitalist markets, they argue, are the ideal vehicle to supply these (ibid).

Conservation has long had a history of fitting in with dominant trends in society as a way of achieving success (Holmes, 2012: 194). Given that neoliberal capitalism is the dominant force in today's society, it is not surprising that conservation has adjusted its strategies in order to succeed (ibid). It is intended for it to be a mutually beneficial relationship. Privately owned and managed conservation is increasingly recognised as being able to make significant contributions to conservation worldwide (ibid; Global Environment Facility, 2011) whilst at the same time making money for its investors. This potential impact is compounded when one considers the quantity of biodiversity falling outside formally protected areas; in Kenya, this is 65% (Western et al., 2009). This speaks to both of the reasons behind the neoliberalisation of conservation: capitalism engaging with conservation to make more money, and conservation engaging with capitalism to facilitate more conservation (ibid: 194-195).

In 1999 advocates of community-based conservation saw the spread of markets and private enterprise as a key obstacle to their agenda (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). By 2007, conservation-business partnerships were common and deemed increasingly

desirable (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 433). Holmes (2012: 187-188) draws together a number of generalisations about how conservation is neoliberalising:

Conservation is increasingly turning to market mechanisms to find ways of preserving biodiversity, of “selling nature to save it”, such as payment for ecosystem services, bio-prospecting and ecotourism (Igoe and Brockington, 2007)... [Also,] since the 1980s, but accelerating since 2000, leading conservation NGOs have developed closer relationships with corporations, working with them, copying their methods in areas such as marketing, taking their donations and generally developing more positive attitudes towards their activities.

The conservancies under investigation exemplify these features. They are a private alternative to the state run national parks and reserves and they undertake ecotourism so that the conservation can pay for itself. They also have affiliated NGOs that work closely with the initiatives. While large conservation NGOs are not yet heavily involved within the study site, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) are all beginning to show an interest. For a detailed discussion of neoliberal conservation policies, specifically regarding the conservancies within and around the study site, see Bedelian (2014).

The use of public-private partnerships in conservation is not universally supported. There are pros and cons to both private and state involvement in conservation. The state is usually preferred as a wildlife manager because it is widely perceived as a publicly accountable institution that can devise management plans and has the capacity to implement them (Brockington et al., 2008: 182-183). On the other hand, private enterprises are able to pay for conservation when the state cannot or will not do so (ibid). This injects new resources into biodiversity conservation, especially in poorer parts of the world where states lack the resources and capacity to effectively protect biodiversity (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). More broadly, the introduction of new actors in environmental governance changes the consideration of who is responsible for conserving biodiversity, with less responsibility for the state and more for private individuals and civil society (Holmes, 2012: 192). This reflects what Mbembe (2001) refers to as ‘private indirect government’, or what Ferguson (2006) calls ‘the privatisation of sovereignty’. Both terms refer to an emerging system where

sovereignty has become highly decentralised and fragmented (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 439).

In comparison to state-run ventures, the approaches of neoliberal conservation promise increased democracy and participation by dismantling restrictive state structures and practices (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 434; Brockington et al., 2008: 182). In public-private partnerships the hope is that local people can be brought into the market as competent conservations (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 442). In Goldman's (2001) words, they must become 'eco-rational subjects'.²² Child (2000) clarifies requirements for local engagement in conservation-oriented business ventures. These include securing the necessary capital or collateral and having legally guaranteed property rights, which gives people both the authority and incentive to protect natural resources (ibid). In other words, land should first go through the neoliberal privatisation process before conservation itself can be neoliberalised. Payments can then be made for use of this land.

Market forces, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES), have found their way into environmental policy and conservation to a degree that was unimaginable only two decades ago (Arsel and Büscher, 2012: 53-54). Emphasising the financial value of land and carefully calculating the putative losses from not harming the environment, easements such as land rental payments represent a clearly neoliberal conservation strategy of developing new ways of financially valuing nature and using market mechanisms to conserve it (Morris, 2008). From their study on community conservation in South Africa and the Philippines, Büscher and Dressler (2012: 368) conclude that through neoliberal conservation the 'emphasis is shifting from local constructions of nature *by* communities to what nature should mean *for* communities in terms of commodity resources and capitalist markets'.

It is vital that this research engages with this issue and assesses the impact that the move towards neoliberal conservation has had upon how nature and wildlife are perceived by stakeholders within the study site. Recognising the growing importance of what nature should mean *for* communities emphasises the need to examine benefits captured through the presence of the conservancies, how these are perceived

²² The 'eco' in this case refers to both economic and ecological

by the recipients, and what further implications they have. This can only be achieved by engaging directly with those directly affected by the presence of conservancies.

Despite the current enthusiasm, the proliferation of private-sector involvement does not always translate into positive benefits for local communities, especially if they have no power within such initiatives. Neoliberal conservation approaches are creating new forms of governance and new relationships between communities and the private actors (Bedelian, 2014). For the conservancies in the study, land tenure reform was essential for their creation and is also critical in determining the degree of control and power to negotiate and receive direct benefits by communities (Ashley and Roe, 2002; Bedelian, 2014: 117). Subdivided land can result in power being shared more evenly between landowners, rather than it being captured solely by elite – as occurred during the wildlife association phase in Koiyaki.

2.2.2 Conservancies and Community Involvement

Criticisms of protectionist approaches combined with a rethinking about pastoralism resulted in an alternative approach to conservation in East Africa. Community-based conservation was developed in the 1980s with the aim of incorporating the needs of local residents. It postulates that resource users should be seen as potential conservation collaborators rather than obstacles to negotiate in pursuing conservation independently (Russel and Harshbarger, 2003; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; Igoe and Croucher, 2007; Nelson et al., 2009).

From pre-colonial times to the present day, the Maasai have been dispossessed of land at every stage. This dispossession has been carried out by white settlers, other Kenyan communities and Maasai community leaders, as well as in the name of conservation (Tignor, 1976; Halderman, 1989; Knowles and Collet, 1989; Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 92; Adams and Hulme, 2001:10; Hughes, 2006; Mwangi, 2006; Adams and Hutton, 2007; Homewood et al., 2009). Even in recent times, conservation and tourism has had poor outcomes for the majority of Maasai people, with most benefits being captured by a few well-placed individuals (Homewood et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2009). This is exemplified by the wildlife associations in the Mara during group ranch land tenure (Thompson, 2002; Thompson and Homewood, 2002). The increasing exclusivity of the wildlife

associations resulted in the omission of socially, politically and spatially less well-placed members from wildlife conservation income leaving them with little incentive to conserve wildlife (ibid: 105). The wildlife associations lacked the capacity and structures for equitable benefit sharing which hampered their success and ultimately led to their breakdown (Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Kaelo, 2009; Thompson et al., 2009). The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara have always been intense and conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 127).

Governance in neoliberal conservation is characterized by a reduction in the state's control over conservation in favour of hybrid forms of governance (Igoe and Brockington 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 20). An important effect of neoliberalism is the increase in private sector involvement in conservation through private ownership and management of protected areas (Langholz and Krug, 2004; Carter et al., 2008), as well as the growth of global ecotourism (Duffy, 2010).

By linking landowners directly to the market, and bypassing community level institutions, new neoliberal conservation initiatives in the Mara have the potential (and promise) to provide better incomes to those participating in comparison to the former wildlife associations (Osano et al., 2013). One major change through land subdivision has been the marked shift from a situation where the group ranch committees exercised considerable control which enabled manipulation, to the current position whereby private land tenure has given individual landowners significant autonomy (Homewood et al., 2009: 11). However, there is still little understanding of who, within the heterogeneous Maasai community entity, gets to participate in such initiatives.

In Cameroon researchers found local elites usurped leadership roles, creating institutional structures not recognized by the larger community, and failed to provide sustainable resource management (Brown and Lassoie, 2010). Similarly, despite the widely-reported success of Namibian conservancies, there are concerns of elite capture, power dynamics, and the lack of community empowerment threaten benefit distribution to local communities (Hoole, 2010). Within the Mara conservancies, there is community representation, but Jandreau (2012) rightly questions the extent

to which this is formalized and to what degree is this arrangement consultation or intensive participation. Also, in the Mara, the use of the same leaders, the ones having the greatest power, in conservancies as wildlife associations inevitably ensures the continuation of their political nature (Bedelian, 2014: 244).

In addition to elite being the committee members and power brokers within conservation schemes, PES may disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of society. This creates or reinforces power asymmetries amongst those involved (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). As ecosystem services are commodified, they form the basis for new socio-economic hierarchies, and the reproduction of unequal power relations (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Bedelian, 2014). One cause of this is that the poor may be limited to participate in PES due to institutional and technical barriers, insecure land tenure, high transaction costs or limited understanding (Wunder, 2008; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Bedelian, 2014). Despite these criticisms and allegations of inequitable benefit distribution, there is evidence of PES having a positive contribution to the poor (Wunder, 2008). However, effects on non-participants may be positive or negative (ibid).

This review of literature on community involvement has highlighted several important issues that need to be addressed within this research project. This includes an analysis of who has power within the conservancy structures, who participates, and to what degree. It is also important to assess how this power is gained, for example through societal position or land ownership. Once the nature of those in power is established there is a need to examine the nature of the relationship between power and benefits accrued. This should examine the degree, if any, of elite capture, the differential impact of conservancies on members and non-members and any gender differentiation.

2.2.3 Conservancies and Livelihoods

Protectionist conservation is based upon romanticised images of wild Africa. In the Mara this was combined with a perception of the Maasai that resulted in fears that wildlife would progressively lose out to livestock (Brockington and Homewood, 1996). Such pejorative attitudes and repressive policies towards pastoralists

emanated from the view that they do not fit into this construction of wilderness, cause desertification and bring about a tragedy of the commons (Leach and Mearns, 1996: 19-20). Pastoralists, and especially the Maasai, were thought to be economically inefficient, having an irrational attachment to livestock numbers and unwillingness to sell animals resulting in them accumulating stock beyond their needs and the land's carrying capacity (ibid, Talbot, 1973; Collett, 1987; Brockington and Homewood, 1996). The idea of carrying capacity in the context of rangeland management is the notion that there is a quantity of livestock and/or wildlife that can be sustained by the resources within a certain area and if these levels are exceeded it will lead to reduced productivity and degradation. Hardin's (1968) "Tragedy of the Commons", takes this notion a stage further. It postulates that when livestock are owned individually and the rangelands are held communally, the incentive for individual profit inevitably drives overstocking, resulting in environmental degradation at the expense of the group (ibid).

As a consequence of these entrenched views held by some conservationists, the Maasai and their livestock were excluded from key wildlife areas through "fortress conservation", in pursuit of "wilderness" and "pristine" habitat ideals (Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 94; Adams and Hulme, 2001:10; Adams and Hutton, 2007). This exclusion created, and continues to create, tension between pastoralism, tourism, wildlife and park management (Berger, 1996: 192), exemplified by the ongoing battles in MMNR between herders and rangers over grazing rights.

Savannah ecosystems are man-made and not the natural wildernesses that these protectionist conservationists like to believe. Over the 5,000 years since pastoralism emerged as a land use system in sub-Saharan Africa, pastoral natural resource management and herding strategies have modified ecosystems (Notenbaert et al., 2012: 5). This is to the extent that the removal of pastoralism can be detrimental to grazing ungulates and rangeland diversity (ibid). According to Homewood and Rogers (1991), the combined effects of fire, grazing, trampling, and nutrient cycling by pastoralism has created some of the most biologically diverse savannah ecosystems in the world. Exemplifying this, in the Mara ecosystem more wildlife can

often be found on the neighbouring group ranches than within the reserve itself (Reid et al., 2003).

Since the 1990s it has increasingly been advocated that if nomadic movement can be assured, pastoralism could be an economically efficient use of resources as well as being a benefit to conservation and increasing biodiversity (Behnke et al., 1993; Scoones, 1995; Leach and Mearns, 1996: 28-29; Swift, 1996: 90; Homewood, 2008; Sinclair, 2008; Homewood et al., 2009; Notenbaert et al., 2012: 1; Reid, 2012). One reason for this change is the phenomenon of ecological flux/non equilibrium dynamics. This denotes that rangeland productivity is more constrained by factors such as climatic variability and external shocks, than by density-dependent factors such as stocking rates and grazing pressure (Behnke et al., 1993; Boyd et al., 1999).

A key aspect of this argument for the utility of pastoralism is the need for large areas for mobility (Behnke et al., 1993; Notenbaert et al., 2012). This is essential for effective risk management, the harnessing of environmental variability, livestock production enhancement, and the production of positive environmental externalities such as biodiversity conservation and stimulated pasture growth (ibid).

Consequently, changing land uses and tenure arrangements threaten the existence of both the pastoral way of life and the large wildlife herds and migrations (Homewood et al., 2009: 76; Reto-o-Reto, n.d.: 1). More specifically, Seno and Shaw (2002: 86) note that the change from communal to individual tenure may negatively affect livestock production by eliminating the resource sharing strategy that has ensured their survival. Recognition of this has resulted in calls for the maintenance of land models that permit livestock mobility and access to key resources such as communal tenure (Nyariki et al., 2009; Notenbaert et al., 2012: 11). However, in the face of rapid population growth and other factors, the continued viability of such open land tenure is questionable, especially in the Mara.

Despite arguments in favour of pastoralism's ecological efficacy and sustainability, most African governments continue to hold entrenched views about pastoralism and its impact upon the environment (Homewood, 2008: 252). When combined with the perceived failure of community-based approaches, the 1990s and 2000s saw a resurgence of the protectionist paradigm (Hanna et al., 2008:4). This was named the

“back to barriers” movement (Hutton et al., 2005). CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe is one such CBC initiative that has received a lot of criticism. Despite the theoretical community-based approach, this initiative did structural damage to rural security and land tenure, had doubtful economic benefits and enabled something close to a new enclosures movement (Alexander and McGregor, 2000; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; Hughes, 2006).

Notwithstanding the resurgence of protectionist approaches, critiques remain. In his PhD thesis (1998) and later book (2002), Brockington uses research from Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania to challenge whether cattle destroy wilderness, and whether wilderness needs to be devoid of people in order to be “saved”. In line with the earlier discussion, he argues that the dominant fortress approach to wildlife conservation in Africa has more to do with western conceptions of nature and environment than what is appropriate for African people and their herds (Brockington, 2002). Such pointed critiques of protectionist approaches refuelled calls for more community-based approaches in conservation and ecotourism across Africa (Brockington and Homewood, 1996: 97; Adams and Hulme, 2001). This debate as to how best to undertake conservation in East Africa is still on going today, resulting in a polarisation of discourse on the role of livestock in conservation areas.

In addition to the form of the conservation model applied, the broader systematic shifts in land tenure regimes and human influences have added to the uncertainty of a sustainable model for both livestock production and wildlife conservation (Reid, 2012). In Narok District wildlife populations have declined by up to 75% in the last several decades (Ogutu et al., 2011). Human influences are primarily to blame for this drastic decline in wildlife. This includes the intensification of cultivation, immigration, sedentisation, settlement expansion, climatic changes and poaching (Thompson et al., 2002; Thompson, 2002; Reid et al., 2003; Waithaka, 2004; Homewood et al., 2006; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2009; Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010; Ogutu et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2012; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014).

Around the time of the subdivision of Koiyaki Group Ranch, many criticisms and fears regarding its impacts were expressed. For example Norton-Griffiths (2008:

396-405) notes that the immediate effects of subdivision in the Mara include rises in land values and rampant land sales; an expansion of cultivation and concentration of pastoral settlements and tourist facilities around the Mara Reserve; and the construction of permanent buildings, pens, water development and fencing. He blames subdivision for the 65% drop in migratory wildebeest population on the former group ranches since 1984 as the density and diversity of large wildlife decline with decreasing ranch size (ibid: 403). Similarly, Seno and Shaw (2002: 85), Waithaka (2004) and Thompson et al (2009: 77) all feared that subdivision would result in wildlife being confined to the reserve with insufficient forage, due to the encroachment of incompatible land uses such as cultivation constraining the formally free-ranging wildlife-livestock matrix. Allan Earnshaw (1969), the chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust, was so worried about the concept of fragmentation that he presented two papers to the Kenyan cabinet pleading with them to revoke their decision. However, once he saw that the conservancy concept could pull together hundreds of individuals to form community conservancies, he reversed his opinion of land individualisation (ibid). He now believes that it has been an even better success story than conservancies on trust lands that are still un-subdivided as the money can reach the right people directly (ibid). This addresses the prolonged status quo in the Mara, where the poor distribution of tourism-related incomes used to allow revenues to concentrate in the hands of a few (Homewood et al., 2009: 14-5).

As previously noted, conservancies represent a combination of protectionist and community-based conservation approaches as livestock access is restricted but the community are heavily involved in both ownership and decision-making. Regardless of the descriptive term used for their approach, as conservancies invariably involve an adjustment in pastoral livelihoods, this can have important implications for access and use of the rangelands (Bedelian, 2014: 14). The fear is that through neoliberal conservation, local land uses and livelihood systems can be undermined or criminalised in favour of how conservation is interpreted by the global market (ibid: 22). As such, the effectiveness of markets for conservation in developing countries to work for local communities is questioned (Levine and Wandesforde-Smith, 2004). In relation to cattle in the Maasai Mara, Butt (2012) describes how the rise of a commoditized form of nature tourism, coupled with idealized notions of 'nature' and

‘wilderness’, have altered the micro-geography of interaction between herders and protected area managers. Existing literature is critical with regard to the extent to which livestock is incorporated into the conservancy model, the lack of community participation in determining livestock access and the implications of this for pastoralism and the surrounding areas.

Bedelian (2014: 114) reports that community members are concerned that conservancies have radically altered access to livestock grazing; it is the main source of conflict between communities and the conservancies. The 2010 OOC land lease agreement (Raffman Dhanji Elms Virdee Advocates 2011, cited in Osano et al., 2013: 247) states that the landowner should not ‘use or permit the Premises or any part thereof to be used to graze livestock save in accordance with a grazing management plan set out by the Tenant’.

All conservancies in the Mara have introduced controlled grazing plans, which set certain rules for grazing inside their boundaries (Osano et al., 2013: 244; Bedelian, 2014: 136). These regulations restrict the number of livestock, the areas to be grazed, and periods of permitted access (Osano et al., 2013: 244). Conservancies usually allow more flexible grazing during the tourism low season (April/May and November) when there are very few tourists in the conservancy and some camps may be closed (ibid). Usually it is cattle herds neighbouring the conservancy are allowed access, on a rotational basis, as different parts of the conservancy are opened up at different times (ibid: 139). Grazing is only usually permitted during the day for ease of monitoring and to avoid conflict with predators (ibid). Despite the grazing rules there is a lot of illegal grazing in conservancies by both conservancy members and non-members (Bedelian, 2014: 137). Grazing rules are monitored and enforced by conservancy rangers, and herd owners are fined if herds are caught grazing in the conservancy at non-stipulated times and places (ibid).

Bedelian (2014: 115) reports that there is little community participation in decisions determining livestock grazing, instead they are informed by the conservancy management or land committee of any decisions made regarding grazing. It is the land committee, conservancy management, and tourism investors who are perceived to have decision-making power regarding conservancy grazing (ibid). However, in

some conservancies, including Mara North, sub-committees have been created for grazing (ibid). Bedelian later adds, now that many conservancies have established conservancy management and controlled grazing plans, crafted by technical managers, there are fewer opportunities for input from the livestock owners themselves (ibid: 128). Furthermore, participation by landowners in formulating conservancy livestock grazing and management plans may lead to better compliance (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012; Bedelian, 2014: 129).

In the case of the Mara conservancies, PES participants face having to make the trade-off of a reduction in the area available for livestock grazing, in order to conform to the Conservancy land use regulations (Osano et al., 2013: 252). The choice to lease land for wildlife tourism and exclude livestock in the OOC does not necessarily mean that the participating households have abandoned pastoralism altogether. Some household may relocate livestock grazing away from the conservancy to community areas but the resulting crowding therein could worsen the degradation of these areas due to overgrazing (ibid). This increased pressure adds grievances to landowners outside the conservancy, especially those who are not conservancy landowners and do not receive the monthly payments (Courtney, 2009). In some cases, livestock grazing is also transferred to the Mara Reserve (Butt, 2011; Osano et al., 2013: 253). Although cattle populations have not increased significantly, small stock have tripled, and illegal cattle grazing within the MMNR has risen, increasing competition between livestock and wildlife over forage (Butt 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 65).

Bedelian (2014: 137-138) concludes that grazing restrictions and the reduction of space for livestock grazing in conservancies has been a contentious issue within the community, creating much conflict. Livestock owners complained that conservancies had seriously reduced the grazing areas available to them, and prevented access to areas they once relied on (ibid). This is accentuated during dry conditions. Consequently, many viewed livestock grazing restrictions imposed by conservancies very negatively as they big cost on their livelihood, pastoralism. Such perceptions question whether community access and user rights are protected, or lost, under the Mara conservancy model (Butt, pers. comm. cited in Jandreau, 2012). Such

criticisms emphasised calls for increased access for cattle as a management tool within conservancies, because cattle are beneficial for wildlife at intermediate levels (Reid et al., 2003).

In addition to their influence upon pastoralism, conservancies also generate other livelihood opportunities. Although employment in conservation and tourism can lead to a decline in other activities (e.g. hunting and farming) due to a shortage of time, new income sources can also enable greater market consumption and the expansion of production (Stronza, 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 25). As such, new livelihood opportunities tend to be additional rather than a substitute for established activities. This means that high earnings may be put back into activities that threaten biodiversity (Kiss, 2004) such as alternative economic opportunities leading to accelerated rates of deforestation resulting in ‘conservation backfires’ (Langholz, 1999). For example, in Zimbabwe Murombedzi (1999) found that revenues to households from CAMPFIRE were reinvested in ways to improve agricultural productivity, which are incompatible with wildlife. In the Mara, Thompson and Homewood (2002) report that tourism earnings were reinvested in large-scale cultivation. Although Bedelian (2014) concluded that there was not a positive relationship between being a conservancy landowner and having more livestock, any influence may not yet have been visible at the time the data was collected for this study.

As discussed, without clear links to conservation goals, increased incomes from a conservation project may counterproductively encourage more rapid resource extraction (Barrett et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014). Stem et al. (2003) report that even if income does cause positive changes in what people do, people’s beliefs or conservation perspectives may not have changed. This is concerning as it would mean that people are likely to revert back to previous ways if benefits reduce or cease (Pretty and Smith, 2004).

This section has reviewed literature advocating that pastoralism can be a sustainable livelihood if it has sufficient mobility on communal land tenure. What is uncertain, however, is how pastoralism can and will evolve in the Mara when faced with land individualisation and high population growth rates. In terms of combining livestock

with conservation, we are perhaps reaching a point when the debate moves on from whether cattle should be incorporated, to how. Existing literature is critical of the extent to which conservancies in the Mara have been incorporating livestock, and the degree of participation given to pastoralists in determining access. This reduction in grazing area available was the biggest criticism that the conservancies faced in Bedelian's (2014) study. This raises the question as to whether community access and user rights are secured or lost in the conservancy model. There have been calls to increase access for cattle in conservancies as a management tool. It is important for this research project, which is undertaken three years after Bedelian's data was collected, to assess whether anything has changed with regard to the conservancies' inevitable impact upon pastoralism. Findings to this will determine whether the neoliberal conservation aspect of the conservancies is undermining local needs and / or human rights in favour of creating a version of nature that is desired by global markets.

Aside from pastoralism, it is important to investigate the impact of money earned through employment and lease payments resulting from conservancies, and whether there are any 'conservation backfires'. Bedelian (2014) reported that evidence from 2010 suggests there has not been an increase in cattle as a consequence of the conservancies, is this still true three years later? Finally, the literature reviewed here highlights the importance in exploring whether there are clear links between income earned and conservation goals. This involves investigating whether benefits accrued from conservancies change people's actions, beliefs or perceptions, and if benefits were to stop, would people reverse to their previous ways?

2.2.4 Conservancies linking Conservation and Development

Community-based conservation involves linking conservation objectives to development needs (Adams and Hulme, 2001). PES is also popular because of the rhetoric of expected win-win outcomes in conservation and development (Muradian et al., 2010; Bedelian, 2014). In theory, conservancies have the potential to both expand habitats available for conservation and provide social and economic benefits.

The extent to which projects are able to achieve and combine these two, often contradictory, objectives is much debated. There is little credible empirical evidence

that solutions to meet the joint goals of conservation and development have been met (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Adams et al., 2004; Ferraro, 2011). Communicating projects as win-win does not acknowledge the multiple complexities of most conservation and development scenarios (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). Some projects would be better understood as involving trade-offs and hard decisions (ibid).

An area neglected in the current literature is how attempts to achieve this win-win for both conservation and development influences the actors involved. Are traditional development actors as heavily involved in conservation areas? Or do conservation actors become development actors in these contexts? If so, to what extent do their dual-core motivations influence development outcomes? Do their conservation objectives influence the trade-offs made?

There appears to be a mismatch between the theoretical win-win linkage between community-based conservation and development with empirical findings. Whilst this study will not assess the success of the conservation aspect of conservancies, the continued presence of high-end tourism operators is highly indicative of this. Instead, the focus of the study will be on perceptions of the relationship between conservancies and development, and who is undertaking this work. This will include assessments of the trade-offs and hard decisions made in name of conservation objectives.

2.2.5 Conservancies as a Tourism Business

Tourism is one means by which nature is neoliberalised (Duffy, 2013; Bedelian, 2014: 23). Tourism, and especially ecotourism, creates economic value from species, landscapes and activities, and turns these into ‘commodities’ that clients pay to see or experience (ibid). It opens up nature to international markets and inscribes new values and uses for nature, species and landscapes (Brockington and Duffy, 2010). Nature is produced, reproduced and redesigned as a tourism attraction (Duffy, 2013).

In the case of the conservancies under investigation, money earned through tourism funds the payment of the easements through PES. Unlike areas that rely upon donor involvement, this model makes the conservancies in the Mara self-sustainable. As

previously discussed, the need for an alternative, higher-end tourism product was also one of the dominant influences behind the creation of the conservancies.

Tourism is one of the largest and fastest growing industries in the world (Chambers, 2000). Alongside tourism's growing importance, as with community-based conservation, great expectations have been generated with regard to its development potential – especially community-based tourism (Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). As developing countries are increasingly desired as holiday destinations, tourism has become “the world's largest voluntary transfer of resources from rich people to poor people” (Mitchell and Ashley, 2010: 1). In many less developed countries of sub-Saharan Africa, tourism is perceived to be one of the few feasible options for development (Briedenhann and Wickens, 2004: 71). However, Mowforth and Munt (2009: xii) caution that it is too easy to be seduced by the possibilities inferred from relatively few examples of positive change.

In 2013, Kenya's tourism sector contributed \$5.4 billion to the economy (Kamau, 2014). However, Kenya's tourism industry is fragile, due in particular to the country's political instability. In addition to ingrained memories of Kenya's post-election violence in 2007-2008 and the after effects of the terrorist attack on Westgate Mall in 2013, Foreign and Commonwealth Office warnings continue to undermine Kenya's tourism sector (ibid, Business Monitor International, 2014). Despite these challenges, the tourism industry in Kenya remains the second highest national economic earner after agriculture (Akwiri, 2013). The Kenyan government recognised the development potential of this and named tourism one of the key sectors within its Vision 2030 development programme (Government of Kenya, 2007).

Although the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem is a mere dot on the African continent, it embodies the ideals of pristine wilderness which have long been central to wildlife conservation following colonial imaginations and policies (Adams and McShane, 1992: 38). It is undeniably a big pull for tourists; almost half of all international tourists to Kenya visit the Maasai Mara (Honey, 2008; Sayagie, 2013). Despite its economic importance nationally, tourism in the Mara ecosystem has received extensive criticism regarding its environmental impact and inequitable benefit

distribution to local communities²³ (Roe et al., 1997; Honey, 2008). The emergence of conservancies is an attempt to address these criticisms through the creation of an alternative model.

As highlighted throughout this chapter, conservation approaches have evolved over time towards attempts to incorporate developmental needs of destination environments and communities; tourism has evolved likewise (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 27). These new approaches, including ecotourism, sustainable tourism and community-based (eco)tourism, are collectively referred to by the World Travel and Tourism Council as “New Tourism” (WTTC, 2003). As with many of the key concepts within this study, there is no universally agreed definition of these niche tourisms. Although with varying foci, they are all widely perceived to be “responsible travel” to areas rich in wildlife that also helps to preserve the environment and promote the well-being of the local people through their inclusion in decision making and benefit distribution (Mbaria, 2007). Largely because of this lack of agreed definition, the terms are often misused and abused through “green-washing” campaigns by tourism companies which threaten to make the term merely a marketing and promotional tool (Telfer, 2002: 348; Mowforth and Munt, 2009; Nguny, 2009; Yunis, 2009). My Masters dissertation (Courtney, 2009) concluded that although no tourism venture is likely to fit into more comprehensive definitions of ecotourism perfectly, Olare Orok Conservancy conforms to a large extent. This dissertation advocated that such conservancies warrant the label “ecotourism”; therefore, this thesis will not reassess the vast array of literature debating ecotourism definitions.

Community-based tourism (CBT) is a broad term to encompass initiatives that genuinely work together with neighbouring communities (Mtapuri and Giampiccoli, 2014). Due to the nature of land ownership combined with the conservancy framework in the study site, community members are involved in both decision-making and benefit receipt. As a result, community-based ecotourism would be an accurate descriptor for the tourism undertaken in the conservancies within this case

²³ The heterogeneity and complexity of “communities” is acknowledged, as well as difficulties in defining “local” (as discussed by Naguran, 1999). These issues will be discussed further in chapter three.

study.

As already touched upon, tourism is widely seen by governments as a tool for national, regional and local economic growth, as well as employment creation (Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). Its potential role has also been expanded to address global-scale developmental challenges (Ashley and Mitchell, 2005; Bolwell and Weinz, 2008). For example, the potential of tourism in the context of the Millennium Development Goals has been stressed (Ashley and Roe, 2002; UNWTO, 2006; Novelli and Hellwig, 2011; Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). Although they recognise that the tourism industry cannot address all these ambitious development targets, Saarinen et al. (2011: 201) advocate that tourism has the potential to be a tool, or can represent a partial solution.

The global reach of the tourism industry cultivates hopes and expectations that it can challenge global problems. As 75% of the 2 billion people living on less than a dollar a day live in rural areas surrounded by natural or cultural attractions that can be given economic value through tourism (Yunis, 2009), this potential has immense scope. Aside from contributing to national economies, it is in the destination locale that many of the physical manifestations and impacts of the industry occur (Telfer, 2002: 347), both positive and negative (Duffy, 2002; Honey, 2008). This is why the destination scale was selected for this research project.

Echoing the conservation-development discussion above, the tourism industry, international agencies such as the UN and World Bank, bilateral organisations and some NGOs are all optimistic regarding tourism's impact upon development (Honey, 2008: 90). In particular, community-based tourism (CBT) is promoted as a means of both poverty reduction and community development in developing countries (Baktygulov and Raeva, 2010: 2-3; Mtapuri and Giampiccoli, 2014: 1). Duffy (2002; 2006) suggests that this is encouraged because tourism fits into existing neoliberal structures. Again mirroring community-based conservation, the key word used in many assessments of the community-based tourism – development nexus is *potential* (see Telfer, 2002; Moscardo, 2008: 175; Mitchell and Ashley, 2010: 136; Sebele, 2010; Saarinen et al., 2011: 202).

This approach to development has been subject to criticism, and some scholars have pointed to a mismatch between theory and practice (Scheyvens, 2002: 72; Honey, 2008: 90; Mitchell and Muckosy, 2008; Goodwin and Santilli, 2009). CBT offers both opportunities and challenges; if not properly facilitated, it can inflict profound damage on communities instead of serving as a development tool (Suansri, 2003: 7; Khanal and Babar, 2007: 7; Mtapuri and Giampiccoli, 2014: 2).

In its broad sense, tourism is criticised for environmental degradation, dependency on international corporations (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 28) and challenging the nation state by engaging in issues such as conservation and development (Mowforth and Munt, 2009). Tourism is a neoliberal, capitalist industry and these criticisms mirror those of capitalism in general – as will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight.

Analysis of literature and community-based tourism case studies, including other conservancies in Kenya, identified six factors commonly cited as limiting tourism's ability to have a positive impact on development. These are: inconsistent definitions of development, motivation, insufficient or inadequate distribution of benefits, resource access restrictions, inadequate participation or control by communities, and unsustainability. Although community-based tourism is only one component of the conservancy concept, as this chapter has demonstrated, this body of literature is greatly relevant to this research. Some of these six factors have been touched upon already in this chapter and are reflected upon again, through the tourism lens. They will now each be examined, in turn, so as to deepen the contextualisation for this study.

2.2.5.1 Inconsistent Definitions of Development

Although many reports extol the benefits of using tourism as an agent of development, definitions of development can be very restrictive, with economic benefits often receiving the most attention (Telfer, 2002: 339). The contribution of tourism can be easily identified in economic-centric definitions, but it becomes more complex in holistic definitions that encompass social, cultural, political, environmental and economic targets (ibid).

Further, Kontogeorgopoulos et al. (2013: 2) caution that the measurement of success is subjective, controversial and ‘depends largely on one’s perspective and expectations’. Current models are “overly reliant on Western ‘experts’ and development agencies and that far too little attention has been paid to local and non-Western perspectives and knowledge” (Le et al., 2012: 362). Snider (2012: 210) concluded his thesis, based in the Mara, by appealing for new innovative measures of non-economic benefits emanating from tourism, as defined by the host community. Consequently, it is vital that the concept of development, and how different people interpret it over time and space, is analysed within this study.

2.2.5.2 Motivation

Mbaria (2007) notes that there is debate whether the demand for ecotourism is driven by:

the need to genuinely alter the socio-economic circumstances of communities or the desire of the global environmental movement – NGOs, UN bodies, environmental charities and private environmentalists – to halt the degeneration of key ecosystems in Kenya and elsewhere.

These two approaches either prioritise development or conservation. As previously discussed in section 2.2.4, although theoretically community-based conservation is a win-win for these two objectives, empirical examples point more towards trade-offs and hard decisions based on these, often competing, objectives. Similarly, Burns (1999) identifies two differing approaches and labels them “Tourism First”, in which tourism is the focus, and “Development First”, referring to the idea that tourism is framed by development needs. Butcher (2011) believes that determining the motivation is important because this dictates whose needs are met. He suggests that tourism may actually better serve the needs of already industrialised countries that aim to save global biodiversity, than poverty alleviation and socio-economic development more generally (ibid).

In Eselenkei Conservancy bordering Amboseli National Park, Rutten (2004: 28) notes that within the public-private partnership, theoretical voluntary and genuine commitment in collaboration, transparency and good communication do not match practice. He believes that the core problem that led to many of the troubles was that

there was no genuine motivation by the tour operator to develop the sanctuary for the benefit of the local people (Rutten, 2002: 22-3).

In addition to motivating factors for involvement in tourism, there are also different motivations for actors being involved in development initiatives. For some, such as the state, this stems from a sense of responsibility and for others, including religious and tourism organisations, it is used as a way to gain acceptance and support. Tourists also have multifaceted reasons for wanting to become involved in development around tourism areas.

2.2.5.3 Insufficient or Inequitable Distribution of Benefits

Tourism activities need to benefit local communities as well as pass revenue onto the national government (Novelli and Scarth, 2007). Yet the way the revenue is allocated is fundamental, as development projects, for example, do not solve the problem of passive economic dependency or the antagonism rooted in the presence of problem animals (ibid: 70). Benefits for host communities must also outweigh perceived social costs (Whelan, 1991). From the case study of Liwonde National Park in Malawi, Novelli and Scarth (2007) argue that tourism should finance enterprise-based community development and provide employment opportunities as well as tangible park benefits. In some instances, tourism revenues may always remain too low to bring personal wealth, such as Il Ngwesi Conservancy in Laikipia (Harrison, 2001), but in prime areas like the Maasai Mara revenues are much higher.

As previously discussed more broadly in relation to PES, it is important to determine who benefits from tourism, and whether local elite benefit disproportionately (Telfer, 2002: 344). There is a close relationship between having power and control in a venture, and receiving direct benefits from it. Where adequate benefit capture and distribution are absent, Murphy (2013: 153) notes: “tourism development has frequently failed to live up to its promised expectations and many communities have begun to develop jaundiced attitudes to this panacea growth industry”. Power is closely linked to land tenure. In Eselenkei, where land is still a communal group ranch, Ogutu (2002) and Rutten (2004) concur that some elite individuals, including those on the group ranch committee, are accumulating huge returns while others receive very little in return for the loss of their resources.

2.2.5.4 Resource Access Restrictions

One of the main costs incurred by communities hosting tourism initiatives, especially wildlife or nature tourism, is restricted access to resources. In some cases, in an attempt to protect environments for ecotourism, traditional resource uses and users have been eliminated, thereby depriving local people of their livelihoods (Wall, 1997: 489; Roe and Urquhart, 2001; Mwangi, 2005: 61; Mowforth and Munt, 2009). This will be the focus of chapter six. In his case study in Ghana, Eshun (2010) finds that ecotourism development has continued practices of colonial wildlife conservation and forestry that fail to understand the problem of the marginalisation of local communities. As a result, ecotourism has brought hardships to the residents in surrounding communities (ibid). Osano et al. (2013) and Bedelian (2014) have already indicated that this is a major issue for the pastoralists living alongside the conservancies in the Mara.

2.2.5.5 Inadequate Participation or Control by Communities

Participation is essential to ensure that more benefits are captured by local communities (Mbaria, 2007). This is exemplified by multiple case studies including Khama Rhino Sanctuary Trust in Botswana (2010: 136) and Elmina in Ghana (Sonne, 2010). One of the most frequently cited concerns regarding the realisation of tourism's potential for development is the power relations between actors in ventures, more specifically the degree of participation and control held by the local communities (Wall, 1997: 489; Wallace and Russell, 2004; Sebele, 2010: 136; Ferreira, 2011; Mbaiwa, 2011; Saarinen et al., 2011: 202).

Matarrita-Cascante (2010) uses a case study from Costa Rica to advance “the critical relevance of open communication, widespread participation, tolerance, and communication between residents and different tourism-related stakeholders for the promotion of processes leading to tourism-led development”. If this does not happen, tourism ventures can lead to human rights infringements and a deterioration of the status quo (Goldman, 2011). Insufficient or ineffective participation can also result in unfair deals for communities, as reported by Ogutu (2002), Rutten (2002; 2004),

Mwangi (2005) and Southgate (2006) regarding Eselenkei²⁴ and Kimana Conservancies which border Amboseli National Park in Southern Kenya. Interestingly, although “New Tourism” demands an effective, long-term partnership between the public and private sectors, no explicit reference is made to community participation in its definition (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 27-8).

It is particularly difficult for communities to maintain control and capture benefits in light of the dominant power of multinational hotel chains and holiday providers (Saarinen et al., 2011: 201). Telfer (2002: 344) questions whether those who have the power in the tourism industry will ever be willing to share this power with local communities in destinations, and whether the sharing of power will represent a meaningful partnership. Exemplifying this, the *Ecotourism and Community Benefits Report* analysed by Mbaria (2007) uses six partnership operations in Kenya to argue that communities have reaped minimal gain, instead ending up in “exploitative partnerships with various private investors”. If communities have secure rights over a resource critical to the tourism venture, such as land, they have more power to negotiate fairer agreements.

Within the literature on local participation in tourism, little consideration is given either to the degree of participation or who within communities should participate (Gauthier, 1993; Scheyvens, 2002; Garrod, 2003; Honey, 2008). Given the heterogeneity of communities, this is a significant omission. In Kimana, broad participation proved elusive owing to the highly fragmented community (Southgate, 2006). The political rifts between ethnic groups, clans and age sets resulted in the failure to capitalise on its immense ecotourism potential (ibid). De Kadt (1990: 30) also warns that “calls for community participation gloss over the well-known tendency for local elites to ‘appropriate’ the organs of participation for their own benefit”.

In the Eselenkei case, community members claim that they were merely informed of the ecotourism project rather than becoming involved in its development, as regular communication was only held with community leaders (Mwangi, 2005). The

²⁴ This is also sometimes spelt Selenkei, Selenkey or Selengei. The initiative was originally called a “Conservation Area” but later changed to “Conservancy”.

elections for these leaders were undemocratic and Mwangi (ibid) also suggests that they had been compromised by the tourism partner; thus the leaders were not accountable to the group ranch members (ibid). This enabled thriving corruption amongst the politically motivated leaders resulting in the lack of incentive for them to increase community involvement or to spread benefits more evenly (ibid: 63). Reviewers of this case study criticise KWS for failing to provide support during contract negotiations (Rutten, 2004) and the government for having no structures or watchdogs in place to assist the community (Mwangi, 2005: 62). Expanding on this, Ngunyi (2009) argues that an inadequate policy framework by some governments to guide the process also prevents the development potential of tourism from being fully realised. For example, in Kenya there are no clear structures or guidelines outlining how the local area should benefit from tourism ventures (ibid).

Although most tourism venture partnership agreements are drawn up by lawyers, and NGOs often take on a brokerage role, few have clear-cut criteria for sharing revenues between investors and local people (Mbaria, 2007). This ambiguity, and a lack of watchdogs, hinders the accrual of community benefits from projects and thus minimises any development impact (Mwangi, 2005: 62).

2.2.5.6 Unsustainability

The final key aspect identified from literature, which is a deterrent to positive tourism-development relationships, is unsustainability. Using the case of Tsiseb Conservancy in Namibia, Lapeyre (2010) shows that tourism income captured locally has improved rural households' livelihoods, generated linkages in the local economy, empowered rural actors through training and unlocked socioeconomic opportunities for the future. However, he questions the sustainability of such community tourism ventures due to competitiveness in the tourism industry, high costs, weak local capacities and inadequate support by donors and NGOs (ibid). Similarly, the impact of conservancies upon development in the long term will only be complete once the sustainability of the conservancies is understood.

In summary, when deciding whether to introduce tourism businesses, potential destinations in the developing world face a dilemma: tourism represents a potentially valuable development option, yet it is associated with a variety of costs or impacts

(Telfer and Sharpley, 2008: 28). Many of these echo the costs and impacts associated with community-based conservation, neoliberal conservation and PES schemes. What emerges from existing literature on tourism is a “set of interesting results and notions, which both support and challenge the connections between tourism and development and the new role of tourism in global development” (Saarinen et al., 2011: 202). It is essential not to accept at face value the tacit assumption that the new forms of conservation or tourism are both designed for, and will result in, addressing problems such as poverty through development (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 61).

2.2.6 Conservancies as Africapitalism

Conservation is not alone in adopting a neoliberal approach to try to achieve its needs through a mutually beneficial approach: development is following suit. Increasing attention is being paid to the idea of business as a solution (Blowfield, 2008). Concepts such as conscious capitalism and inclusive business strategies²⁵ are now widespread in the business arena (ibid). Organisations, including United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), are promoting business strategies for development. The Millennium Development Goals also refer to a “global partnership for development” (MDG 8) in which there is a role for companies. Africapitalism is a more specific branch within inclusive capitalism that brings back the importance of place within our globalised world. Tony Elumelu, the founder of the term, insists that Africapitalism is not capitalism with an African twist, but rather “an economic philosophy that embodies the private sector’s commitment to the economic transformation of Africa through investments that generate both economic prosperity and social wealth” (cited by Amaeshi, 2013). There are a multitude of ways in which this potential development power could be realised through such alternative approaches to capitalism, but as with community-based conservation and community-based ecotourism, despite this optimism, doubts and criticisms remain (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006; Karnani, 2009: 38).

If the conservancies are found to have a positive relationship with development, this will exemplify these notions and demonstrate that neoliberalism can target

²⁵ Inclusive business or inclusive capitalism are terms that have taken over from sustainable and responsible prefixes (Ashley 2009). They have less ethical connotations and a wider conceptual embrace (ibid).

development, as well as conservation, outcomes. This will be the focus of chapter eight. That chapter will also highlight similarities between the pros and cons of neoliberal approaches to both conservation and development, drawing upon findings presented throughout the thesis. In the broader sense, whilst this thesis examines grassroots perceptions of development, and the impact of conservancies upon this, it is simultaneously assessing grassroots perceptions of sustainable Africapitalism.

2.2.7 Literature Framework Conclusion

The literature framework identified in section 2.2 highlights fundamental existing literature and case studies that relate to the six core components of the conservancy concept in the Mara. These were: neoliberal conservation, community involvement, livelihoods, linking conservation and development, tourism businesses and Africapitalism. This literature framework will guide the direction of this thesis and, as highlighted, it has been particularly useful in identifying key issues and questions that should frame this research. During the subsequent chapters, this literature will be referred back to, expanded upon, and discussed in relation to the empirical findings of this study.

2.3 Research Questions

In order for this thesis to be undertaken efficiently, strictly defined research questions were used to limit the amount of data gathered and ensure that everything was appropriate to the research problem (Silverman, 2006). The research questions for this thesis emanate from the literature framework discussed throughout this chapter. They are:

1. How do stakeholders within the study site understand the term ‘development’?
2. What is the perceived relationship between the conservancies and development?
 - a. (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?
 - b. Why are they doing this?
 - c. Does this affect society evenly
3. How does this research relate to literature on sustainable forms of capitalism, including Africapitalism?

2.4 Thesis Structure

The thesis comprises an introduction (chapter one), this literature framework (chapter two), followed by six thematic chapters and then a conclusion. The six thematic chapters will all focus on a different area and will present empirical findings. In each chapter, these findings will be discussed in relation to the literature that forms the framework for this thesis. Table 2.1 below highlights some of the key aspects discussed within this literature framework. The structure of this thesis is based upon grouping these issues thematically. The table also highlights the chapter within which each point will be addressed.

Table 2.1 Literature Framework Summary

Key Features within the Literature Framework	Chapter Considered
Inconsistent definition of development	3
Little attention paid to the subjectivity and non-Western perspectives of impacts	3
Who are the actors who want to get involved in this area? Are traditional development actors as heavily involved in areas linked to conservation?	4,5
Motivation - is conservation or development prioritised? What are the motivations of the different actors involved?	4,5
Are there clear links between benefits and conservation goals? In actions, beliefs or perceptions?	4,5,6,7,8
What are the implications of nature becoming a commodity from which benefits are expected? Does this change how 'nature' is treated?	4,5,6,7,8
Quantity and distribution of benefits	5,6,7
What are the trade-offs and hard decisions needed between conservation and development?	5,6,7
What are revenues from conservancies being used for? Have livestock numbers changed since the creation of the conservancies? Are there any 'conservation backfires'?	5,6,7
How do access restrictions affect traditional resource users?	6
How can pastoralism survive on subdivided land with a rapidly increasing population?	6
Have conservancies heeded calls for greater incorporation of livestock and changed their approach to pastoralism? How are their policies regarding grazing perceived by conservancy stakeholders?	6
Do conservancies have a differential impact on the elite/non-elite, members/non-members and different genders?	7
Degree of participation or control by communities	7
What are the power relations between stakeholders? Who are the power brokers and how did they attain these positions? Do they benefit disproportionately? Are societal inequalities increasing?	7
How do general criticisms of capitalism reflect upon this case study?	8
Does this case study exemplify conscious capitalism and Africapitalism? If so, what can be learnt from this case study for these fields?	8
How sustainable are the conservancies in the Mara?	8

Chapter three focuses on the first research question and examines the concept of “development”. In recognition of the subjectivity of the issue and the importance for non-Western interpretations, this includes an overview of how development is interpreted by each of the stakeholder groupings active within the study site. Through an analysis of these grassroots perceptions, three key development indicators are identified. The indicators are selected to represent notions of development that are raised most frequently across the stakeholder categories. These, in the following four chapters, are then used to systematically assess the impact of the conservancies upon development, from the perspective of those directly involved with and affected by the conservancies. This middle section of the thesis contains the majority of the primary data and analysis addressing the second research question: perceived impacts of the conservancies upon development.

Chapter four examines the multiple actors involved in community development projects aimed at addressing basic needs such as education, health and clean water within the study site. It probes the relative involvement of each in this context and their motivations. Chapter five goes on to assess the success and limitations of some of these community development initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations. Chapter six looks more broadly at perceptions of how the conservancies affect the predominant livelihood, pastoralism. Chapter seven explores the economic implications of conservancies for individuals and households as well as issues pertaining to participation and power distribution.

Chapter eight explores the bigger implications of this research in relation to alternative capitalism, addressing the third research question. This includes a deliberation of the use of neoliberal approaches, such as inclusive business practices and the new concept of Africapitalism, to achieve conservation and development outcomes. This chapter also highlights some of the key threats facing the sustainability of conservancies within the Mara, and thus any resultant development.

The concluding chapter summarises the key findings in this thesis in relation to the research questions and literature framework. To end the thesis, the contribution to knowledge made for various audiences will be highlighted.

Because of the nature of this research, emphasis is placed upon commentary, thoughts and opinions from primary research participants. Where appropriate, direct quotes have been used to allow voices from the ground speak directly to the reader. Amongst these empirical findings, literature is brought in where it informs discussions generated from the fieldwork.

2.5 Anticipated Contribution to Knowledge

It is anticipated that each of the three research questions of this thesis will contribute something new and unique, either by taking a different approach that resolves current issues with existing studies, or filling in a gap in the literature. With regard to interpreting “development”, Telfer (2002: 339) questions the applicability of using a western framework to measure tourism’s impact on development in developing countries. Is it appropriate? “Should Western development concepts be utilised in non-western settings?” (ibid: 345). Existing research assumes that there is a definitive answer to what is development. As “development” is understood differently by different people, any impact on this notion is also constructed both individually and socially. Existing case studies on this topic have not fully acknowledged this subjectivity. Using indicators determined from understandings of development by those directly involved within the study site, this thesis will address this literary gap and add a new dimension to current discussions.

The strengths of this research are rooted in the emphasis on interpretive paradigm and qualitative methodology, in which voice is given to local people and stakeholders. This study aims to provide a broader view of stakeholders’ understandings and perceptions of the conservancies’ role in development, as opposed to earlier works in the Mara. A key strength is enhancing the focus beyond the loudest voices to include those who are often excluded. Further, as discussed in chapter one, this thesis utilises visual ethnography methods in a new context.

Telfer (2002: 348) states: “more research is needed not only on the goals of development but also on how tourism can be used to reach those goals effectively”. Although tourism is only one component of the conservancy concept, the second research question will provide a new case study that assesses the impact of conservancies upon context-specific development goals. As previously mentioned,

given the importance of the context for potential impacts, linkages can only be pieced together through case studies. With the proliferation of conservancies in Kenya as well as Africa more generally, it has become increasingly important to measure the impact that they have upon their widely advertised community development objectives.

Broader ramifications of the research are explored by linking findings to notions of conscious capitalism, inclusive business strategies and Africapitalism. This is a new approach for research on tourism. Making linkages between disciplines is not only beneficial to this thesis. As will be seen in chapter eight, this case study also augments discussions on Africapitalism within the business studies arena.

3 Interpreting Development

In order to assess perceptions of the relationship between the conservancies and development in the Maasai Mara, it is first essential to acknowledge the subjectivity of the term ‘development’, its Western bias, and discuss how the term is interpreted within the study site. The importance of this was stressed in chapter two, where the inconsistent definition of development was one of the six identified threats regarding tourism’s contribution to development. This chapter will address the first research question: how do stakeholders within the study site understand the term “development”?

Development is a complex, multidimensional concept that seems to defy definition (Cowen and Shenton, 1996: 3; Telfer and Sharpley, 2008:6). It is socially constructed in nature, and means different things to different people (Wall, 1997:34). These meanings change over time (ibid). Early formulations focused primarily on the economic aspects and measurements of development, but definitions have since broadened (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008:15). Development has come to be used as a philosophy, a process, a plan and a product; but these perspectives are not distinct and overlap to a considerable degree (Wall, 1997:34-35). There has also been a tendency for the discourse on development to swing from one grand narrative to another, reflecting the prevailing political economies that underpin the promotion of these ideas (Parnwell, 2002; Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 36). As a result, policy-orientated judgements sometimes obscure the success of projects (Mosse, 2005). Even if the desired project outcomes are achieved, these are only positively acknowledged if they still fit into the dominant policy model (ibid). In addition to these complexities in defining development, many commentators – especially post-developmentalists – emphasise that development has a built-in Western bias (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 31-2). This is because the vast majority of development theories and policies are fashioned by the West – dominated global institutions, governments, agencies and academe (ibid).

As noted in chapter two, this thesis concurs with Telfer (2002: 339) who challenges whether Western development concepts should be utilised in non-western settings. Moving away from Western-designed definitions of development, this research

empirically examines how development is interpreted by different stakeholders active within the study site. Understandings of development differ between stakeholders, and stakeholder categories are not homogenous in their interpretations. Yet some shared perspectives can be identified within categories (which will be outlined in table 3.1).

The aim of this thesis is to assess the impact that the conservancies are having upon development within the study site. It is not feasible to assess the extent to which conservancies influence every aspect within every interpretation of development noted by every stakeholder. Consequently, prominent themes will be identified from these multi-stakeholder definitions to form key development indicators. Assessing the impact of conservancies on Western notions of development may not resonate with those directly affected by the conservancies. Using development indicators generated from local interpretations makes the research more specific and relevant to the study site. This is especially important considering that the continuation and success of the conservancies depends upon the contentment of these stakeholders. Before stakeholders' perceptions of development are analysed, some key terms require clarification.

Throughout this thesis, the terms “grassroots”, “local”, “community”, “community leaders” and “stakeholders” are used. These terms are not easily defined; however, the context in which they are used within this thesis can be outlined. “Grassroots” is a term often associated with aid and development to denote an initiative coming from the ground up, as opposed to top-down. In this thesis it is used more generally to indicate what is happening on the ground at a local level within the study site, as opposed to district, regional or national levels. For the purposes of this research, “local” is delineated as the study site and its immediate surroundings. In total, this is approximately 1000km². “Community” refers to residents brought together by living in the same area or village. Villages are either formed by groups of homesteads,²⁶ or multiple individuals living in close proximity in more urban environments. House styles range from those made of mud and cow dung surrounded by acacia thorn

²⁶ A homestead is a cluster of huts that use one communal livestock enclosure. This is usually comprised of one man, his wives, children and parents/parents-in-law, although sometimes there are multiple families within one homestead.

circular fences, to iron sheet constructions and, on occasion, cement or stone houses. Scattered around the study site are a few small shopping centres, usually clustered close to a school or health centre. These shops are often managed by people of Somali decent as well as those of other heritages within Kenya. Larger urban centres border the study site, including Nkoilale, Sekenani, Talek and Aitong. The term “community leaders” refers to both formal and informal leaders within a community. In many cases, these are respected elders. Yet increasingly educated young men, including those who have been through Koiyaki Guiding School (KGS), are included in this category. Leaders are given respect and power by the wider community which results in them having decision-making powers. It is very rare for women to be classified as community leaders, but female individuals are identified as group leaders or facilitators in the context of women’s groups.

As noted in footnote two, a ‘stakeholder’ is defined as “any group or individual who can affect or who is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 25). In this research, this refers to individuals within the study site who are actively involved in either communities or conservancies. Despite the difficulties of grouping people into categories in heterogeneous societies, this can be useful as a way to examine, discuss and compare common themes - in this instance, interpretations of development. The stakeholder categories used to analyse interpretations of development are outlined in table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1 Stakeholder Categories

Category	Source	Details
Male community members	10 focus groups, 7 camera participants	Maasai men residing within the study site.
Male community leaders	36 interviews	Male Maasai community leaders residing within the study site. This ranges from those with village level authority to elected area councillors.
Female community members	18 focus groups, 4 interviews, 13 camera participants	Maasai women residing within the study site.
Relatively educated women	9 interviews	Maasai women residing within the study site who have, at minimum, completed secondary school.
Conservancy managers	5 interviews	Two white Kenyan men.
Tourism industry	28 interviews	With the exception of two camp managers who are black Kenyans, all other camp managers and tourism partners are white. These are a combination of South African, European and Kenyan nationals. All tourism partners were men.
NGO employees and researchers	38 interviews	Men and women who are white European, white Kenyan or black Kenyans. With one exception, those in the highest positions are white.

3.1 Stakeholders' Perceptions of Development

Discussing development issues with Maasai participants is complicated by there being no word for “development” in Maa. Maasai people have adopted the Swahili word for development, “*maendeleo*”, and modified it slightly to “*emaendeleo*”. This term has inherent positive and appealing connotations. For example, it is used alongside “paradise”, “glory” and “joy” in both its Swahili and Maa forms as common names for shops and hotels in Narok town (figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1 Use of Term "Maendeleo" in Narok

The word for “change” in Maa, “*ebelekeny*”, was often used by research participants in conversation. When asked, some people (including FG 1, 12, 14, 15, 17) perceived a difference between development and change, and so the term “*ebelekeny*” was not used by myself or my research assistants. To break down the task of defining a complex abstract term such as development, research participants were encouraged to give examples of what they saw as development. This generated discussions. I asked open questions regarding what development means to them as individuals. Research participants were not given a set of options for the definition of development. If participants were still unsure how to respond, I asked: “If you were writing a dictionary definition of development, what would you write?” Interpretations of development presented by each stakeholder category will now be discussed.

3.1.1 Male Community Members

The individual definitions of development given by male community members contained common elements. These included meeting basic needs, especially education. Three focus groups with men (18, 22, 26) specified that they supported education in order to increase the power and control held by their families. They believed that their children, if educated, once grown could get jobs, for example in tourism. This means that their children could gain some control, become leaders, and then bring change back to their communities (ibid). These stakeholders also emphasised that development is the physical construction of classrooms and clinics, as well as improved access to grazing for their livestock. This could be expressed as increased livelihood security. FG 22 identified improvements in livestock breeds and enclosures as other examples of development. Land subdivision was discussed by many male focus groups, with some people seeing it as a positive change, and others as negative. In light of this, FG 1 noted that the conservancies are contributing to development by bringing the community back together following land individualisation. Male community members were one of the many stakeholder categories that stressed the importance of economic aspects of development: specifically direct financial payments such as, conservancy rents, employment and small scale businesses – including cultural villages.²⁷

3.1.2 Male Community Leaders

In addition to the construction of new facilities such as schools and clinics, male Maasai community leaders noted the need for higher quality facilities. Unlike male community members, who did not mention any negative aspects, male leaders indicated that development is not always positive. They highlighted the social problems brought by the creation and expansion of trading centres, for example, the large number of bars (I 85) as well as land sales to ‘outsiders’ (I 87). Two trained safari guides who now focus on community work, Nelson Kirrokor (I 64) and Dominic Koya (I 84), included in their definitions of development attaining the knowledge needed to identify and utilise existing resources (including land and wildlife). More generally, male community leaders emphasised the role of conservancies in development; this is not surprising considering the favourable links

²⁷ These are villages visited by tourists, for a fee. They are discussed further in chapter seven.

between many community leaders and the conservancies. The chairman of Naboisho Conservancy's LandCO, John Sengeny (I 86), suggested that development is an end point or target to be achieved. In his opinion, the area is currently not developed and the conservancies should address this. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) disagreed with the notion of development as a fixed target, and instead advocated that it is a continual process of meeting needs. He elaborated that, once these needs are met, you then get other needs and the more that you "develop", the more needs you seem to get (ibid).

3.1.3 Female Community Members

Unlike their male counterparts, the vast majority of focus groups with female community members identified women's groups and the microfinance project as examples of development. In addition, female community members discussed ways in which development is changing their culture, in both positive and negative ways. This was not mentioned by male community members. FG 9 suggested that negative cultural changes include the loss of respect and women wearing provocative clothing. FG 27 explained that women's priorities have also changed. When their mothers were their age, the focus was looking after livestock, but now women want jobs and to ensure their children are educated (ibid). FG 3 noted that their interpretations of development – which focused on the importance of schools, hospitals, drilling for water and women's groups – have evolved from what NGOs have told them. One woman said: "people come and ask... do you have xyz... and they told us this is what development is" (ibid). In addition to the construction of facilities, this category identified the need to move beyond just having the buildings, and rather concentrated on their outputs such as health care and education or knowledge (FG 12, 17). Looking to the future, the most commonly-cited developments desired by female community members were cultural villages where they can sell their beadwork, or alternative ways to sell their homemade wares to tourists (FG 4, 6, 13, 15, 17, 19, 25).

3.1.4 Relatively Educated Maasai Women

As with female focus groups with community members, educated Maasai women's development definitions also highlighted the importance of working with women. They believe that there has been a gradual increase in empowerment and self-

sustainability; this is due to education, along with outreach projects, microfinance and the employment of women (I 13, 49, 62). Grace Naisinya (I 62) highlighted that one of the main changes that she has seen over her lifetime is the attitude towards education. Families are no longer reluctant to send children to school (ibid). Teriano Soit was one of the first girls in the study area to be formally educated and, as a law student at Nairobi University, is now a role model to other Maasai girls and their families (ibid). Despite this focus on formal education, in her own interview Teriano highlighted the importance of Maasai people also maintaining traditional knowledge (I 13). She noted that the opening of clinics is a positive development, but she would like to see this combined with traditional medicines (ibid).

Outreach worker Sarah Liaram compared the Naboisho area before the conservancy with the present day. She said that an example of development that she has seen is the coming of tourism activities (I 49). To her, tourism's involvement in development has "empowered the people around" (ibid). This is because the subsequent assistance and incomes are enabling people to educate their own children (ibid). She concluded that the resultant development is increasing the self-sufficiency of families as "if the conservancy wasn't there you would have to rely on donor funding" (ibid).

3.1.5 Conservancy Managers

Both conservancy managers (I 76, 81) indicated that education must be an important aspect of development, but urged that alongside this, traditional knowledge must be recognised. They both emphasised that development should not be defined by the 'West', as the Maasai are inextricably linked to their environment and culture (ibid). Rob O'Meara noted the importance of pastoralism but stressed that development should be locally defined (I 81). He summarised: "I would define development as a long-term security of the Maasai culture and lifestyle, if that is what they want" (ibid).

3.1.6 Tourism Industry

Camp managers and tourism partners are grouped into the category "tourism industry". Within this, three people (I 4, 72, 73) used the term "basic needs" in their definition of development. Similarly, another popular response was the construction

and improvement of community facilities such as schools, clinics, water projects and churches (I 14, 16, 21, 70). These were perceived to be the developmental desires of the local communities (I 15, 82). Similarly, the outputs of these facilities in terms of education, training and healthcare were seen to be important (I 14, 16, 21, 73). Respondents gave several differing motivations for prioritising education. These included empowerment (I 74), the ability to expand options such as employment (I 56), starting businesses (I 21), and learning better ways of doing things (I 73). Two tourism partners suggested that economic measures of development are not appropriate in the Mara context (I 56, 70). Despite this, money-earning opportunities were widely cited as examples of development. These included direct rental payments, employment (I 56, 73, 88), businesses resulting from microfinance schemes and beading for the women (I 21). Three tourism partners - Svein Wilhelmsen (I 56), Greg Monsen (I 70) and Sean Anderson (I 72) - stressed that they do not believe that development should equate to westernisation. This is because traditions remain important (ibid), it cannot be assumed what is desired, and so people should decide development paths for themselves (I 70). Svein Wilhelmsen (I 56) suggested that people living around the conservancies could be classed as richer than “we are” in terms of enjoying life. Greg Monsen concurred:

We rush in and say everyone should be educated and developed but why are they worse off than a lot of other people? It is chilled out; you’ve got your cows and your family (I 70).

Svein also highlighted that, although 70% of Maasai in the area live below the UN definition of poverty, this figure is an “over-exaggeration” as it does not adequately take into account livestock (I 56). Gerard Beaton said that, to him as a tourism partner, given the pastoralist nature of the communities, development should include “working with them to develop the true potential of that livestock” (I 21). A desire was expressed amongst tourism stakeholders that a long-term holistic approach to development needs to be taken (I 56). The aim of this approach is self-sustainability (I 21, 73), through a focus on the environment, resources, conservation and wildlife (I 15, 21, 72, 73, 74, 88). Such notions are in line with a sustainable development approach. This was most clearly expressed by tourism partner Garry Cullan who said: “development is improving conditions and issues for the benefit of as many people as possible without detracting from things that could damage the environment

or living situations” (I 15). Two people in this category mentioned the development of towns and centres in the Mara, and both perceived it as a negative aspect of development (I 21, 88).

3.1.7 NGOs and Researchers

The final stakeholder group is that of NGO workers and researchers. This group is largely made up of white Kenyans and Europeans, plus a few non-Maasai Kenyans and Dickson Kaelo (who is also included in the male community leader category). Interpretations of development expressed by this category are most similar to those of tourism industry stakeholders. They concur that environmental conservation should be an integral aspect of development, alongside the sustainable use of resources (I 44, 69, 80). Allan Earnshaw pointed out that combining this with human development can be a challenge, and difficult balances need to be found (I 69). These stakeholders agreed that centres such as Talek are examples of “bad” development (I 75, 78, 80). Instead of directly changing cultures, it was suggested that development initiatives should concentrate on educating people (I 75); for example, by ensuring that girls attend school, and helping women learn about saving and investing money (I 78). With the exception of Dickson noting the importance of improving the accessibility of health care and education, the construction of facilities was not included in definitions or examples of development amongst NGO employees and researchers. This was surprising, considering the popularity amongst NGOs of infrastructure as community projects (as will be discussed in chapter five).

As with the tourism industry category, there was a desire to move away from conventional definitions of development, particularly amongst researchers and high-level individuals within conservancy-affiliated NGOs. Similarities with Sen’s (1999) capability as freedom approach were expressed. Researcher Niels Mogensen (I 80) stated: “we should stop comparing the lives of the Maasai to our own”. Terry Davidson (I 75) elaborated that development should move away from assessing poverty by material possessions, and instead look at the quality of life and ability to make choices. In line with this, Lars Lindkvist (I 31) and Nathaniel Robinson (I 36) defined development as the freedom to make choices and live the life desired. Similarly, Ben Skelton defined poverty as the lack of this freedom (I 58). To Lars,

poverty was a lack of alternatives, for example a reliance on a single livelihood (I 31). In this stakeholder group, there was an agreement across the board that development is a process with no end goal.

3.1.8 Discussion: Stakeholders' Interpretations of Development

Although categories were not homogenous in their understandings, it is clear that different stakeholder groups have differing interpretations of development. The main implication of definitions differing between stakeholders is that actions undertaken by one actor with the intention of being development may not be seen as such by other stakeholders. Consequently, it is important to be aware of the different ways in which development is understood, and the nature of the development paths desired by the stakeholders being targeted. With the exception of the tourism industry and NGO categories, most research participants did not appear to have a detailed knowledge of global development theories and approaches. NGOs are required to be aware of dominant approaches as they are answerable to their funders, and thus need to emulate current notions. This echoes Mosse's (2005) proposition that the success of development actions are determined by their reflection of the current dominant development approach.

As will be discussed further in chapter four, conservancy-affiliated organisations (included in the NGO category) are widely seen to be the main development actor within the study site. These organisations have a particularly complex matrix of motivational considerations regarding development actions, as they have to satisfy multiple stakeholders. As with all NGOs, they must please their donors. But due to their involvement in the conservancies, they must also focus on the environment, conservation and livestock to satisfy the conservancy managers and the tourism industry. In addition to this, these organisations must appease the communities and meet their expectations. These competing objectives are not always harmonious and hard decisions and trade-offs are likely, as discussed by McShane et al. (2011). These multiple motivating factors may be one reason why conservancy-affiliated organisations continue to undertake infrastructure projects, such as the construction of schools and clinics, despite it differing from their own stated understandings of development. Tourism partner Garry Cullen (I 15) explained: "schools, dispensaries

and water are issues of great interest to the community and we need to address that”. This is a cyclical process as the conservancy-affiliated organisations are undertaking initiatives that they expect will meet the desires of the local communities. Simultaneously, these community members are moulding their interpretations of development based on “good things that we have seen” (FG 1, 3, 11, 15). This issue will be considered again in chapter five.

3.2 Development Indicators

So far, this chapter has explored the complexities involved in defining development through an analysis of interpretations by stakeholders active within the study. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, it is necessary to extract key indicators against which the conservancies can be assessed. These development indicators are needed in order to answer the second research question regarding the relationship between the conservancies and development. It is not feasible to evaluate every aspect identified by every stakeholder; the identification of three key common features within the stakeholders’ definitions enables the conservancies to be assessed against manageable indicators. Rather than ignoring the subjectivity of the issue and focusing on Western-based definitions, these indicators importantly reflect the perspectives of stakeholders within the study site. Telfer (2002) notes that definitions of development can be restrictive – with economic benefits receiving the most attention – but this approach ensures that the research assesses the impact of conservancies against how development is interpreted within the study site.

In order to select three key development indicators from the stakeholder’ definitions of development, common themes were identified. These themes were those that were mentioned most frequently, and spanned multiple stakeholder categories.

The first key component is that of meeting basic needs such as education, health care and clean water through community projects. This analysis will take place at the community scale. Chapter four will identify key actors involved in community development initiatives and discuss their motivations as well as highlighting the complexities brought by the multiplicity of actors within the study site. Possible causes for this actor matrix will be discussed. Chapter five will then assess the

success of the outputs and outcomes of some projects undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations.

The second key indicator identified is that of livelihoods, specifically pastoralism and livestock. Male community members, in particular, defined development as access to grazing for livestock, and advancements in livestock keeping. More broadly, community members (including FG 18, 19, 20) emphasised that, although development is desired, this must not come at the expense of their traditional livelihood. It is therefore important to assess the effect of the conservancies on pastoralism within the study site. Chapter six will concentrate on this.

The third and final indicator is economic implications. Different stakeholder groups raised different economic aspects, but the vast majority included some form of money-earning activities as examples of development. This was often in the form of land rental payments, employment or – for the women – microfinance and selling beadwork. Chapter seven will be devoted to this economic implications indicator.

4 Community Development Actors

As determined in chapter three, addressing basic needs through community projects is a key development indicator for the study site. Recent studies on the Mara Conservancies (see Bedelian, 2012; Snider, 2012; Osano et al., 2013) have largely ignored community initiatives. Instead, authors have concentrated on the environment, economy and livelihoods. The direction of this study was determined by stakeholders' own interpretations of development and community projects were the most frequently cited example of development. This secured its inclusion as a key development indicator for this thesis.

This chapter, and chapter five, will examine community development initiatives within the study site. Their aim is to meet basic needs through the provision of health care, water, capacity building and the advancement of education. Locally, the development of such facilities is commonly referred to simply as "projects". The link between the term "development" and these projects was reinforced by answers in focus groups to the question "who has been involved in development in this area?" Responses to this question centred around who had undertaken community projects, as opposed to any other form of development.

Many different actors are involved in development projects within the study site. This chapter will outline the perceived involvement of each actor noted by research participants. The literature framework for this thesis emphasised the importance of assessing which actors are involved where both conservation and development objectives are targeted. For example do traditional development actors have the same level of involvement as elsewhere in Kenya or are conservation organisations playing the main role in development? An examination of this may reflect implications of the commodification of nature through which benefits are expected from it. Perceptions regarding the degree of involvement by tourism-specific actors will then be discussed.

Once the actors involved in development are identified it is also important to examine their motivations, whether these are primarily conservation or development based and how motivations differ between actors. These findings will then be analysed further, with a focus on the matrix of actors involved in community projects

in the Mara. Chapter five will then concentrate on examples of community initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations. This chapter contributes towards the second research question: “What is the perceived relationship between the conservancies and development?” It is only by examining the role of all actors active within the study site that the relative significance of the conservancies in development projects can be assessed.

The state, religious organisations, communities and NGOs are commonly involved in development projects across Kenya. Within the study site, in addition to these actors, conservancy-affiliated organisations and tourists are heavily involved. The conservancies and their affiliates are widely perceived by research participants as the most significant development actors in the area at present. One prominent exception to this viewpoint was a local councillor, Ole Ketuyo (I 30), who claimed that the government and communities are responsible for community development projects in the area. He stated that conservancies were “only here for profit” (ibid).

The head teacher of Aitong Primary School (I 86) suggested that the actors involved in community projects have evolved over time: “projects like schools began originally with the community and then the government helped us through CDF²⁸ and at the moment the Obel Foundation²⁹ have done several things in Aitong”. Mechanica Lolkumum, a community leader and elder in Endoinyo e Rinka, agreed that previously councillors and occasionally the MP assisted with the schools in the area. He purports, however, that: “today it is OOC³⁰ and Basecamp³¹ that are helping us the most” (CP 16). More detailed discussions of perceptions regarding the roles played by seven development actors within the study site will now be discussed, beginning with the state.

4.1 The State

Many study site residents are very frustrated by the lack of development assistance from their national government: “They [the government] have done nothing here; it

²⁸ Constituency Development Fund, started in 2003 by the national government to support grassroots development projects.

²⁹ The Obel Foundation donated \$1million to Mara North Conservancy (MNC) to assist with community development projects.

³⁰ Referring to OOMT.

³¹ Referring to BCFK.

is only the white people who are helping us” (FG 22). Criticisms encompass all levels of government, but the MP receives the most criticism. FG 3 noted: “We don’t think that the MP knows that this place exists”. The local councillor, Ole Ketuyo, did have a few supporters amongst local residents. One person in FG 3 suggested: “The key community person for development is the councillor”. Two other focus groups with women (17, 21) also praised Ole Ketuyo for his development work, especially at their schools.

It is interesting to note that Mbitin and Olkuroto villages, where these two cited meetings were held, have the two poorest-quality schools³² in the area - despite them being amongst the oldest. These two schools have received minimal support from conservancy-affiliated organisations. OOMT did earmark a large amount of funding for Olkuroto School, but this was reallocated to Endoinyo e Rinka following disagreements with the head teacher (FG 21; I 3). There is a correlation between the perceptions of development actors and degree of support given. Therefore, minimal involvement by conservancy-affiliated organisations in a community, regardless of cause, results in anomalous perceptions that the state is the main development actor. In concurrence with observed correlation, women in Olkuroto explained the logic behind citing the councillor as the major development actor in their area: “our school has only been supported by Ole Ketuyo and ourselves over the last 10 years” (FG 21). These two communities also expressed some of the most negative attitudes towards the conservancies and wildlife. This advocates that developmental assistance by conservancy-affiliated organisations may improve community members’ opinions of conservancies, and wildlife more generally. This backs-up the notion that benefits need to be distributed in order to gain support.

Focus group participants only assessed the actors who have worked within their own villages. They did not acknowledge projects that the conservancies have done in neighbouring communities until specifically asked. Once this issue was raised, a sense of jealousy was expressed that the conservancies were involved in the schools in those areas and, as a result, they were able to reach a higher standard (FG 16). FG

³² This is in my personal opinion and was assessed on the condition and size of the school in addition to the quality of teaching and grades achieved.

14 expanded: “we do not know why they [the conservancy-affiliated organisations] help the people in those villages but not our own. What have we done?”

Research participants (including FG 17; CP 4, 14, 16) highlighted that one of the main roles undertaken by the government is the employment of teachers. Councillor Ole Ketuyo explained that this is one way in which he is bringing development to these communities. He was adamant that all teachers employed by the county council are fully qualified, adding: “They are trained teachers and nowadays we do not want the teachers who are not trained. If you are just from secondary school we cannot agree with that” (I 30). Contradicting this, one of the camera project participants (anon 4) told me that two of his children, who have only completed primary school, are employed by the county council as teachers within the study site. A teacher at another school (anon 5) explained:

The county council can only employ local people who have not been to college, and normally we have only completed standard eight.³³ No trained teachers will work for the 6,800 [KES (\$80) per month] that they pay (ibid).

In comparison, the central government employs trained teachers for KES 15,000 (\$170) per month (ibid).

Interviews with head teachers of all public schools within and bordering the study site revealed that on average only 42% of teachers are employed by the Teacher Service Commission (TSC) of the central government (i.e., are trained teachers) (I 19, 38, 41, 51, 52, 54, 60, 61). A third of teachers are paid via the county council (some of whom have received some training).³⁴ The remaining quarter are paid by parents, with few of these teachers having received any training (ibid). In some of the smaller schools, there is only one trained teacher in the entire institution. Primary education in Kenya is theoretically free.³⁵ Yet the severe lack of teachers paid for by the state has resulted in the majority of schools within the study site demanding payments of approximately KES 300 (\$3.50) per child per term from parents. Talek

³³ Standard eight is the final year of primary school at the end of which students sit the KCPE (Kenya Certificate of Primary Education) examination, which determines whether students can progress onto secondary school.

³⁴ Several head teachers stressed the unreliability of this income source. When payments are delayed or do not come at all, parents have to pay the remaining wages otherwise the teachers do not come into school.

³⁵ In 2003 President Kibaki re-introduced free primary education, and in Kenya’s new constitution of 2010, primary education was declared free and compulsory (Article 53).

Primary, the only school that did not charge a fee at the time they were interviewed, indicated that they would start doing so the following year to pay for additional teachers (I 38).

The overwhelming opinion within focus groups and key stakeholder interviews was that it was the state that should be responsible for bringing development projects to the area. FG 14 said: “This is all the work of the MP and the councillors but they are not doing the work that they are supposed to be”. John Sankok, the director of Christian Missionary Fellowship (CMF), pointed out: “There is not even a single government [health] facility in Koiyaki” (I 26). Community members claimed that they have asked the government for help, “so many times until we have become very tired” (I 14). FG 11 added: “The only way that we can get them to do something is to go and stand before them and keep reminding them”. There is a sense of betrayal as, “When they’re not looking for votes, they forget about us” (FG 3). Several participants (including FG 3, 14, 15, 22; I 37) noted that when campaigning, politicians come and make promises, but once they are elected they disappear. FG 22 explained:

At the moment the MPs are trying to do projects³⁶ because the elections are coming up but as soon as they are elected they go and sleep for four years until they want re-electing.

When I asked focus group participants how the role of the government in the Mara compares to elsewhere, their responses often expressed uncertainty. For example FG 24 said: “We are not aware of other places as we have not been to the other side”. Most of the community members included in this study said that they have travelled as far as Narok town (three hours drive away), with the exception of some elderly women. The majority have not been any further than this, nor do they believe that they have spent sufficient time elsewhere to assess what the government has done there. Individual exceptions to this were able to make some interesting comparisons. Nairobi University student Teriano Soit believes that the government should be involved in local development projects because “the Mara is still part of Kenya. In fact the government and the county council should be doing more for us than anyone else [because of all of the money earned from the Mara]” (I 13). Teriano did not

³⁶ For example Naserian School, near Osilale, was expanded shortly before the election by Ole Tunai, who was campaigning for Governor (FG 24).

think that the government was living up to this responsibility because “the community itself is largely illiterate and so they don’t know their rights and what should be given to them and so they are reluctant” (ibid).

Supporting Teriano’s thoughts, Gert Bomhof (I 24) – the founder of Stichting Nkoilale³⁷ – noted that he has to constantly push his local partners to make demands on their leaders, as it is not something that they do of their own accord. Similarly, as part of the water project in Endoinyo e Rinka, it is Dig Deep who suggested that the community should apply for CDF funding, and then got the papers together for the application (I 58). Anna Banyard, who facilitated Endoinyo e Rinka’s water project, noted:

I don’t think it’s a lack of knowledge as they are very aware of the CDF and that they can ask their MPs for money but there is lack of initiative and perhaps overreliance [on other people and institutions] that is stopping them doing this themselves (I 1).

One of my research assistants, Lorna Serseri, explained that a large proportion of state funding is directed back to the home areas of politicians, and so many people feel as though an area can only develop if a politician comes from your locale (I 14). At the national scale, it is alleged that presidents direct assistance back to their home areas and favour their own ethnic group. Councillor Ole Ketuyo was optimistic that devolution,³⁸ following the adoption of Kenya’s new constitution in 2010, will increase the state financial support for the Mara:

Before all of the money had to go through the government and the president is someone who decides where the money goes, if he is a Kikuyu it goes to that area, if he is a Kalenjin it goes to that area but now the money is divided equally. And so now I think that this area will get a lot more (I 30).

Conservancy manager Justin Heath was more uncertain about how devolution will change state involvement in development. He expected that it may “change a bit with this devolution, but now you are giving a lot of power to one governor... I think we’re just going to find the same problem of corruption” (I 76). Lorna agreed that, in

³⁷ Stichting Nkoilale is a Dutch NGO, started by a tourist, which is working with Nkoilale Community Development Organisation to promote development in Nkoilale.

³⁸ Kenya’s 2010 constitution called for devolution to county governments. These county assemblies are run by elected governors and senators (elected in March 2013) as well as appointed executive committees. According to Elias Wakhisi, a programme officer at The Institute for Social Accountability (TISA) (May, 2013), the aim of devolution is to “bring services, resources and power closer to the people. And this power means that citizens will be able to make decisions about aspects and issues affecting them directly”.

addition to the misappropriation of funds at the national level, it is also occurring at the regional level through MPs and councillors taking “their turn to eat” (I 14) (see Wrong, 2010). For example, in her hometown of Ololulunga, a new clinic was built by the county council because the current councillor is from that area “and so he had to build a clinic there” (ibid).

More generally, community leaders (I 8, 23, 26, 48, 84) blame the minor involvement of the government in community projects in the Mara on its distance from Nairobi, and low population density. In addition, it was expressed that low education levels have resulted in poor leadership, representation and relatively few powerful Maasai politicians able to fight for the provision of resources (I 48, 69; FG 14, 18, 26). In the state’s defence, teacher Mike Kahiga (I 44) pointed out that the nomadic nature of the Maasai, which continued up until land individualisation and sedentisation, made it difficult for the government to provide services such as education and health care.

Councillor Ole Ketuyo (I 30) proposed that the communities bordering the Maasai Mara are more developed than interior areas of Narok District, and that the schools in the area have improved. He suggested that there are two reasons for this: direct support from tourists, and the wards neighbouring the reserve purposefully being given a higher share of the 19% funding.³⁹ Although recognising state funding sources, a young community leader (anon 6) blames corruption within district (now county) finances for the state’s inadequate involvement in the Mara:

I am sure we do get some money from CDF but we don’t know where it goes – you can see one or two classrooms but the rest disappears. There is no proper management of those funds, they are disappearing like the 19%.

Another source concurred, stating:

The politicians pocket everything, the CDF money, the whole lot goes. They are the ones who are driving this poor Maasai image. They try to get donors to put money in so that they can then steal that too and blame the *wazungu*⁴⁰ for not putting it in (anon 3).

³⁹ As discussed in chapter two, 19% of the revenue from the Maasai Mara National Reserve is theoretically placed in a fund to be distributed to the surrounding communities through projects and scholarships. There are grave doubts regarding the percentage that actually reaches this fund, and how it is distributed.

⁴⁰ Swahili term for white people.

In summary, the majority of research participants assert that the state is playing a relatively minor role in the Mara. Maasai academic and conservationist Dickson Kaelo (I 48) concurred with FGs 3 and 18: they felt that, even if other organisations were not helping and they were forced to take their complaints to the politicians, they would still not get any help, just as before. On the other hand, some participants argued that the reason that the state is not heavily involved within the study site is because there are other organisations doing it for them. Lincoln Njiru (I 39) proposed that CDF are active at his hometown of Embu because they do not have many other organisations working there, unlike the Mara. Similarly, Niels Mogensen, who has undertaken research in the Mara for over eight years, stated that the government merely wait until they realise that no one else is going to intervene; it is only then when they might step up (I 80).

Despite a poor general perception of the role of the state in development within the study site, Councillor Ole Ketuyo was keen to take full credit for projects that the government contributed to - in the form of CDF, 19% of county council funding. For example, he told me that the water project in Endoinyo e Rinka was funded by CDF (I 30), whereas this contribution only amounted to 10% of the total project costs (I 1). This insistence by a government official that conservancies are not beneficial for development contradicts national policy. Similarly, from his research in Ghana, (Sonne, 2010: 240). concluded that the government tends to place emphasis on benefits of tourism at the national level, rather than at the local level.

4.2 Religious Organisations

Compared to other areas in Kenya, religious organisations (defined as NGOs or community groups with religious underpinnings) are also perceived to be playing a relatively minimal role in community development in the Mara. Aside from traditional Maasai beliefs, the predominant religion within the study site is Christianity. In the CMMF survey (Courtney, 2012) of women belonging to microfinance groups, one quarter indicated that they follow traditional beliefs, and three quarters classified themselves as Christian. These figures from the women's groups, however, are not likely to be representative of the study site as a whole as more woman than men attend church (FG 4, 5, 17, 20, 21, 24). Mainstream Christian

denominations, such as Catholicism, Baptism and Methodism, are not active within Koiyaki. Outside of the study area, there are Christian missionaries based at Sekenani who occasionally assist with projects, for example by welding solar panels (FG 3). The closest Catholic Church is in Lemek. Within the study site, the only church buildings are at Nkoilale and Endoinyo e Rinka.⁴¹ In all other communities, church services are held in school classrooms with pastors travelling to villages for services (FG 1). FG 27 in Nkoilale noted: “The church is not doing anything for us here yet, we are the ones who are contributing to the construction of the church by selling our cows”.

There is one religious organisation, Christian Missionary Fellowship (CMF), active in the area. The director of their health ministries (I 26) explained that, when funders build a clinic, CMF then provides the staff and ensures that it is sustainable and operational. When discussing the role of the church or religious organisations in development, no community members mentioned CMF. This suggests that either they are not visible, or that the Christian aspect of the organisation may not be widely understood. The most cited role of religion in development was in an educational capacity, teaching moral behaviour (FG 13, 19, 21, 26). This includes advising people “how to live a good life” (FG 1), and to prevent “evil things like alcohol” (I 33) and “men beating their wives” (FG 13).

This minimal involvement contrasts with that of the church in development elsewhere in Kenya, especially Central Province. Teacher Mike Kahiga (I 44), who is from Nakuru, explained:

At my home the church is very involved in development, especially in terms of education. We have a number of schools that are run by missionaries, both primary and secondary... and a number of clinics that have been constructed through the churches.

Dickson Kaelo (I 48) believes that there are several key reasons for this geographical inequality within Kenya:

Initially the colonial government made sure that outsiders were not permitted into the Maasai reserve so it is only after independence that the first missionaries started coming into Maasailand while in Central Kenya and other places in this county, the colonialists came with the missionaries and

⁴¹ There was previously a small CMF missionary base in Endoinyo e Rinka (CP 16)

they started projects. So that was the main reason but also because there were low levels of education, poor infrastructure and so the church couldn't penetrate into these areas a lot and it was a big sacrifice to start missions anywhere in Maasailand, just because there were no services. It might also be to a certain extent that the Maasai themselves had their own traditional beliefs and customs and they resisted any external influences including the church and so it took quite some time for people to be convinced that believing in the white God brought by the missionaries is superior to the Maasai God.

In addition to Dickson's reasons for the minimal involvement of the church in Maasailand, other Maasai areas have had different experiences. The relative absence of the church is not consistent across Kenya's Maasailand. Lorna Serseri (I 63) told me:

In Ololulunga [50km north-east of the study site] the Catholic Church is sponsoring more than 200 students through high school from poor families and orphans from the community, and these are not just those from the congregation.

Also, "in Mashuuru [Kajiado District] the [Catholic] church is very active in development projects like schools, but the church still isn't doing much here in the Mara" (I 9). Paul Murero (ibid) is employed by the Catholic Church to run the Oltopesi Cultural Centre in Mashuuru, Kajiado, and he is from Lemek. Having been involved in an unsuccessful attempt to bring Catholicism to Koiyaki, he believed that tourism may partly be to blame for the Catholic Church's relative absence in this area of Maasailand. More specifically, he thought that wealth from tourism has encouraged local residents to adopt a more selfish attitude:

The [Catholic] church did come to Talek but then later left because the local community were getting a lot of money from tourism but they were only thinking of themselves... when the people got money they became more egoistic. That is now when the church started pulling out because, remember, the church becomes more involved with the people when the people show willingness and cooperation and therefore the church would also want to get income from the people. Even if a priest came to Talek, where the people are getting a lot of money, if he spent [KES] 500-1000 [\$5.50-11] in fuel, he only gets [KES] 200 [\$2.30] in the collection. Especially when he knows that people are getting a lot of money, he gives up (ibid).

Paul Murero's account of why the Catholic Church withdrew from the Mara suggests that living alongside tourism may encourage the local people to become spoilt, and reliant upon being given assistance rather than participating in it. This notion will be expanded upon in the next section on community involvement.

4.3 Communities

FG 11 in Enooronkon suggested that, together with the state, the community was one of the few development actors in the area prior to the introduction of the conservancies:

The school⁴² began by people selling sheep and those with children in school would contribute 2-3,000 shillings [\$23-35]. By doing this we built 2 wooden classrooms, and then we went and asked for help from the leaders.⁴³ That is what we have been doing before the conservancy was there to help.

Although additional development actors are now involved, the community are still expected to contribute financially towards social projects. Lars Lindkvist, the executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation, said that this is because:

There is no ownership, there is no sustainability without [local contributions]. Whether you are contributing in cash or in kind, it just needs to be something that is clearly valued. Now I think that the opportunity of contributing in cash is becoming rapidly more relevant... the most negative and dangerous type of aid and development is that which doesn't ask for anything and doesn't see it as an investment and it is a give-away and a charity (I 31).

Exemplifying this, a community health worker at Koiyaki Community Clinic told me that sometimes the government hand out mosquito nets for free (I 55). Many of these are subsequently torn up and used as rope for building houses (ibid).

Gert Bomhof stressed that in Nkoilale the community are contributing financially towards projects undertaken through Nkoilale Community Development Organisation (NCDO). He added:

Always they can do more. They just support through a little money but... it is hard to understand why they don't contribute more because they say that they don't have the money but then if you look at all of the cows and goats, you can see that they have money (I 24).

Dickson Kaelo (I 48), who previously worked as project manager for Basecamp Foundation, does not believe that the communities in the Mara have become donor dependant. He noted: "They are very willing to [contribute an amount] and they are very appreciative, they don't see it as a right that they are being assisted" (ibid). In Endoinyo e Rinka, each household agreed to contribute the price of one sheep or goat to the water project. However, Dig Deep's programme manager found ensuring that

⁴² There is no school in Enooronkon. Participants were referring to Olesere School, which is the closest to them.

⁴³ By leaders, FG 11 is most likely referring to councillors and the MP.

this agreement was met was a long drawn-out process (I 1). Lincoln Njiru (I 39) suggested that, in comparison to Embu where he is from, people in the Mara do not understand or value the importance of matters such as education. He believes this, in turn, influences their willingness to make contributions (ibid). For example, in the Mara “if they need water in the village, for that to happen they rely on people from outside to come and do that” (ibid) or to say: “let’s do this together” (I 37). From her experience in Endoinyo e Rinka, Anna Banyard of Dig Deep noted that communities desire leaders:

It is a lack of leadership that is preventing them [communities] from developing on their own; no one wants to take the leading role. They’re a lot more confident when there is someone to lead (I 1).

Despite acknowledging its importance for community ownership in joint projects, donor organisations do not always follow their own advice. As Dig Deep found in Endoinyo e Rinka, it is very time consuming to collect community contributions. Despite stating that “of course” the community should contribute financially to community projects, the director of CMF (I 26) then conceded that, in the case of the extension to Endoinyo e Rinka clinic, the community did not contribute financially. When questioned about this, CMF director of health ministries, John Sankok, explained: “they [communities] are very poor in timeframes... here we have a donor [Better World Canada] who says I have some money I want to help you... we are so much quick because we wanted to make sure that it was done” (ibid).

Although it is easy to criticise the minimal role of the community, Gert Bomhof questioned whether it is their responsibility to fund infrastructure and projects targeting basic needs:

I would not blame them [the community] to not be behind the development of infrastructure, as that is the government’s job. Although they are participants, helping the development organisations by giving them a bit of an amount [of money] for projects such as water construction and schools, just as a way to empower them or to give them a responsibility, but the main and the basic responsibility should be the central government.

When asking focus groups what responsibility the community has for their own development, responses often focused around showing appreciation for the initiatives undertaken by others. For example, FG 1 said: “If someone has brought developments to us, it is the responsibility of the community to appreciate any help

and they should give presents or beadwork”. Some groups (including FG 1, 2, 6, 14) noted that they should also contribute financially towards projects, possibly because in recent years this has increasingly become standard practice. The stated aim of this is self-sustainability so that in the future projects will be completely undertaken, managed and maintained by communities (I 2, 24, 25, 31, 36, 58). There are no real signs of this mind-set changing within the study site yet.

Another highlighted responsibility for the community as a whole involves coming together and holding events – fundraisers⁴⁴ – to finance secondary and tertiary education (FG 16, 24; CP 7). Such fundraisers are common across Kenya, but they are relatively rare within the study site. Mbitin, where FG 16 was held, is the only village where one is known to have taken place during the 19 month research period. Mike Kahiga (I 44), a teacher at Koiyaki Guiding School, believes that fundraisers are not popular in the Mara because of tourism. He elaborated:

In my home [Nakuru], people would seek bursaries from the government but they are not enough for everyone so people are always doing small fundraisings... but here [in the Mara] there are a lot of donors. I have seen a number of cases where donors or tourists just visiting from outside are very willing to assist [with bursaries] (ibid).

Grace Naisenya (I 62) works on a day-to-day basis at the schools in Koiyaki through her job as an outreach worker. She agreed:

Fundraisers are not common here because they get scholarships from tourists and camps... People from this area don’t like education so they don’t fundraise for that, what is assisting education here are the camps.

Local students attending KGS are only expected to pay 10% of the course fees. 40% of the fees are covered by bursaries from conservancy-affiliated organisations, camps and tourists (I 44). The remaining 50% comes from KGS’s affiliated camp, Eagle View, which is contracted out to be managed by BCE (ibid). In addition to support from the tourism industry, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) agrees with Grace that the lack of fundraisers within Koiyaki is also a result of how residents regard education:

It is very likely that if you invited people [to a fundraiser] to come and help you because there is a sick person in Tenwek⁴⁵ and the bill has gone to

⁴⁴ “Fundraisers are when you call your neighbours and maybe politicians to come to your home. You cook some food, then they come and contribute towards the school fees” (I 14).

⁴⁵ Tenwek Missionary Hospital is one of the closest major hospitals to the study site, located in Bomet District.

100,000 [KES, \$1100] that there will be a higher turn-out than for schools. Education is not, to a large extent, regarded highly, especially by the most illiterate of the community.

Lincoln Njiru (I 39) proposed that this general lack of support for education in the Mara, combined with bursaries through tourism, is resulting in an expectation amongst parents for external assistance. This, he believes, absolves them from their responsibility (ibid). Comments made by men in FG 14 supported Lincoln's notion:

There are so many children who finish primary and are unable to go to secondary school and so we'd appreciate well-wishers who are able to sponsor children through secondary school because most of them just come home after primary school and do herding if they don't get sponsors (FG 14).

The reason that children could not progress in education was frequently (including CP 4; I 50) cited as "*mekiata enkidimata* (a lack of ability)", referring to inadequate finances. However, Dickson (I 48) suggested that this is often not the whole truth:

You still see children are dropping out of school but the guy [father] still has 200 sheep... they say yes I couldn't afford to take my child to school, they use lack of ability to afford it [as an excuse] but in fact the lack of motivation of wanting to keep that child in school is because they want him to herd rather than lack of money.

In comparing her home area of Ololulunga to the study site, Lorna Serseri noted:

People here [in the Mara] are rich in terms of livestock but they don't exploit that richness. You can wonder, someone may have 1000 cows and he cries that he can't afford school fees and demands bursaries (I 14).

Although they benefit many children by enabling them to further their education (I 62), scholarships can also have a downside. From Lorna's experience of schooling in Narok District, she believes that financial support influences the work ethic of students:

In the schools in my place [Ololulunga] we have a lot of children from the Mara and they don't work hard because they know that the donor is paying for it and so they don't feel the pressure. If a parent has to sell the cows to get the school fees, the children work a lot harder. Maybe it would be good if the donors paid half and the parents paid half so that he feels some of the pain (I 14).

Gender disparity within education is still present in Koiyaki. Whilst some primary schools now have more girls than boys registered in the lower classes (CP 14), there are still high dropout rates for girls. This is especially when they reach 12-13, when girls often leave school to get married (I 12, 19). In addition, some men refuse to pay

to educate their daughters (I 50). One woman (anon 7) explained that her husband pays the school fees for her four boys, but refuses for the four girls. Prior to giving birth to her last born, she was able to cover the school fees for the girls by doing odd jobs, but with the baby she is now unable to work. She has had to send the young girls to stay and work in other households, who pay their school fees when they can. She said: “This will be my last baby because I cannot support them. I want to educate all of my children but my husband is not supporting me enough and so I cannot have any more” (ibid). Wanting to educate all their children, both boys and girls, is becoming an increasingly common rationale for women desiring fewer children (CP 3, 7, 14, 19). Whilst the community will not directly pressurise women to have many children (CP 19), Noormiseyieki Mpooya (CP 13) explained: “Maa men still want us to have as many children as possible.” This highlights the need for family planning education to be expanded beyond women’s groups; even if women desire fewer children, it would be very difficult without the consent of their husbands.

There are also ways in which communities within the study site are involved in development at a household scale. Despite the generally relaxed attitude to education, there are some examples of sacrifices made by families to educate their children. While talking to Mechanica Lolkumum (CP 16) at his home in Endoinyo e Rinka, he explained that one of his wives has two houses, (one in which to sleep, and another in which to cook), but another of his wives has only one house. He said: “this is because her son has just finished secondary school and he wants to go to KGS and so she has spent a lot of money paying school fees” (ibid). Aside from education, there are other examples of families taking the initiative to assist themselves on a household scale, for example providing their own water by building small dams (see figure 4.1).



Figure 4.1 Household dam in Olkuroto (CP 19).

Although these reservoirs may run dry for a several months of the year, when one contains water it is used by the family that built it and their friends (CP 7, 9, 19). Dam building can also have undesired effects for the family. Noosokon Kaleku noted that there has been an increase in mosquitos since they built a dam on their land (CP 7). During the rains, water is also often collected in large buckets or drums (see figure 4.2) directly from iron-sheet roofs (CP 8). Larger water tanks (such as that seen in figure 4.3) remain rare due to their expense (CP 19). Faith Kereto (CP 9), who has both a household dam and a large water tank said: “collecting water is something new. It is good because it means that I don’t need to walk far to collect water so often”.



Figure 4.2 Oil drum positioned to collect rainwater (CP 9)



Figure 4.3 Household Water Tank (CP 3)

At a smaller scale still, there are certain individuals who are deemed to play a vital role in community involvement in development. In Olesere, one such person is Rusei Ole Soit. FG 10 explained that he took the initiative to “bring development to this place”. In his interview, Ole Soit told me that he wanted the children in his village to become educated, and so he gave his own house and used his own money to start a school (I 85). It was also suggested that, while in Eldoret the city is being developed by local long-distance runners, in the Mara it is safari guides who are building the local economy and developing shopping centres like Nkoilale and Talek (I 14).

Community members are involved in development in terms of contributing financially to projects, paying school fees, moving towards water self-sufficiency and being leaders. As well as this, community members are also involved in project

decision-making, to greater or lesser extents. According to FG 1, donors do not bring predetermined projects to the communities, instead:

There are two ways by which the white people help us, either we go to them and say these are the developments we want, can you bring them to us? Or the white people come and ask, what do you want us to do for you?

Although projects do sometimes evolve in this way, including the school and water projects in Endoinyo e Rinka (CP 16), personal observation revealed that is not always the case. If donors have set projects in mind, these were introduced regardless of the needs and desires stated by the community. For example, the computer classroom at Loigero School and the solar project at Olesere School did not address the most urgent needs at these specific schools, yet they were introduced regardless. This will be discussed further in chapter five.

When communities gather to discuss the needs within their society, youth also attend the meetings. However, FG 3 described the involvement of young people using the verb “*aaduakuki*”, which translates most closely as “to witness”. This suggests that they may not participate as fully as other members of the community. Women also attend. Lorna Serseri explained:

Traditionally, women were not allowed to speak at meetings. They were told that the mouth of a woman is just for eating, not for speaking. But nowadays, if there is a meeting there must be women representatives (I 14).

A female focus group in Olesere purported that women are equal to men when it comes to making decisions on issues concerning the community because “if there is a contribution to be made, we as women contribute as well as men. Equality in decision-making has just come recently” (FG 3). In contrast to this, another group with women at a homestead on the outskirts of Olesere said:

The men don’t talk to us about such things [community projects]. The men have refused to involve us in their developments. If meetings are called then it is only the men who go and women are told to herd the cattle (FG 5).

One possible reason for these conflicting answers from the women of Olesere is that the loudest voices in FG 3 belonged to Nooloiretu and Noombarbali Soit who are wives of the community leader, Rusei Ole Soit. In addition, Noombarbali is the Olesere community based facilitator (CBF) for Basecamp Foundation’s microfinance project. Therefore, these co-wives may attend and voice their thoughts at community meetings more than other women within Olesere.

NGO employees said that they are continually trying to increase the involvement of women in meetings and decision-making processes, but face many challenges. Anna Banyard (I 2) noted that during the water project at Endoinyo e Rinka:

Dig Deep encouraged women to share in any decision-making and positions of responsibility but despite this encouragement, women played a much more passive role in community meetings than men. It was only in around half of the meetings that a woman stood up to address everyone.

Similarly, Gert explained that in Nkoilale they normally have a meeting with about 50 men and 3 women (I 24). One of the challenges noted in meetings that I attended personally is the language barrier. In several instances, only Swahili and English were used in the meeting, excluding women and uneducated men, who only speak Maa.

Women in Enooronkon (FG 9) believe that there is a shift taking place regarding who is listened to in community meetings. They explained that today, even if you are young or female, so long as you are knowledgeable you will be heard (*ibid*). But they stressed that men must have their voices heard first, and the priority is still given to the older men over the younger (*ibid*). Such accounts suggest that, even though women and youth may now attend more meetings, they may not yet be participating as fully as the older men who have traditionally held decision-making power. This shift in who participates, although not yet complete, is an example of Cleaver's (2001) conclusion that a rethinking is needed in community participation regarding the differential role played by individuals due to historical and spatial social structures. As discussed in chapter two, little consideration is currently given either to the degree of participation or who within communities should participate in literature on local participation in tourism (Gauthier, 1993; Scheyvens, 2002; Garrod, 2003; Honey, 2008).

Despite this expansion of participation, community members made two criticisms. The first is that participation in some meetings is not evenly distributed spatially between communities. FG 14 in Mbitin suggested that one of the reasons that their neighbouring village of Olesere receives greater development assistance is that "most of the people in Olesere attend the [conservancy] committee meetings, and so that is why the help is directed there". The other main criticism is that too much decision-

making power for projects still lies with the donors and trusts (I 8). James Kaigil argued “the local people need to be more involved because they know where the problems are around here” (ibid). This will be discussed further in chapter five.

4.4 Conservancy Landowners

Following the creation of the conservancies, the landowners decided to use a proportion of their rental incomes each month to undertake their own development projects. A Naboisho Conservancy landowner explained: “Olaro Orok began this, and then we in Naboisho followed up by also collecting money from each landowner each month” (I 85). The agreed amount is subtracted, and then the landowner bodies in each conservancy decide how this is spent. Olaro Orok landowners agreed on a rate of 150 shillings per hectare per year. Motorogi landowners contribute 50 shillings per hectare per year to their own fund,⁴⁶ as do Naboisho landowners. In Naboisho, in addition to this contribution from the rental income, 30% of the \$11 per client per night camp landowner bed night fee⁴⁷ is added to the landowner community fund.⁴⁸

Motorogi Conservancy used this fund to contribute KES 1.5million (\$17,000) towards a water project on its border, working together with Operation Universal Eyesight (I 87). Several participants raised a concern over the lack of transparency in this fund as, other than the water project, it is not known what the money raised from landowners has been used for (anon 3, 9, 11). On a return visit to the study site in summer 2014, I was told that it had been uncovered that two officials had systematically withdrawn at least KES 700,000 (\$7,700) from this fund’s bank account (anon 3). Such discrepancies are fuelling the creation of a Motorogi Conservancy landowner association that is calling for democratically elected, rather than appointed, officials. This movement is now also spreading to other neighbouring conservancies.

⁴⁶ At the time of research there were discussions amongst Olaro Orok and Motorogi land committee officials about increasing this to 150 shillings to match OOC. As previously mentioned, increasing the payment without the correct consultations breaks the contractual agreement between landowners and the conservancy (anon 3).

⁴⁷ For clarification, there are two bed night fees. \$11 per client per night is divided with \$8 going to the individual landowner(s) who own the land where the camp is located and in OMC the remaining \$3 goes to the landowners committee and in Naboisho the \$3 goes to the landowners’ community fund. This is different to the additional \$5 bed night fee in OMC which goes to OOMT.

⁴⁸ See diagrams 2.6 and 2.7 to see how these payments flow between the stakeholders.

OOC landowners previously contributed money towards OOMT but during a political “bust up” in 2011 certain members of the land committee decided that they would no longer give this money to the trust (I 81). Now the money is put towards covering school fees for the children of landowners (I 64) and it is processed through the land holding company (I 81). A list FG 18 provided of award recipients of these bursaries for 2012 detailed 54 grants ranging from KES 8000 (\$93) for a few primary school bursaries to KES 28,500 (\$330) for university students. The modal average was KES 10,000 (\$120). Theoretically, the provision of these scholarships is determined by considering the student’s performance, whether their father is a member of the conservancy and the capability/neediness of the family (I 64). Landowners say that this is significantly helping some families, enabling their children to continue their education and is the cited reason why some non-conservancy members think that OOC is the best conservancy in the area (including I 18, 79; CP 13, 15, 19). As one OOC landowner explained: “I would not be able to take the children to secondary school if I didn’t get the money from OOC because a drought came and my livestock died and so I only have few cows now” (CP 16). This money is benefiting some families, but there are widespread allegations of nepotism and political favouritism by the land committee regarding the allocation of this money (anon 3, 8, 9). It is alleged that individuals in the land holding company are using their decision-making power in this initiative to strengthen their political standing by favouring family, friends and allies (ibid).

To date, Naboisho Conservancy has used its landowner fund to build six classrooms or nursery schools in surrounding communities (I 84, 86). They plan to now move on to focusing on water projects for the coming year (2014-15) (ibid). For the money to be released for projects, LandCO propose potential uses to ManCO and seeks approval (I 31). Likewise, for the \$100,000 community fund provided by Naboisho’s tourism partners, they suggest uses for that money, but it must also be approved through ManCO. ManCO comprises an equal representation of conservancy landowners and tourism partners and is then chaired by Lars Lindkvist of BCFK (ibid). Initiatives by Naboisho Conservancy landowners have also been subject to allegations of corruption. In the run up to the 2013 election, a large portion of money earmarked for a classroom at Mbitin School allegedly disappeared (FG 14; anon 9,

10, 11). The cause of this was that the money was kept in a teachers' SACCO⁴⁹ account instead of a bank account. Given that the chairman of Naboisho's LandCO is a head teacher, he had too much influence over this SACCO (anon 11). This was recognised as a design flaw, the majority of the money was returned and alternative banking arrangements have been made (I 35). One Naboisho landowner suggested that to prevent this from happening again:

We need greater transparency between the LandCO officials and the contractors so that no more money can go missing. There is still KES 100,000 (\$1200) unaccounted for. ManCo should pay the contractors directly and miss out LandCO (anon 10).

Another young Maasai man explained:

Giving money to local people can be a problem because they use it for themselves and this leads to mistrust within the community. The Maasai trust you white people more than their own people to manage such things because you [white people] will not consume the money (anon 2).

Whilst it is encouraging to see the landowners wanting to get involved in development projects, accusations of favouritism and corruption within the management and allocation of these resources is universal across conservancies. This phenomenon is not unique to this case study. In Ghana, Sonne (2010) also found that greater transparency is needed in the finances of community projects resulting from tourism. The official motivation for this conservancy landowner initiative is to nurture the feeling of ownership over both the conservancy and development projects, and to encourage the belief that the community can do things for themselves (I 86). However, these on-going issues make it possible to argue that motivations may be more aligned with a desire to have greater control over finances that can be manipulated for personal and political gain by individuals on landowner committees. At present, these organisations lack the rigorous accountability and transparency in decision-making and accounting which more formal development actors must meet to satisfy donors.

In 2013 the Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association (KWCA) was established to act as an umbrella body for all wildlife conservancies across Kenya. Dickson Kaelo was appointed CEO. The aim of this landowner-led national association is to be a

⁴⁹ A SACCO is a Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization. This is an organisation that is owned, managed and run by its members who have a common bond, in this case teaching.

forum through which landowners can have a unified voice and share experiences (KWCA, 2014). Regional bodies feed up to this national entity, with the Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservancies Association (MMWCA) representing Narok District. This new association, which brings representatives of each conservancy's landowner committee together at a regional level, is indicating that it would like to become involved in distributing benefits, such as the implementation of community projects. In light of the issues discussed in this section, some individuals (anon 3, 8, 9) are concerned that the representatives in this association are those who are currently managing the individual conservancy landowner funds. Without transparency and rigorous management, MMWCA may face the same problems as the individual conservancy landowner funds.

4.5 Other NGOs

Juma Sampuerrap, a CMF nurse, considers development projects to be the responsibility of the government, "but since they are not doing this, other people such as charity organisations need to step in" (I 23). The key motivation of these organisations is to "see people being served... They make sure that people get the services that other Kenyans are getting" (ibid). Anna Banyard from Dig Deep UK believes:

It is not the responsibility of western aid organisations but it has become their responsibility due to a lack of funding and care from Kenya's own. It seemed that when we met with the constituencies development fund (CDF), they were much more willing to fund projects that had a western aid donor than those without. I think that the community could have done this project without Dig Deep's involvement but I don't think they would have. They are very reliant.

One problem associated with external NGOs is an inadequate presence within the communities with which they are working. For example, "[prior to the conservancies] World Concern also did a lot on development in this area, especially in education" (I 13). According to FG 14, "they came to Mbitin School and said they were going to assist us and so we [the community] dug the hole for the toilets, but then they never came back". "This is very dangerous for the children and when it rains it [the hole] becomes full of water" (FG 16). One way to address this is for external NGOs to partner with field-based organisations. Following recommendations from the head of the district water authority, Dig Deep UK came

to the study site and decided to work together with OOMT because “they have a handle on what is happening on the ground” (I 1). Other conservation NGOs, including Tusk Trust and Kenya Wildlife Trust who both undertake community initiatives in wildlife areas, also use OOMT as their facilitator for the Mara.

Some stakeholders believe that there are fewer NGOs in the study site than in other parts of Kenya. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) suggested that most people shy away from wanting to come and work in this area because local residents can have very strong political opinions. In addition to the political context, the director of Dig Deep (I 58) highlighted educational and organisational differences when working in Koiyaki. He explained:

If I go to a meeting in Kericho there is a secretary, they have an agenda... This makes me both keener to work here [in Koiyaki] because this area has more need and less keen as it is more difficult (ibid).

As a result of these difficulties, the majority of NGOs active in the study site are in the Mara for a specific reason. In some cases this is a conservation agenda, but the most common reason for the NGOs present to be working in this area is an affiliation with camps, conservancies, or tourism more generally. For example, Mama Zebra Memorial Fund, Better World Canada and Stichting Nkoilale all work in the Mara because of a need seen by individuals holidaying in the area.

4.6 Tourists

As noted earlier, Councillor Ole Ketuyo believes that donations from tourists are one reason why schools bordering tourism areas, such as Koiyaki, are better than those further away from tourism activities in areas (I 30). Dickson Kaelo concurs that a large proportion of the money for projects in communities bordering conservancies “is through travellers’ philanthropy, people who just come here and they feel that they want to do something” (I 48). Travellers’ philanthropy is a relatively new area of research for academia but it is increasingly being heralded as one way in which tourism can positively impact upon development (see Wiebe, 2011; Lacey et al., 2012). As an example of this, in Ghana, Sonne (2010: 181) found that through travellers’ philanthropy tourists helped a marginalised sector of society known as the ‘Castle Boys’ through scholarships and other capacity building opportunities.

In focus groups with community members, with regard to the responsibility of development actors, participants placed few expectations on tourists directly. Three sessions with men (FG 1, 18, 22) hoped that tourists may decide to help their children by donating to the local school or giving scholarships, whilst women wished that they would buy their beadwork (FG 5, 6, 10, 13, 17). Expectations on tourists were not as high as other actors, and there was a general attitude that “if they see it in their hearts to help us we would accept that” (FG 15). On the other hand, Juma Sampuerrap of CMF (I 23) had higher hopes:

I think that there is a very big role that tourism should play... it is good to have a holiday, it is good to spend money on being happy and having fun but it is also good to spend money, just a little, maybe a dollar or two, to help somebody near you to change their life.

Regardless of these varying expectations placed on them by Maasai residents, tourists are contributing towards development within the study site. There are several different ways in which this is being undertaken.

There are a few examples of tourists starting their own NGOs to address problems witnessed first-hand.⁵⁰ The Mama Zebra Memorial Fund was created in memory of two people, one Swedish and one Danish, who were killed in East Africa (Zetterlund, 2013). The Swedish woman was holidaying and writing a book in Talek, and came to be called Mama Zebra by Maasai school children, prior to her death at Mount Kenya (ibid). In her memory, her husband, together with the widow of a Danish man killed in Tanzania, decided to start a foundation to give children in Talek a better life (ibid). Another example is the foundation Stichting Nkoilale which created the Nkoilale Community Development Organisation (NCDO). Gert Bomhof, who came to Nkoilale nine years ago as a tourist, founded Stichting Nkoilale. He told me that he “saw what was missing, how these people live, and especially how these kids have to struggle and so we started to help as a family and then we started a foundation” (I 24). As a result of these organisations, FGs 26 and 27 in Nkoilale said that tourists are the main development actor in their area.

The presence of tourism also assists community projects by encouraging existing NGOs to bring their donors to the area. Erik Ranja is the director of Better World

⁵⁰ These individuals may not have been tourists in the conservancies, but the organisations discussed here work within the study site

Canada, which funds schools and clinics within the study site. He explained how they became involved with projects in the Mara specifically:

We had projects elsewhere in Kenya but I came to the Mara on holiday and I drove around and saw the need here. I then thought, I know, I'll bring my friends here and they can see the animals and while they're here they can invest in the people. Also, it is an easy place to bring the donors to see their work and they really like that (I 25).

Despite their own involvement, Erik Ranja noted that – considering the number of tourists coming to the area – there is not much development work coming from them “as most people don't even leave the lodge” (ibid). The conservancies are trying to break down this barrier between tourists and the communities by encouraging clients to visit genuine local villages to see their way of life as an additional experience (I 21). This is in contrast to the commercial cultural villages that border the national reserve. There are not yet clear conservancy-wide agreements regarding village visit arrangements, and this prevents the full potential being realised. An OOC landowner and former employee of a camp in Naboisho pointed out: “Many of the camps in OOC take their clients to the ‘commercial villages’ near the reserve⁵¹ instead of ‘genuine villages’ like Naboisho does” (I 64). Even within Naboisho Conservancy, camps have different arrangements with the homesteads that they visit, and this has caused tensions within communities (I 20). Despite these issues, village visits are widely interpreted as a form of development by the communities and are greatly desired (FG 13, 25; I 20; CP 2). This is not surprising as they can be a significant source of income. For example, Naboisho Camp charges \$25 per client: \$15 goes to the homestead visited, \$5 to the local school⁵² and \$5 to cover VAT and credit card expenses (I 16). In 2012, this one camp paid over \$3000 to the village visited (FQ Asilia Naboisho Camp).⁵³

According to camp manager Helen Schutte (I 16):

⁵¹ For a further discussion on the issues associated with these villages see Mitchell and Ashley (2010: 59) and Honey (2008: 319).

⁵² The camp keeps this \$5 per client for the school and then once or twice a year they discuss with the school committee what is needed, buy the items and then deliver them to the school (I 21). For example, in March 2013 they donated 30 benches to Olesere School costing \$1350 (P.C. Helen Schutte).

⁵³ Financial Questionnaire– This information is from the financial survey. The subsequent name identifies the organisation/company whose financial survey response is being referred to.

In addition to the payment for the trip, village visits make the problems that the Maasai people face visible and real to the tourists. For example, appalled at seeing children in old ripped clothing with no shoes on village visits, tourists have accused us as camp managers of not doing enough to support the local communities. Roelof [her husband] tried to explain that these families have many livestock and that if they wanted to dress their children in new clothes and shoes they are more than financially able to do so, but it is difficult for the tourists to understand this.

Dickson Kaelo (I 48) agreed that outsiders see the Maasai as very poor because of how they dress. He explained that he knows some “very poorly dressed Maasai guys who have [KES] 800,000 [\$9000] in their purse” (ibid). This is one example of tourists, from their Western backgrounds, thinking that Maasai people are poor by comparing them to their own ways of living (I 36, 58, 62). Yet as a result of this, many tourists are keen to donate to local initiatives (ibid). For example, a Belgian tourist from Kicheche Bush Camp in OOC donated \$1000 to build a pit latrine at Loigero Primary School following a visit (I 3). In this instance, the money was processed through OOMT, following advice from the safari guide (ibid).

Often tourists pass donations directly into the hands of head teachers or other community members. Although donations are given with the best intentions: “they [tourists] shouldn’t just give money directly to people because that is the most wrong way; it just goes in the pockets” (I 24). Exemplifying this, a tourist visiting a school near a conservancy donated \$600 cash directly to the head teacher (anon 12). When the camp managers heard about this the next day, they went to the school to discuss how best to put this money to good use, but the head teacher denied all knowledge of the donation (ibid). It became increasingly apparent by visiting schools over a long period of time that in some instances, despite regular donations from tourists and camps alike,⁵⁴ they do not look any better off. One returning volunteer to Naboisho picked up on this issue. She stated:

When I was here last time we donated so many books and things to (anon) school and I know that many other people do as well. But when I go back there now, it looks poorer than ever (I 92).

This raises questions as to where this money has gone and whether these head teachers are deliberately wanting their schools to appear “poor” and “needy” in order

⁵⁴ The ‘Pack for a Purpose’ scheme has increased the quantity of donated items even further as many of the camps within the conservancies have now joined the initiative (see <http://www.packforapurpose.org>).

to continue attracting donations from visiting tourists – as has been reported at some orphanages in Cambodia (see Birrell, 2010).

Passing donations directly to local residents is the most unsustainable route as there are no organisations overseeing expenditure to ensure that it is used for its intended purpose. This is one of the tasks undertaken by the conservancy-affiliated organisations. Any donations linked to tourism are reliant upon the presence of tourism, and if this dwindles donations will simultaneously reduce, however, any donations are at risk of cessation.

The administrator of OOMT noted that the ability to raise money to be used in development projects from tourists is immense, especially within the conservancies as the clients are often very wealthy⁵⁵ (I 36). For example, the trust has received donations from tourists to construct toilet blocks at schools (ibid). It is also fashionable to give to the Maasai (I 76). Yet it needs to be coordinated, it has to be regulated somehow and channelled through accountable organisations (anon). This is because:

There is a whole ton of money coming into the Mara from tourism that isn't going where it should be going. A few people getting very rich from it (I 36).

To a certain degree, some community members are sceptical about the motives of such donors and believe: “organisations like Mama Zebra must be benefiting from that [donating] because she would not be doing it if she wasn't benefiting” (FG 24). Another focus group (22) thought that donors must get free entry to the national reserve, and that this is how they benefit from donating to the area. Although, FG 22 stressed that they do not mind if the donors benefit in some way so long as they continue supporting the communities. Individuals involved in receiving donations from tourists broke down motives into three main categories. Firstly, being faced with “poverty” first-hand, leading to a guilt complex; secondly, wanting to reward communities who have leased their land for tourism and wildlife; and thirdly, a desire to get a “warm glow” feeling, having personally been involved in making a difference.

⁵⁵ This is not exclusive to development-focused initiatives, tourists also donate to conservation-based schemes, such as predator projects (I 80). Tourists' philanthropic income generation for conservation is discussed further by Barnes and Eagles (2004).

Dickson Kaelo believes that one of the main motivations for tourists to donate is that they witness problems for themselves:

They come here and they hear that community members have to go 25km to access the nearest clinic and they just feel that this is unfair, [and they say] if there is a way I can do it, I would be willing to help (I 48).

Teriano Soit, a young educated Maasai lady, does not think that donations from tourists are linked to a sense of guilt because “they have not caused the poverty in this area and so do not have a reason to feel guilty” (I 13). However, Ron Beaton (I 3), the founder of OOMT, is adamant that a guilt complex caused by seeing problems first-hand encourages donations. This is why guides are encouraged to take interested clients to KGS, to increase support for the school (ibid). The manager of NCDO (I 64) agrees with the importance of this direct personal experience. He believes that tourists are assisting in Nkoilale’s development because “they feel like they want to improve the lives of the people they have seen. They meet people and see poverty for themselves” (ibid).

Specifically for the conservancies, Dickson highlighted another possible motivation:

It is also very likely that a few people are motivated by the fact that people have given up their land for me to come here to enjoy. So more recently I think there are people who come in and if they enjoy the conservancy they feel that I was on someone’s land and if there is anything that I can do to make his life better because my life was better because I came here and I had a great time and I enjoyed it (I 48).

The schools’ outreach worker agreed that tourists enjoying the resources and wildlife sometimes results in them wanting to give back to the local communities, which has “helped a lot to bring development to this area” (I 62).

Donors do not necessarily fall into just one of the aforementioned categories. When I asked Gert to explain the motivation behind his work at Nkoilale he replied:

Just look in the eyes of the kids over there. You know what I told them? You have the same rights. You know what, we came from another world and we were just so happy with the wildlife and everything in Kenya and then I talked to our driver and I said please bring me to a primary school because I wanted to see the other side... and then I saw it and I said wow, just like a virus it struck me at that moment, it was 2003, the 3rd of July.

Finally, tourists also often feel uplifted assisting communities, especially when they can return on holiday and see first-hand the impact that this is having. As one donor

explained: “You feel good helping other people. I always think of giving like shopping, you have to have some satisfaction in the money that you give” (I 25). The manager of Naboisho Camp believes that this feel-good sensation from supporting the local women is behind the success of the new beadwork project (PC⁵⁶ Helen Schutte). She has found that the tourists are desperate to buy the produce, especially if the label includes some information about the lady who made it (ibid).

Although, as has been discussed, many tourists choose to become directly involved in community development in the Mara, this does not mean that those who do not make this choice have no impact. Lars Lindkvist of Basecamp Foundation (I 31) argued that, while every traveller needs to think about how they can contribute, the very structure of sustainable tourism - in this instance conservancies - can do this on behalf of the tourists. He elaborated:

If you design your tourism so that by default it supports development, for example, or supports communities one way or another, then choosing that business as your product to provide that is a deliberate step in that direction. [Then] you might not need to do anything else as a visitor, other than to make sure what they say, what they claim [is true] (ibid).

4.7 Conservancy-Affiliated Organisations

Conservancies and their affiliated organisations are widely perceived by informants as the main development actor within the study site at present. In addition to their role in livelihood security and creating income-earning opportunities, they are heavily involved in social development projects. As previously noted, OMC have their own trust, OOMT which is financed by a “\$5 per person per night” fee (I 36). Despite this funding support, the trust is an independent entity and the conservancy does not influence its activities (I 36, 75). The majority of OOMT’s other funding comes from a few key previous tourists and prominent white Kenyans – especially those involved in the tourism industry – as well as organisations including Tusk Trust and African Digna (I 36). Olare Orok’s trust initially held communal machinery for use in the conservancy, but over the last few years they have come to concentrate more on outreach and projects in the communities that border the conservancies (ibid). Naboisho Conservancy does not have its own trust. The main actor for this conservancy is Basecamp Foundation Kenya (BCFK), one of the key

⁵⁶ Personal Communication

instigators and funders in the creation of the conservancy. Basecamp Foundation has evolved from its corporate sister, Basecamp Explorer, which has two camps within Naboisho Conservancy as well as one in Talek bordering the reserve.

In addition to these two main organisations, Kicheche, who have camps in Olare Orok, Naboisho and Mara North Conservancies, have their own charitable arm called Kicheche Community Trust (KCT). KCT have largely been involved in projects in Aitong, which borders Mara North Conservancy and is just outside of the study site (I 71). Despite this, head teachers within the study site named KCT as a development actor as they have provided books, desks and tree saplings for their schools (I 19, 41, 54). Naboisho Camp previously had its own organisation called Rekero Community Conservation Fund. In 2012 this was merged into Kenya Wildlife Trust (KWT). KCT and KWT both work through OOMT for any community-focused projects within the study site (I 69, 71). As well as these registered NGOs, individual camps sometimes informally assist neighbouring villages using either company money or donations from clients (I 12, 21). Conservancy managements also play a role in some development initiatives. For example, Naboisho's contracted management company (Seiya Ltd) is sometimes asked by organisations such as BCFK to project manage the building of predator-proof livestock enclosures and classrooms (I 76).

Naboisho Conservancy's LandCO chairman claimed: "Almost all community projects [in this area] are connected to tourism" (I 86). Dickson Kaelo suggested that, more specifically, conservancies are a key factor in stimulating community development as:

They [community projects] are not happening in Olkinyei, in Maji Moto, in Oldurkesi, in Naikarra, you go there and there is nothing, absolutely nothing happening and it is because they don't have conservancies to a large extent (I 48).

As previously noted, Councillor Ole Ketuyo disagrees with such perspectives. He claimed: "they [conservancies] are not development conscious; they are only here for profit - that is the problem" (I 30).

The vast majority of focus group participants disagreed with the councillor's viewpoint. They concluded sessions by ranking conservancies and their affiliated organisations as the main development actors in the area. It is important to note,

however, that this was sometimes not the opinion at the beginning of sessions. On many occasions, participants responded to one of the initial questions, “have the conservancies been involved in development in this area?” by stating that they have done nothing (FG 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22). More specific questions were then asked which broke down the issue. We asked the participants what is development, what are examples of development, and who is responsible for each of these initiatives.

All female focus groups held in areas included in the scheme named, as examples of development, the women’s groups and the microfinance scheme run by outreach workers. They praised the impact that this scheme has had on their lives (FG 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 19). The outreach workers responsible – employed by OOMT and BCFK – were often named by focus groups as people involved in community development, although their employers and the link to conservancies was not always recognised. Bedelian (2014: 145) concurs as she also found that many people did not link projects to conservancies in Koiyaki.

Regarding infrastructure-based community projects, several focus groups (including 5, 9, 10, 13, 16, 22) described the actor responsible as “*ilashumpa*” which translates as “the white people”. Participants were often unable to specify further who exactly these people were, although FG 5 stressed: “there is no link with the conservancy”. In several focus groups some individuals knew the organisation responsible for a project, but their affiliation with a conservancy was not understood. The link between OOMT and OMC was more widely recognised than that between BCFK and Naboisho Conservancy, perhaps due to the organisation’s name. This disconnect was especially common amongst non-conservancy members. If some individuals in the focus group knew who was responsible, this then led to a group discussion. If no one in the group was aware who had undertaken the project under deliberation, I asked what they would think if these projects were connected to the conservancies. Participants replied that if this was the case: “we would then say that the conservancy is good” (FG 13). This supports the idea that there is a close relationship between understanding who is responsible for such initiatives and broader perceptions of the conservancies.

Regarding the involvement of conservancies in projects, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) acknowledged that in some instances community members may not realise this link and provided an example:

We had a guest who came to Naboisho and she was concerned that there were no health facilities around here and she went back and made contact with the Japanese embassy and they are going to do a clinic in Nkoilale. So the people in Nkoilale now know that there is a clinic coming but they may not know that the guest actually got interested because they had a visit to Naboisho.

When I mentioned to Dickson that many people in Olesere claim not to know who is responsible for the projects there he responded:

Specifically for Olesere, the person who was in the meetings and the opening ceremony et cetera was me and they know me and they know who I work for. So if someone says that they didn't know it was Basecamp who did it I think that they are just being mischievous.

In contrast, participants in FG 19 revealed that, although they know the names of some people involved in projects, they do not know for whom they work. Lars Lindkvist, the executive chairman of BCFK, believes that the issue may be more complex:

Sometimes we get these indicators that they deliberately misunderstand it [who is responsible for projects]... There might be a situation when you feel that they haven't understood it but they have understood it and they deliberately are misusing information for some other reasons (I 31).

Another possibility is that there is complacency that "people do know who has done these projects as there has been a lot of branding" (I 87). This presumes that all members of the community are literate and that they read and understand the signs. Branding is controversial amongst development actors for a number of reasons: donors think that it is insufficient (I 31); some working with the communities think it is excessive (I 1, 87); critics think it takes away from the desired goal of community ownership (I 2, 36, 58); and the community seem to pay little attention to it (I 58). James Kaigil was also surprised that some community members claim not to be aware who is responsible for these projects because:

At every launching they [the conservancies] shout we do this, we want you to see the importance of the conservancy, we want you to benefit, we need you to see the sweetness of wildlife, you should like the elephants the same way as you like your cows, and so they also preach like a gospel.

Perhaps, therefore, at present the community are simply not interested in who is responsible and what their motivations are, so long as they receive their desired

outputs. If this is the case, Allan Earnshaw, the chairman of KWT, believed that funding projects is “wasted money” (I 47). Another consequence of the conservancies’ involvement not being fully understood by communities is that the government often gains credit for work undertaken. FG 5 explained: “We don’t know who has brought these developments but because they are here we presume that it is the government who has brought them.”

The scale under consideration is an additional influencing factor for initial negative responses when asking the conservancies’ involvement in development. To begin with, participants only thought about the impact that the conservancies are having on themselves and whether they are benefiting directly. As more specific questions were asked, some respondents then revealed that they do benefit from the conservancies because they have family members who receive rental payments or wages, and that these individuals sometimes support them (FG 11, 15, 25). There was one instance when a lady in FG 6 was adamant that she did not know anyone employed by the conservancy. Knowing that her stepson is a guide in a camp, I questioned her further about this. She was surprised that I knew about her stepson and then conceded that he is the main financial supporter of the homestead. This woman then whispered to the other participants in the group saying: “she knows us too well, we need to think about what we say to her”. This suggests that some participants may have intentionally tried to play down the impact that the conservancies are having, perhaps in an attempt to attain more benefits. This is one example whereby the longevity of the fieldwork period proved vital. Without personal relationships with community members I would have accepted initial negative responses at face value, which would have painted a very different picture.

Focus group participants were also asked whether they ever go into the conservancies to graze their livestock and if they ever use the community projects that had been discussed, even if these are located beyond their village. As a result of breaking down the benefits and asking more specific questions in this way, by the end of the sessions when I re-asked the initial question regarding perceptions of the role that the conservancies are having upon development, responses in 21 out of 29 focus groups were positive. Opinions of groups held in Mbitin, Olkuroto and Osilale

remained mixed, and in five instances predominantly negative. Considering the relative lack of conservancy involvement in these villages, as previously discussed, their perceptions are perhaps not surprising.

In addition to encouraging participants to look at the issue from a broader household and community scale, there are three factors that potentially influenced this change of opinion. Firstly, as exemplified, participants may have been initially trying to deliberately downplay benefits accruing from the conservancies. Secondly, some people may have been genuinely unaware of the conservancies' involvement in community projects. Thirdly, community members may not have thought through and added up all of the benefits that are affecting them, both directly and indirectly, until specifically asked. James Kaigil (I 8) told me that he has had a similar experience at his home area of Mpuai. Men wanted to block access to the conservancies because they said that they were not getting benefits:

I told them, please don't. You have to be patient and wait for some other benefit, and that it doesn't necessarily have to be direct and may be indirect, and even now you may be benefiting but do not see. I tell them, your brother is employed in Mara Plains, your uncle is employed in Porini⁵⁷ and tomorrow you're also grazing during open grazing in the conservancy and so why do you try to create an enemy? (ibid)

This change in response is critical because responses to more general questions regarding opinions of conservancies changed in sync. In other words, while participants felt that conservancies were not involved in development, they also expressed negative opinions of conservancies in general, saying that they are bad and not wanted. Yet as participants' thoughts about the conservancies' involvement in development changed, they also changed their broader opinion of the conservancies. This means that if conservancy stakeholders want to ensure that communities think positively about the concept, assisting with community development is one way to work on achieving this. However, this will only succeed if conservancies' roles in such initiatives are clearly understood by the broader community.

Although many community members may not currently be fully aware of the conservancies' involvement, individuals on the various committees do see this link and are very positive and appreciative. Rusei Ole Soit explained that, in Olesere, "we

⁵⁷ Mara Plains and Porini Lion are two camps in OOC.

now have facilities like the school, water project and clinic – they wouldn't be here if the conservancy wasn't here" (I 85). FG 25 disagreed with this sentiment, noting that schools were present before the conservancies were created. Dickson admitted that there would be schools in the absence of conservancies, but stressed that "they would be struggling schools" (I 48). In addition to committee members, school children also seem to be more aware of who is responsible for assistance, especially within their own school environment. Discussions with students at Mbitin, Olesere and Endoinyo e Rinka schools suggested that they are also comparatively more positive about the conservancies and wildlife than their parents' and grandparents' generations. As part of these participatory sessions, students were asked to draw something that they associate with the conservancies. The majority of students drew wildlife and tourists (see figure 4.4) but some students drew projects that conservancy-affiliated organisations have been involved in (see figure 4.5). This highlights comprehension of who is responsible, and their relationship with conservancies.




Figure 4.4. Selima Kumum. Class 7 student at Endoinyo e Rinka Primary School
Conservancy picture showing the environment, wildlife and tourists in a conservancy.



Figure 4.5. Sarah Fimer, Class 6 Student at Endoinyo e Rinka Primary School
Conservancy picture showing the new school dormitories, built with support of OOMT.

Tourism partner Gerard Beaton (I 21) noted that the conservancies' involvement in projects is leading to "more of a planned approach" to development, although he recognised that this can still be improved upon. As another respondent described: "At present each conservancy has their own organisation and then the camps have their own pet projects too and they don't talk to each other" (anon 13). One benefit of organisations closely linked to businesses, such as tourism camps being involved in development, is that they are long-term players – because the investment is also long-term (I 31). In contrast, more conventional NGOs and development organisations have short perspectives due to working on 2-4 year budgets and strategies (ibid). This has led to many coming and going in the Mara over the years (ibid).⁵⁸ Alan Earnshaw, the chairman of KWT, explained that many NGOs are selecting to work through the conservancy-affiliated organisations because some other organisations have good websites and publicity but do not actually do anything

⁵⁸ This will be expanded upon in chapter eight.

on the ground (I 47). In his opinion, OOMT can be trusted as they are a constant presence (ibid). Because of time constraints, camps within the conservancies are also keen to work with these organisations rather than trying to do it themselves (I 21). Sonne (2010) concluded that Elmina requires the accountability that such organisations bring in order to increase the potential development impact from tourism, including that from travellers' philanthropy.

Another outcome of the conservancy-affiliated organisations being permanently present, active and visible on the ground is that they are more approachable to communities. Nathalie Leen of KCT believes that one reason that conservancy-affiliated organisations are so heavily involved in development is local demand (I 71). Community members openly acknowledged: "when we have a problem, or we want help, we go and cry for help at a camp then they come here" (FG 5). Respondents indicated that these organisations specifically are approached because "white people" are perceived to do a better job as they are thought to be "trustworthy", "efficient" and "clever" (FG 8, 9; anon 2, 10). In comparison, "before the conservancies we were relying on the local authorities" (I 87). Now "for us people who are near the conservancies we are benefiting because people in the other areas are still waiting for the government to come and help" (I 79). FG 8 added: "We have seen that the people in the camps and conservancies are now the people near us and so they are the people who we can approach to do these things for us".

In October 2012, BCFK and one of their major donors, Stromme Foundation, visited Olesere School to open a new teachers' house that they had co-funded. In the preceding months, governmental support to buy food for student lunches ceased in the run up to the election. Instead of complaining to the government department who had suddenly stopped the payments, the head teacher used the official opening speech as an opportunity to ask BCFK for help. Similarly, at the opening of the new IT room at Loigero School, the head teacher used his thank you speech to appeal to OOMT as the school was in desperate need of water. Both of these cases show that once a donor becomes affiliated with an area, opportunities for future assistance are enhanced. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) explained that this, rather than a conscious decision, is the reason why BCFK's projects are focused in Olesere village:

The first project was the water project and while we were doing [that]... they [the donors] would ask, what is the health situation? Where do people go to hospital? And that is how the fundraising happened. So it wasn't a conscious decision to focus on this one area, much more than actually doing one project and that led to the others.

Community members also place expectations on conservancies, especially regarding the provision of water sources for livestock. This is largely because sources used previously are now inside conservancies, restricting access (FG 1, 2; I 84, 85). In addition, as the work of conservancy-affiliated organisations is used in marketing the conservancies and their camps, tourists' expectations are raised. This adds to the conservancies' responsibility towards community development (I 36).

As well as community and client demands and expectations, there are several other factors that motivate the conservancy stakeholders to exceed the degree of involvement in development usually associated with tourism ventures. One factor is the nature of the conservancy structure, which – because of the nature of land tenure – has a partnership between landowners and tourism partners at its core. Whilst it is only the conservancy landowners who sign agreements with the conservancies, the cooperation of local communities more broadly is essential for the conservancies' success. FG 22 explained:

The conservancy is using our land for a business and so that is why they are helping us. They cannot reward [pay] everyone and so they have to do something that can help the whole community through a project such as school, hospital or water project.

OMC assistant manager James Kaigil (I 8) proposed that this is especially important considering human-wildlife conflicts. Discontent amongst neighbouring communities could easily cause the collapse of the conservancy concept (ibid). Put another way, “conservancies are not so much threatened and troubled by what is going on inside them, as what is going on outside” (I 31). In order to ensure the sustainability of the conservancies and their affiliated businesses, community satisfaction is essential.

Gerard Beaton recognised that conservancy tourism partners have a responsibility and a financial obligation to assist with community development if the conservancies are to be sustainable (I 21). He elaborated:

I just think that it is a responsibility if you go into an area like this, this is not a private conservancy, it is owned by 500 heads of family which probably leads to

probably 5000 people. They are all sitting on the edge of this conservancy so I think that there is a primary responsibility that we address their needs and we develop together. You can't develop a world class conservancy and then on the edge have poverty and chaos. You have got to develop and be in harmony otherwise the 15 years will be up and they will all pile in here and take over this place (ibid).

At present Gerard thinks that tourism partners are focused on tourism needs and there is only a small focus on the community. Yet he noted "it has gone from 0 to 10% and it will keep increasing as more people realise the threat of not getting it right" (ibid).

Two focus groups with men in Mbitin and Endoinyo e Rinka took a more critical view of the motivations of conservancy-affiliated organisations. FG 14 said that they believe some camps are philanthropic in an effort to get a good name for themselves and improve their businesses. FG 18 concurred and expanded this notion:

The conservancy also does this [work on projects] so that they can advertise themselves to get more tourists, when they do a project here they take pictures that they take back to their country so that they can get more people to come.

While projects are certainly used in advertising for the conservancies, as well as specific camps, community projects are also an attempt to distribute benefits back to local people. The aim of this is to assist with development whilst simultaneously improving perceptions of the conservancies and the wildlife on which they depend. The aim is to achieve statements like the following made by FG 1:

One change in this area is the coming of the conservancies which we like very much because they have brought a lot of help which we have received and accepted like schools, water, and hospitals and so we support them a lot.

As will be discussed at length in chapter eight, it is proposed that the actions of conservancies and their affiliated organisations go beyond that of corporate social responsibility (CSR), especially with regard to community projects. Being involved in community development is an integral part of the business model as it is necessary to ensure the success and longevity of the business. Another difference is the power dynamics involved. In contrast to the one-sided nature of CSR, because of the structure and agreements in place, conservancy landowners and neighbouring communities have a degree of power and are thus able to make demands of the conservancies.

An underlying question here is whether the motivation behind assistance in community development matters? Conservancy stakeholders may undertake

community projects because it is in their business interest in order to incentivise positive perceptions amongst communities or attract clients; yet it is suggested that this does not matter so long as the output is beneficial. The nature of outputs and outcomes resulting from conservancy-affiliated organisation's projects will be the focus of the following chapter. As noted, development actors being linked to businesses can be beneficial in terms of active presence on the ground and long-term commitments to the area. Looking at the bigger picture, Lars Lindkvist proposed "there is no deed that is not selfish" (I 31). He elaborated:

I don't think that it [community assistance by BCFK and other actors] is selfless. I think that even altruism is not selfless... The Florence Nightingales of this world and so forth are all wonderful people but they just have a different set of drivers that we sometimes mistake for being selfless (ibid).

4.8 Discussion - Koiyaki Development Actor Matrix

The actors involved in community development within the study site are perceived to differ from those involved elsewhere in Maasailand and Kenya. Despite the majority of communities stating that the main responsibility of development should lie with the government and elected political leaders, they are not perceived to be living up to this. Religious organisations are also seen to be comparatively absent, and communities are taking a relatively passive role in development. This apparent 'absence' of traditional development actors is extremely noteworthy. Within this context, alternative actors are currently involving themselves in developing Koiyaki, especially those affiliated with the conservancies. There is no simple explanation for the present development actor matrix in the Mara. Many factors, including those of a geographical, historical, political and cultural nature, are likely to be influential. The motivations behind development actor's actions are also of critical importance to understand. Finally, it is suggested that the neoliberal model upon which the conservancies are based may be altering the dynamic of those who are involving themselves in development, as well as the power dynamic between actors.

Informants suggested a myriad of reasons for low levels of engagement by the state, religious organisations and the community within the Mara. Regarding the state, reasons included the Mara being forgotten due to its distance from Nairobi, low population density and difficulties in working with nomadic communities. In the Mara, the presence of the church remains small. This is perhaps partly due to

residents being egoistic, as suggested by Paul Murero, and historically, missionaries did not enter Maasailand to the same extent as elsewhere in Kenya. This low engagement by the state and the church has contributed towards the continuation of low education levels. This in turn curtails effective leadership, representation and allocation of resources. Local residents have not been widely exposed to developments occurring elsewhere. This is combined with low levels of support for formal education and a perceived “lack of ability” is resulting in the relatively minor involvement of communities in development initiatives. The same issues may have influenced the low expectations that are placed on elected representatives and community leaders, which have allowed them to neglect the area and “reallocate” resources. Although it is encouraging to see conservancy landowner committees initiating their own development initiatives, these organisations currently have insufficient accountability and transparency to ensure that money is not misappropriated. In the Mara, there is also a degree of expectation that assistance is to be given by those involved in conservation or tourism fields as an exchange for access to natural resources and wildlife. These factors make the Maasai Mara a challenging place to work in development.

The Maasai Mara is not an area of greatest need globally or nationally. The World Economic Outlook Database for 2011 (International Monetary Fund, 2011) ranks Kenya’s GDP as 11th out of 52 in Africa. Within Kenya, poverty rates in Narok District are amongst the lowest in the country, with the district ranked 63/69 poorest by the Kenyan Government’s open data resource (Government of Kenya, 2005-6). This relative lack of poverty, combined with aforementioned difficulties associated with working in development in the Mara, suggests that external actors have specific reasons for choosing to work in this region. This is vital to acknowledge because, as discussed in chapter two, motivation dictates whose needs are prioritised (Butcher, 2011). Motivating factors are a desire to have a closer relationship with donations in the case of tourists, and conservation plus the sustainability of businesses for conservancy-affiliated organisations. These differing motivations and expectations produce a very complex set of power dynamics. They also influence which aspects of development are prioritised and which approaches are chosen. Although no

development actor is without their own stimulus, motivations behind the main development actors are vital to recognise and acknowledge.

Although it is an area that is often neglected in studies of tourism's developmental impact (Wiebe, 2011), philanthropic tourists are increasingly becoming major actors within the study site. Philanthropically-motivated individuals make emotional connections with people and places (discussed further by Lacey et al., 2012), and are drawn to donate in order to tackle issues seen first-hand. Surpassing tourists, the most prominent development actors at present are perceived to be conservancy-affiliated organisations.⁵⁹ As discussed in chapter two, conservancies have dual objectives in that they seek win-win outcomes for both conservation and development (Muradian et al., 2010; Bedelian, 2014). Yet this does not acknowledge the multiple complexities which results in projects having to make hard decisions and trade-offs (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16), or the extent to which these trade-offs or approaches taken differ when undertaken by traditional development actors or those motivated by conservation – or business – objectives.

Although community-based conservation involves linking conservation objectives to development needs (Adams and Hulme, 2001), there is little credible empirical evidence that solutions to meet the joint goals have been met (Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Adams et al., 2004; Ferraro, 2011). Chapter five will examine this in more detail by assessing some of the community development projects undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations. Chapter eight will also continue this line of questioning by examining business motivations for involvement in development.

The key difference between this case study of the Mara conservancies and conservation or tourism initiatives that are not perceived to assist development is the inherent need for conservancies to win and maintain community support. This is essential for their business product because of the privatised nature of land tenure and the resultant conservancy structure. Due to the neoliberalisation of nature emphasis has shifted towards what nature should mean *for* communities (Buscher and Dressler, 2012: 368), in other words what benefits they can get from it. One

⁵⁹ It is important to note that these organisations also get a significant amount of funding directly through tourists.

benefit stream initiated by the conservancies as a way of appeasing and working together with neighbouring Maasai people are community projects. This is the source of communities' expectation for development assistance from conservation and tourism organisations.

The neoliberal nature of the conservancies inevitably means that new actors will be introduced. With regard to conservation, Holmes (2012: 192) notes that the introduction of new actors in environmental governance changes the consideration of who is responsible for conserving biodiversity, with less responsibility for the state and more for private individuals and civil society. This 'private indirect government' (Mbembe, 2001) refers to the decentralisation and fragmentation of sovereignty (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 439). Ferguson (1994) found that state involvement in development intervention in Lesotho expanded the extent and reach of "bureaucratic state power". In contrast, the relatively minimal role of the state in development initiatives in the study site potentially represents a reduction in state power, sovereignty and legitimacy. This mirrors that seen within neoliberal conservation. As conservancy-affiliated organisations are now largely perceived to be the main development actors, the power brought by this involvement in development interventions – discussed by Ferguson – is ultimately being handed to private entities. This could be described as the privatisation of development and will be discussed further in chapter eight.

Prior to the creation of the conservancies, communities were reliant on the state for assistance; to attain this, people felt they had to beg politicians (I 87). As a result, some political leaders now see conservancies as competition because "they can't win people's minds like they used to. Before they were the only people who could help but now others can and so they have lost some power" (ibid). Yet there are no signs that the state is reacting to this. Debra Kaigil (I 37) and Grace Naisinya (I 62) both suggested that, because of contributions made by these other actors, there is now less pressure on the state to assist these areas. FG 26 thought that this is why the government does not interfere with the conservancies. Sometimes government agencies even support initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations

as it lightens their load and enables them to concentrate on other issues and in other areas (I 24, 48).

Saying that conservancy-affiliated actors have replaced the state, the church, and the community as the main development actors does not tell the full story. While tourism actors may have surpassed the previous levels of support given by these actors, making them look relatively smaller, levels of assistance from the state and the community may actually be higher now in real terms. This is because they are often pushed to match contributions made by conservancy-affiliated organisations.

Community members do not seem concerned as to who brings development assistance. Whilst questioning focus group participants as to who they think should be responsible, a common answer was “anyone who is willing” (FG 9, 13, 27). There is a notion within communities that once an “outsider”⁶⁰ has seen the problems, they then have a responsibility to act upon this. When FG 12 mentioned that they would really like a water project and school closer to them in Enooronkon, I asked whose responsibility this is. They replied that it was now the responsibility of my research assistant and myself because “now that you are the ones who have seen that we don’t have these things, you should be the ones to bring this to us” (ibid). Similarly, another group explained that the government was not meeting their responsibility regarding meeting the needs of the communities “because they do not know that there are people who have these problems here” (FG 24). While a lack of personal interaction is considered an excuse for the state’s minimal involvement, direct contact with those “in need” compels tourists and those linked to the conservancies to assist. As FG 17 explained, people working with the conservancies “are here in this area, come and see the state of the schools and so decide to help”.

Once stakeholders are seen to be assisting communities, expectations quickly develop and increase. This can lead to an “addiction” (I 36), “over-reliance” or “degree of dependency” (I 31) by communities on tourism donors to be the support crutch for community development. The anticipation of tourists giving direct “hand-outs” can also provoke begging and stir up rivalry and jealousy within communities,

⁶⁰ Referring to non-residents and includes foreigners, politicians and those involved in the tourism industry.

as discussed by Cravatte and Chabloz (2008) in relation to Burkina Faso. Dependence on tourism would also be problematic if the conservancies and their affiliates ever withdrew from the area. Also, if expectations increase with each initiative undertaken, these may soon spiral beyond available capabilities and resources leading to disappointment and discontent within communities. This would directly oppose the aims and motivations of involvement. Similarly, there are currently no agreements regarding what is within and beyond the responsibility of each development actor, both regarding the type of initiative and the geographical scope.

To date, there is no integrated management plan for the Mara area and there is no unified approach to development (I 69), even between conservancy-affiliated organisations (I 21). Insufficient communication and collaboration between the multiple development actors can lead to the unnecessary duplication of projects, reduces their efficiency and effectiveness and enables communities to play organisations off against each other. When the pump at Olesere borehole stopped working, the community first approached BCFK, with whom they had jointly funded the project (anon 10). They were told the amount that they would have to contribute for the repairs; the community then turned to OOMT to see what deal they would offer (ibid). In addition, the lack of a comprehensive Mara-wide development organisation prevents large big international NGOs from putting money into the area, even though the willingness is there (I 69). It is hoped that the development of Maasai Mara Wildlife Conservancies Association (MMWCA) at the end of the research period may go some way to address this problem. The disjuncture between projects having successful outputs and outcomes will now be the focus of chapter five, through the examination of initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations.

5 Conservancy-Affiliated Organisations' Projects

This chapter will use examples of community projects undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations within the study site to highlight that a successful output does not necessarily lead to a successful outcome. Chapter four found that communities currently perceive these organisations to be the main development actors within the study site. This short chapter will highlight that the effectiveness of their initiatives can be improved and will explore possible reasons for the current disconnect. This builds upon findings in chapter four; that actors within the study site differ from those traditionally involved in development work and as such they also have different motivations. Analysis in this chapter will address the question highlighted in the literature framework regarding the extent to which the shift towards alternative actors in development, especially those with simultaneous conservation objectives, influences development outcomes. It will also discuss the potential 'conservation backfires' (Langholz, 1999) that refer to income generated through conservation activities being used in a way that threatens biodiversity (Kiss, 2004).

If positive outcomes are not achieved, community projects may be more beneficial as marketing for the tourism industry than for neighbouring Maasai communities. This chapter contributes towards the second research question: "What is the perceived relationship between the conservancies and development? Following on from chapter four, this chapter will focus in further on the three sub-points of this research question:

- a) (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?
- b) Why are they doing this?
- c) Does this affect society evenly

Conservancy-affiliated organisations have a higher active presence on the ground and a closer relationship with communities than other development actors which generally results in a higher success rate for projects. But the length of the research period enabled a deep analysis, breaking through surface appearances. Issues were uncovered with some of the initiatives undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations, finding that successful outputs did not necessarily leading to successful outcomes. Three ways in which projects appeared successful on the

surface by achieving their output but not meeting their potential outcome, will be analysed. These are: the use of income earned through conservancy schemes; focus on building infrastructure projects that do not necessarily meet expectations and are rarely well maintained; and the greatest needs of communities not being met.

5.1 Increasing Incomes

Female research participants largely praised the role of women's groups. This was both the creation of women's groups by an outreach worker who is funded jointly by OOMT and BCFK, and the CMMF scheme undertaken in these groups that is supported by Stromme Foundation through BCFK. Consultancy work done for BCFK in August-September 2012 involved undertaking a baseline survey for this CMMF project and producing a report (Courtney, 2012). This found that income earned through this scheme is not being used in the ways anticipated. At the time of the survey, 24 CMMF groups had been formed with a total membership of 574 women from seven villages within and immediately bordering the study site.

A comparison between groups that had been established for over six months and those newly created suggested that the scheme has increased the income that women contribute to the household by an average of 55%. In real values this equates to KES 2175 (\$25) per month. Whilst it cannot be proven that this difference is the result of the CMMF project, it is very indicative. This growth in income is likely to increase further with time as the groups develop. For example, Mwirigi (2010) found that women involved in the microfinance scheme initiated by Lewa Conservancy in Northern Kenya multiplied their income by a factor of four. Surprisingly, further comparative analysis of the baseline study data in the Mara between the established and the newer groups suggested that this increased income was not increasing household expenditure.

According to the founder of BCFK (I 56), the aim and hope of the CMMF scheme is that additional income earned by women will reduce poverty within their households, and improve the social and economic status of women. Yet the data from this survey indicates that this additional income was being used to reduce the deficit between expenditure and household cash income (principally from employment and conservancy lease payments). This household deficit was largely cancelled out

through livestock sales. With the introduction of this additional income provided by the women, fewer livestock needed to be sold to balance out the deficit. In other words, instead of increasing expenditure on food, school fees, or improving living conditions as hoped, income generated through the CMMF scheme reduces the number of livestock that need to be sold each month to meet the same household needs. This subsequently increases livestock numbers. Whilst this can be seen as increased financial security and household resources, it is not leading to the fulfilment of the aims of projects, or the needs and desires of the women involved, as will be discussed shortly. Increasing livestock numbers also has environmental implications within the constraints of the ecosystem. This will be examined in chapter six.

Whilst in some cases women indicated that they are giving this money directly to their husbands, because this is what the church teaches them to do (FG 19), this was not always the case. In other instances, women were using their income to buy their usual items at the market each week without asking their husbands for money, as they would have done previously (FG 6). A possible reason for this is that one of the CMMF facilitators advocated that the aim of the project is to reach a point whereby “the Maasai lady can help herself, with or without the husband. She can be able to take care of the kids and pay school fees and clothe the kids” (I 37).

Although this finding may seem disappointing, the hard work of setting up the groups and increasing their income (i.e. “the output”) has been successful. Many other studies of tourism impact (including Harrison, 2001; Rutten, 2004; Mbaria, 2007; Saarinen et al., 2011; Osano et al., 2013) only assess the amount of money earned and do not go on to look at the impact that this money has upon the household. It is often presumed that increased income has the expected outcomes, without specifically investigating this – as I did in this baseline study. If this study had followed this trend, all income-generating schemes would have been labelled a success. It is through a deeper analysis that a disjuncture was found. If a successful outcome – reducing household poverty and increasing the social and economic status of women – is to be achieved, further education with the women is required. For example, a simultaneous education programme could highlight options for the

women with regard to how this money could be spent to improve their lives, and the lives of their children and families. In the study site, options for spending or investing money are currently very limited.

Following the creation of a beadwork project in the summer of 2013 by OOMT, during a short return visit to the field site I talked to some women in Olesere about how they are spending this new-found income. The most popular answer was buying sheep, although the women recognised that, if they all bought sheep every time they earn some money, it will become increasingly problematic as “it is already difficult to find grass for these animals” (FG 29). I then asked them on what they would really like to spend their money. Responses included buying solar lanterns and solar phone chargers, water tanks and alternatives to firewood for cooking. The reason stated was that these items would make the work of women a lot easier (ibid). They explained that they are not spending their money on these items at present for two reasons. Firstly, they said that saving money is a foreign concept to the Maasai (many of these ladies are not in a CMMF group) and so it is difficult to buy expensive items as “we always spend whatever money we have in our pockets” (ibid). Secondly, these items are not widely available to buy in the Mara, and those that are available are very expensive (ibid). Living in Koiyaki I found prices to be significantly higher than in Nairobi or Narok, largely because of transport expenses. If the transport of such items could be subsidised and buyers permitted to pay in instalments, positive outputs (income generation) could become positive outcomes (socio-economic advancement). Giving women autonomy over their own money does not come without difficulties. It is not in line with Maasai culture whereby men have the sole ability to own such possessions and make financial decisions (I 95). As a result, “some men accuse her [the outreach worker who runs the women’s groups] of not being a good lady and teaching their wives bad ways” (I 85).

The CMMF scheme and beadwork project are just two examples of income sources generated from conservancies. They are used here to represent the broader issue of how money earned through conservancy-affiliated schemes is utilised. Research participants indicated that in many instances all cash income sources, including rental income and employment, are used to reduce the number of livestock needing

to be sold, rather than increasing expenditure.⁶¹ This is an example of what Langholz (1999) termed ‘conservation backfires’. Just as Homewood (2002) reported that tourism earnings in the Mara were reinvested in large-scale cultivation, recipients of money earned as a result of the conservancies are using it to reduce the number of livestock they need to sell which increases herd sizes. This in turn threatens the biodiversity through which the money was earned (Kiss, 2004). This issue will be examined in more detail in chapter six.

It could be argued that influencing spending is beyond the remit or responsibility of those creating income-earning opportunities, including the conservancies or their affiliated organisations. When questioned about this, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) responded that he believes these organisations should build capacity for the local people to manage the money themselves. Similarly, Lars Lindkvist suggested that, while it cannot be the entire responsibility of the organisation involved, “we can showcase some ways of doing it” (I 31). Regarding land lease payments he raised a concern that:

If they [landowners] are just paid rent and left it could actually be quite disastrous in terms of the amount of cash that is actually introduced into these, not long ago, cashless communities (ibid).

There is a wide array of literature on the geographic, gendered and social inequality of incomes earned through tourism enterprises (Lee and Seyoung, 1998; Tosun et al., 2003; Thrane, 2008). As discussed, there is also a body of literature on money earned through conservation being used in ways that threatens biodiversity (Langholz, 1999; Murombedzi, 1999; Homewood, 2002; Kiss, 2004; Bedelian, 2014). Yet there is minimal literature discussing the process involved in ensuring that money earned through conservation or tourism initiatives has a positive impact upon standards of living, and whose responsibility this is. In light of this, the case study provided here raises some interesting questions to be considered regarding incomes earned through tourism initiatives.

⁶¹ The economic impact of the conservancies upon development will be the focus of chapter seven.

5.2 Infrastructure and Maintenance

The construction of buildings, such as school classrooms and clinics, is one of the main forms of development that communities request. As noted in chapter three, during discussions with male focus group participants regarding developments they would like to see in their communities in the coming five years, answers centred around physical changes in houses, infrastructure and the addition of new facilities (FG 1, 8, 14, 22). Although women agreed with their male counterparts about the need for these, some women also highlighted the importance of capacity building, such as the women's groups (FG 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 17, 25). A focus on capacity building and training within the women's groups may be partially responsible for this gender differentiation. Women also stressed the need for trained personnel within buildings constructed as they recognised that infrastructure alone is insufficient to be of benefit (ibid).

Women in Mbitin referred to a local clinic as being "like a picture" because it is just something that you can see with your eyes rather than being of any help (FG 15). When my neighbour (Kijoolu Soit) began having difficulties, when nine months pregnant, I took her to a new clinic built with the financial assistance of tourists and a conservancy-affiliated organisation. There was only a community health worker present and due to a lack of midwifery training, this individual was unable to tell whether Kijoolu was in labour or not. She then had to endure an agonising 90 minute journey along very rough roads to Talek Clinic for a consultation with a nurse. I discussed this issue with her a few days later, following the birth of her healthy baby girl. She acknowledged that the new clinic is still growing, but expressed disappointment (I 50). She said that a building shell is of little use to the community if they do not have any trained staff or the necessary equipment (ibid). Kijoolu went on to suggest that, instead of spending money on building clinics, perhaps vehicles could be bought to transport patients to existing hospitals that have better resources and trained nurses (ibid). At present, to hire a car for a return trip to the clinic that she visited costs KES 8000 (\$92) (ibid). She thought that people would be happy to pay towards the use of such a vehicle as it would be cheaper than hiring a private car, as they do now (ibid).

Improved transport linkages⁶² across the Mara could also reduce the need to build small, inefficient schools in each village. Whilst water sources and nursery schools are needed in all settled areas, the concentration of resources for schools in certain areas could enable the creation of some good quality facilities. With a thawing in general opinions of education, some community members are starting to prioritise the quality of schools over proximity. Women in FG 25 in Osilale explained that, even though a new school has been built very near to where they live, “once the children are old enough they walk past this school to Talek which can take up to two hours [5km] because it is a better school”. If transport either in the form of bicycles or vehicles was available, this would reduce the proliferation of poorer quality schools.

Focus group participants always stated that they wanted schools, clinics and boreholes closer to their homes. However, breaking this down and discussing what they want more specifically, they agreed that they actually desired better access to education, health care and clean water. Communities explained that they state that they want these facilities because that is how they have seen these needs previously being met, but stressed that they are open to other delivery routes so long as their needs are met.

Reasons for development organisations focusing on providing infrastructure are that it is easily quantifiable to donors, it is impressive in pictures, and it can be branded. The Kenyan government’s open data resource exemplifies this need for quantifiable results (Government of Kenya, 2005-6). This database assesses the level of health care provided in each district by counting the number of clinics, regardless of the condition of the clinic or services provided (ibid). The construction of infrastructure is another example whereby projects can look successful from the surface, but waver under closer examination. It was only because I was living in the communities and tried to access these facilities that the underlying problems beyond the actual building construction became apparent.

⁶² In the form of community transport vehicles combined with infrastructure such as bridges over seasonal streams and placing marram (gravel) on tracks crossing black cotton soil.

Chapter three disclosed the interesting finding that those in the NGO sector did not include the construction of infrastructure projects in their definition of development, despite these organisations commonly undertaking such. As with all NGOs, they must please their donors but conservancy-affiliated organisations must also focus on the environment and livestock to satisfy the conservancy managers and the tourism industry. In addition, these organisations must appease the communities and meet their expectations. This complex set of motivations and expectations may point towards why conservancy-affiliated organisations continue to undertake infrastructure projects despite it differing from their own stated understandings of development. Tourism partner Garry Cullen (I 15) explained: “schools, dispensaries and water are issues of great interest to the community and we need to address that”. This is a cyclical process as the conservancy-affiliated organisations are undertaking initiatives that they expect will meet the desires of the local communities. Simultaneously, these community members are moulding their interpretations of development based on “good things that we have seen” (FG 1, 3, 11, 15).

This situation raises an interesting question as to whether this pattern of providing communities with what they say they want (infrastructure) rather than what they mean (better health care, education etc.) is the result of conservation affiliated organisations not being ‘expert’ or ‘traditional’ development actors. One could argue that organisations or agencies that solely focus on development work and undertake this all day, everyday, would have come across this issue before and subsequently would prevent it from happening. The example of how the Kenyan government assesses the level of health care, based on the number of clinics, places doubt on this hypothesis, however, it is one that is worth raising. Another contributing factor is that conservancy-affiliated organisations will always consider the environmental implications of projects to a degree that other development actors may not. For example, when I suggested improving transport links across the Mara rather than providing inefficient resources in each centre one of the tourism partners (anon 17) countered that they did not want to see an increase in traffic around or across conservancies. While no participant stated that infrastructure projects were being developed to reduce transport in this way, it may – to some degree – be an unconscious thought for those actors who are simultaneously trying to achieve

conservation objectives through a more environmentally sustainable approach to community development.

Another major problem in the study site with infrastructure projects, once completed, is a lack of maintenance. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010: 16) suggest that this is widespread across the continent, with one third of Africa's infrastructure assets in need of rehabilitation. In the Mara it seems to be especially problematic for water projects due to their need for frequent maintenance. For example, during my 19 months living in Olesere village the borehole there, constructed by BCFK, only worked for 3 weeks. Communities are told from day one that, once the project is up and running, day-to-day maintenance of the project will be their responsibility. But an expectation on other people to undertake maintenance remains. In Endoinyo e Rinka, Dig Deep worked closely with the community from the project's conception to create a water committee and develop plans to ensure sustainability. To create a maintenance fund, the committee decided to collect monthly usage fees from families using the project. Despite this, once Dig Deep left, these payments were not made. When the turbine needed its annual maintenance, there was no money in the fund to pay for this (PC Anna Banyard). As donor organisations do not want failed projects on their books, they are often coerced into coming back to these communities to help. During the research period, this was seen with the water projects in Olesere, Endoinyo e Rinka and Olkuroto. If donors do not return, projects collapse, as with the Ilera cattle troughs in Olesere. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010: 16) believe that funding for maintenance is often not forthcoming because recipients believe that if they wait donor funding could be obtained for reconstruction or repair. This is in line with the findings from the study site.

Reasons for communities not taking care of projects once complete, suggested by research participants, included a lack of ownership due to community members not putting enough equity in (I 76). However, for the vast majority of projects examined throughout the research period, community contributions were relatively high. One underlying issue is that despite agreeing to these contributions, communities sometimes seek other funders to cover this, such as other NGOs or politicians (I 2). Organisations responsible for these projects were also criticised for not incorporating

running and maintenance costs into budgets (I 76). Yet in all projects that were overseen, this was given real consideration with plans being put in place to ensure financial sustainability. The main problem has been that, once supporting organisations leave, the communities have not kept to the plans that they participated in developing. This means that despite ownership theoretically having been passed to the relevant community, responsibility is not being taken for maintenance.

Dickson Kaelo (I 48) believes that while this problem of maintenance is faced across the whole of Kenya, it is particularly problematic in the Mara because of Maasai culture. He explained that it is not in the nature of Maasai communities to repair community projects. This is because they are “communal in sharing their resources but individualistic in their own activities and so it [coming together to do or repair a project] is something that doesn’t work very well in their culture” (ibid). Another contributing factor with water projects in the Mara is that the conservancy-affiliated organisations have been trying to use modern renewable energy systems that increase costs because they require more maintenance (such as wind turbines) or are frequently stolen (like solar panels). Using generators instead is not practical due to the continual fuel expenses, as Mpuaai community have found (I 37). Going back to basics with hand pumps – which local people could be trained to maintain themselves – may be an option. This is another example of the trade-offs made as a result of trying to combine conservation and development objectives (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). Following the maintenance issues in Endoinyo e Rinka, Dig Deep are now looking into alternatives to boreholes to increase and improve water access in the Mara such as rain water catchment, shallow wells and dams (PC Anna Banyard and Ben Skelton). This concurs with a recommendation made by Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010: 16) that a lack of willingness to maintain infrastructure projects should be taken into account in the design of projects by choosing low-maintenance technologies.

5.3 Satisfying Needs

Although conservancy-affiliated organisations generally have a greater collaboration and participation with communities than other development organisations, there are still instances where projects do not address the greatest needs of the area. Examples

of this include: the distribution of solar panels amongst schools; the provision of IT equipment; and the spatial distribution of community outreach.

Olesere School is a day school⁶³ bordering Naboisho Conservancy. A client from Ol Seki Camp donated their first solar panel. When asked, the head teacher revealed that this was only used to charge the teachers' phones and light one classroom for security at night-time (I 12). Then, as part of their Green Village Initiative, BCFK in February 2013 donated a 1000 watt solar system to the school. In an interview with the chairman of the school board shortly after receiving this system, he said that the school does not know what to do with all of this power. He explained: "It is so big and we don't have boarding here... they just came and said we have it" (I 85). Given that this solar power is not deemed to be necessary, or wanted, he was unhappy that the community had to pay to build a battery room for the system (ibid). This chairman was re-interviewed six months later and the issue of the solar power was raised again to see if it had now found a use; for example by linking it up to the nearby clinic. He responded that in the intervening six months, BCFK had brought another solar system for the clinic, and that shortly after this the government delivered two more solar systems – one for the school and one for the clinic (I 94).

In sharp contrast to the situation in Olesere, is Loigero School, near Olare Orok Conservancy. This school has 80 boarding students but no power (I 51). In February 2012, OOMT donated a computer lab to the school, together with its own solar system to power the computers. Although it was appreciated and used, this computer lab did not satisfy the greatest needs of the school: water and power (ibid). In order to satisfy the latter, the school tapped the electricity from the computer lab to power lights in the boarding students' dining room (anon 14). This meant that the children did not have to eat in the dark (ibid).

BCFK and OOMT both concentrate their efforts on schools that border their affiliated conservancies. As one former BCFK employee said: "All the NGOs that are here are fighting over their patch and their right for influence and that doesn't always best serve the communities around here" (anon 15). Whereas the greatest

⁶³ In 2013 this school became a boarding school, even though there were no existing boarding facilities.

need for power was at Loigero School, this is not where solar power systems were donated. Conversely, a computer lab at Olesere School could have utilised their plentiful power supply. The need for conservation-affiliated benefits or development work to be located geographically close to the conservation initiative is a common trait amongst organisations in the Mara. This is so that the link with the source of the benefit can be emphasised. Despite this, it does not serve the best purpose of communities.

As this thesis is submitted, there are on-going discussions between development actors and tourism partners within the study site regarding the creation of one trust to bring together all community development work within and around the Mara Conservancies. If all of these conservancy-affiliated organisations could join together as one trust and pool their resources, situations like that affecting Loigero and Olesere schools could be prevented. Although in some instances donations are made because specific items have been given to organisations to pass on, the greatest needs from the ground must be listened to and acted upon if successful outcomes are to be achieved.

Unfortunately, it is not as easy as simply asking the local people what their greatest needs are. As previously discussed, communities often state that they want a specific project rather than highlighting a need to be addressed. In addition, some individuals within communities want to use donations for their own benefit, or that of their friends and family. For example, a camp manager told me about her attempt to assist a local school (anon 18). She asked the head teacher what the greatest need in the school was, and he replied that they were in need of more teachers. Knowing that there are few well trained teachers in the school, she was pleased by this response and said that they would happily employ a new teacher. She told the head teacher that she would like to be part of the interview process to ensure that the money was spent on employing a well-qualified individual, but he replied that this was not necessary as he already had CVs and knew whom he would like to employ. The camp manager asked to see the CV for this person and found that they did not have any teaching qualifications or experience but happened to be a friend of the head teacher. Disappointed and frustrated at the lack of desire to make the most of the

offer to fund a fully qualified teacher in favour of benefiting his friend, the camp manager retracted the offer.

One final example of the greatest needs not being met is the spatial distribution of the conservancies' outreach scheme. This focuses on women's groups and school wildlife clubs. An analysis of areas covered by these initiatives highlighted that they focus upon bigger centres. This is understandable as it is easier to start women's groups in places like Talek and Endoinyo e Rinka. In these areas, women are more organised, willing and aware of what the CMMF concept is trying to achieve. Similarly, it is easier to work in more formalised schools that are more welcoming of extra-curricular activities. It is also likely that these areas would produce the greatest quantifiable results when the schemes' impacts are assessed.

Mbitin, Nkirgir, Osilale and Olkuroto are the least developed in terms of community facilities and education levels are the lowest within the study site. Yet the outreach schemes do not include these villages. Focus group sessions also suggested that these same areas are the most negative about the conservancies and wildlife more generally, often due to human-wildlife conflicts. In November 2011, a lion killed a schoolboy from Mbitin School near his home. Teachers at the same school have been injured by buffalo and another lion. Consequently, the teachers and pupils have openly negative perceptions of wildlife, yet this is one of the few schools in which the outreach scheme does not run a wildlife club. It is not known if the negative perceptions are a cause or consequence of the lack of outreach work. Similarly, ladies from Nkirgir and Olkuroto revealed that an outreach worker came to their area to set up women's groups but then left and did not return (FG 17, 21). In Nkirgir this was because a grandfather gave the outreach worker a hard time regarding the land that they were meeting on (FG 17; CP 13). Instead of finding somewhere else to meet she never returned (ibid). Now the women only see her driving past on her way to work with other communities (ibid). Such areas are undeniably more challenging to work in, but these villages have the greatest need and are where outreach work could have the greatest impacts.

Although, as noted, the direction of causation is not known, if the negativity towards the conservancies and wildlife in these locations is a consequence of the lack of

engagement by conservancy-affiliated organisations it would strongly insinuate that their involvement in other communities have made them more positive. An important, unknown, issue is whether perceptions within these communities are likely to revert if incentives reduce or cease (Pretty and Smith, 2004).

5.4 Implications: The Importance of Positive Outcomes

Although successful outputs are being achieved, successful outcomes are being hindered by conservancy-affiliated organisations not: adequately carrying out capacity building alongside income generation schemes; looking beyond easily quantifiable projects such as infrastructure; or working together to apply practical sustainable solutions to address the greatest needs. These findings would not have been uncovered if it were not for the length of the research period, the ethnographic methods adopted or the fact that I chose to live within a community in the study site and experience day-to-day village life.

The majority of other studies assessing conservancy impacts in the Mara (Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014) have only looked at the surface findings such as the amount of money generated, the number of infrastructure projects built and the provision of items such as solar panels and outreach support. This is the first study in the Mara to have probed development aspects further to investigate what this money is used for, how infrastructure projects are staffed and maintained, and whether current actions are meeting the greatest needs of communities. The findings within this chapter highlights that a closer examination is essential in order to probe how the communities perceive such development interventions as they are able to see beyond initial impressions given to researchers and donors who are just passing through. To ensure that development projects are truly appreciated by community members and the intended outcomes are satisfied, this level of analysis is essential.

The first point highlighted in this chapter, that earnings emanating from the conservancies are being used to reduce the number of livestock being sold, and thus increasing herd sizes bordering the conservancies is a critical one. This is an example of a conservation backfire and it is especially problematic when conservancy-affiliated organisations are involved given that they have both conservation and development objectives. Given this dualistic approach, such organisations inevitably

have to face difficult decisions and trade-offs with regard to development interventions. This was highlighted in the infrastructure projects section. As a result of this conflict it was questioned as to whether such organisations are suited to undertaking development interventions. Although conservancy-affiliated organisations are not solely devoted to development, and may not have as much experience as more traditional actors, for those in favour of sustainable development, one could argue that they are the best placed. Without due consideration for the environment, any development has the potential to hinder both current and future generations.

One challenge with these organisations taking a lead in implementing development initiatives, however, is their limited geographical scope. As each conservancy-affiliated organisation wants to benefit those living near it, largely so that they can associate the benefit with their conservancy, the greatest needs of the communities are not being met. What was highlighted in the final section of this third point, which assessed the spatial distribution of outreach schemes, is an indication that actions undertaken by conservancy-affiliated organisations do work in improving perceptions of the conservancies, conservation and wildlife. Whilst this is only inferred at this stage, and is not conclusive, it is an encouraging sign for these organisations.

Regardless of cause, the result of the current disconnect between successful outputs and successful outcomes means that community projects may become more beneficial for the camps and conservancies, who use them for advertising and marketing, than the communities themselves. If conservancy-affiliated organisations are to support community development initiatives in an attempt to improve perceptions of the nature and wildlife upon which the businesses⁶⁴ within the conservancies depend, it is vital that positive outputs lead to positive outcomes. If they do not, communities will get frustrated and attempts will back-fire, making people more negative about the conservancies and wildlife more generally. If the successful outputs can be transformed into successful outcomes then the appreciation of benefits received by community members will increase. This would address one of

⁶⁴ Businesses engaging in development work in response to various motivations will be explored further in chapter eight.

the greatest threats to initiatives such as conservancies, as discussed in chapter two. For this to be achieved, greater unity and collaboration between actors, as well as with all demographics within all communities, is essential. The current levels of community engagement and participation will be critically analysed in section 7.3.

6 Pastoralism

The dominant livelihood of residents within the study site is pastoralism. Livestock keeping is deeply ingrained in these communities:

As Maasai people, we cannot live without our livestock. If you come back in 10 years, things may have changed, but we will still be here, on our land, with our livestock and the wild animals. Cattle and the Maasai are one (FG 20).

At the most basic level, livestock provide food security for pastoralists such as the Maasai and are central to their social and cultural lives. In the Mara, livestock also form a living bank account and have an important role in development through the provision of capital for investment (Nyariki et al., 2009: 163). FG 22 unintentionally stressed this role of cattle in financial security by using the Maa word for cows, *inkishu*, to discuss money instead of the usual nouns, *impesai* or *iropiani*.

Pastoralism refers to the “extensive production of herbivorous livestock using pasture or browse in which herd mobility is a central management strategy” (Notenbaert et al., 2012: 2). Homewood (2008: 1) notes that popular conceptions of pastoralism have focused on ‘pure’ pastoralists who live a nomadic or transhumant existence, subsisting entirely on the produce of their herds. She elaborates that it has become increasingly clear that such pastoralists are the exception rather than the rule (ibid). In a broader sense, Homewood (ibid: 250) states:

African pastoralists emerge as constituting a loose, permeable, highly diverse category that embraces people from a wide spectrum of ethnic groups, ecologies and economies, engaged in an enormous range of livestock-related occupations.

The nature of pastoralism is also changing temporally. The rapid transformation of land tenure into small parcels, each with an individual title deed, over the last 15 years has been a major and fundamental change throughout the Mara area and is having major impacts on both land use and land values (Thompson et al., 2002; Thompson, 2002; Thompson and Homewood, 2002; Homewood et al., 2004; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008). The majority of residents now live on their individual plots and nomadic movements are increasingly restricted.

As discussed in chapter two, perceptions that pastoralists and their livestock are harmful to the environment and not compatible with conservation remain entrenched within African governments. Research over the last thirty years has repeatedly

pointed to the efficacy of pastoralism, as well as its benefits for rangeland ecology *if* mobility can be assured (Behnke et al., 1993; Notenbaert et al., 2012). As land in Koiyaki is subdivided and the population is rapidly increasing, how can pastoralism be incorporated into this system? Another question raised in the literature framework was whether access granted to traditional resource users, pastoralists and their livestock, within the conservancy system has changed since the research period of previous studies (including Snider, 2012; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). This chapter will examine how and why changes in resource access are occurring, whether this is enjoyed evenly within society, and the impact that this has had upon community perceptions of the model. This boils down to the need for benefits to outweigh costs.

As such, this chapter will systematically examine how the conservancies are thought to be affecting this livelihood. This incorporates perceived direct impacts such as access to resources and human-wildlife conflicts as well as more indirect changes to the composition of livestock holdings within the study site. This is another point raised in the literature framework. Bedelian (2014) found that conservancies had not increased livestock numbers amongst its members and beneficiaries, but the finding in chapter five regarding how revenues earned from conservancy initiatives are spent calls for this to be re-examined. This chapter contributes towards the second research question, which focuses on perceptions of how the conservancies are impacting on development, why they are doing so and whether it affects society evenly. To begin, this chapter will discuss the continued dominance of pastoralism as a livelihood within the study site.

Despite the importance of tourism in the Maasai Mara, livestock keeping remains the dominant livelihood. According to the BCFK CMMF baseline survey, 97.5% of households within the study site participate in livestock keeping, contributing on average 57.6% of household income (Courtney, 2012). Income is gained by selling livestock at local weekly markets through middlemen. Traders, through multiple onward sales, then take the livestock to the outskirts of Nairobi where they are slaughtered and the meat sold. Men in Mpuaai (FG 22) explained that, on average, each household sells one shoat every market day, meaning four are sold per month.

The monthly income from this, for the pastoralist, is approximately KES 20,000 (\$230) (ibid). This cash revenue is used to cover household expenses and so the number of shoats needing to be sold depends on the size and demands of the family (ibid). Cows are sold when additional money is required, for example when school fees are due (FG 21).

As previously discussed in chapter two, carrying capacities are a concept supported by those who believe that there is a limit to the quantity of livestock that can be sustained within a set area. Although recognising the importance of other ecological flux aspects such as rainfall, Maasai pastoralists state that they are increasingly acknowledging limitations regarding the number of livestock that can be sustained throughout the year on their allocated land. This has come about since the sedentisation of people and cessation of mobility through nomadism. Discussions with conservationists and range management researchers may also have influenced these perceptions. Prior to the introduction of the conservancies and their grazing schemes, Berger (1996) and Nyariki, Mwang'ombe et al. (2009) suggested that livestock were beginning to cause degradation in the Mara. During my research period, focus groups estimated that one cow (0.7 LU)⁶⁵ can be supported on one acre of land. Dividing the current number of livestock on the unprotected community land within the study site gives a current LU/acre of 0.68 (36,688 LU within 54,225 acres of non-conservancy land). As this area includes land that is unsuitable for grazing, such as the Pardamat Hills, it is likely that the current density on suitable land will exceed the 0.7 LU/acre predicted by the landowners.

As well as pastoralism remaining the dominant livelihood and income source for the residents within the study site, it also continues to be immensely important socio-culturally. In line with the earlier quote from FG 20, when I asked the men in FG 18 “what would you like your lives be like in the future?” the three responses were:

- We should stay together with our livestock.
- The life of the Maasai is staying with the wild animals and our land and so we need to stay being the Maasai, together with our cows.
- We want development, we want to improve, but we want to stay Maasai.

⁶⁵ 1 livestock unit (LU) is 250kg live weight of any domestic herbivore. Therefore 1 cow = 0.7 LU and shoats = 0.1 LU.

As these research participants indicated, although they want to stay Maasai – which to them means remaining with their livestock, land and wildlife – they also desire development, improvements and changes. Similarly, in local schools I asked the students to draw a picture of how they would like their life to be when they are grown up. We then discussed their pictures. The students usually drew a permanent house, a smaller family than is currently the average for the Maasai⁶⁶ and sometimes a car. One consistent feature in these drawings was the presence of livestock enclosures. All children said that regardless of whether they have a job, they will always want to keep livestock at their home (see figure 6.1). This suggests that rather than replacing, alternative income sources will diversify and financially support pastoralism in the Mara (as suggested by Kiss, 2004; Stonza, 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 25).




Figure 6.1 My Future Home by Sawmei Nawisais STD 1 Mbitin School

⁶⁶ A shift is occurring in Maasai culture regarding family size. Elders of today on average have 3-4 wives, younger men in their 30s have 2-3 wives and the youth are saying they only want 1-2 wives. It is likely that this change is largely the result of recognising the expenses involved in having a large family in an increasingly cash-driven society.

Having discussed the continued importance of pastoralism within the study site, positive and negative direct effects of the conservancies on the livelihood will now be discussed.

6.1 Direct Affects of Conservancies on Pastoralism

Stakeholders unanimously believe that the greatest direct impacts of the conservancies on pastoralism are their influence on resource access and human-wildlife conflicts. Grassroots perceptions of these two aspects will now be analysed. It is important to remember that the research used to form this discussion was undertaken over 19 months. During this time there were many changes, especially regarding resource access. Therefore, perceptions at the beginning of the research period may not be identical to those, even from the same participants, at a later date.

6.1.1 Resource Access

To date the Mara Conservancies have been heavily criticised regarding the extent to which people and livestock are integrated into the model, as discussed in chapter two. At an ILRI workshop, Katherine Homewood (2012) argued that conservancies are detrimental to pastoralism because they restrict nomadic movements and access to resources for livestock. She also states in her written work that, although private conservancies deliver financial returns and conservation outcomes, they may “replace rather than sustain local livelihoods” (Homewood et al., 2009: 395). Specifically regarding the Mara Conservancies, Bedelian (2012: 13) agrees that: “tourism is in direct competition against other livelihood activities such as livestock production.” This is in direct contrast to Maasai youth stating that they will always keep livestock, regardless of future employment, as discussed above.

These statements by Homewood and Bedelian reflect the status quo prior to, and at the beginning of, my research period. The conservancy rental agreements signed by conservancy landowners state that no grazing is permitted within leased areas. When fieldwork began in August 2011, grazing within conservancies was very limited; livestock were generally only permitted to graze in the conservancies during droughts or when desired by conservancy management. Beyond this, herders grazed illegally at night, which increased the likelihood of predator attacks. At this time, the

conservancies were largely exclusionary and more in line with fortress conservation ideals.

Towards the beginning of the research period, ladies in Nkirgir (FG 17) stated: “the only disadvantage of the conservancy is that our cows can’t graze there”. They expanded:

Cows aren’t allowed to graze inside even when there is a lot of grass. It is your land and your cows are dying. They are only allowed to go in when it’s open for 4 weeks during the low season when the conservancy is closed.⁶⁷ The rest of the time when we’re not allowed in, we have to graze illegally at night. When it is open it helps and benefits the cows but when it’s closed, what benefit does it bring to them (ibid)?

Men in Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14) suggested “it would be better if the conservancies weren’t there so that we could graze our cows freely like before”. A tourism partner acknowledged:

Traditional ways are definitely being restricted; they [the herders] can’t just go and graze where they traditionally did. And I think to a certain extent this is the fault of the conservancy but also it’s also due to the whole change in land ownership (I 21).

Bedelian (2014: 220) agrees that criticisms of conservancies restricting access and settlement is “closely integrated and mixed up” with land subdivision. I asked the men in Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14) to what extent they thought the changes in resource access were the result of the conservancies, or the change in land ownership more generally. They responded that without the conservancies, they would have ignored land subdivision with regard to grazing (ibid). This statement, however, presumes that all landowners are willing to continue grazing communally, which allows those with large herds to utilise the resources owned by the less wealthy. The rapid proliferation of fencing in the Mara contests this (see figure 6.2).

⁶⁷ Camps often close during the low/rainy season.



Figure 6.2 Newly constructed fence around an individual's plot in Olesere. Photo: N. Mogensen

Several focus groups (including 3, 10, 14, 27) complained that in addition to the restrictions imposed on grazing, conservancies prevent access to natural salt licks and water points. Again, it is difficult to determine the extent to which this would have occurred anyway following land individualisation, independently of the conservancies' presence, as these occurred simultaneously. The idea that resources now belong to individuals is proliferating rapidly. For example, when I was building my house, I collected water from a dirty spring for smearing the walls. This quickly resulted in debates within the community regarding whose land the spring was on and who was able to charge me for using this dirty water. Similarly there has been a recent spurt in blocking roads for tolls to charge vehicles for passing over private land. These examples highlight the realisation by some individuals that the resources on their land are not communal any more. Therefore, even without the presence of the conservancies, those who are 'lucky' enough to have springs and salt licks on their land may have restricted access.

During the research period, a more comprehensive approach to livestock grazing was introduced by the conservancies within the study site. This decision was made by the conservancies in an attempt to prevent illegal night-grazing in favour of a more organised and manageable approach (I 5, 76, 81). There were also strong demands by local communities to make grazing access more comprehensive. As James Kaigil, assistant manager of OMC, said: "one way [for the conservancies] to acknowledge the importance of livestock to us Maasai, and to support us, is to have balanced and controlled grazing in subsections [of the conservancies]" (I 8). FG 14 argued that unless wildlife is contained within the conservancies, livestock grazing inside the

protected areas should be allowed. This is because wildlife comes and eats the grass on their land, especially at night (ibid). Tourism partners did not want cattle in conservancies, they had to be persuaded to allow some level of grazing (Bedelian, 2014: 226). Dickson Kaelo believes that this change in practice is evidence that landowners have a say in the running of the conservancies. He expanded:

If we allowed the decisions to be made 100% by one tourism operator it is very likely that they would come in and fence it and no cattle could come in. But because they go to meetings and they see the reaction of the community representatives when they say no grazing, perhaps it makes them say this can't fly so let's accept it in a way (I 48).

As well as gradually recognising the importance of pastoralism for the surrounding communities, Dickson (ibid) believes that the tourism partners were more open to this change because of a growing awareness of the potential benefits of grazing for both the flora and fauna (Homewood and Rogers, 1991; Notenbaert et al. 2012), something that has long been recognised by the conservancy managers (Bedelian, 2014: 226). He partially accredits this change to ILRI's work in the area, in addition to reports that have now been read widely that suggest some level of grazing might be beneficial for the environment (I 48). Consequently, the change in grazing policy is a combination of the intrinsic need for the conservancy management and tourism partners to keep the local communities onside, and recognition that doing so could also be beneficial for the tourism product – if well managed. Finding this balance is not an easy task for conservancy managers. It involves constantly “walking a fine tightrope attempting to look after the interests of both tourism partners and landowners” (I 81). This balance of interests represents the trade-offs and hard decisions that need to be made when targeting both conservation and development objectives (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16).

Grazing in conservancies is widespread. In 2009/2010, Bedelian (2014: 226) found that 87% of households in Koiyaki graze in conservancies. Of this, 46% took their livestock to conservancies to graze regularly/daily, 47% in dry times and 7% occasionally/seasonally (ibid). Since this study, undertaken at the inception of conservancies in Koiyaki, the percentage of households using the conservancies, and the regularity of this use, is likely to have increased. The management of Olare Orok and Motorogi Conservancies falls under the same body (Ol Purkel Ltd) and so they

follow the same grazing scheme. This differs from Naboisho Conservancy whose management is contracted to Seiya Ltd.

Rob O'Meara (I 81), the manager of OMC, explained the two ways in which grazing access is usually granted:

If the management decide that the grass has become too long they will call in the cows, and if there is a drought, the communities come to request additional access.

He added that grazing can also be used to dissuade elephants from approaching the borders of the conservancies where they are likely to conflict with the local people (ibid). This is because if cattle eat the grass in these areas before it becomes too long, it is less likely to attract elephants (ibid). During open grazing in OMC, the livestock from different communities are all pushed together in one small area (ibid). Rob estimated that in 2013, areas of the conservancy will be open for 10-11 months as opposed to 9 months in 2012 and 8-9 months in 2011. Access is increasing as the grass root base is now recovering from the overgrazing prior to the conservancy's presence and so now some areas are being opened for the first time in three years (ibid, I 101). Also, increasing pressures for grazing in community areas have fuelled both night-grazing and demands for the conservancies to open larger areas for longer (I 101).

Emma and Darren Geary (I77) believe that there is a general agreement amongst camp managers that the introduction of a more formal grazing plan in 2012 is increasing the extent of access permitted. On the whole, camp managers in OMC are very happy with the management of the controlled grazing, especially with regard to the regular emails that they receive clarifying the areas open for grazing so that the guides can be advised of locations to avoid (I 83). Two camp managers (I 77, 82) mentioned that there is still a problem with night-grazing as cow bells are sometimes heard from the camp during the night. One camp manager (I 82) was under the impression that day-grazing was only open to conservancy landowners and so night grazers are non-conservancy members 'stealing' the grass. The conservancy manager and assistant manager independently insisted that day-grazing access in OMC is not exclusively for conservancy landowners (I 8, 81). According to the Motorogi liaison officer (I 87):

We allow everyone to graze, [conservancy] landowners and non-[conservancy] landowners. [Conservancy] landowners are guaranteed access and although the non-[conservancy] landowners are not guaranteed, so far we have not had to experience it [excluding them]. When the resource is available we're happy to share. This reflects back to our [Maasai] culture.

Bedelian's study concurs with this as she found that conservancy members and non-members equally reported grazing in a conservancy (2014: 227). This equal treatment is especially important considering that those whose whole plot is inside the conservancies are not able to live on it, and so they often reside and graze on land owned by non-conservancy members. It would therefore create a great deal of tension if they were to benefit exclusively from grazing rights inside the conservancies.

Countering Rob's description, some other stakeholders believe that the grazing periods in OMC are very short. One new camp manager said that he liked the grazing in OMC because it is open for a maximum of one week, a small area is grazed and then it is closed again (I 83). Similarly, men in neighbouring Mpuaai village (FG 22) claimed that the conservancy only opens for grazing for two weeks. In Olkuroto village, which is sandwiched between the three conservancies, there was a heated debate in FG 20 about how often grazing is permitted. This inconsistency in responses, even merely within Olkuroto, suggests that there is general confusion regarding the extent of grazing access currently permitted within OMC. Conservancy management originally tried to organise grazing through a central conservancy landowner committee but this became very political. Within the Mara, grazing access is a form of political currency. Committee members tried to manipulate and personally allocate grazing rights so as to expand their political power (I 101).

Of OMC's 292 landowners, the manager estimates that 75 % do not have livestock in the immediate area (I 81). This would suggest that the grazing is largely enjoyed by the neighbouring non-conservancy members. However, Rob went on to clarify that a few of the key influential landowners own the majority of the livestock brought in to graze (ibid). He estimates that four cattle barons⁶⁸ own 75% of the cows that come into OMC, as they each own between 2500 and 4000. It is these barons who have

⁶⁸ This term is widely used by conservancy managers to describe those who own many cattle. They are often also politically well-connected.

been using their influence in the conservancy committees to ensure that the grazing schemes benefit themselves (ibid). If decisions did not go their way, this would create a political backlash (ibid).

In an attempt to keep the conservancies as apolitical as possible, instead of making grazing decisions at a central point, grazing committees were set up in neighbouring villages. These committees now negotiate directly with the conservancy management for access on behalf of their area (ibid). In addition, if someone breaks conservancy regulations, for example grazes illegally or kills wildlife, it is then the responsibility of the community to reprimand the individual or they will risk losing their grazing access (ibid). This was an attempt to encourage responsibility at the village level (ibid). The chairman of OOMT (I 75) hopes that through such measures, peer pressure may introduce a more equal, fairer system that benefits the majority whilst marginalising the cattle barons. However, inclusion in these committees does not recognise the heterogeneity of society. Although the grazing committees were not intended to be formed exclusively of conservancy landowners, in reality the majority are (I 101).

As the majority of landowners do not graze in the conservancy, Rob O'Meara predicts that in the future they may demand a grazing fee (I 81). This would be a fee per head for livestock to come and graze in the conservancy and would need to be hand-in-hand with livestock improvement programs (ibid). This is because people would be more willing to pay a fee to access a high-quality grass bank⁶⁹ for fewer, high-quality cattle. Rob O'Meara and Dickson Kaelo were two of the first voices stressing the need for a broader, more holistic approach to land management in Koiyaki, extending beyond the conservancies. Bedelian (2014: 247) agrees that conservancies need better, well thought out, grazing plans and greater integration of livestock into conservancies and the wider landscape. She believes that such measures would increase landowners' interests to continue participating in conservancies (ibid: 248).

⁶⁹ A grass bank is the high volume of long grass that develops when mass grazing has been restricted in an area for a period of time.

Communities that border OMC are closer to the national reserve where a blind eye is often turned to illegal grazing, especially during dry times. FG 22 explained that herders are able to go there for weeks without being fined, whereas in OMC, herders entering illegally are caught every time. Butt, Shortridge et al. (2009) and Butt (2011) suggest that the creation of the conservancies may have increased night-grazing within the national reserve. Whilst, for those living close to the reserve, grazing there represents a less risky option when conservancy grazing is closed, when the conservancies are open for grazing they may actually take some pressure off the reserve. Grazing in the reserve is also not a viable option for the majority of villages bordering Naboisho because of the greater distances involved. In comparison to OMC, Naboisho has developed a more formal grazing scheme as part of the conservancy's master plan.

Initially when the conservancy was created, no cattle were allowed into Naboisho, but this created a very intense conflict with the surrounding communities (I 76). Rangers had to police the area in 24-hour shifts to prevent illegal night-grazing (ibid). Seeing that grass was exhausted on the community land, the conservancy manager decided to be proactive. His thinking was:

It is better to do it in a controlled manner rather than having them all sneaking in... as if they want to come in we do not have the capacity to stop them. We just need to control it as much as possible (I 5).

When the rains came in 2012, Justin Heath, the conservancy manager, began to create grass banks (I 76). Working together with Dickson Kaelo, trials then started with the Nkoilale community, experimenting with rotational grazing (ibid). As in OMC, Naboisho's grazing scheme attempts to balance the role that livestock can play in rangeland management, community pleas for greater access and concerns from the tourism partners regarding the extent to which this will affect their 'exclusive' product (ibid). Naboisho's scheme allocates areas to each of the five bordering communities for rotational grazing (ibid). All the cattle from one village graze in a small allocated zone until the grass becomes very short, and then they move onto their next zone (ibid). The intention is to provide year-round grazing for each village and the zoning takes into account seasonal changes in tourism, with grazing concentrated around the camps and central tourism areas during the low

season when most camps are closed (ibid). This tries to combat the prior situation whereby herders would move further and further into the conservancy during dry times, inevitably leading to conflicts as they approach the centre during the camps' high season (I 48). Although this approach minimises the disturbance to tourists, some conservationists complain that the location of sensitive animals, such as lion cubs, is not sufficiently taken into account through this zoning method, compared to the more informal approach adopted by OMC (I 80). This related to Bedelian's (2014: 128) criticism that grazing plans crafted by technical managers have few options for input or adaptability. Dickson Kaelo honestly admitted that the conservancies are still learning how to balance the trade-offs with conservation:

There is a general agreement that some degree of grazing should happen but I think people want to see it more controlled and I do not think that we are yet there... no-one yet has a good plan on how you can fit livestock into a conservancy without affecting wildlife (I 48).

This transition represents a shift from debating *whether* pastoralism should be included, to *how* it should be done.

As with OMC, there was still a degree of misunderstanding about the grazing regulations among those who were not included in Naboisho's village grazing committees, especially women. For example, some women in Enooronkon (FG 10) thought that when conservancy grazing was open, grazing was only allowed at night, and for just one week. This has never been the case. There was also a general incomprehension as to why cattle are restricted to specific small areas. It was difficult for some herders to understand why they had to stay on one side of the road where the grass was shorter, when there was tall grass on the other side in the next zone (FG 14; I 31). Understanding of the scheme within the communities involved improved gradually during the research period, perhaps as a result of the numerous community meetings held between the management and grazing committees in each village. Nkoilale was the first area to get to grips with the scheme and then other committees were taken to talk to them, to see how it was working in practice (I 5).

One interviewee (I 64) involved in both Naboisho and Motorogi Conservancies explained some of the similarities and differences between their grazing schemes:

The rotational grazing that Naboisho is doing is very good as it brings the local people together and it helps them realise the benefits [of conservancies].

If the conservancy can also use grazing to cut the grass it can help them too. At Olare Orok and Motorogi the local people think the things aren't going the way they want, for example with the rotational grazing. In terms of management there is not a big difference but Naboisho is big so people can do the rotational grazing at the same time, all the time. Sometimes it interferes with the tourism partners though. The local people [who border OMC] look at what is happening in Naboisho and compare it to OOC and they're not happy. At the moment in OOC they are only allowed in at certain times and only into small areas. People need to be educated and sit down and find the best way that will not interfere with the TPs [tourism partners] and will assist local people. All of the conservancies are trying to do this.

Nelson Kirrokor pointed out in this quote that one of the key causes for the difference in grazing policies between the conservancies was size. Naboisho comprises 50,000 acres, whereas OMC has a combined area of 35,000 acres. Further, there are large parts of Naboisho Conservancy, estimated at 50%, which are currently under 100% unofficial grazing and are not at all managed (I 48). Naboisho's manager blames this on a lack of resources and manpower (I 76). As OMC is smaller and has been established longer, management have a more comprehensive control of the area, and thus appear stricter with regard to grazing access. Tourism partner Gerard Beaton elaborated:

OOO has a slightly different approach [to Naboisho], a slightly more conformed way of grazing in one place, and controlling and knowing where everything is. Whereas here [in Naboisho] you have 3, 2 or 4 zones that are grazed and it is harder to supervise. And so it is trial and error and if it works fine, and if it doesn't we have to change it until it does work (I 31).

One similarity between the conservancies' grazing schemes is that they all impose fines on those whose cattle are caught grazing outside of the prescribed times or areas. The penalties imposed by the two management bodies vary slightly. In Naboisho the fine is 5000 shillings (\$57) per herd with 50% going to rangers who make the arrest and 50% to a fund in ManCO who chooses how to utilise this (I 76). Recently some of this fine money was used to build a more permanent ranger base and the next batch will go towards a community project (ibid). In addition to fines, as in OMC, the grazing 'privilege' can be withdrawn if a community is deemed to be acting inappropriately. For example, when a lioness was killed and a community bordering Naboisho were thought to be withholding information, they were threatened with exclusion from the grazing scheme unless they assisted the management.

For OMC the fine is also KES 5000 (\$57) per herd for the first four occasions within 12 months, and then it increases to KES 10,000 (\$110) (I 81). The fine is increased to 30,000 (\$340) if violence is threatened, and communities can be banned from grazing altogether if they do not cooperate (ibid). In order to ensure that fines in OMC are paid, 5-10 cows are held until payment is received. For conservancy landowners, non-payment within 3 days results in it being deducted from their rental income (ibid). Fines in OMC are not shared with the rangers who make the arrests because the conservancy manager believes: “it is part of their job and as soon as you put a price on what the rangers get, there is a price above which herders can bribe” (ibid). Instead they have a monthly performance prize that is won by a team of rangers, rather than individuals (ibid). This encourages the rangers to push each other as the reward can be up to KES 5000 (\$57) per person (ibid). At present, the money taken in fines from OMC is used to cover management expenses but the conservancy manager would like to see it as an income in a stand-alone initiative that could support cattle improvement schemes (ibid).

I asked the conservancy managers if rangers found it difficult to fine their own friends and relatives. They both agreed that it was a problem (I 76, 81). In Naboisho they try to ensure that rangers are not based near to their home village and they are overseen by wardens who are from other areas of Maasailand (I 76). In OMC they try to combat this ‘cattle blindness’ through the incentive to win the team reward (I 81). An elder in Endoinyo e Rinka mentioned that he does not think that the policing of herders is problematic for local people because “it is their [the rangers’] employment and so if they have to arrest you it’s your fault because you took your cows into the conservancy” (CP 16).

After the more comprehensive grazing plan had been implemented in Naboisho, I asked a community leader why people were still getting fined even though there is now always grazing available for the community. His response was:

The rangers have not been helping people to know where the open area is, they would just name it or put out sticks. Recently they have been taking people in the car and showing us and so now people know where the areas are. Now I don’t think that people will get fined if they know the areas, it will be better (I 85).

This lack of assistance on the part of the rangers may have been an attempt to continue receiving their half of the fine payment. In addition to this, some owners suggested that herders were to blame for accruing fines. Men in FG 22 blamed children for the fines, as they are unable to prevent the livestock going into the conservancy when cows and shoats are drawn towards the longer grass. To overcome this problem, a man in FG 6 explained:

[The conservancy] is good for grazing during the open grazing period and for this time I employ herdsmen to take the cattle. The rest of the time I would herd them myself so that I could ensure that they don't ever go in the conservancy illegally so that we don't have to pay the fines. A herdsman doesn't care about this because he doesn't have to pay the fines.

One point of discontent within the communities is that “if you only have a few cows you still have to pay the fine of 5000” (FG 25). This favours those who have many cattle. At times these big cattle barons just come in and happily pay the fine, considering it to be a grazing charge (I 28). The largest complaint by far with regard to fines is that if you are caught many times in a month the fines can become greater than the rental income paid to conservancy landowners (FG 1, 8, 14, 21, 22; I 85).⁷⁰ As such, the cost of the presence of the conservancy is higher than the benefit. This was the main justification for those who said that they would prefer that the conservancies were not there (FG 1, 8, 14, 21, 22).

Men in FG 22 did not think that it was stated in their lease agreement that their cows could be caught and fined when grazing. They thought that the conservancy management were unsympathetic and “have hatred to the local people and their cows”. As a result they said that they will give OMC six months to see what happens and “will then decide what to do about the conservancy” (ibid). This emphasises the critical nature and importance of the grazing scheme in determining community perceptions of conservancies. If local communities are not happy with the grazing access, even if this is just the result of misunderstandings and incomprehension, this could lead to the demise of the conservancies, their conservation efforts and their associated businesses.

⁷⁰ In total, fines equate to 1.9% of rental payments in Naboisho and 3% in OMC. This will be discussed further in the economic analysis at the end of chapter seven. However, this is not to say that individual landowners' fines may exceed their personal rental income.

As a result of this brewing discontent around OMC, especially regarding grazing access, the conservancy manager and assistant manager were fired in August 2014, after the research period had finished. Neighbouring pastoralists can push the conservancies for access because, if thousands of livestock invade the conservancy the management openly admit that they will not be able control this (I 76). Camp managers (I 6) who previously worked at Shompole Conservancy near Lake Magadi in Southern Kenya have seen this happen before:

If the conservancy doesn't work well with the communities they will just take their land back when a drought comes... and the tourism partners will only take cattle being around the camps for so long before the whole thing collapses.

Johanna and Patrick's prophecy came true. In 2011 the camp at Shompole was forced to close due to a conflict with the neighbouring communities (The Safari and Conservation Co., 2011) and in 2014 it was burnt down (The Star, 2014).

As the restrictions imposed on pastoralists and their livestock are the main source of criticisms of conservancies (see Homewood et al., 2009; Bedelian, 2012; Snider, 2012), the establishment of more comprehensive grazing plans is a very significant development. From the community perspective, when I asked each focus group to rank the best things about the conservancies, the creation of grass banks that can then be accessed for grazing (see figure 6.3) was most frequently named number one.



Figure 6.3 "The best thing about the conservancy - my cows grazing inside"
Photo: Nkaate Koya (CP 6)

This was especially true of the communities that border conservancies. Endoinyo e Rinka, which is further away from access to conservancy grass, was the only

community to rank projects and rental income higher than grazing. It was also observed that communities around Naboisho Conservancy were more positive than those neighbouring OMC. Around Naboisho, this positivity increased throughout the research period as the more comprehensive grazing scheme was introduced and became more widely understood.

There are several reasons why access to grass banks is valued so highly. Culturally, women in Olesere believe “the very good thing about the conservancies is the grass that we get because, to us, the cows are the most important thing. They are more important than money” (FG 4). For social reasons, women in FG 17, where only two out of eleven of their husbands owned land in a conservancy, thought that grazing was the best thing about the conservancy because it was inclusive. They explained: “for those who don’t have land in the conservancy they also get the benefit in the form of grazing – it helps everyone” (ibid). This is a significant point in the face of criticisms that conservancies may increase inequalities between members and non-members (Osano et al., 2013).

Grazing schemes also have economic benefits for pastoralists, both on a day-to-day basis and during droughts (I 79). Conservancies have the potential to increase income from livestock because “when cows get this grass they will be fat and will sell at a higher price” (FG 22). During the dry season at the end of 2012, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) observed that the body conditions of the livestock in communities like Olesere that border and regularly graze in Naboisho were a lot healthier than those further away, for example in Endoinyo e Rinka. This dry season was part of the natural bimodal rain pattern in the Mara, but even at this time, the impacts of the conservancy grazing schemes were visible. The last severe drought in the Mara was in 2009. Although at this time Naboisho was still being developed, OOC was already established and so people have experienced the benefits that conservancies can bring during these difficult times. OMC assistant manager James Kaigil noted:

Look at the real drought times like in 2009. If you look at the external communities in Olkinyei, Siena et cetera they lost a big majority of their cattle because they didn’t have any protection against the drought. But around the conservancies we didn’t lose a good number of cattle basically because of protected areas like here [the conservancy] where their livestock could graze. They make them survive until the rain time comes (I 8).

Bedelian (2014: 228) points out that in this 2009 drought, grazing rules in OOC were not relaxed as wildlife were dying and so the management remained strict, fining herders 220,000 (\$2800) in three months. As a result of access for livestock becoming more comprehensive since 2012, there is a looming crisis for conservancy grazing schemes, namely how to satisfy the cattle all year round while leaving sufficient grass as a buffer in case the rains fail. In other words, “a big problem with the livestock issue is the unsustainable number that want to come into the conservancy and how you overcome that” (I 21). This would be compounded during a severe drought because “people will come from far [to graze] and there is no way to stop it from happening. From here to Amboseli there are no other grass banks” (I 76). Having discussed resource access, attention will now turn to wildlife conflicts.

6.1.2 Human-Wildlife Conflicts

One of the conservation aims of the conservancies and their affiliated initiatives is to maintain, and ideally increase, wildlife numbers. When combined with an increasing concentration of homesteads on the borders of the conservancies, partially as a result of a desire to access conservancy grazing, it is likely that contact and conflict between wildlife and communities will increase. As well as specific conflicts, such as livestock predation, there is an ongoing debate between stakeholders regarding the effect of conservancies on people’s tolerance of wildlife.

In some communities, participants indicated that the presence of conservancies has made people more tolerant of wildlife. FG 13 said:

It is the responsibility of the people to look after the animals because we are now getting rent money from the conservancy and morally it would be wrong. Ever since the creation of the conservancy we do not kill wild animals.

Noosokon Kaleku explained that there was now an understanding that the killing of wildlife would be punished:

Before the conservancy was here, the owners would get mad when the cows were attacked and so would retaliate. But ever since the conservancy came we can’t do it anymore because we are afraid of getting caught (CP 7).

Analysis of focus group transcripts suggested that perceptions of wildlife were higher in some villages, including Enooronkon, Nkoilale, Olesere and Endoinyo e Rinka, than others. There may be rationale behind this. The first three of these communities

are located on the border of Naboisho Conservancy and so each has designated grazing zones which they can now access year round. The latter three communities (Nkoilale, Olesere and Endoinyo e Rinka) have also, to date, received the majority of projects from conservancy-affiliated organisations. These four communities have also had more students through Koiyaki Guiding School than other villages (I 79). These individuals become “positive and influential role models for their own communities, especially when it comes to understanding the importance of wildlife” (I 80).

In contrast, some other focus groups expressed very negative perceptions of wildlife. For some, tolerances had decreased since the creation of the conservancies. Non-conservancy members who claimed that they were not getting direct economic benefits from the conservancies argued that they did not need to let wildlife onto their land, or sit back and endure the conflicts that they brought, whilst others received benefits from the presence of wildlife (FG 8, 14, 20, 24). In some areas, including Ng’amuriak, men who were too young to be allocated land anywhere have reportedly taken their frustration out on the wildlife by chasing ungulates such as giraffes on motorbikes and spearing them (I 5; FG 8). In addition to the non-conservancy members, there are several communities that are comparatively more negative towards wildlife in general, namely: Osilale, Eor Olkimaita, Mbitin, Nkirgir, Olkuroto and Mpuaai. The discussion in chapter five was inconclusive as to whether conservancy affiliated organisations are not working in these areas because they are more ‘difficult’ due to their negativity, or whether they are negative because of the lack of engagement. Further analysis of focus group transcripts strongly suggests that residents of these communities are more negative about conservancies, conservation and wildlife due to a belief that they are not benefiting sufficiently from the conservancies either in terms of rent, employment, community projects or grazing access. As previously noted, some conservancy landowners who receive rent also fall into this category if they believe they are paying more in fines than receiving in rent.

This way of viewing nature as something that they should receive benefits from is a direct result of neoliberal conservation approaches (Büscher and Dressler, 2012). By

turning nature into a commodity, payments are expected in exchange for its 'use'. As discussed in chapter two, Stem et al. (2003) report that even if benefits cause changes in what people do, there may be no change in people's beliefs or conservation perspectives. The ultimate test of this is whether people revert back to previous ways if incentives reduce or cease (Pretty and Smith, 2004) or indeed whether conservation perspectives would decrease even further.

Dissatisfaction regarding grazing access expressed by FG 14 resulted in threats being made to any wildlife coming onto their land, as well as the continuation of the conservancies more generally. They stated:

We can only allow the conservancy to be there if the livestock are allowed to mix with wild animals. The tourists should understand this is how it has always been. If our cows cannot graze in the conservancy, we will stop the wildlife coming here onto our land.

Believing that they received minimal benefits from the presence of the conservancies, these men were very frustrated by the continued presence of wildlife on their land, especially those that created conflicts with their livestock. MNLP's manager (I 80) explained that since the creation of the conservancy, some people now believed that all wild animals should stay within the designated protected areas. For example, an hour before FG 28 in Eor Olkimaita, lions had attacked a cow whilst it was drinking at the nearby river. The women in the group stressed how bad this was because "the cow was on the side of the river that is our land, not the conservancy land" (FG 28). As they saw it, the lions should have known where the invisible conservancy borders were and not breach them. In terms of the neoliberal approach discussed above, this behaviour exemplifies community members recognising that they should get benefits from conservation, but believe that they are not. Inequality is also likely to be playing a role here, as community members see some of their neighbours benefiting to differing degrees to themselves, yet they all face conflicts with wildlife evenly. To address these low tolerance levels, MNLP's manager believed: "we need the communities to recognise the benefits that they are getting from conservancies, especially the non-conservancy members" (I 80).

Many of the communities that are less tolerant of wildlife openly admitted trying to kill any predator that attacked their livestock (FG 14, 15, 21, 24). Retaliation does

not always involve spearing. Over the last 10-15 years, pesticides have also been used to poison carcasses which predators then come and feed on (I 80). This can have far-reaching consequences as it can wipe out several individuals or an entire pride of lions (ibid). During the study period there were rumours of one poisoned sheep killing five leopards in the Pardamat Hills (anon 2). In addition, the carbofluran strain of pesticides is carried through the food chain (I 80). This means that any scavenger that feeds on a poisoned predator would also die through secondary poisoning, as would anything that then feeds on their carcass, and so on (ibid).

Between June 2012 and June 2013, MNLP was only aware of three lions being killed by people around Naboisho Conservancy (MNLP, 2013). In comparison, 16 were known to have been killed in the preceding eight months when the project first started (ibid). When interviewed in March 2013, MNLP's manager was hopeful that the combination of receiving benefits from the conservancies and MNLP's community work may have reduced retaliatory killings (I 80). On the 4th June 2013 one of the lionesses affixed with a GPS satellite collar ate a poisoned carcass and died, together with her three cubs (MNLP, 2013). This led to the realisation that many lions could have been killed, including this lionesses' entire pride, in secret (ibid). It is only because of the collar that this poisoning was uncovered (ibid). Instead of conflicts reducing, it now seems as though killings are well hidden, in fear of prosecution. This suggests that rather than beliefs and perceptions of conservation becoming more positive, they may instead be just disguised under a shield of positivity. In line with the preceding discussion on the link between perceptions of insufficient conservancy benefits and tolerance of wildlife, the Mbitin/Nkirgir area has been the central focus of the majority of retaliatory killings (I 80).

Pastoralists who admitted to retaliating said that they were taking measures into their own hands because they were frustrated that they "go and report it [livestock being killed] to the conservancy but they don't really care. By reporting it, we're just doing it in vain" (FG 16). The men of Mbitin/Nkirgir (FG 14) believed that the conservancies should take responsibility for "helping with the wildlife problem because they are the ones who approach us and tell us not to attack and kill the wild

animals.” The communities would ideally like to see compensation schemes; however, the conservancies are resisting this approach.⁷¹ Research (including Bulte et al., 2005) suggests that compensation can actually increase the number of conflicts since people would take fewer measures to prevent attacks (I 80). Although OMC and Naboisho Conservancies do not support compensation, the landowners of neighbouring Mara North Conservancy have started their own insurance scheme whereby they all contribute (through a deduction of lease payments) and if someone loses livestock from a ‘secure, well-fenced enclosure’, the fund pays out (I 18). Pastoralists around Naboisho and OMC are contemplating replicating this scheme (FG 14, 20, 22). In the meantime, steps are being taken by conservancies and their affiliated organisations to try to prevent predator attacks. In terms of costs and benefits, this approach is centred around reducing costs incurred through conservation so that fewer benefits are needed to outweigh these.

The style and design of livestock enclosures within the study site are changing rapidly as families decide to spend money building stronger enclosures, especially now that land tenure is secure. This is resulting in a conversion away from the traditional circular design with an outer fence lined with houses and the night-time livestock enclosure in the middle (figure 6.4).



Figure 6.4 Circular Maasai Village Design. Photo: C. Courtney

⁷¹ All wildlife in Kenya is owned by Kenya Wildlife Service who are thus theoretically responsible for compensation. In the Mara it is very rare for families to receive compensation and it is usually only when people are seriously injured or killed.

Increasingly, instead of dried acacia branches forming livestock enclosures (figure 6.5), thicker tree trunks from local trees are being used (figure 6.6) and over the last five years cedar posts (figure 6.7) have become very popular. At the same time, the outer fences enclosing homesteads have become uncommon.



Figure 6.5 An acacia branch fence
Photo: Nasha Rakwa (CP 4)



Figure 6.6 An enclosure made of local posts
Photo: Nooretet Yiale (CP 1)



Figure 6.7 Cedar post enclosure. Photo: Nooretet Yiale (CP 1)

None of those with cedar post enclosures who were questioned had lost any livestock from inside their new enclosures. As Kimanyisho Sikona (CP 3) explained, this was because “the new cedar enclosure is strong and it prevents the lions from attacking the cows. They can still threaten and scare them but they can’t get in and the cows can’t stampede out”.⁷² Nasha Rakwa (CP 4) did not yet have a strong fenced enclosure because her family were not living on their allocated land, so they did not want to spend money when they would be moving soon. As a result of their poor quality enclosure (location of figure 6.5): “during the rainy season we have a big

⁷² Lions often attack by startling livestock, causing them to stampede out of weak enclosures (I 80).

problem with lions attacking the village. In the last year we have lost five cows and so many shoats” (ibid). Two months after this discussion, a leopard attacked Nasha’s enclosure and killed three more shoats (figure 6.8).



Figure 6.8 Goat killed by a leopard inside an enclosure.
Photo: Nasha Rakwa (CP 4)

As the reinforcement of livestock enclosures prevents predator attacks and subsequent retaliatory killings, it is being supported by conservancies and their affiliated organisations. This is a proactive preventative alternative to compensation (I 80). Two initiatives being undertaken within the study site are the construction of predator-proof bomas⁷³ in the form of chain-link fenced enclosures⁷⁴ (figure 6.9) and the placement of Turere Lion Lights⁷⁵ (6.10) which act as a deterrent.



Figure 6.9 Chain link fencing in Olkuroto supported by OOMT. Photo: C. Courtney



Figure 6.10 A light bulb in the Turere Lion Lights System in Endoinyo e Rinka. Photo: MNLP

⁷³ A *boma* is the Swahili word for livestock enclosure that is used in English within the study site.

⁷⁴ Chained fences (figure 6.9) are favoured over those with adjacent cedar posts (as in figure 6.7) as the use of cedar is deforesting the Mau Forest which has environmental implications (Hesslerová and Pokorný 2011). In the predator-proof bomas, conservancy-affiliated organisations are now using treated gum poles instead of cedar to support the chain fencing (I 80)

⁷⁵ This system is named after a 12 year old Maasai boy called Richard Turere whose family live near Nairobi National Park. When he noticed that lions did not come and attack the boma when there were torches in the vicinity he made an electrical circuit using bulbs and an old car battery to deter lions.

Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust, in collaboration with the Anne Kent Taylor Fund, and MNLP together with BCFK have been subsidising the cost of fenced predator-proof bomas. In addition, MNLP has affixed a trial Turere Lion Light system in a village that was previously frequently attacked by predators (I 80). Initial indications suggest that this technique is also effective (ibid).

Men in Mpuaai (FG 22) were, in the main, very critical of their neighbouring OMC, especially regarding its impact upon pastoralism. Despite this, they stated:

One of the best things about the conservancy is the new [predator-proof] bomas that they do. They are really helping us. It is a new development this year. There is a conflict between the community and the lions because if the lions come to your enclosure, if they want to feed on your cows, you will not allow them and you will chase them away. But now we are building an enclosure with the wires to stop the lions from entering. If the lion comes inside the cow enclosure we would be forced to kill them and so that is why the conservancy is helping us to improve the enclosure because then a lot of lions will not be killed... The way that it works is that you pay half and then they [the conservancy] pay half. It is for both the families who have land in the conservancy and those who don't.

Another very critical focus group (FG 14) also said: "we have just recently heard about the conservancy [Naboisho] building these fenced enclosures... Should there be something like that we would really want it, it is a good idea" (FG 14). This suggests that conservancies' supporting the construction of predator-proof bomas in these predominantly negative areas is likely to improve their perceptions of conservancies, and wildlife more generally. This is another way in which the conservancies are perceived, by Maasai men, to be involved in development.

In summary, the creation of conservancies has had major direct impacts on pastoralism, both in terms of accessing resources and wildlife conflicts. There have been negative ramifications but the conservancies and their affiliated organisations are trying to address these by providing additional benefits in terms of more comprehensive resource access and reducing costs by preventing human-wildlife conflicts. What has been stressed is that neighbouring Maasai communities will not tolerate any threat to pastoralism. In addition to the conservancies having a direct impact on pastoralism, it is also influencing the livelihood indirectly by influencing livestock holding compositions.

6.2 Changes in Livestock Holdings

The Maasai express their wealth and power through livestock numbers (Spear and Waller, 1993). To date, the priority has not been on livestock-keeping in a way that many in the West would call economically efficient. Cows were not sold for profit when they reached maturity as they were instead kept to increase holdings (I 11). Because of this desire to have high numbers, even when droughts came, animals were not sold before they died (FG 22); “so long as a cow was alive, it counted towards status” (I 11). Daniel Sopia (I 87), a young community leader, explained a change that he sees occurring: “people are now thinking of using the cows for economic gain. You have some steers that graze then you sell them. In the past cows were only used as prestige.” This suggests that pastoralists today are trying to combine both economic and socio-cultural aspects of livestock keeping, whereas in the past the latter was prioritised. Changes in pastoralism resulting from both this new approach, and indirectly from the creation of the conservancies, will now be examined. These include: number of heads, holding composition and breed.

6.2.1 Number of Livestock

Alongside attempts to turn livestock keeping into a more profitable business,⁷⁶ there is still the wide-held belief in Koiyaki that a family must keep many livestock.

Women from the Pesi family in Olesere (FG 7) explained their justification for this:

We have been allocated 150 acres here and we own 200 sheep, 40 goats and 100 cows. We know that this is too many but it is better to have a large herd like this because when they get sick or there is a drought they die, so at least at the end we will be left with a few.

The women elaborated that they believe that they can continue to keep high livestock numbers, or increase their holdings, by buying more land (ibid). Land subdivision, and thus the ability to buy and sell land, is a very new concept to the Koiyaki Maasai and there is a lack of realisation that land is limited. For example, FG 2 incorrectly stated that there are still areas nearby that have not been subdivided where they can take livestock to graze when they run out of space in Koiyaki.

Studies by McCabe (1997), and Homewood, Coast et al. (2006) suggest that as land in the Mara becomes privatised there is a reduction in the size of livestock holdings.

⁷⁶ This language of livestock now becoming a ‘business’ was repeatedly used by research participants, especially camera participants, when employment and household finances were discussed.

Reid (2012: 182) also predicts that, in the context of the conservancies, the Maasai will be forced to reduce herd size due to a decrease in grazing land and increased competition from wildlife. Ryan Snider's (2012) thesis examines the impact of land tenure and ecotourism on pastoralism around the Mara Conservancies but contradicts himself with regard to the effect on livestock numbers. He notes that once land is subdivided into private land: "many households realised they needed to reduce their herd size due to restricted access to grazing" (ibid: 174-75). However he also states: "landowners [of the conservancies] are using their significantly increased income generated by leasing out their land to purchase more livestock" (ibid: 135). My primary research also found conflicting opinions within the study site regarding the impact of land subdivision and the emergence of the conservancies on livestock numbers.

A relatively wealthy and educated man from Mbitin (FG 14) who works at a camp in the reserve claimed that because of land subdivision and the creation of the conservancies he has been forced to decrease his cattle herd from 500 to 60. He complained: "these are not enough for me" (ibid). The location of FG 14 is also likely to influence this frustration as the Mbitin/Nkurgir area does not directly border a conservancy, which limits access to grazing schemes. In addition to the influence of location, it was largely those who owned many livestock prior to land subdivision who said that the conservancies had affected their livestock numbers negatively. Although, as discussed in chapter two, some elite community members were able to benefit disproportionately from land subdivision, poorer families now have land in their own name and can manage this land as they see fit. In other words:

The cattle barons have been making money based on using other people's resources. A revolutionary point is now occurring in Maasai culture. People are thinking why should I just give off my land to this man who has so many cattle (I 70).

Although some richer families state that they have had to sell some livestock as a result of the changes in land tenure and usage, others have adapted by moving some of their livestock to other locations. FG 7 explained:

There is no-one who doesn't have a friend, when we have to stay on a small area we give our animals away to our friends to look after. Even what we have here now is only a part of what we own, the rest are currently staying

with our friends. Also, we have already bought another plot of land somewhere, and so we would move some of the cattle to there.

Faith Kereto (CP 9) added:

Our livestock are kept in different places because we do not have enough grass to feed them all here and we have family and land in different places. This also stops them all dying from a disease or drought that is in one place.

The dispersal of herds is especially common during certain times of the year, such as when the wildebeest are calving and malignant catarrhal fever⁷⁷ is prevalent.

Noombarbali Soit (I 67) praised the conservancy for creating grass banks that the communities can access. She estimated that up to one-quarter of her family's cows could have died if she had not been allowed to take them to graze in Naboisho

Conservancy. Naboisho's community liaison officer (I 84) expanded:

It is difficult for the conservancy to manage the livestock because numbers are increasing but it is good for the communities because they are getting plenty of grass and it is being managed... If there was no conservancy this area would support less livestock than now... for example in Endoinyo e Rinka [which is quite far from the conservancies] there are fewer cows."

The data from the household census supports this statement as there is an average of 21.5 cows/adult in Endoinyo e Rinka compared to 27.3 cows/adult in Enooronkon and Olesere, which border Naboisho Conservancy. Not only are families who live near a conservancy able to support more livestock per person, but population densities are also high in these areas, partly as a result of people moving to conservancy borders to access the grazing schemes. Nasuju Naurori (CP 12) told me that they were not allocated land near a conservancy but they bought 50 acres where they currently reside "so that we can have our livestock here and they can graze at the conservancy." This is an example of Bedelian's (2014: 227) finding that conservancy land is valued higher, in terms of grazing, than non-conservancy land and so people are relocating so that they can access this. In an attempt to curtail this practice there was a meeting in Olesere in May 2014 in which residents pledged to

⁷⁷ Malignant catarrhal fever is a deadly viral disease transmissible to cattle during the wildebeest calving season. This was previously not too problematic in Koiyaki because the Loita wildebeest calved further north in Olkinyei and Maji Moto. Over recent years they have begun calving in Koiyaki, perhaps a result of the fencing off of large areas for cultivation further north.

try to stop people from outside moving into the area just to access the conservancy grass banks.⁷⁸

In addition to the grazing schemes, the supplementary income now entering the communities through rental income and employment from the conservancies means that more livestock could be bought, or fewer need to be sold. This finding was introduced in chapter five. John Sengeny (I 87) explained:

There is a big difference now as before we used to sell livestock for money but now with the conservancy if we have enough cash to fund daily life then we don't need to sell our livestock.

In addition to this, because people are now receiving this income they are able to buy medicines to prevent and treat diseases (I 79). Dominic Sakat (ibid) estimates that this combination of factors may have enabled livestock numbers to increase by one-third over the last five to six years since the conservancies were established.

As testimonies from research participants did not agree about the conservancies' impact upon livestock numbers, quantitative analysis using the household census was undertaken. This was compared to earlier studies on livestock numbers in Koiyaki which have, to date, formed the baseline for understandings of pastoralism in the area. These studies are the Mara Count (Reid et al., 2003), which was an extensive land and aerial count carried out by a large team of scientists in 1999 and 2002; and research undertaken by Lamprey and Reid, published in 2004. A comparison will also be made with Bedelian's (2014) study from 2009/10.

Using data from the 1990s, Lamprey and Reid (2004) calculated a figure of 3.13 livestock units (LU) per reference adult (RA)⁷⁹ and concluded that the Maasai in Koiyaki are poor in terms of livestock holdings. This concurs with the Mara Count which estimated that in 1999 and 2002 the area only had 25% and 37% respectively of the livestock necessary to support a pastoral livelihood (Reid et al., 2003). The household census undertaken for this thesis indicates that at the beginning of 2013,

⁷⁸ This move is not in line with Maasai culture in which livestock move to where grass is available and are housed either in a temporary village or with family members or age mates. The decision was an attempt to secure grazing for their own livestock because the grass within the conservancy was limited and there was an increasing number of livestock wanting to access it.

⁷⁹ The Reference Adult value (RA) is calculated as follows: adult male = 1; adult female = 0.86; children 0-5 = 0.52; children 6-10 = 0.85; male child 11-15 = 0.96; female child 11-15 = 0.86 (FAO 1974).

the average number of livestock owned per homestead in the study site was 161 cows and 335 shoats. This represents an average of 11.2 LU/RA or 1830.75 livestock kg/person. Analysis of livestock numbers is complicated by the use of different units in each study. The results are displayed in table 6.1 for comparison.

Table 6.1 Livestock Holding Calculation Results

	LU/RA	Kg/person
Data for 1990s from Lamprey and Reid 2004	3.13	-
Data from Mara Count 1999	-	335
Data from Mara Count 2002	-	497
Data from household census 2013	11.2	1831

Even when these alternative units are taken into account, the most recent data from the household census suggest that current livestock per person ratios are three to five times higher than previous assessments. For LU/RA, Nestel (1986) stratified the Maasai as poor (0-5 LU/RA), intermediate (5-13 LU/RA) and wealthy (>13 LU/RA). This would classify the pastoralists within the study site as poor using Lamprey and Reid's data but at the top end of the intermediate strata when the 2013 household census data is used. Regarding live-weight of livestock per person (kg/person), it is estimated that the Mara Maasai need 1125-1575 kg/person to rely completely on livestock for subsistence (Reid et al., 2003). In contrast to the Mara Count's conclusion in 2003, 1831kg/person using the household census data exceeds this estimated minimum requirement. As different measures cannot account for the significant difference in findings between data collected for this thesis and prior studies, other influencing factors need to be considered.

The former Koiyaki Group Ranch was the data collection area for both the Mara Count and Lamprey and Reid's study. Whilst my study site, within which the household census survey was conducted, includes the majority of Koiyaki, the two study areas do not match exactly. The study site for this thesis is shaded yellow on figure 6.11 and the black dots represent homesteads within the study site that participated in the household census. The group ranch border (shown as a black line and shaded in yellow) creates a larger area of study for the other two studies. Also, homesteads along the Eastern border of Naboisho were included in the household census but not the other studies as they are outside of Koiyaki.




Figure 6.11 Comparison of coverage areas for household census (yellow) and the former Koiyaki Group Ranch (cream stripes) used by the Mara Count and Lamprey and Reid (2004)

As a result, population dynamics differ slightly and exact comparisons are not possible. Large centres such as Talek and Aitong were not included in the household census but were in the other two studies. As there are high populations in these towns and the households have much lower livestock numbers, this would have altered the figures. In my opinion, urban areas should not be included in analyses of pastoralism because the vast majority of people living in these areas rely on other livelihoods and thus distort the data.

Another contributing factor to the differences in findings between the studies is that human populations were estimated in the previous studies. In comparison, the household census counted individuals directly. In order to calculate the population of Koiyaki, the Mara Count tallied the number of huts and then multiplied this by 4.61, the average number of people per house found by Lamprey (1984). This data is now very outdated. The household census suggests that the average occupancy per house in 2013 was 3.19. If this 3.19 people/house figure is used,⁸⁰ the 2002 Mara Count

⁸⁰ The reduction in this figure is partly the result of the trend for each wife to have one house for cooking and another for living and sleeping in. It is appreciated that the Mara Count was undertaken

area would have had estimated a population of 6584 rather than 9515. This suggests that the Mara Count may have overestimated the population by up to 31%. This of course has knock-on implications for their kg/person ratios. Similarly, Lamprey and Reid (2004) lacked detailed population age structures on Koiyaki and so they assumed that these would be the same as in Ngorogoro, Tanzania in the mid-1990s. As a result, instead of calculating this for each societal strata (as suggested by FAO, 1974 described in footnote 79), they used an estimate of 0.8 to multiply the total (estimated) population by to calculate the RA value. The societal stratification found in the 2013 household census suggests that 0.66 would have been a more accurate multiplier as there is a greater proportion of women and children than the 0.8 figure accounts for.⁸¹ Again, this would have greatly modified Lamprey and Reid's values. Whilst these inaccurate population estimates close the gap between the previous studies and the household census, table 6.2 shows that this does not fully account for the disparities.

Table 6.2 Modified Livestock Holding Calculation Results

	LU/RA	Modified LU/RA	Kg/person	Modified Kg/person
Data for 1990s from Lamprey and Reid 2004	3.13	3.79	-	
Data from Mara Count 1999	-	-	335	484
Data from Mara Count 2002	-	-	497	718
Data from household census 2013	11.2	11.2	1831	1831

In addition to the calculations used for human population figures, there are also significant differences between the studies regarding how livestock were counted. The Mara Count and Lamprey and Reid acquired their livestock numbers by counting animals that were visible, either from the air or the ground. In comparison, the household census asked respondents how many livestock they owned. The key difference here is that the census included livestock owned by the family that might permanently or temporarily have been located outside of the study site. This may be on other plots owned by the household, or land belonging to a family member or friend, as previously discussed. It is recognised that asking the respondents how many livestock they own means that these figures are not necessarily exact as they

more than 10 years ago, and so the occupancy may have been higher than at present, but the use of data from 1984 is likely to be highly inaccurate.

⁸¹ Again, it is appreciated that Lamprey and Reid's data is more than 10 years old, and so the societal strata may have been slightly different to that found in 2013.

will have been rounded up or down. It is also possible that respondents may have intentionally increased their livestock numbers to appear richer, and thus have a greater social standing. However, it is deemed just as likely that they may have underestimated the figures to appear poorer, and more in need of assistance.

Although statistics are not directly comparable between studies due to slight differences in study areas, the findings of the household census suggest that in 2013 the pastoralists of Koiyaki were significantly wealthier than was previously presumed. Previous studies may have underestimated the livestock per capita ratios for Koiyaki by including urban centres predominantly housing non-pastoralists; overestimating population and RA figures; and counting livestock numbers physically within the site rather than assessing the total number owned. Whilst recognising the importance of these factors, it is expected that they may not fully account for the discrepancies identified between the studies. Therefore, the latest 2013 data suggests that there may have been a net increase in livestock numbers over the last 10 years.

An increase in livestock would be supported by Lamprey and Reid's (2004: 1014) conclusion that livestock numbers in Koiyaki vary in accordance with rainfall:

A further period of good rainfall in 1997/98, associated with 'El Nino', led to an increase again [in Koiyaki cattle numbers] to 40,000; this was followed by a massive 'crash' in the catastrophic 'La Nina' drought of 1999/2000.

In the middle of this 'crash', the Mara Count estimated that cattle numbers in Koiyaki had fallen to about 16,300 in November 1999 (Reid et al., 2003). As there had not been a severe drought preceding the 2013 survey, their hypothesis would suggest that livestock numbers should be high. The total number of cattle owned by the Koiyaki residents included in this study was 40,430.⁸²

In order to visualise this reported increase, the total LU/RA (11.2) and cattle LU/RA (8.6) calculated from the household survey have been extrapolated onto Lamprey and Reid's graph (figure 6.12). Although not 100% accurate, bearing in mind the differences between the studies, this graph shows that, whilst current numbers may be higher than noted in studies from the 2000s following the drought of 1999/2000,

⁸² Although it needs to be remembered that not all of these livestock may be present in Koiyaki

they are still within the variations seen over the last 35 years. It is likely that numbers took a dip as a result of the 2005 and 2009 droughts and to a lesser extent also in 2011. These dips are not included in the extrapolation as the extent of any decline is unknown.




Figure 6.12 Temporal change in livestock holdings in Koiyaki. Graph from Lamprey and Reid (2004: 1020), extrapolated from 2001-2013 using household census data.

In summary, unless the sole factor influencing livestock numbers is the natural flux as a result of climate variability – which seems unlikely when statements from community members contextualise the data – it is suggested that the conservancies have had a net positive impact on livestock numbers. Further, access to grass banks throughout the year and especially during times of drought may result in the ecosystem sustaining higher numbers. The financial ability to buy veterinary medicine also reduces the number of livestock dying.

In numerical terms, the census survey found that households that lease land to a conservancy had an average of 112.9 LU per household. Non-conservancy members had an average of 102.5. Conservancy owning households have slightly larger population, perhaps as a result of family members not being able to live on land leased to the conservancy. It is therefore important to work out how many livestock units there are per reference adult. This reduces the gap, but conservancy member households still have a slightly higher livestock ownership at 10.8 LU/RA as opposed to 10.4 LU/RA for households that do not lease land to a conservancy.

When the conservancies began, conservancy members had fewer livestock per adult equivalent than non-conservancy members (Bedelian, 2014). Therefore, although this difference is small, it shows that conservancy members have increased their holding at a higher rate than non-members. Those who own the most land in a conservancy

(over 100 acres) surprisingly had a lower LU/RA at 10.1. Although these individuals receive higher rental payments from the conservancies, this may be the result of owning insufficient land outside of the conservancy to keep livestock on. The wealthiest, in terms of livestock, were those who leased around half a parcel (between 50-80 acres) to a conservancy. This category had an average LU/RA of 11.1.

As noted, Bedelian's (2014) found that conservancy member households had significantly less livestock than those who do not lease land to any conservancy. There are several possible reasons for this. Bedelian (ibid) collected her data in 2010, just a few months after the completion of subdivision in block four and the creation of Naboisho Conservancy. As noted in chapter two, there was a reported reduction in livestock holdings during the land subdivision process as some wealthier households sold livestock to buy influence in the land allocation process (Thompson et al., 2009: 96-7). Also, it is not surprising that any impact of conservancy membership upon livestock holdings are not visible in Bedelian's study as one of the largest conservancies in the Mara was only launched during her research period. As a result there was a very limited time for conservancies to impact households' wealth, a point that she recognises (ibid: 193).

In the Mara, the scale of livestock holdings is the single most important predictor of income (Homewood et al., 2006: 21). Therefore, the finding that pastoralists in the study site own more livestock than previously thought is very significant. It reveals that livestock keeping is even more financially important than previously reported. The greater wealth held by these communities also suggests that they may be able to financially support their own advancement internally to a greater extent than was previously believed.

There are also environmental implications of this finding. As discussed, if pastoralists and their livestock are able to move over large areas then environmental damage and degradation can be managed. Compression and the inability to continue nomadism as a result of sedentisation, combined with an increase in livestock numbers, could potentially have detrimental impacts on the ecosystem – as suggested in chapter five. This is the same ecosystem that is producing the very benefit that is

enabling the increase in livestock numbers exemplifying Lanholz's (1999) concept 'conservation backfires'. This mirrors Kiss's (2004) finding that high earnings from tourism may be put back into activities that threaten biodiversity. When considered in conjunction with the report produced by Thompson and Homewood (2002) that tourism earnings in the Mara are reinvested in large-scale cultivation, the impact is compounded.

Solutions are needed to cushion the risk brought by high numbers in confined areas in order to ensure the sustainability of this livelihood, as well as environmental sustainability. Conservancy grazing schemes are one example of this, as Dickson Kaelo (I 48) explained:

If you look at the arguments now in pasture management, it is not always the numbers that are the problem; it is how much time the cattle are spending on one patch. So I would be more interested to see a grazing system first that allows some areas to rest rather than trying to manage numbers. If we can design a grazing system, the current numbers of livestock that are in the system could still be able to be sustained... And just look at a few months of no grazing, how it rebounds back [pointing to the tall grass all around us at KGS].

In addition to the growth of grass when areas are left to rest, it is claimed that the density of the grass in these areas is also increasing within conservancies (I 76). The manager of Naboisho Conservancy (*ibid*) explained that the size of an area that can sustain a herd for one month has halved over the last six months as the grass is now thicker because it is reseeding itself and the root base is being conserved.

As the conservancies appear to be not only financially supporting an increase in livestock owned by those living within the study site, but also increasing the fodder base for these livestock, the findings of this thesis suggest that conservancies may be beginning to have a positive impact on pastoralism. At the end of the research period, those who were able to make use of the grazing schemes increasingly said: "it is easier to be a pastoralist here now than it was before the conservancies came" (FG 26). It is important to recognise, however, that the impact on families is not homogenous. As previously discussed, some households may have been forced to reduce their numbers if they were not: sufficiently well-positioned politically to receive a large amount of land in the subdivision process; able to redistribute their holdings, or; in a position to access the conservancy grazing schemes. As such, there

are still many local residents who believe that the conservancies are having a negative impact on pastoralism because of resource access restrictions. Poorer families may have been the greatest beneficiaries as they are able to increase their holdings now that they have secure rights over their own plots of land (I 104). As an example of this, Bedelian (2014: 150) reports that although livestock ownership remains uneven within Koiyaki's society with 19% of households owning 50%, this has reduced from 20% of households owning 60% of livestock in 2004 (as found by Thompson et al., 2009).

6.2.2 Livestock Holding Composition

It is not only the quantity of livestock that is changing, the species and breed composition of livestock holdings are also currently under flux. Referring back to figure 6.12, it can be seen that the gap between the two lines representing total LU/RA and the cattle LU/RA has increased. This signifies that the species compositions of livestock holdings are changing, with a greater proportion being held in shoats. Bedelian (2014: 62) notes that shoats have increased by 210% between 1977 and 2011, with the most significant increase occurring since 1995 (figure 6.13).




Figure 6.13 Changes in Shoa Numbers in Koiyaki 1977-2011 (Bedelian, 2014: 63)

Between 2010 and 2011 shoat numbers increased from approximately 48,000 to 65,000, a 35.4% increase in one year. Data from the household census undertaken for this thesis suggests that in 2013, shoats made up 22.2% of household livestock units, more than three times that in the late 1990s (as reported by Lamprey and Reid, 2004: 1014). This means that pastoralists within the study site now have, on average, more than twice as many shoats as cattle. Rather than being a strategy in reaction to drought or hardship as thought previously (ibid), two other justifications for this change were given by research participants. First, shoats could be sold regularly for a smaller income, which would usually cover family expenditure for one week (FG 22). According to Dominic Sakat: “sheep being seen as a source of money is a change in Maasai culture because some years back they were just slaughtered and eaten, not sold” (I 79). FG 22 explained that they prefer to sell one shoat every week than one cow per month because: “when cattle are sold you get more money but this disappears quickly”. This increase in the proportion of livestock holdings being in shoats also has environmental implications as they are much harder to graze sustainably. OMC’s manager said that whilst they may seem like an easy option to the Maasai because they do not really need herding, they can cause big problems for the grass (I 81). Shoats stand still and eat the grass in one place until they finish everything, often including the roots, whereas cows are more particular and they graze and walk simultaneously (I 80). Such concentrated grazing can also lead to changes in plant species from those that are palatable to those that are not (Reid, 2012: 66-67).

Although the proportion of shoats is increasing, cows are so important to the Maasai culturally that it is very unlikely they would ever want to move totally away from cattle. The conservancies advocate that they are supporting neighbouring pastoralists to continue keeping cattle. In OMC’s manager’s opinion: “there would be hardly any cows left here without the conservancies because there would not be sufficient longer grass to support them out there [on community land], leaving only goats” (I 81).

6.2.3 Changing Breeds

The majority of pastoralists within the study site are in the process of changing from the Maasai breeds of sheep, goats and cows to hybrid animals (I 26). Hybrid animals

are those that have genetic variation: they are a combination of breeds. In the Mara, rather than introducing pure Boran or Sahiwal breeds of cows, these are mixed with the Maasai stock to improve the quality, yet keep the hardiness associated with the Maasai animals. The hybrid livestock are seen to be better quality and bring with them a variety of advantages. They produce a lot more milk (CP 9), grow quicker and bigger (CP 7) and achieve a higher price at market (CP 8). Land subdivision and the creation of the conservancies are encouraging this change. FG 22 stated that new livestock breeds are needed: “because the land for our animals is becoming small and so we need few animals which have a higher value.” Nkaate Kuya (CP 6) also believes that this will minimise illegal grazing. He stated: “when I have all hybrid sheep they will be fewer and they will just be able to graze within my land and so I will not get fined” (ibid).⁸³ Yet others (including FG 7) stated that they will not reduce the number, even if they have hybrid breeds. Marshall (2014) concurs that there no evidence that improving the quality of cattle leads to keeping fewer animals.

The vast majority of tourism, NGO and conservancy employees purported that increasing the quality and decreasing the number of livestock is the way forward for pastoralism in Maasailand (I 2, 4, 6, 15, 16, 21, 28, 31, 32, 34, 44, 56, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 96). Whilst many local residents are taking steps in this direction, they are doing so cautiously and many remain sceptical. FG 26 explained:

It is just recently that we have started doing this [changing to hybrid animals]. We started on the sheep and that has worked so now we’re trying to see if the cows will survive here. The problem is that in a drought the Sahiwal breed may be the first ones to die because they cannot tolerate a small amount of grass.

Dickson Kaelo (I 48), who has extensive experience working with livestock through ILRI, supports this cautiousness. Regarding the future of pastoralism in the study site, he advocates a greater focus on range management and cautions against thinking that changing the breed and upgrading livestock is a ‘silver bullet’. He elaborated:

If there was an arrangement [for controlled grazing], it might be a more sustainable arrangement that trying to say reduce numbers, increase quality and then people never do it. And if they do do it then drought comes and they all die... I think that it is only now that people are coming to recognise that

⁸³ Sheep and goats are not permitted to graze in conservancies. If owners are caught, they are fined.

the upgrading is not a ‘silver bullet’ as people would like to imagine... If numbers could be regulated I would be very happy, if some bulls could be introduced so that a bit of improvement can happen, I think that is what I would like to see... In Kajiado in [the drought of] 2009, they lost 80% of the cattle because they had changed to the Sahiwal breed and 60% of the sheep because they had gone Dopa. In the Mara, there was less than 40% losses because they still kept the indigenous breed that is tough and strong. So there is this argument to have less cows of a bigger value. It looks very attractive, but in practice that big value can go in one year, so what makes the Maasai better off?

In combination with land subdivision and increasing pressures on scarce resources, livestock hybridisation is encouraging a resurgence of the Maasai grazing practice of *olokeri*. This is where an area of land is set aside, frequently demarcated or fenced, to prevent general grazing so that it can be used for sick animals, those who have just given birth, or often hybrid bulls and rams (CP 5 – see figure 6.14).



Figure 6.14 Simon Taki's hybrid bull grazing inside an *olokeri* area
Photo: Simon Taki (CP 5)

Men in Mpuaai (FG 22) explained that *olokeri* is needed because of high grazing pressures and they also recognised: “it is good too for the grass to set some land aside, it improves because nothing is feeding inside.” Several community members also pointed to the similarities between this traditional practice and the rotational grazing schemes undertaken in the conservancies as they leave land to lie fallow for periods of the year.

In summary, both qualitative and more quantitative findings suggest that changes are occurring in the livestock quantity, species composition and breed-type of holdings within the study site. As has been demonstrated, the conservancies are not the only influencing factor, but they are deemed to be a major contributor to these changes.

6.3 Concluding Discussion: Weighing Up Perceptions on Pastoralism

The continued importance of livestock to the Maasai within the study site is undeniable. However, whilst staying as Maasai may mean a continuing central reliance on livestock, this does not equate to a conservative dependence on pure pastoralism (Homewood et al., 2009: 379). Given the underlying importance of livestock, it is vital that the conservancies support pastoralism as a livelihood in order to maintain and enhance community support for both the conservancies and conservation more generally. This support is essential for the sustainability of the conservancy businesses. As has been discussed, if consequences of the conservancies are perceived to threaten this livelihood, support from the communities will quickly dissipate.

When the Mara embraced privatised land tenure it was expected that the land would become fragmented into fenced parcels, creating more hard boundaries (I 69). As discussed at the beginning of chapter two, this was of great concern to all who profited from wildlife and supported conservation (ibid) as well as those who recognised the importance of open rangeland for pastoralism (Behnke et al., 1993; Homewood et al., 2009; Notenbaert et al., 2012). Homewood (2012) and Bedelian (2012) both argue that the creation of conservancies are detrimental to pastoralism because they are in direct competition and prevent nomadic movements. Yet given this change in land tenure, nomadism would not be possible notwithstanding the presence of the conservancies. This research has found that stakeholders in the Mara no longer believe that conservancies are inherently negative for pastoralism.

Whilst negative consequences are possible, with certain policies and practices in place, conservancies also have the ability to support this livelihood. Reid (2012: 174) recognises that through conservancies, land privatisation in the Mara has created an unexpected window of opportunity, providing new ways to keep the land open and improve the flow of benefits to the local people. One example of these benefits is the creation of grass banks. Due to the grazing schemes accessing this grass, towards the end of the research period some of the research participants (including FG 26; I 76, 86, 87) began to suggest that the conservancies may in fact support pastoralism and

be key for its survival in light of land subdivision. Rationale for this is that in a time of individualised land tenure, the conservancies are bringing landowners back together, preventing fencing, restricting onward sales and reintroducing communal grazing practices. To Dickson Kaelo, the most appealing feature of the conservancies is the fact that land is kept open in a way that can work for both wildlife and livestock (I 48). Conservancies have the potential to hold land within the community rather than its going up for sale and having many other investors come in and start flower farms and construct fences (ibid).

Although you would not rent your house out and then expect to still be allowed to come back each day to cook your dinner, providing traditional users access to resources on land that they own is essential for the survival of conservancies and may even be a human rights issue (Goldman, 2011). Grazing schemes are not a one-way street. They can be beneficial to the flora and fauna of the conservancies as well as the cattle. The chairman of Naboisho's LandCO (I 86) explained:

Sometimes people can feel that cattle are a threat to the conservancy but they're not, they support it. Once the cows have grazed the grass is cut down, it is easier for the wildlife and they like it. And because of grazing access [in the conservancies] we can now have as many [cows] as we want. If there was no conservancy, people would be very restricted.

Grasslands that have been disturbed by certain events, such as grazing, support more species than those that remain undisturbed (Grime, 1973). This helps to explain why wildlife are often concentrated around pastoral settlements (Reid, 2012). In other words, these savannahs decline, or are simplified, if they are not grazed (Oba et al., 2000). In the Mara this becomes clearer by comparing wildlife densities between the centre of the Maasai Mara National Reserve where grass is left to grow, reaching two meters high (figure 6.15), and the conservancies where managed livestock grazing controls grass height (figure 6.16).⁸⁴ Grass height greatly affects wildlife biodiversity as, with the exception of buffalo, ostriches and elephants, many species do not like to eat the tall dry grass which is poor quality and low in nutrients. Instead, they move out to areas where the grass has been kept short by livestock (I 80). In addition, prey feel unsafe in tall grass because it enables carnivores to creep up on them (ibid).

⁸⁴ The photographs in figures 6.14 and 6.15 were both taken the same week in June 2012.



Figure 6.15 Ostriches in tall grass inside the reserve
Photo: C. Courtney



Figure 6.16 Multi-species compositions on a grazed area in Naboisho Conservancy. Photo: C. Courtney

In spite of this potential, “the complementarities between pastoralism and biodiversity are not guaranteed. They require special attention and investments and policies supporting these overlapping land uses” (Notenbaert et al., 2012: 13). Too much disturbance, such as grazing, can also reduce species diversity if unrestricted (Connell, 1978; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008: 404; Reid, 2012). For example, all stakeholders concurred that the community lands around the conservancies are currently overgrazed which is reducing the productivity of these areas.

By implementing grazing schemes, the conservancies are countering fortress conservation approaches whereby “park managers have tended to regard their neighbours as a nuisance and to overlook the rights of the original inhabitants” (Berger, 1996: 182). Instead they are moving more towards a community-based conservation approach. This is the result of a combination of factors: local community members having a voice and a degree of decision-making power; recognition of the importance of supporting pastoralism; appreciation of the effectiveness of the traditional Maasai grazing practice (combined with Allan Savory’s (1988) ideas of high stocking rate and short duration grazing); and, finally, understanding the benefits that grazing can bring to the flora and fauna within the environment. New approaches to range management usually take a long time to be integrated into institutions and bureaucracies, especially if the new ideas have the potential to fundamentally shake up the rationale or existence of the organisation (Chambers, 1993; Scoones, 1996: 52). The conservancies have a distinct advantage;

being independent of the government and other large organisations, they can quickly change and adapt their policies.

Mosse (2005) argues that development entities need to make themselves needed. Unlike state or development agencies, it is in the interest of the conservancies to address the issues associated with pastoralism rather than perpetuate them to justify their employment. This is because the sustainability of conservancies, and more specifically their businesses, is reliant upon improving the status quo and creating satisfaction within communities.

Analysis of the household census challenges existing studies regarding livestock numbers in Koiyaki. This proposes that pastoralists within the study site are wealthier in terms of livestock than previously thought. In addition, the empirical findings presented in this chapter, both quantitative and qualitative, suggest that since the development of conservancies, the numbers of livestock owned by pastoralists living within the study site have increased. This growth is attributable to the conservancies rather than to land privatisation more generally because it contradicts earlier research within the Maasai Mara ecosystem at a time when land had been subdivided but no conservancies had yet been established. These studies (McCabe, 1997; Homewood et al., 2006) found a positive trend between land privatisation and reduced livestock holdings.

Chapter two introduced Langholz's concept of 'conservation backfires'. Within the subdivided lands of the Mara where there is a high population growth rates and livestock concentrations have also reached or exceeded their estimated carrying capacities. In this context the use of revenue and other benefits emanating from the conservancies to increase livestock numbers would usually easily qualify as a conservation backfire – as suggested in chapter five. Prior to conservancies, increased holdings would have had a detrimental environmental impact; but, *if* cattle can be supported by grass banks developed within conservancies, this may not be the case. In spite of this, in contrast to John Sengeny's quote earlier, there is a limit to the number of cattle that can be supported by the conservancies, especially in times of drought. As the conservancy managers indicated, they are constantly walking a tight-rope with regard to the amount of access given to cattle. There are many trade-

offs and hard decisions in this attempt to balance conservation and development objectives.

Land subdivision may have brought greater equality within resource access for pastoralists, regardless of wealth or status, in spite of corruption within the land allocation process. Those who had larger herds have had to sell some to be able to survive on the land that they have been allocated and poorer families who previously could not expand their herds due to a lack of grass now have their own land to use. At the same time, conservancy grazing schemes provide an opportunity for cattle barons to maintain their large herds which would otherwise be unsustainable on their private land. Despite this, Maasai women especially praised grazing access as a benefit from the conservancies because it is inclusive of all, regardless of land ownership or wealth. In addition to changing livestock numbers, holdings are also changing in terms of species composition and breed type.

During the research period, responses from community members regarding the impact of conservancies on pastoralism were polarised: some were inherently positive whilst others were negative. Analysis of community responses reveals that the degree of positivity largely depended on the distance to the nearest conservancy and perceptions of the extent of grazing access permitted there. Initially all communities that border a conservancy gave relatively even responses: the benefits of access during the permitted periods were appreciated but were outweighed by the strict limitations and fines imposed for illegal grazing. During the research period, improvements in opinions were seen, especially from the communities around Naboisho Conservancy. This coincided with the implementation and increased understanding of the new more comprehensive grazing scheme.

For communities that remained more negative about their local grazing scheme, this negativity was reflected in their overall opinion of conservancies.⁸⁵ This correlation emphasises the continued importance of cattle to the Koiyaki Maasai and represents the shift brought by neoliberal approaches to conservation. It also highlights the link between benefits and perceptions of the conservancies and conservation more

⁸⁵ It is important to note that even those who are negative about conservancies for certain reasons still identified ways in which they are bringing development. FG 22's discussion of the predator-proof bomas despite their complaints about the grazing schemes is one example of this.

generally. Despite livelihood diversification, cattle remain the priority. In order to keep the neighbouring communities onside, grazing needs to be given precedence. As people come to see the benefits of the grazing schemes, they increasingly recognise that instead of threatening or destroying pastoralism, the conservancies may be able to maintain and salvage this way of life in a way which brings landowners together during a time of physical and social subdivision and separation (FG 26; I 76, 79). Dickson Kaelo explained the importance of not dwelling on the past:

I think that the majority of them [local people] who are thinking about the future will see it [the conservancies' effect on pastoralism] as a positive but the majority who are thinking about the past will see it as a negative. We have people here who think that in the absence of the conservancy they can revert back to the way the group ranch existed, which is actually not the case. In the absence of the conservancy it would be small subdivided plots so if they are looking at what it was in the past and wanting to go there then they will be negative about the conservancy, but if they are thinking about what may happen into the future, they will be very positive I think (I 48).

Findings suggest that the positivity of perceptions of the conservancies dictates the degree of tolerance expressed towards wildlife. This stresses that links between benefits and conservation goals are clearly understood. It means, however, that for wildlife to safely move on the community lands that border the 'conservation islands', pastoralism must be worked with and not against. Costs associated with the conservancies need to be minimised, and the benefits – of which grazing was most frequently ranked number one – must be widespread, understood and appreciated by the local communities. As will be discussed further in chapter eight and the conclusion, this is vital because they are the ones who have the power to decide whether the conservancies, and the wildlife on which they depend, will survive.

All these factors suggest that conservancies should expand their grazing schemes and open up further to livestock. But extensive grazing access, to the degree that Naboisho has reached and beyond, brings its own challenges. In the face of potential droughts or further increases in livestock, there will be no grass banks left to cushion crises. This will be discussed, alongside other threats to the conservancy concept, in section 8.4. It is also important to differentiate between cattle and shoats as while the pressure brought by cattle could, theoretically, be cushioned in part by conservancy

grazing schemes, this is not true of shoats. Further, the destructive nature of shoats eating habits compounds environmental problems brought by their increase in number.

7 Economic Implications

The aim of this thesis is to examine perceptions of the relationship between the conservancies and development within the study site. In chapter three, economic advancement was identified as one of the three key indicators because of its dominance within stakeholders' perceptions of development. Following on from chapters four, five and six, this chapter will continue to address the second research question. It will explore how the conservancies are impacting upon economic aspects of development, why they are doing this, and whether it affects society evenly.

Within the literature framework set out in chapter two, this chapter will assess the extent and equitability of the various economic benefits emanating from conservancies. The power relationships between stakeholders will be examined; who the power brokers are and how they attained their power will also be investigated. This culminates in an assessment of the degree of participation and control held by communities, and sectors of communities, within the conservancy concept.

Despite the inconsistencies in definitions of development, it remains a widely held belief that economic growth is fundamental to the wellbeing of the poor and the progress of development (Mowforth and Munt, 2009: 44-46). Both neoliberal conservation and community-based tourism are centred on economic benefits being returned to local communities. Many studies looking at the impact of tourism focus on economic aspects (including Croes and Vanegas, 2008; Schubert et al., 2011). This is largely because of the first Millennium Development Goal (Mitchell and Ashley, 2010) and tourism's frequent adoption as a national poverty reduction strategy (Hawkins and Mann, 2007). For example, in Kenya, tourism is one of the key sectors outlined within the economic pillar of the country's Vision 2030 development programme (Government of Kenya, 2007). Evidence that tourism countries achieve higher economic growth rates compared to non-tourism countries (Lanza et al., 2005) is often used to justify this approach.

For these reasons, global or national scale analyses of tourism's economic impact are commonly undertaken. Tourism also has an economic impact in destination areas. Local economic development is particularly encouraged within alternative tourisms such as community-based ecotourism (Reid, 1999). Yunis (2009) describes seven

ways in which ecotourism can provide economic opportunities for local communities. These are employment, earning concessions from tourism, the supply of goods and services to tourism enterprises, the direct sale of goods and services to visitors, running tourism enterprises such as village visits, voluntary giving by tourism enterprises and tourists, and finally investment in infrastructure stimulated by tourism (ibid). Mihalic (2002: 81) warns that in practice, local economic benefits are not always realised.

As opposed to protectionist conservation which largely excludes neighbouring communities, in public-private partnerships the hope is that local people can be brought into the market as competent conservations (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 442). This involves those with legally guaranteed property rights being given an incentive to protect their natural resources (Child, 2000). These PES schemes emphasise the financial value of land and calculate the putative losses from not harming the environment (Morris, 2008). By doing this, easements such as land rental payments can be paid (ibid). As with community-based conservation, the theory of passing these benefits on to local communities are not always realised, especially if they have insufficient power within the initiative. Neoliberal conservation approaches also creating new forms of governance and new relationships between communities and the private actors (Bedelian, 2014).

To date, in Kenya there is scant evidence of wildlife-based tourism significantly impacting on the local economy, particularly in pastoral areas (Manyara and Jones, 2007). This is largely because revenues generated have been diverted from the producers of wildlife, the pastoral landowners, to the service side of the industry (Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010; Osano et al., 2013). At the extreme, Earnshaw and Emerton (2000) calculated that in 1987 only 8% of wildlife earnings were received either directly or indirectly by the local population: 5% to Narok county council, 2% to local employees and 0.6% to landowners. More recent estimates of predicted revenue to Narok and Trans-Mara county councils in the MMNR Management Plan (NCC and TMCC 2011, cited in Bedelian, 2014: 66) total more than \$41 million,

with \$34 million to Narok county council alone.⁸⁶ Despite this enormous revenue, neighbouring Maasai landowners have so far received little financial benefit (Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008).

Although livestock trading remains the dominant livelihood and income source within the study site:

Other people get money when tourists come to the conservancies. Those are people who have their land there and also some people have employment in the camps inside the conservancy (FG 22).

As will be discussed, this represents a diversification of livelihood strategies. In line with the quote from FG 22, concessions in the form of rental income and employment were the two economic benefits of conservancies most frequently raised by focus group participants. To begin the chapter, these conservancy benefit streams will be examined. As noted in chapters three and four, the sale of beadwork was very much desired by local women. This will briefly be discussed within the broader examination of the role of women in the conservancies, but as OOMT's beadwork project began after the research period, a more detailed analysis of its economic impact was not possible. Following this focus on women, perceptions of participation and the distribution of power within the conservancies' structure will be assessed. Different land use options will then be compared and how the leasing of land for conservancies weighs up financially will be assessed. Concluding thoughts will then be brought together.

7.1 Conservancy Benefit Streams

The two conservancy benefit streams to be examined are rental income and employment.

7.1.1 Rental Income

Those whose allocated land is within a conservancy have the option to rent it in exchange for a monthly payment deposited directly into their bank account.

⁸⁶ These are only predicted revenues as reported revenues are not available. These estimates are based on what the two county councils should potentially be earning from the MMNR (and Mara Triangle) based on existing visitor usage in a good year. Revenues only include the major revenue types, such as visitor entrance fees, bed night fees and balloon fees. They do not take into account any of the leakages in the revenue collection system that may be occurring (NCC and TMCC 2011: 43 cited in Bedelian, 2014: 66).

According to outreach worker Grace Naisenya, this is the main difference between the conservancies and the Maasai Mara National Reserve. She said:

The conservancy has helped a lot bringing the development back to the community as opposed to the reserve where the money goes to central government so very little comes back to the community (I 62).

As previously noted, 19% of revenue from the National Reserve is theoretically fed back to local communities, although residents widely consider it to be mismanaged. The MMNR management plan agrees with these accusations. If 19% of the predicted earnings were returned to neighbouring areas, this would exceed \$6.5million annually (Bedelian, 2014: 66-7).

Following land subdivision, it was possible for lease payments to be paid in their entirety directly to landowning individuals, thus preventing them from being amassed by group ranch committees and community leaders. This was a major problem in previous community tourism attempts such as the Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust (KLWT), as noted in chapter two. One drawback of bank transfers is: “we have to go to Narok every month to collect this money which is very expensive” (FG 2). Some landowners are aware that it is possible to transfer the money from their bank accounts to their phones through M-Pesa,⁸⁷ which can then be withdrawn at centres in the Mara, but many do not know how to do this (FG 2, 26). As the research period finished, Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) began building a branch in Talek which has an ATM machine.

Families receiving this rental income describe it as a form of development. Male conservancy landowners living further away from the conservancies, who are less able to access grazing schemes, ranked it particularly highly as a conservancy benefit. Landowners indicated that the payments are used to pay school fees and buy food or settle shop debts built up over the month (FG 2, 26). Dominic Koya, Naboisho’s liaison officer, estimated:

50% are using the money in a good way, while 50% have not realised a better way of using it. Those who are spending the money well are using the money to pay school fees. I normally go to town [Narok] at the three times of a year when school fees are due and I see a lot of landowners withdrawing their money (I 84).

⁸⁷ M-Pesa is an electronic banking system for mobile phones run by the Safaricom network and will be discussed further in chapter eight.

Landowners explained “the benefits that we get from this money means that we don’t need to sell cattle to get money” (FG 5); “we will stop selling livestock while we still have that money” (FG 21). As previously discussed in chapters five and six, this implies that although the money from the conservancy may not be used directly to buy more livestock, it reduces the amount of livestock that needs to be sold to meet the family’s financial needs. Chapter six concluded that this was an example of a ‘conservation backfire’ unless the conservancies are able to provide for these additional livestock – and this is only possible if those livestock are cattle.

Bedelian (2014: 192) concurs that there is no difference in expenditure per adult equivalent between conservancy member households and those of non-members. The wife of a conservancy landowner said:

We have not noticed improvement [in our lives] as the money [rental income] already has its uses. No more needs are being satisfied than before. [But] for those who didn’t have anything to support themselves with, now they do. From the money they get for the rent they’re able to buy food, pay debts and pay school fees for themselves (FG 7).

This quote suggests that landowners who were previously struggling financially may be experiencing the greatest benefits from the rental payments as they are now able to meet needs that were previously beyond their capability. This would represent a decrease in societal inequality.

MNLP assistant Dominic Sakat believes that conservancy landowners are benefiting economically because “their livestock are increasing as they don’t have to sell them for the school fees and they can go for a loan and so they never sell their cows” (I 79). Favourable credit arrangements have been negotiated by conservancies on behalf of their landowners, using the rental agreements as collateral (I 81, 87). It is hoped that this will drive further livelihood diversification through microfinance and small-scale businesses (I 31). Lars Lindkvist suggested that such measures will be especially needed once land is subdivided further over generations (ibid). However, one unhappy landowner of MNC in FG 14 accused the conservancies of using loans as a way to trap people into the 15-year conservancy lease because “once you get a loan you cannot back out”.

While some people noted that the total amount of money now coming into communities each month from the conservancy rents is very large (I 21, 31, 76, 79), individual conservancy landowners deem their payments to be relatively small (FG 1, 6; I 87). One landowner in FG 6 said: “the money from the conservancy helps in a small way, but it is your cow that helps the most.” This concurs with Bedelian’s (2014) findings that, despite the high earnings from tourism in the Mara, livestock remains the primary economic activity. As noted in chapter six, some groups also stressed that receiving cash for leasing their land is of no benefit when fines for grazing illegally in the conservancies equal or exceed this amount (FG 2, 25).

My analysis for BCFK’s CMMF baseline survey found that the average monthly expenditure per household in 2012 was KES 34,250 (\$390). The census survey indicated that 76% of households have some land rented to Naboisho, OMC or Mara North Conservancies.⁸⁸ For households who lease land, the average area leased is 36.2ha. Rent rates vary between these conservancies. This is because they were initiated at different times and so the rates for older conservancies are higher as lease payments increase each year. The payments per hectare per year for 2012 and 2013 are in table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1 Conservancy lease payments 2012-2013

	OMC			Naboisho			MNC ⁸⁹		
	\$/ha/yr	Area	Total	\$/ha/yr	Area	\$/ha/yr	\$/ha/yr	Area	Total
2012	43	12,764	\$548,852	32	19,500	\$624,000	38	30,000	\$1,140,000
2013	44	12,764	\$561,616	35	19,776	\$692,160	41	30,000	\$1,230,000

In 2013, these three conservancies distributed \$2,483,776 to Maasai landowners but this rental income is not spread evenly within society. As noted, only 76% of homesteads within the census survey owned land within a conservancy. Reported size of land owned⁹⁰ in each conservancy by census survey participants was

⁸⁸ Although Mara North Conservancy (MNC) is not within the study site it is included here as many census survey participants within the study site indicated that they earn a rental income from this conservancy.

⁸⁹ In MNC there are multiple lease payments. Figures in the table are for those who have signed for the 15 year lease. For those on the 5 year lease in 2012-3 the payment was KES 3000 (\$34) and for settled land on the 15 year lease the rate was KES 550 (\$6.30) and KES 600 (\$6.80) in 2012, 2013 respectively. For the purposes of the following calculations it is presumed that the MNC landowners in the census survey are full landowners on the 15 year lease.

⁹⁰ Conservancy land ownership was requested in acres, as this is the measurement predominantly used within the study site. It is suspected that some figures may have been given in hectares. As this was

multiplied by its specific lease payment rate. The average annual income for conservancy land owning homesteads was KES 110,648 (\$1250) in 2012 and KES 118,030 (\$1350) in 2013 - this is 29% of average household expenditure calculated in the CMMF survey. This closely conforms with Bedelian's (2014) estimates regarding conservancies' contribution to household income.

As noted, conservancy lease payments are increasing, but how long this increase can be sustained is uncertain. For OMC there is a KES 50 [\$0.57] increase in rental payments each year up to 2015, and subsequently an 8% compound increase (I 101). One source suggested that OMC tourism partners entered the 15 year agreement with the intention of serving out five years and then selling the business on, as once the 8% compounded increase kicks in, expenses for the tourism partners will dramatically increase (anon 3). In Naboisho there is already an 8% increment every year and every 3 years an arbitration situation can be called if inflation is more than 5% above or below this figure (I 21). Given that the inflation rate in Kenya is currently 20%, arbitration is expected (I 31). Allan Earnshaw pointed out that there are limitations as to how much money can be realistically expected from tourism for the land (I 69). He explained:

Tourism operators are not putting up prices by 20% a year, they are lucky if they can put them up 5% a year in the current situation. Even in a rich area like the Mara, people need to have realistic expectations (ibid).

OMC and Naboisho tourism partner Greg Monsen (I 70) agreed that expectations need to be managed:

We can't afford to pay enough to provide all money needed for life. Expectations need to be aligned and we need to think about what people can do for more income. What other opportunities are there?

Ole Soit (I 85), a community leader in Olesere, concurred. He noted "the money we get from the conservancy is very little and so you can't rely only on that, we need to be able to get money from cows too" (ibid). People continue to place more value on the keeping of livestock, seeing tourism as a supplement not a replacement (Homewood et al., 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 163). Homewood et al. (2006) found that, in the Mara, the greatest income is generated by combining pastoralism and wildlife

not certain, all areas given were presumed to be acres and then converted to hectares. If some figures were already given in hectares this would increase the average incomes further.

tourism.⁹¹ This will be discussed further towards the end of this chapter when alternative land use values are compared.

For the conservancies within the study site, the set monthly remittance is paid by the tourism partners regardless of tourist numbers. The relative amount that each tourism partner has to pay for the running of the conservancy (which includes land lease payments and management expenses) is determined by the number of beds that they own within the conservancy. This is not necessarily the number of beds that they have in their camp, as some companies pay for more beds than their camp currently has, so that they have the ability to expand in the future. The total number of beds within a conservancy is fixed by the size of the area; there is a ratio of one tourist bed to every 300 acres to ensure low tourist densities. At the beginning of each year the amount needed to run the conservancy is calculated and this is divided by the number of beds owned; this is then paid monthly by the tourism partners. For example, the Naboisho tourism partners paid KES 60,000 (\$690) per bed per month in 2012 (I 21) and OMC tourism partners paid \$637 (FQ Ol Purkel). There are several reasons why the bed charge in OMC is lower than Naboisho's.

Naboisho is not yet at capacity and there are more than 300 acres/bed. This means that the rental payments for the extra land must be covered by increasing the price for each bed. Also, OMC undertake their own management rather than contracting it out, which is slightly cheaper. The bed rates are based on the premise that expenses can be covered if the camps achieve occupancies of around 30%. If the occupancy goes above this, any profit is reportedly held by the tourism partners for financial security in the case of tourism downturns, such as following the 2007 election, as well as for infrastructure and community welfare projects (Bedelian, 2012: 7). If occupancy goes below this level, the bed fees must still be paid. At certain points in 2012 one camp in the study site was only running at a 3% occupancy rate, but payments continued regardless.

Paying per hectare, as opposed to per tourist, is one of the defining characteristics of the conservancies in Koiyaki (I 48).⁹² Following the collapse in tourism following

⁹¹ This data was collected in 2004 during the demise of the Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust, which preceded conservancies in Koiyaki.

the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-2008, Thompson et al. (2009: 108) doubted the ability of tour operators to continue meeting the guaranteed payments. Olare Orok Conservancy was the only conservancy within the study site fully operational at this time, but its tourism partners remained fully committed to the payments despite the financial hardship (I 3, 81). According to Daniel Sopia, the community liaison officer for Motorogi Conservancy, another benefit of this system is that families can learn to budget as they know the amount that they will be receiving each month (I 87). This arrangement of paying set monthly rents is not clear to all tourists, as some conservancy camps charge clients a 'conservancy fee' of \$100 per day in addition to accommodation. This mimics ticket fees for the reserve and gives the impression that it is this money that is used to pay landowners.

Despite the benefits associated with set monthly payments, some individuals associated with OMC would prefer a ticket-based system whereby rental payments would be a share of a set amount paid per client (I 81). These individuals argue that they would receive a higher net total, even though it would vary throughout the year and drop alongside decreases in tourist numbers (ibid). One person associated with OMC (anon 3) criticised the conservancy approach for not having conservation at its heart. This person believed that a ticket-based approach would provide more money to improve the land, product and wider area (ibid). According to their calculations, given there were around 6500 bed nights in OMC in 2013, if tickets were \$120 this would have totalled \$720,000 (ibid). Expenditure by the conservancy in 2013 was approximately \$600,000 and so with the ticket system there would have been an extra \$120,000 to use on community/cattle projects (ibid). This individual proposed that an agreed amount could be returned per quarter, as schools restart, in the form of a dividend (ibid). This could create an incentive for the landowners to improve their product, in order to increase tourist numbers (ibid). The proponent stressed that this approach could still work within the current bed-ratio agreements (ibid). As the average camp occupancy is around 30%, spare tickets each day could be sold as game viewing tickets to those residing outside of the conservancies (ibid). If, through

⁹² Within the former Koiyaki Group Ranch all conservancies use this system, but there are two conservancies in the Mara (Lemek and Olchorro Oiruwua) that use a ticketing system.

this method, the average occupancy of the conservancy increased to around 45%, this would bring in an additional \$360,000 in revenue (ibid).

Tourism partners worry that changing to a ticket based system would incentivise high tourist numbers, just like the national reserve, whereas the conservancies want to focus on low numbers but higher quality (I21, 74). Such a system might also create mistrust between stakeholders, as landowners could accuse camps of not declaring all bed night numbers (I 21). Tourism partners argue that they face all of the financial risk associated with the conservancies, especially in times of instability, and cannot afford to increase payments further (I 72). The creation of a bonus fund that tourism partners pay into when occupancies at camps exceed 30% may be a compromise.

As detailed in chapter two, there are allegations of political favouritism within the land allocation process (anon 1, 3, 9). Residents in Mbitin noted that they would like to have been given land in the conservancy “because those with land there are benefiting a lot and it is really helping them” (FG 16). They believe that men who were allocated land in Mbitin and the Pardamat Hills were not favoured enough to be allocated good land in a conservancy or near a centre (ibid). One interviewee suggested that there is a correlation between those who were allocated land inside Naboisho Conservancy and allies of a prominent community leader who was influential in the land allocation committee (anon 2). When asked, Dickson Kaelo (I 48) recognised that this leader was probably able to influence decisions and has many friends amongst the conservancy landowners, but he stressed that there are also members in Naboisho who work against him.

Only those who were allocated land in certain areas are able to lease their land to the conservancies and earn this income. This has created a societal divide and has widened income inequality between conservancy and non-conservancy members (Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). Although the rental income ranked second to income from livestock, Osano et al. (2013: 249) and Bedelian (2014) both found that households enrolled in conservancies in the Mara had significantly higher cash incomes, assets and land ownership than non-conservancy households. In FG 25, non-conservancy members stated that they get no benefit from the conservancy. By

this statement they are referring to direct payments but they also did not acknowledge their equal access to grazing and community projects until specifically asked.

Potential wealth inequality between conservancy members and non-conservancy members prior to the creation of conservancies was not taken into consideration in Osano et al.'s (2013) study. They assume that the higher wealth held by conservancy landowners is the direct result of conservancy payments. Bedelian (2014) followed this up and undertook propensity score matching⁹³ between conservancy members and non-members. After this many differences fell away, suggesting that they are not a causal effect of participating in the conservancies but instead represent pre-existing wealth inequality (ibid: 188). It is noteworthy that the research for these two papers was undertaken between 2008-2010. Only OOC was fully functional at this time, and the full effects of the conservancies' impact on wealth will not have been visible. As discussed in chapter six, it is now highly indicative that the conservancies have increased the wealth of their members in terms of livestock.

Multiple research participants pointed out that those who were favoured by the land allocation committee often received multiple parcels or had land allocated to their wives and children who should not have qualified (anon 1, 3, 9). As a result, the most politically connected individuals are often conservancy landowners, as well as owning land elsewhere (ibid). Other residents did not perceive any correlation and suggested that where land was allocated was purely down to luck (FG 6, 11, 22, 28; Courtney, 2009: 40). Reflecting on this inequality issue, the MD of Basecamp Explorer suggested that although Maasai society might seem to be quite egalitarian, levels of inequality had always been higher than expressed by the Maasai image, exemplified by uneven livestock ownership (I 56). Because conservancy participation requires that land be within designated (often highly desirable) areas, this favoured those who benefited the most from land subdivision. Similarly, it prevented the poorest from any involvement, especially those who were not allocated

⁹³ Propensity score matching (PSM) is a technique that attempts to reduce the effects of selection bias by seeking to achieve a balanced distribution of observable covariates across treatment and control groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).

any land at all. Consequently, although conservancies may be decreasing wealth inequality between conservancy landowners as previously suggested, they also have the potential to increase wealth inequality between conservancy members and non-members (Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014: 249).

As with land ownership and other household incomes, conservancy lease revenue is largely held by the men and does not always reach their wives. Women in FG 6 debated as to whether the money given to buy food at the weekly market differs if your husband is a conservancy landowner or not. They concluded that the wives of conservancy landowners “are given the same amount, but before [the conservancy] if we wanted 5000 shillings [KES \$57] we would have had to sell a cow to get this same amount of money” (ibid). Sitting under an acacia tree in Olesere village, FG 4 explained:

The conservancies are an advantage to the men because they get the rent and they are eating the money. Us as women we don't receive any benefit of the conservancy. It is only since the coming of the women's groups that the women in this area get any help.

This quote shows the general feeling that the conservancies, like land, are a male activity as until recently the women have not seen any direct benefits from them.

Regarding the sharing of rent money with wives, one man in FG 2 admitted:

Honestly, there are some men who will just take that money, go and drink it and the women at home never see it but there are others who use it to care for their wives.

Similarly, the wife of a conservancy landowner had the following response when asked what the payments are used for:

The men just go and spend it on alcohol. But those who don't drink alcohol they bring the money back to help their families. Many of them don't make it back from Narok [with the money] though. When they go to collect the money, they drink it all and their friends have to help them home (FG 4).

This problem is not confined to men who drink alcohol. Nasha Rakwa (CP 4) told me:

Even though my husband doesn't drink, when he collects the money from Narok, he buys alcohol for his friends with the money. Everyone knows when the conservancy money arrives and they go and wait [in Narok] for their friends collecting this money so that they can get a drink.

Although this is generating social capital for these men, women in FG 4 said that if they do not bring money back, it causes problems within the family. The wives do not feel that they can enquire about this or persuade their husbands to bring the money to the family because: “when we [wives] ask them [husbands] about this money, we are immediately beaten. You’re beaten... and you’ve not got that money and [so] you’ve been taken to the ground for nothing” (FG 9).

This inequality and perceived misuse of rental incomes⁹⁴ has led to scepticism with regard to the extent to which the conservancies economically benefit local communities (Bedelian, 2012). Studies in India (including Garikipati, 2008) have shown that if money is given to women it is more effective at alleviating poverty because they are more likely to spend it on improving nutrition and paying for education. Women in Koiyaki concur with this sentiment. FG 7 said: “the conservancies need to find ways to help the women because we would take care of our families if we were the ones with the money”. Women in FG 5 detailed how they would spend income from the conservancies if they could ‘catch’ it:

There are so many things that the men don’t know. In terms of the household it is only the women who know what is needed. If we were getting the money we would buy school uniform for the children, food, clothes, and other things for the house.

FG 6 conceded that despite this dream: “we can never be given the money, the men wouldn’t agree.” There are also legal barriers. Women did not qualify for the land register for land subdivision. Title deeds are in the men’s names. It is therefore not possible for the conservancies to give the rental payments to the wives. Only 5% of conservancy landowners in Bedelian’s (2014) Koiyaki-wide study were female, and these individuals had largely gained land through inheritance. The conservancies hope that the microfinance scheme will empower the local women to earn their own money (I 31). As examined in chapter five, initial findings suggest that this microfinance scheme is increasing the average monthly household contribution of the women involved by an average of \$25, a 55% increase.

In addition to the inequality of rental payments, which only benefit those who were allocated land in certain areas, and that men benefit more than women, some

⁹⁴ Although it is important to remember that some men are perceived to be using their income productively (I 48, 87).

conservancy landowners also receive large additional payments. Individuals who have a camp located on their plot of land are paid a bed night fee on top of the normal rental agreements. Each camp has their own exact agreement, but in OMC this ranges from \$8-12 per client per night which is divided between one to four camp landowners. An additional \$2 bed night fee is also charged for the running of the landowner committee. This creates additional annual incomes of up to \$17,600 per camp landowner per year. The exception to this is Olare Mara Kempinski Camp as they own rather than rent the land that the camp is located on.

Before land was allocated in Naboisho it was discussed that, instead of bed night fees for the owner of camp plots, this money would be dispersed to the community more broadly. However, once land was allocated, this changed. As a compromise, having learnt from the experiences in OMC, Naboisho Conservancy shares the \$11 per client per night fee out between more neighbouring plots. 50% goes to the camp landowner(s), 20% is divided between neighbouring landowners and 30% goes into the landowner community fund (as noted in chapter four). As a result, in Naboisho, the maximum additional income from this is \$12,000 per camp landowner per year. There are two camps in Naboisho that do not follow this structure. Ol Seki Camp has its own arrangements with its plot landowners, set prior to joining the conservancy, and Basecamp's Eagle View Camp is located on community land and so pays a set annual \$50,000 fee to KGS instead.

These landowners who benefit greatly from having a camp on their land are not randomly selected. During the land subdivision process, prime plots were allocated to family, friends or political allies of the land subdivision committee as they knew which areas were desirable for camps (anon 1, 9). In addition, OOC's tourism partners were sometimes guided to locate their camp on plots belonging to powerful members of the land committee (anon 9). There were also cases of land quickly changing hands once the locations of camps were decided (ibid). In many instances it is the same elite individuals who have camps on their land who sit on the conservancy landowner committees. One source (anon 8) believes that as a consequence of this, they do not fight as hard in committee meetings to increase benefits for the general landowners because they are too comfortable and do not want

to risk losing their perks. Similarly, two interviewees accused the tourism partners of not wanting these committee members to be replaced because they have existing financial arrangements with these individuals to keep them on side, for example through the camp landowner payments (anon 3, 19). The new upcoming movement to remove these appointed officials discussed in chapter two stands to severely disrupt this status quo.

Despite this inequitable benefit distribution, James Kaigil (I 9) concluded:

Because of the conservancies many families have recently got a direct link to the tourism sector. Even though the politicians and well-connected people tried to grab the good looking places for themselves and can earn the most, poor families can now also benefit, unlike before.

FG 14 argued that the conservancies should also pay rent to those with land outside of the borders because the wildlife is not confined within the conservancies. Bedelian (2014: 248) agrees that payments for conservation should reach all those incurring costs as there is a growing dissatisfaction amongst non-conservancy members which could lead to conflict or destructive behaviour (as discussed by Songorwa, 1999 in relation to Tanzania). There are on-going discussions regarding the possibility of paying a lower rent to those owning land near conservancies, who regularly endure human-wildlife conflicts in an attempt to appease residents and reduce retaliatory killings of wildlife as well as prevent fencing. Whilst rental payments to neighbouring landowners may assist in this, it is unlikely to be a comprehensive solution. This is because the main strata of society responsible for the killing of wildlife are said to be young men (I 79, 80). Men born after 1980 were too young to qualify for land allocation. As a result, paying landowners will not directly benefit these young men, or give them any incentive to improve their view of wildlife. It is also possible that providing payments will just move the problem further back geographically as there will still be a border delineating where landowners are paid and where they are not. This could incentivise those not being paid to start killing more wildlife in an attempt to also receive payments. Also, as noted, tourism partners have limited budgets and find the existing rent a strain in the current economic climate (I 72). They are unlikely to be able to provide contributions high enough to be regarded as meaningful over large areas. This would mean that any financial

support would have to come from donors, eliminating the self-sustainable nature of the conservancy model in the Mara.

Considering all the expenses that tourism partners of the conservancies have to pay, it is not an easy option for investors to make a quick profit. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) elaborated:

Investing in a conservancy is very expensive because you have to pay for the management, you have to pay for the land and there are so many in-built things, you have to pay for a community liaison officer, you have to pay for board meetings, there are a lot of other things that you pay compared to a normal operator, for example operating in the park [MMNR].

Tourism partner Jake Grieves-Cook (I 74) concurred that if the priority of the investor is only to make money, the easiest option is to get a plot next to the park. To invest in the conservancies he noted:

You have to be a company who is in it for the longer term and you must want to be responsible and ethical. You need to pay attention to environmental and conservation issues (ibid).

Grieves-Cook believes that, as a product, the conservancies' time is now coming because tourists are more discerning and want smaller scale products. Dickson Kaelo elaborated that the control brought by this product is one of the main motivators for the conservancies' tourism partners:

You have a product that you can't have elsewhere and then you also have control because in the park [MMNR] someone can just come next to you and build a camp and you have no say. So they have control and they have a product. That is their motivation (I 48).

7.1.2 Employment

In addition to land rental payments, employment injects money from the conservancies into local communities. As one woman in FG 9 said: "getting jobs is another good thing about the conservancies." An elder in Olesere noted: "before [the conservancies] our sons didn't have any jobs and just loitered around. It has, at least, helped them and reduced unemployment" (FG 4). Women in FG 11 suggested that employment does not exclusively benefit the individual as it affects the whole homestead:

Here in the home we're seeing the goodness of tourists coming to these camps [in the conservancy] because now many young men who are [employed] in those camps are now able to bring their salaries home so that we don't have to sell the sheep, it's helping us a lot.

One difference between camps in the conservancies and those within and bordering the national reserve is their focus on employing local people, especially in higher paid positions. This is the result of a combination of the partnership nature of the conservancies and the community capacity building centre, Koiyaki Guiding School (I 21). This school was established in 2005, in what is now Naboisho Conservancy, with the aim of educating young Maasai men and women as safari guides so that they are able to compete for employment in the tourism industry (I 3). As well as 100% of guides, conservancy camps aim to source 50% of their total employees from local communities (I 16). The newest partner in the conservancies studied, Olare Mara Kempinski, had the lowest local employment rate at 20% and their guides are not Maasai (I 83). In comparison, Basecamp Explorer conducts in-house training and 85% of their current full time staff are from the local area, including prestigious positions such as chefs and junior managers (I 89).

These findings regarding local employment counter criticisms that local indigenous people only hold menial jobs in tourism (Sindiga, 1994). Middleton (1992: 53) termed this exploitation by outsiders the ‘final form of colonialism’. Several camp managers expressed a desire to employ an even higher percentage of local staff. They are dissuaded by low education qualifications and some managers noted that, in their experience, many Maasai employees have a poor work ethic. One camp manager explained:

It is much easier to employ people from other areas who have more experience and are easier to work with, but because we’re in a conservancy we have to employ local staff whenever possible (anon 12).

In comparison to criticisms of employment in the tourism industry being seasonal (Butler, 2001; Riley and Ladkin, 2002), over 80% of jobs in the conservancies are permanent. Staff also reported that camps in the conservancies were very good to work for and pay comparatively well (CP 2; I 68). In 2012, through formal employment in conservancies within the study site (including camps, conservancy management companies and affiliated trusts/foundations) ‘local’ staff (as defined by the camp) earned \$683,695 plus an additional estimated \$224,000 in tips or bonuses. This money, along with that from land rental payments, feeds directly into the local economy. Additionally, concerns that employment in tourism may restrict rather than

complement livelihoods (Duffy, 2002: 51) are lessened by the consideration that the conservancies represent livelihood diversification rather than replacement.

KGS teacher Mike Kahiga believes: “a big problem in this area has been an overreliance on livestock as the only source of income, but this is now changing” (I 44). Joseph Mpoe (I 46), who is a safari guide, estimates that today only 30% of families in the Mara rely solely on livestock for their livelihood. He explained that he would like to see further changes:

I want my children to have a better life than mine. My parents didn't live the way I live now, and I want it to continue changing for my children. I want them to have a better job and not to rely on cows. If they do rely on cows it should be a better breed like the Boran (ibid).

This highlights a common error in the perception of those involved in development, that Maasai are culturally conservative and stubbornly persistent in their rejection of more modern ways of being (Hodgson, 2001: 6). Such views ignore the realities of pastoral adaption, flexibility and straddling (Anderson and Broch-Due, 2000).

There are often different reasons for livelihood diversification:

The poorest diversify out of necessity... through a downward spiral of progressive loss of access. Better off households by contrast are likely to diversify for risk management, and the wealthiest diversify as a means of investing wealth for profit maximisation (Homewood et al., 2006: 20).

In the Mara the diversification seems to be a combination of the latter two reasons: profit maximisation and risk management. Through their study of OOC, Osano et al. (2013) found that conservancy payments buffered conservancy landowner households from declines in livestock income during times of drought and as such reduces pastoral vulnerability. Just as a total reliance on pastoralism leaves households open to threats from disease and drought, an overreliance on tourism is also risky – as was seen following the 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya. There are also cultural implications of a total shift in livelihood. James Kaigil explained:

To me, if you become biased on just tourism and conservation that is not what Maasai life is all about and it is not all what these people need... Even though I am a conservationist, I think that the big majority of local people's lives still rely on their cattle so I think that it is very good to have a balanced system to manage cattle, conservation and tourism... [otherwise] there is a big risk in the next 10 years to come (I 8).

Although there is a desire to diversify, none of the Maasai participants indicated that they would like to move away totally from livestock keeping, as discussed in chapter six. Individuals who are employed still own livestock; even if they work far from their rural home they will have livestock that they leave under the care of their wives or a herder. This exemplifies the goal of young people in the Mara today, as shown by their drawings of their dream future lives. As discussed in the introduction to chapter six, young people do not want to move away from pastoralism despite desiring permanent employment. Indeed, employment or other income-generating activities may enable more livestock to be bought or, as has been discussed, provide cash that can be used to meet the household expenditures reducing the number of livestock that need to be sold.

Conservancy managements and camps each have their own policy with regard to employment and how 'local' is defined. For some, this refers to any Maasai people (FQ Kempinski); for others, those who reside within a specified distance from the camp (I 16; FQ Kicheche and Asilia). The general manager of Basecamp Explorer noted that to her, 'local employees' should be Naboisho Conservancy landowners (I 89). Although not all companies overtly favour conservancy landowners in their delineation of who is local, the selection processes used for seeking employees frequently prioritise these individuals and their friends or families. For example the manager of Naboisho Conservancy explained that when they are looking for new employees he tells the conservancy's land committee and they suggest people to be interviewed (I 76). As a result, most people employed as rangers in Naboisho are connected to conservancy landowners (ibid).

As well as the deliberate or incidental favouring of conservancy landowners for employment opportunities, there is other evidence of nepotism. The majority of conservancy-affiliated managers indicated that they use their conservancy's community liaison officer when seeking new employees or arranging villages for their clients to visit (I 4, 72, 88, 89). Over time, some managers have recognised discrepancies. One camp manager explained that they now realise that many of the benefits are being directed by the liaison officer towards his friends and family (anon 12). The manager of OMC believes that such actions are politically motivated –

especially as the community liaison position is elected by the landowner committee (I 81). One young person confided: “it is practically impossible to get a job in the conservancy if you’re not on good terms with the liaison officer, regardless of how educated you are” (anon 16). Grace Naisenya, the outreach worker focusing on schools, concurred. She explained that: “it is problematic if education levels are not the determining factor for employment” (I 62). She continued: “if education is not appreciated in this way, young people see no incentive to advance themselves and continue with their education” (ibid). Camp managers were enthusiastic regarding my suggestion of creating a database detailing individuals seeking employment that they could access directly, bypassing intermediaries.

Five focus groups (5, 7, 9, 10 and 17) noted that they would really like more women to be employed in the camps as “we can do anything that the men can do” (FG 17). Despite this criticism, the conservancies do seem to be further ahead in this regard than other camps in the Mara, especially with regard to Maasai women. This is largely the result of female graduates of the Koiyaki Guiding School. Once camps take on female guides, who prove very popular with guests, the provision of a female area in the staff quarters enables camps to also recruit women in other departments (I 16).

7.2 Role of Women in Conservancies

As noted, many conservancy landowners’ wives claim that they never get to see or ‘eat’ the rental payments and there are calls for more women to be employed. This has led to criticisms that the conservancies only financially benefit men (FG 5). Women want to be incorporated into the conservancy structure in the same ways as the men, breaking the current gender disparity which is discouraging women (FG 7). One lady elaborated:

For Naboisho, it is side-lining the women but instead it should sit down and decide, what should we do for these women? I want the conservancies to stay but what can they do for the women? We are the pillars of the family, we hold the family together (FG 7).

FGs 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19 all stated that what they want most from the conservancies is to be able to sell their beadwork to the camps and tourists. Beadwork is closely associated with the Maasai image and women often sit by their

house or under a tree to bead whenever they find the time. During focus group sessions women often beaded whilst we discussed issues. It is a skill that is passed down through the generations (see figure 7.1) and is an activity of great socio-cultural importance (I 50). Maasai women explained that they really want to earn money from selling beadwork because it is something that can be done from home whilst looking after the children, and that they enjoy doing it (I 17, 50; FG 12). Despite these desires, “right now we’re not beading for tourists because we have no way to sell to them” (FG 15).



Figure 7.1 Kijoolu Soit showing two of her daughters how to make an *enkarewa* necklace
Photo: C. Courtney

Although a Basecamp Foundation booklet (2011) cited a plan to expand their ‘Basecamp Maasai Brand’ handicraft initiative to Naboisho Conservancy in 2011, this has not yet come to fruition. Independently of this, during the research period there was an informal attempt by a Maasai person connected to the conservancies to link ladies with tourists to sell their produce, but promises were made and broken (FG 4, 13, 15, 16). Women in FG 16 explained their frustrations:

When [the person] brought the little money, it didn’t equal the amount of beadwork that we made. When we came under this tree to meet them we covered this area with beads and they only bring back 3000 shillings [KES \$34]. Do you think that this is for all of our beadwork? What about the things that they went with and sold? And then they come to say that the rest are lost, where did they get lost to?

The transpired events created a great deal of disappointment and mistrust between these women and conservancies. When I called the women together for focus groups in the areas affected, they initially thought that I was connected to the person responsible. This led to an angry reception whereby my research assistant and I were called liars and cheats. It was only after their concerns were listened to, and my neutrality and independence from the individual was assured, that the sessions were

able to commence. Even after this experience, these women still long for a route through which to sell their beadwork:

If a camp came and offered that we could go and sell our things we would really want this and would agree with it, because it is a development that will bring change. So if we wanted to buy clothes for our children or something we would have something [money] of our own (FG 15).

Following the research period, the desire for women to sell their beadwork was mentioned to camp managers and owners who responded positively. As a result, camps in Naboisho Conservancy came together with Lorna Buchanan-Jardine, the manager of Mara Plains Camp in OMC (who was informally working on beadwork with some women in Endoinyo e Rinka), and OOMT to create a collaborative beadwork project between the conservancies. A unified and more formal approach such as this will hopefully prevent the reoccurrence of the circumstances described above. This venture is in its infancy but early signs suggest that, with formalisation and improvement in the quality of the product, beadwork has the potential to be a major economic earner for local women. Camps already involved in OOMT's new beadwork project indicated they are each spending approximately KES 60,000 (\$680) to 80,000 (\$910) per month on the wares that the women are making. If this is extrapolated to all nine camps in OMC and Naboisho, an additional \$74,000 - \$99,000 per year could be injected into the local economy, directly into the women's hands.

In addition to a greater incorporation into the direct benefit streams from the conservancies, women in the bordering communities would also like to be included in conservancy meetings and decision-making. FG 9 asserted that currently:

Women are not in the conservancy, we have no say. But we want to be involved and have a say on issues concerning the conservancy because they also affect us... We also want to be committee members.

The exclusivity of participation in the conservancies will now be discussed in more detail, expanding beyond a gender-basis.

7.3 Participation and Power

Bianchi (2002) argues that it is not only important to understand whether incomes are rising due to tourism, but also whether access to power and resources have increased or decreased. In other words, central questions are: who wields the power in tourism

development and can meaningful partnerships result in a sharing of power with the destinations? (ibid). Sharpley (2000: 10-11) argues that because of the dominance of western businesses in international tourism, the structure is such that there is a lack of community control over resource use. He argues a “significant proportion of tourism earnings is lost through overseas leakages” which reinforces global socioeconomic inequalities and dependency (ibid). Such criticisms have led to allegations that tourism is a vanguard of neo-colonialism (Nash, 1989). Similarly, governance in neoliberal conservation is characterized by a reduction in the state’s control over conservation in favour of hybrid forms of governance in which governments, businesses, NGOs and communities all share responsibility for, and opportunity to benefit from, conservation (Igoe and Brockington 2007; Bedelian, 2014: 20). The presence of these powerful actors within the components of the conservancy concept means that it is especially important to assess how participation and power are distributed between, and also within, these stakeholder categories.

Tourism partner companies within conservancies are largely owned by British, South African or white Kenyan individuals. But because of the participatory partnership nature of the conservancy agreements, power and control are shared, to a degree, with conservancy landowners. This reduces overseas leakages and increases the economic benefit streams back to the local communities. In comparison, tourism activities within the national reserve involves very little, if any, local participation and control. In response to criticisms over general calls for participation, the vast majority of literature on participation in tourism now advocates that for the greatest impact, the highest possible degree of local participation is necessary (Briedenhann and Wickens, 2004; Wallace and Russell, 2004; Mat Som, 2005; Sebele, 2010). This is termed ‘citizen control’ in Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, and ‘self-mobilisation’ in Pretty’s (1995) typology. Manyara (2006) is particularly vocal in advocating small scale indigenous community-owned enterprises instead of foreign investment in Kenya. Norton-Griffiths et al. (2008: 410) point out that in southern Africa, landowners and communities typically own and manage wildlife operations themselves, rather than act as simple concessionaires, and accordingly capture a large proportion of wildlife rents (ibid). What they fail to highlight, however, is that in southern Africa the wildlife ranches are largely owned by one or

two individuals who are usually wealthy, well-educated, and have the financial and human capacity to manage such operations. In the Mara, this is not the case.

Community-owned and managed ventures in Kenya commonly encounter obstacles with securing the necessary financial capital, finding the required social capital locally and reaching their potential markets (Kiss, 1990: 14; Leach et al., 1999: 225; Mburu, 2002: 2). This has led to the failure of some projects (ibid). Although 100% of the money earned in these ventures is fed directly back into the local economy, real revenues may be lower and failure rates higher than ventures partnering with tourism investors. Further, in partnerships, communities can be sheltered from the risks brought by local or industry wide instabilities. Mburu et al. (2003) concur that collaborative wildlife management approaches have low transaction costs for the communities involved.

Participation is not a panacea for communities as it will always be a political process with tensions and uneven power relations (Jones and Carswell, 2004). Advocates of participation rarely consider who should constitute the participants (Southgate, 2006). Communities are heterogeneous; notions of a single community voice in participation are naive and conceal uneven distributions of power and benefits (Sharpe, 1998; Naguran, 1999; Gray, 2002; Southgate, 2006). The marginalised in society may find it especially difficult to be equal participants (Scheyvens, 2002; Cornwall, 2003). More specifically, as noted in chapter two, De Kadt (1990: 30) warns that “calls for community participation gloss over the well-known tendency for local elites to ‘appropriate’ the organs of participation for their own benefit”.

Exemplified by the individuals represented on conservancy landowners committees and those who benefit from camp landowners’ bed night fees, elite individuals within the study site do benefit disproportionately from conservancies. These individuals have the power and confidence to deal with outsiders and ensure that development opportunities offer particular gains for themselves and their families. Neumann (1998) suggests that such practices are made possible by facilitators of participatory conservation projects often being outsiders who are unfamiliar with the local political structures. Consequently, they are ready to blindly embrace the participation of any local people (ibid). Unless specific measures are taken to encourage meaningful

participation in community decision-making by all – including traditionally disadvantaged groups – Brohman (1996: 60) warns that local participation may simply transfer control over development from one elite group to another. In the case of the conservancies, inclusive participation should include non-conservancy members, youth and women – especially regarding matters whose influence extends beyond that of conservancy landowners.

Dickson Kaelo (I 48) highlighted that although in many conservation projects the control rests with an NGO or the tourism investors, the way that the conservancies are structured leaves some power with the community (ibid). Security of tenure gives power to negotiate with other stakeholders (Ashley and Roe, 2002; Bedelian, 2014: 117) and conservancy landowners can influence decision-making to a certain extent by holding meetings then taking collective thoughts to tourism partners and management, for example, with regard to grazing (Bedelian, 2014: 116). In conservancies, power resides most heavily with the land committee who are heavily dominated by community leaders (Bedelian, 2014: 244). The individuals on this committee are theoretically democratically elected but the same officials who have traditionally held positions of power maintain their authority and continue to manipulate some benefits. Just as the same individuals who captured leadership positions during the group ranch period became influential in the choice of officials for the wildlife associations (Thompson and Homewood, 2002), the same can be said of conservancies. Conservancies are a new forum whereby the same leaders can exert their power (Bedelian: 121). As one conservancy employee (anon 1) noted, the existing opinion leaders were used to introduce the conservancies to the communities and so have become the big leaders in the conservancy committees, despite being widely acknowledged as corrupt. As Naboisho Conservancy was created later, this informant thinks that more younger people had become informed about the conservancies, and so were more willing to stand up to the established leaders (ibid). To him, this has resulted in a younger, more educated and more informed landowner committee in Naboisho compared to the other conservancies (ibid).

Given the appointment of these individuals and the lack of re-elections, there are concerns over their downward accountability to conservancy members (ibid: 244).

Similarly, Mwangi (2005: 62) found in her study of Eselenkei Conservancy in Amboseli that “traditional power structures seem to hinder community involvement in the decision making process”. On the other hand, the clout of this committee may increase influence in conservancy management and put landowners in a stronger position – if they have the same interests (ibid: 127). This is the same problem as noted by Hughes (2006a) regarding CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe: all participation either reinforces or undermines local power relations. One problem faced by the conservancies is the extent to which they can or should try to influence existing socio-cultural hierarchies and inequalities; for example, who is represented on conservancy committees. Tourism partners are largely leaving the landowners to sort out their own power imbalances and it is questionable whether they would like to see a hand-over of control to other individuals, because of the favourable agreements they have in place.

As noted in chapter two, throughout 2014 there has been increasing awareness and dissatisfaction amongst conservancy landowners regarding their representatives. This was spurred on by the realisation that large amounts of money have been systematically withdrawn from a conservancy landowners’ fund by its officials (anon 3). Having taken legal advice, the landowners began forming their own association, which then began collectively calling for the resignation of the liaison officer and other officials (ibid). In one conservancy, 70% of landowners have now joined the association and this unrest has now filtered, in differing degrees, into all conservancies within the study site (ibid). Considering that in the Mara it is these same officials from each conservancy who form the area wide MMWCA, concerns regarding their accountability are compounded. The increasing calls for the democratisation of the traditional power structures that have, to date, hindered community involvement in decision-making through a top-down approach is the realisation of Mwangi’s (ibid: 62-63) recommendation in relation to Eselenkei.

At present there are also few attempts being made by conservancies to include non-conservancy members in the discussion of issues that affect them. For example, in November 2013 there was a large two-day workshop organised by Basecamp Foundation and MMWCA focused on scaling-up conservancy benefits. Women and

non-conservancy members currently receive the fewest direct benefits from conservancies. Having raised this with one of the workshop organisers, I was asked to provide a list of people who fall into these categories who could participate in the meeting. Despite doing this, only one local woman (a head teacher) was present at the meeting, and no non-conservancy members. The result was that their point of view was not directly included in discussions.

In summary, due to the secure nature of the land tenure in Koiyaki, community members have a significant degree of power in the venture, despite partnering with powerful capitalist businesses. Economic benefits emanating from the conservancies are directed to individuals, as opposed to those targeting the community (chapters four and five) or livelihoods (chapter six). As a result, inequalities in the distribution of conservancy benefits, and therefore the impact of the conservancies on development, are most prominent in those of an economic nature. Although receipt of the rental payments is determined by land allocation, the varying degrees of power (and thus participation) held by individuals also influence the quantity of economic benefits received. Elite members of society simultaneously own more land, due to influencing the land committee or buying land that comes up for sale, and have the greatest degree of participation by sitting on conservancy committees. Compounding this, it is these same individuals who are often the 'lucky' ones to have a camp on their land and thus receive the large additional bed-night fees. This study has confirmed that PES can disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of society creating or reinforcing power asymmetries amongst those involved (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara continues to be intense and conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 127).

These elite conservancy members receive the highest benefits, but unlike under previous models, they do not 'eat' all of the revenue. Through conservancies, ordinary landowners are now assured that they will directly receive their lease payments. This finding is the fulfilment of the potential recognised by Osano et al. (2013) that by linking landowners directly to the market, and bypassing community

level institutions, new neoliberal conservation initiatives in the Mara have the potential (and promise) to provide better incomes to those participating in comparison to the former wildlife associations. In line with Wunder's (2008) finding, this revenue is having the greatest impact on poorer households. At present, non-conservancy members perceive that there is an increasing inequality between themselves and conservancy members. Whilst rental payments are exclusive to conservancy landowners and employment within conservancies has bias towards landowners, community projects and grazing access are inclusive of all living around the conservancies. This is not currently fully recognised.

7.4 Economic Land Use Analysis

Analyses of tourism-conservation initiatives in the Mara (including Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Bedelian, 2012; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014) have focused on their impact on livelihoods, weighing up their relative economic benefits as opposed to other land use options. In general, Homewood, Chenevix Trench et al. (2009) are critical of claims that community-based wildlife initiatives are improving livelihoods in Maasai rangelands. However, they recognise that the Mara case shows that, where land-owning households are located near top-end conservation areas, there can be significant benefits (ibid: 394). These land use comparisons are heavily dependent upon rainfall as net returns from agriculture and livestock-keeping, the two main alternative land use options, fluctuate with mean average rainfall (Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010) (see figure 7.2).




Figure 7.2 Differential returns (\$/hectare/year) for agricultural, livestock and wildlife production concessions in the ASAL districts (Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010: 378).

The estimations represented in figure 7.2 (calculated from data collected prior to 2003) suggest that, in areas with high mean annual rainfall, agriculture produces the highest net returns. Above an annual rainfall of 900mm, net returns from livestock keeping also exceed high concessions from wildlife production (\$50/hectare/year).⁹⁵ According to these figures, 600mm annual rainfall is the critical point whereby net returns from agriculture equal high concessions from wildlife production. At my home in Olesere throughout 2013, rainfall totalled 889mm but this was believed to be above average for the area. It is estimated that average annual rainfall for the study site would be in the 700-800mm range. At this level, this data indicates that agriculture is the most economically beneficial land use option.

Following the creation of the conservancies, economic land use comparisons have continued. Osano et al. (2013: 252-3) compare the OOC lease payments against returns from alternative land use options. At the time of their study, OOC's lease payments were \$41/ha/yr. They compared this to returns from livestock estimated at \$38/ha/yr at a mean annual rainfall of 800mm or below (see figure 7.2). Using Norton-Griffiths' figures, Osano et al. (2013: 252-3) acknowledge that at this rainfall level, agriculture may yield higher returns (\$100/ha/yr) than the conservancy concessions.

In a survey prior to land subdivision in the Maasai Mara Ecosystem, 53% of respondents indicated that they would like to cultivate crops once they have subdivided plots (Seno and Shaw, 2002). The draw of high net returns from agriculture are very appealing to new landowners and there is a very rapid conversion to agriculture underway in the Mara, especially north of Lemek (Thompson, 2002; Reid et al., 2003; Lamprey and Reid, 2004; Norton-Griffiths et al., 2008; Homewood et al., 2009; Homewood et al., 2009; Nyariki, 2009; Thompson et al., 2009; Norton-Griffiths and Said, 2010; Reid, 2012). This is increasingly encroaching on MMNR and its wildlife dispersal areas (ibid). Some research participants (including individuals in FGs 2, 14, 20) who were unsatisfied with revenues from the conservancies indicated that, once the conservancy leases expire, they might convert their land to agriculture.

⁹⁵ The \$50/ha/yr figure for the highest revenues received in the Mara was calculated during the time of wildlife associations, prior to conservancies.

Gerard Beaton (I 21), whose family has been heavily involved in farming in Kenya, conceded that conservancy rental payments are less than half of what they get for wheat in Ngorigori. But in his opinion, very little of the area where the conservancies are located would be viable for wheat, owing to the quality of the land and amount of rock (ibid). Lamprey and Reid (2004) and Thompson et al. (2009) concur that this area is not as agriculturally productive as other parts of the Maasai Mara ecosystem. Osano et al. (2013) add that undertaking agriculture this close to the reserve would have high costs in terms of wildlife damage to crops. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) also pointed out that where land is being fenced and crops grown within this area, it is not actually the Maasai who are doing this agricultural work. Other communities come in to farm the land (ibid). One of my research assistants, Lorna Serseri is from Ololulunga where many Maasai lease their land for agriculture. She confirmed that the landowner only receives a little of the profit earned from the crops that are grown on their land by Kalenjin farmers (I 68).

Analyses of the economic impact of the conservancies have, to date, not encompassed all revenue streams. The financial contributions of conservancies to neighbouring communities extend well beyond the rental payment used by Osano et al. (2013) in their land use value comparison. Consequently, this land use option has been greatly undervalued. In an attempt to calculate a more comprehensive land use value for conservancies, all tourism partners, conservancy managers and conservancy-affiliated organisations were asked specific financial questions for 2012 so that cumulative totals could be calculated. For camps⁹⁶ this included wages and tips to local employees, village visits, donations⁹⁷ and the bed night fee for the owner of the land where the camp is located. Conservancy managements provided details regarding payments to local employees and revenue collected in fines. OOMT and BCFK detailed the amount of money spent in the area as a result of the

⁹⁶ N.B. For the 2012 period two camps in OMC were not yet fully functional. Olare Kempinski Camp provided some data for their local employment during this period but no figures were included for Mahali Mzuri Camp in Motorogi as this did not open until August 2013. Therefore, as well as increases in payments each year, these figures will be higher now, as two additional camps are now fully functional.

⁹⁷ This category is donations that are not processed through OOMT or BCFK; for example, donations to Kicheche Community Trust or direct donations given to local projects.

conservancies' presence. Money from donors working through these organisations who would have donated regardless of the conservancies' presence was excluded.

Although the intention is to compare these figures with agriculture and pastoralism, more comprehensive calculations to include employment and community projects were not made for these two land use options. This is because in agriculture, it is generally not local Maasai people who are employed to do the work. In pastoralism either family members herd the livestock or Maasai from outside of the Mara are employed. Young men in the Mara will not usually work for the small wages offered for herding. Also, no projects are known to have resulted from either of these forms of land use. Therefore, these two land use options do not provide the same additional revenue streams associated with conservancies that, it is argued, need to be incorporated into comparative economic land use analysis. The figures for this analysis are detailed in table 7.2 below.

Table 7.2 Comprehensive Annual Conservancy Land Use Values (\$)

Income source	OMC	/ hectarage (12,756)	Naboisho	/hectarage (19,500)
Landowner payments including land rent, relocation grants and landowner community fund	553,964	43.4	660,680	32
Conservancy management and camps incl. LOCAL employees' wages plus tips, village visits and payments to camp landowner	446,307 (2 camps not yet fully functioning)		623,129	
Donor money due to conservancies	220,154		1,009,800	
Total community income	1,220,425	95.67	2,303,609	118.13
Grazing fines	-16,800		-12,383	
Total with deduction	1,203,625	94.35	2,291,226	117.50
Local purchases (camps and management)	31,336		95,677	
Total with purchases	1,234,961	96.81	2,386,903	122.4
Estimation fully functioning (without local purchases)	1,425,259	111.7	2,291,226	117.50

As table 7.2 outlines, analysis for OMC revealed that \$553,964 was paid directly to conservancy landowners as rental payments in 2012. In addition, the three functioning camps (plus a small amount from the developing Olare Kempinski Camp) together with the conservancy management company contributed \$446,307 to the local economy.⁹⁸ With the addition of OOMT's expenditure from sources that

⁹⁸ OOMT's \$5 bed fee payments from camps are not included in this figure as they are part of the OOMT expenditure amount and should not be counted twice.

would not have donated were it not for the presence of the conservancy, OMC's total for 2012 is \$1,220,425. Grazing fines for the year totalled \$16,800 which equates to 3% of land rent payments. When subtracted, this leaves \$1,203,625. Dividing this total by the 12,756 hectares that made up OMC in 2012 produces a land use value of \$94.35/ha/yr. If indirect benefits through local purchases in the form of food, paying for water from local boreholes, car hire and the purchase of beadwork are included, this adds an additional \$31,336 and increases the figure to \$96.81/ha/yr. The reason that these local expenditures are separated is that it cannot be determined what proportion of this amount is profit. For example, if a lady sells a necklace to a camp for \$7 this is not 100% profit as she has to buy the materials to make it. Costs associated with predation are also not included. This is because predators were killing livestock prior to the creation of the conservancies and there is no evidence as to whether this has increased since these predators have received greater protection and are thriving inside conservancies, or decreased owing to initiatives aimed at reducing and preventing human-wildlife conflicts. In 2010 Bedelian's (2014: 142) survey participants estimated that the mean annual household cost of predation is \$310 but the Mara Lion Project's chief project officer (I 105) believes that the figures given by households are inflated.

In Naboisho, although the rental payment rate is lower, the area is larger. The total paid to conservancy landowners in 2012 was \$660,680. Within this, landowners' contributions to their community initiative (which in 2012 was building classrooms) totalled \$11,738. The five core camps in Naboisho (excluding Porini in Olkinyei) together with the management company contributed \$623,129 to the local economy. Combining the landowner payments, camp contributions, 60% of the tourism partner fund,⁹⁹ contributions from the management company and money entering the area through BCFK (again only that which would not be included if it was not for the conservancy's presence) totals \$2,303,609. Grazing fines in 2012 totalled \$12,383 which was 1.9% of rental income. When subtracted from the running total this leaves \$2,291,226. When this total is divided by the 19,500ha which the conservancy was comprised of in 2012, the land use figure is \$117.5/ha/yr. Camps and management in Naboisho Conservancy indicated that they spent significantly more than OMC on

⁹⁹ The other 40% of this is not included here as it was used to register the land leases.

local purchases. This totalled \$95,677 and was bolstered by Basecamp's Maasai Brand beadwork project sales, paying for water usage and more food being bought locally. Again, the percentage profit within this expenditure cannot be determined, but if it is included in the figures the land use value for Naboisho Conservancy increases to \$122.4/ha/yr.

These two figures (excluding local purchases), \$94.35/ha/yr for OMC and \$117.5/ha/yr for Naboisho are not dissimilar. As two camps in OMC were not yet fully functioning in 2012, the land value for this conservancy will have subsequently increased further. If it is presumed that the two new camps in OMC have the same average finances as the other three, already functioning camps, this income would increase OMC's land use value to \$111.7/ha/yr. These figures are significantly higher than the rental payments alone, the figure previously used for land use comparisons. For OMC this figure of \$111.7/ha/yr is 2.5 times higher, and for Naboisho the \$117.5/ha/yr figure is 3.6 times higher. Similarly, Bedelian (2014: 154) found that conservancy rent revenue only accounts for 47% of conservation incomes within Koiyaki.

It is important to recognise that, rather than being the amount accruing to each conservancy landowner per hectare, the figures calculated here represent the money going into the local area more broadly for every hectare leased to the conservancy. As this chapter has discussed, economic benefits accruing from conservancies are not dispersed evenly within society. Although landowners can be encouraged to assess land use options by the value that they bring to the wider community rather than at the individual level, decisions regarding land use are increasingly taken at the household level. OMC manager Rob O'Meara (I 103) warned that if just 5% of people whose land is compatible with wheat decide to take that option, everyone else would be affected. For example, one of the focus groups which showed an interest in changing its land use was made up of men from Olkuroto (FG 20). This village is centrally located between three conservancies and so land use change here would have far-reaching implications.

Norton-Griffiths et al. (2008: 409) estimate that wildlife rents of between \$100-150/ha/yr are required for wildlife to survive on significant areas of the Mara. This is

the amount required to match the land-rent value of agriculture in areas with mean annual rainfall around 800mm in figure 7.2. The new land use value analysis detailed above suggests that if a comprehensive view is adopted and all revenue streams are taken into account, the conservancies within the study site are entering this range. Thus they are competing to be the most economically beneficial land use option. This directly contradicts current perceptions amongst landowners within the study site that growing wheat is the most lucrative use of land. It will be interesting to see how landowners react to this analysis and whether they will recognise the indirect revenue streams, such as employment and projects, or whether they will want to make land use decisions based purely on the quantity of money entering their personal bank accounts.

There are also other conservancy impacts that are difficult to put a figure on. Dickson Kaelo (I 48) believes that the conservancies are largely improving the quality of the land, as opposed to degrading it like farming, and so the value of the land will be increasing. Also, unlike agriculture, conservancies are compatible with pastoralism. Ecotourism works better if it does not threaten or interfere with main sources of livelihood (Kiss, 2004). Tourism does not need to out-compete pastoralism because, as discussed, conservancies diversify rather than replace pastoralism as a livelihood. This is especially important considering the socio-cultural importance of livestock to the Maasai. Further, chapter six detailed that the conservancies may even be having a positive impact upon livestock keeping within the study site. Any assistance that the conservancies can give to livestock keeping – for example through the grazing schemes – increases its land use value further. Unfortunately I was unable to quantify the value of this within this study.

7.5 Concluding Thoughts – Economic Implications

Mihalic (2002: 81-82) Kosoy and Corbera (2010), Koronbery and Hubacek (2013) and Bedelian (2014) all question whether host communities in less developed countries are able to attain a comparative advantage and profit from the tourism or neoliberal conservation initiatives. Due to the secure nature of the land tenure in Koiyaki, community members have a significant degree of power in the venture,

despite partnering with powerful capitalist businesses. Chapter three confirmed that communities see resultant income and employment as a form of development.

Economic benefits emanating from the conservancies are directed to individuals, as opposed to those targeting the community (chapters four and five) or livelihoods (chapter six). As a result, inequalities in the distribution of conservancy benefits, and therefore inequalities in the impact of the conservancies on development, are most prominent in those of an economic nature. Although receipt of the rental payments is determined by land allocation, the varying degrees of power (and thus participation) held by individuals also influence the quantity of economic benefits received. As commonly occurs in tourism fuelled development, elite members of the local communities maintain positions of authority and attain more benefits (De Kadt, 1990: 30), leading to an increased social stratification (Stronza, 2001). Elite members of society simultaneously own more land, due to influencing the land committee or buying land that comes up for sale, and have the greatest degree of participation by sitting on conservancy committees. Compounding this, it is these same individuals who are often the 'lucky' ones to have a camp on their land and thus receive the large additional bed-night fees. The accountability of these individuals to the wider group of conservancy members is also questionable. This study has confirmed that PES can disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of society creating or reinforcing power asymmetries amongst those involved (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara continues to be intense and conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 127).

These elite conservancy members receive the highest benefits, but unlike under previous models, they do not 'eat' all of the revenue. Through conservancies, ordinary landowners are now assured of directly receiving their lease payments. This finding is the fulfilment of the potential recognised by Osano et al. (2013) that by linking landowners directly to the market, and bypassing community level institutions, new neoliberal conservation initiatives in the Mara have the potential (and promise) to provide better incomes to those participating in comparison to the

former wildlife associations. In line with Wunder's (2008) finding, this revenue is having the greatest impact on poorer households.

Although the money earned through conservancies filters through households and surrounding villages to a certain extent, the exclusivity of economic conservancy benefits often leaves women and non-conservancy members feeling disenfranchised (FG 7, 14). Consequently, these individuals see little motivation to conserve wildlife or tolerate it on their non-conservancy land (ibid). In addition, these same stakeholders are rarely included in the decision-making process, even when this affects the community more generally. At present, non-conservancy members perceive that there is an increasing inequality between themselves and conservancy members. Whilst rental payments are exclusive to conservancy landowners and employment within conservancies has bias towards landowners, community projects and grazing access are inclusive of all living around the conservancies. This is not currently widely recognised.

The land use comparison analysis undertaken in this chapter has produced new and revealing findings. At present some landowners perceive that the land rental payments from conservancies are too low when compared to other options such as agriculture, and consequently deliberate changing land use. This analysis has shown that when a broader view of money entering the area as a result of the conservancies is adopted, as opposed to sole consideration of individual rental payments to the landowners, land use values converge. Recognition that not all of the land within the study site is suitable for wheat farming would push conservancies ahead of agriculture in terms of which land use produces the highest net returns. Further, quantification of the extent to which conservancies support pastoralism would increase this land use value further.

8 Conscious Capitalism

Having analysed grassroots interpretations of development by a myriad of stakeholders in chapter three, three key development indicators were identified. In the subsequent chapters I examined perceptions of the impact of the conservancies on these indicators within the study site. These were: community development initiatives targeting basic needs, pastoralism and economic implications. Although multiple problems and issues have been identified and discussed, each of these chapters found that the conservancies, which are a form of neoliberal capitalism, are perceived to be having a positive impact on local development by the majority of research participants. This discovery is significant, coinciding as it does with increasing global interest in a private-sector approach to development. The conclusion of this thesis is not purely an abstract product of analysis. The fact that the conservancies are businesses and yet are still acting as development agents was recognised by several stakeholders within the study site. For example, men in Enooronkon (FG 8) summarised:

The conservancy has appeared, and it is good. When drought comes we can access grass easier because of the conservation of grass in the conservancy. And also now because of the conservancy, people are no longer cutting down the trees there and as a result we get more rain... We are also now getting facilities in our villages and our sons are being employed... It is also a business to make money but it is helping everyone. So those are our opinions about the conservancy.

To assess the broader implications of this research, an analysis of the role of business in development is necessary. Neoliberal approaches can have negative consequences on development (such as those discussed by Chomsky, 1999; Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009). However, this thesis has demonstrated that when capitalism is conscious of its impact upon its surroundings, the role of business in development can be significant. This chapter will assess how this case study relates to current literature on conscious capitalism. This will include discussions on the concepts “inclusive capitalism”, “creating shared value”, and “Africapitalism”. Following this, literature pertaining to the expansion of the role of neoliberalism within the conservation field, and specifically public-private partnerships such as ecotourism ventures, will be analysed. This section expands upon the introduction to neoliberal conservation in chapter two and will highlight how the very essence of the conservancy concept has

evolved within a capitalist mind-set. I will then reflect on the implications of the findings resulting from this chapter. Specifically, I will consider lessons that can be learnt from this case study regarding the broader implications of using business as a development tool, highlighting the relative pros and cons of this approach. This chapter will address the third research question: assessing the bigger implications of this research. In terms of the literature framework in chapter two, this chapter will reflect upon criticisms of capitalism in light of the findings from this study and explore what lessons can be learnt for both inclusive capitalism and Africapitalism. Finally, it will explore the sustainability of the conservancy concept.

8.1 Private Sector Development

While shifting definitions of responsibility give the impression that corporate responsibility is a fad, the idea of companies having an obligation towards society has a long history (Blowfield, 2008). Despite this, in media and through campaigns, business went through a period of being portrayed as exploitative of poverty (ibid). Porter and Kramer (2011) believe that this problem has been exacerbated by policy choices in which the presumed trade-offs between economic efficiency and social progress have been institutionalised in an attempt to address social weaknesses at the expense of business.

Now, increasing attention is being paid to the idea of business as a solution (Blowfield, 2008). Organisations including NGOs, and international organisations such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are all promoting business strategies for development. The Millennium Development Goals also refer to a “global partnership for development” (MDG 8) in which there is a role for companies. This is being explicitly targeted by the UN Commission on the Private Sector and Development that UNDP launched in 2003 (UN News Centre, 2003). ‘Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business work for the Poor’ in 2004, ‘Growing Inclusive Markets’ in 2006 and ‘Business Call to Action’ in 2008 have all been UNDP initiatives focusing upon realising the potential power of business for development (UNDP, 2012).

There are a multitude of ways in which this potential power could be realised through alternative approaches to capitalism, but as with community-based conservation and community-based ecotourism, despite this optimism, doubts and criticisms remain (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006; Karnani, 2009: 38). The following section will examine some of the alternative approaches put forward and will examine the arguments presented by both advocates and critics. Where appropriate, the conservancies' case study will be brought in to support or counter the literature.

Porter and Kramer (2011: 75) state: "Not all profit is equal. Profits involving a social purpose represent a higher form of capitalism, one that creates a positive cycle of company and community prosperity". This statement proposes that there are multiple forms of capitalism, with some 'higher' than others but does not address why such alternative capitalisms may be required. Advocates of free markets having a singularly important role make the case that business cannot cause poverty if it acts rationally because the market is the most effective way of determining price and allocating resources (Blowfield, 2008: 7). Even if this is accepted, power asymmetries that favour certain business actors mean that there are wide disparities in how trade proceeds are distributed (Raynolds et al. 2004). Similarly, the power that some brand-owners hold as gatekeepers to lucrative consumer markets results in manufacturers having limited bargaining power over price or specification (Blowfield, 2008: 7). Consequently, labour becomes one of the few areas where management can influence profitability, with the result that long hours and abusive labour practices become common (ibid). In other words, whilst capitalism is theoretically a rational and efficient entity, power imbalances can result in inequitable benefit distribution, often with the poorest receiving the smallest share and the environment being damaged. More broadly, Harvey (2007) criticises neoliberalism for being a project to restore class dominance, channelling wealth from subordinate classes to dominant ones. It is this inequality that alternative capitalisms aim to address through a business-poverty agenda.

In many instances, perhaps the majority, poverty is still not a consideration in investment decisions and business actions, with corporations positioning themselves as bystanders (Blowfield, 2008: 6). Yet some companies are increasingly becoming

aware of the potential benefits. The business-poverty relationship is multi-faceted and there are several different approaches that have been suggested as to how capitalist businesses can influence development. These include minimising costs and bringing the poor into the market as consumers or producers, as well as more fundamental changes such as bringing a development focus into core business structures (ibid).

Over time, requirements for companies to mitigate damage and comply with human rights and environmental standards have strengthened and become part of normal operations (Ashley, 2009). This focus has been to ‘do no harm’ and ‘clean up damage’ rather than create new value (ibid). Corporate responsibility programs reacting to external pressures have largely emerged to improve firms’ reputations and are treated as a necessary expense. Anything more is seen as an irresponsible use of shareholders’ money (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Kramer and Kania (2006) describe the distinction between these two approaches as ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ corporate responsibility. Defensive strategies are intended to address problems of the business’ own making, for example by protecting its reputation and reducing its legal liabilities (ibid). In contrast, offensive strategies involve companies investing their resources and competencies either alone or in partnership with others in initiatives (ibid). Examples of offensive strategies are funding the construction of a local school or promoting the use of local entrepreneurs as suppliers.

Blowfield (2008: 2) makes another distinction within the business-development nexus and divides business’ influence into being a development tool, or a development agent. When business acts as a development tool (ibid), which can also be termed business-in-development (Amaeshi, 2014), positive outcomes such as job and wealth creation and the satisfaction of basic needs such as goods and services can be achieved. Business acting as a tool does not hold itself accountable for causing, preventing or alleviating poverty (Blowfield, 2008: 2). In contrast, business acting as a development agent (ibid), or business-for-development (Amaeshi, 2014), takes conscious intentional actions because of poverty. Expanding on this, Blowfield (2008: 14) notes:

This is not simply a restatement of the centrality of business to the capitalist economy as a source of employment, goods and services, and wealth. Rather it

is the belief that business can consciously invest in ways that are simultaneously commercially viable and beneficial to the poor.

Blowfield (ibid: 15) argues that it is important to distinguish between companies that serve the poor (development tools) and ones that factor poverty alleviation outcomes into their decisions and strategies (development agents). This is because he advocates that financial performance ultimately should be a less important indicator than social outcomes (ibid). This is not to say that companies should approach poverty as a social enterprise where profits are unimportant (ibid). To be profitable can require unconventional business models in such terms as understanding the market; designing products; and the collaborations that are required (ibid). There are various instances whereby companies collaborate with NGOs to identify needs and deliver products (ibid), as will be discussed in more detail shortly. Actions undertaken by the conservancies fall into the category of business acting as a development agent, therefore this aspect is of most interest within this thesis.

The intention of inclusive business is that through purposeful action, the business model can be adapted, not just to avoid damage, but to unleash greater development impacts while still being driven by commerce (Ashley, 2009: 7). The aim is to have a greater developmental impact than conventional corporate social responsibility (CSR) (ibid). Although the term CSR is sometimes used to encompass more comprehensive approaches, Ashley (ibid: 5) and Porter and Kramer (2011) argue that altering core business practice differs from CSR. Their rationale of this is that the latter is widely considered an optional add-on – a reaction to external pressure – which is not fundamental to the business and can be divorced entirely from day-to-day activities (ibid). Although the annual report of almost every large company claims its mission is to serve some larger social purpose besides making profits (Karnani, 2009: 41), Crook's article on CSR in *The Economist* concluded that for most large public companies, "CSR is little more than a cosmetic treatment" (2005: 5).

8.1.1 Creating Shared Value

Creating Shared Value (CSV) is a concept created by Porter and Kramer (2011) which has similarities with CSR, but also significant differences. Simply put, it can be seen to be a more strategic approach to CSR in which initiatives are profit

maximising as well as socially beneficial (ibid). The logic behind the commitment to communities incorporated in CSV is recognition that societal needs, not just conventional economic needs, define markets (ibid). In spite of this self-interest approach, Porter and Kramer advocate for CSV over CSR as they purport: “companies acting as businesses, not charitable donors, are the most powerful force for addressing the pressing issues [societies] face” (ibid: 2). As such, whilst CSR is widely viewed as an optional add-on to businesses, CSV represents a more inclusive business approach in search of the evasive win-win scenario. Again, this approach of undertaking philanthropy to directly support business interests is not new and can be dated back to the great industrial philanthropists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Sawaya, 2008).

General motivators for companies to adopt inclusive business approaches include: improving reputations and gaining competitive advantage, market growth, and/or strong localised supply chains (Ashley, 2009: 6). This is undertaken so long as the costs, which are mainly short-term, can be outweighed by the benefits, which are largely long-term (ibid). Looking specifically at whether businesses will take on a development agent role, Blowfield (2008) presents three basic conditions that dictate the likelihood of action. First, business is more likely to act when poverty is associated with an identifiable risk to the company or industry, including risks to reputations, production, or the availability of commodities. An example of this is Cadbury’s Cocoa Partnership aimed at preventing long-term shortages in the commodity. This initiative involved a total investment of £45 million (\$76 million) over 10 years to secure the social and environmental sustainability of around one million cocoa farmers and their communities in Ghana, Indonesia and the Caribbean (ibid: 12-13). The second condition is that business is more likely to act when poverty offers a favourable return on investment (ibid). For example Safaricom¹⁰⁰ recognised the need of migrant workers to remit money home and so launched the

¹⁰⁰ Formed in 1997, Safaricom is the leading mobile phone network provider in Kenya. It is a subsidiary of Telkom Kenya and the UK’s Vodafone Group Plc who own 40% and have the management responsibility for the company.

M-Pesa mobile phone money transfer scheme¹⁰¹ in Kenya as a way of providing a service to an under-served market (ibid: 16). The third condition notes that business is more likely to act when poverty is associated with inefficiency, exemplified by education programmes of companies such as Anglo American and Cisco Systems (ibid: 19).

Blowfield suggests that development lying outside the scope of these three conditions is unlikely to be addressed by business overtly (ibid: 19-20). This highlights one of the key disadvantages to using business for development, a complexity which advocates often overlook: it is only realistic under certain conditions. Businesses will only become a development agent and enter the world of inclusive capitalism if they are to benefit by doing so. Further, within each industry sector there are additional factors limiting the potential reach of this development approach. For example, there are only certain locations viable as successful tourist destinations. This restricts the locations able to capture any resultant benefits from this industry. Yet such limitations do not prevent positive outcomes accruing when these criteria are met.

The conservancies meet all three of the development agent conditions stated by Blowfield, to a greater or lesser extent. For example, low development levels around the conservancies restrict camps from employing locally (which is desired by community members, especially landowners). Therefore, it is the interest of the camps to support initiatives such as Koiyaki Guiding School which enhances local social capital. It could also be argued that the lease agreement with the conservancy landowners, for which they receive the monthly payments, represents a favourable return on investment. Blowfield's first condition is the most significant in this case study; a lack of development is a major risk for the tourism partners. Chapters four and five highlighted the fact that there is an expectation for conservancies to hold a degree of responsibility for developing the area. This is through three main routes: community initiatives, grazing schemes and economic advancement. Discontentment

¹⁰¹ M-Pesa is the result of DFID funded research that highlighted the need for a system whereby money can be transferred by mobile phones in Africa. The idea was then introduced to Vodafone who had been discussing similar microfinance projects.

within local communities has the potential to remove the commodities – land and wildlife – upon which the conservancies depend.

8.1.2 Africapitalism

Another possible motivating factor for businesses to give greater consideration to the environment and societies in which they function, is patriotism and a resurgence of the importance of place in this globalised world. At a conference in Nairobi in December 2011 the Nigerian economist Tony Elumelu introduced the term ‘Africapitalism’ (All Africa, 2011). In the United Kingdom, this concept has been popularised by two articles in *The Guardian* by Afua Hirsch (2013) and Kenneth Amaeshi (2013). Elumelu insists that Africapitalism is not capitalism with an African twist, but rather “an economic philosophy that embodies the private sector’s commitment to the economic transformation of Africa through investments that generate both economic prosperity and social wealth” (cited by Amaeshi, 2013). Africapitalism does not ask businesses to be philanthropists. As with other inclusive capitalism approaches, although the long-term investments should be beneficial for the locale by creating social wealth, they also stimulate profit for the investors.

Capitalism encounters different circumstances around the world, and business practices in Africa differ from those in other locations (Elumelu, 2013: 12). In China there is limited private equity ownership, while family-run multi-national conglomerates dominate the business landscape in India and Korea (ibid). In Africa there are new challenges or opportunities such as increasing populations, labour pools, spending power and accelerating reforms which create various demands (ibid). Partly as a result of striving to meet these challenges, Africa has been the location of some of the most advanced concepts guiding the development of global business today such as the ‘double bottom line’¹⁰² and Porter and Kramer’s CSV (ibid).

Amaeshi (2013) proposes that the emotive power of Africapitalism is not necessarily a new phenomenon, as economic patriotism and nationalism played significant roles in the rebuilding of Western Europe following World War II, as well as in contemporary China. He asserts that as economic development is both a rational and

¹⁰² While all businesses have a conventional bottom line to measure their fiscal performance, enterprises that seek a second bottom line look to measure their performance also in terms of positive social impact.

an emotional project it is not surprising that there is a resurgence of sentiments in economics and finance in the wake of the recent global financial crisis (ibid). Elumelu (2012) stresses that the term ‘African private sector’ does not necessarily mean African indigeneness, and he urges all entrepreneurs and investors who do business in Africa to come together and show greater commitment to the economic transformation of the continent. Despite this, all case studies of Africapitalism documented to date (see Elumelu, 2013; Linnay, 2013) are undertaken by nationals of the country where the business is undertaken.

The case study of the Mara Conservancies augments discussions on Africapitalism by showing African and non-African investors working together with a shared commitment to undertake business responsibly. This multi-national approach to Africapitalism conforms to Elumelu’s ideals in a way that other case studies to date do not. Instead of making distinctions along nationality lines, it is affinity with the locale that appears to be the influencing factor amongst tourism partners, with regard to how they perceive the developmental responsibility of their businesses. Tourism partners who have grown up in the Mara or who have either been visiting the area for a long time or spent a long time there over a shorter period,¹⁰³ appear to be the most committed to ensuring that the conservancies are integrated within surrounding communities and have a positive impact. To a large extent this may be because they recognise the potential threat brought by unsatisfied community members. In contrast, instead of explaining how involvement in development is an integral part of the conservancy approach, those affiliated with new tourism partners (including I 83) who do not have a close affinity to the area used terms such as CSR when discussing their interaction with communities.

Amaeshi (2013) anticipates that Africapitalism embodying an Africa-consciousness, a form of reimagined Afrocentricism which places the interests of Africa and Africans at the epicentre of business decisions, will guide Africa's renaissance. The inclusion of Africonsconsciousness within capitalism, represented by Africapitalism, helps to neutralise the onslaught of globalisation (ibid). The key distinction between Africapitalism and more general forms of conscious capitalism is the importance of

¹⁰³ It is important to note that growing up in the area or visiting it frequently does not indicate that these individuals are Kenyan, or even African citizens.

place. Approaches and actions are specifically adapted to the locale and the aim is to meet the genuine development needs of African people within that specific context, regardless of the nationality of the business decision-maker.

Returning to the broad remit of alternative approaches to capitalism, there is a body of thinking that equates the opportunity to engage in free market activity with ethical outcomes (see Easterly, 2006; Sachs, 2006). From this have flowed various attempts to encourage businesses to help the poor by showing there is a positive business case to be had from operating at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’¹⁰⁴ (BoP) (McFalls, 2007; Blowfield and Dolan, 2010: 144). Prahalad’s book *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits* urges the poor to be recognised as “resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers” (Prahalad, 2009: 25).

8.1.3 Bottom of the Pyramid

Bottom of the Pyramid approaches tend to blur the distinction made by Blowfield (2008) between business as a development tool and as a development agent. Businesses tapping into the purchasing power at the bottom of the pyramid would seem to equate to the development tool notion, as it implies that the poor represent a rational, if overlooked, business opportunity (ibid: 14). However, BoP advocates argue that these approaches are an example of business as a development agent, because “by meeting the needs of the poor, business can increase their productivity and incomes, and be an engine of empowerment, not least by allowing them to enter into the formal economy” (ibid). In other words, they argue that by selling to the poor, companies can help eradicate poverty. This proposition is not universally accepted. Karnani (2009: 40) argues that poor people do not necessarily do or want what is truly in their best interests, for example, spending available cash on impulse purchases (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010) or alleviating short-term suffering or stress through alcohol and tobacco at the expense of economic prosperity in the long-term (Karnani, 2009: 41). Karnani (ibid: 43) also believes that the ability of the poor to be entrepreneurs, which is the other aspect of the BoP approach, has been romanticised; most people do not have the skills, vision,

¹⁰⁴ Bottom or base of the pyramid (BoP) refers to the largest but poorest socio-economic group of the global society.

creativity and persistence to be an entrepreneur (ibid). Instead of bringing the poor into the market as consumers, he advocates focusing on them being producers (Karnani, 2007; Karnani, 2009). He expands:

This is not to deny that free markets can help reduce poverty. In fact, the private sector must play a critical role... The best way to alleviate poverty is to raise the real income of the poor by creating opportunities for steady employment and reasonable wages. Firms can do this by creating more employment opportunities in labour-intensive industries and investing in upgrading the skills and productivity of poor people, thus increasing their income potential (2009: 43).

Ansari et al. (2012) conclude that poverty alleviation is not fundamentally irreconcilable with enterprise-based solutions, but assert that it needs to be more community-centric and concentrate on building capacities within BoP communities. Simanis, Hart et al. (2008) acted upon this collaborative approach, focusing on the poor as business partners and innovators, rather than potential consumers or producers, and developed the 'Base of the Pyramid Protocol'. This is an entrepreneurial process that guides companies in development business partnerships with income-poor communities in order to co-create businesses and markets that mutually benefit both the companies and the communities (ibid).

Within the case study, the conservancies are not selling a product to poor consumers. It could be argued that the Maasai communities are producers, in that many are employed by or lease their land to conservancies which in turn produce the tourism commodity. However, it is this final BoP collaborative approach which has the most similarities with the conservancy concept under investigation.

These three different recommended approaches for poverty alleviation within the broader BoP concept are the result of differing interpretations of what poverty is, and thus how it can be addressed through development. The BoP approach proposed by Prahalad advocates the inclusion of the poor within the market system as consumers and entrepreneurs. This differs from that offered by Karnani. He instead pushes for the need to focus on the poor as producers, to enable the creation of income through employment and income-earning opportunities. The first approach is an attempt to undertake development through consumerism and the resultant price reductions, whereas the latter focuses upon increasing incomes and education levels. Ansari et

al. (2012: 834) push for a partnership style. This is in recognition that Sen's freedom and capability approach to development is currently lacking from the BoP approach. Consequently, there is a continued reliance on traditional economic remedies for poverty alleviation and community wellbeing (ibid).

This multiplicity of approaches extends beyond the BoP concept. Chapter three detailed that any work within the 'development' field involves the necessity of defining this socially constructed, value-laden term. In recognition of this, Blowfield (2008: 5) notes that the role of business looks different if the rights-based, empowerment, or neoliberal elements of development are emphasised. This distinction that varying business responses are dependent on differing ideas of development is often blurred in business-poverty discussions (ibid). Failure to recognise that development is a socially constructed concept that differs between individuals and organisations as well as over time can lead to unwarranted criticism or praise of the private sector's role, depending on how it relates to the individual's own interpretation of development (Bond, 2006). For example, if corporations make decisions about how to address development without including the local communities, the actions undertaken may meet their own definition of development but not that of community members.

It is for this reason that stakeholders' development conceptualisations were explored as part of this research project. Despite the heterogeneity of these interpretations, it was possible to identify and assess three key indicators against the conservancies' actions. Although those who interpret development differently may disagree with some of the conclusions, my intention (as outlined in chapter two and made explicit in the research questions) is to assess the extent to which the conservancies are an agent for development, from the perspective of the stakeholders within the study site, especially the local communities.

8.1.4 Partnership Approach

As noted, in recent years there has been a push for business to adopt a collaborative partnership approach rather than to think of the poor as purely consumers or producers. These new forms of engagement are unleashing synergies between profit-driven and social-driven institutions resulting in NGOs and governments entering

into an array of new partnerships with corporates (Ashley, 2009: 7). For this, the philanthropist Bill Gates (2008 cited by Ashley 2009: 7) favours the term ‘creative capitalism’:

The challenge is to design a system where market incentives, including profits and recognition, drive the change. I like to call this new systems creative capitalism – an approach where governments, businesses and non-profits work together to stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases the world’s inequities.

Given that companies are rarely sufficiently equipped or specialised to undertake development work, collaborations with NGOs can increase effectiveness and contribute the on-the-ground implementation capacity (ibid, Prieto-Carrón et al., 2006: 984). Governments can create incentives for inclusive businesses (Ashley, 2009: 7). In recognition of the value that they can bring each other, mutual suspicion is beginning to be replaced by relationships between governments, businesses and NGOs (ibid). This three-way partnership approach mirrors that of neoliberal conservation (as discussed in chapter two) but, instead of partnering with individuals such as landowners, businesses and NGOs work together with the state.

In *The Poverty of Capitalism* (2013), Hilary condemns NGOs for choosing to cosy up to corporations and governments as it reduces their ability to be critics, consciences and routes for social feedback. Further, he argues that corporations have been able to point to their partnerships with respectable NGOs as a means of dismissing criticisms (ibid). Yet Blowfield (2008: 23-4) points out that this informal regulation by NGOs can be important because although there are pressures, companies are under no formal compulsion to consciously manage their relationship with society and the environment. Also, without any systems of accountability in place, corporations may be able to pick and choose what constitutes societal good, as well as appropriating development approaches for their own interests such as commercial competitiveness (ibid). Prieto-Carrón et al. (2006: 985-986) calls for more formal regulation¹⁰⁵ of such collaborations, otherwise:

The emphasis on multi-stakeholder dialogues and public-private partnerships may result in institutional capture or co-option of governments, NGOs or

¹⁰⁵ The issue of regulation and accountability in inclusive business practices will be expanded upon shortly.

indeed the United Nations, all of which may then consciously or unconsciously come to represent the private company interests instead of broader public interests.

Hilary (2013) charts how numerous attempts to regulate and hold transnational corporations to account have given way to voluntary initiatives and CSR projects instead. He argues that rather than constraining capital and ensuring good working conditions for workers, CSR actually legitimises current practices of exploitation (ibid: 79). Bieler (2013) retorts that Hilary is being too optimistic regarding potential moves beyond capitalism, and questions whether it is actually being challenged.

Those, such as Hilary, who fundamentally disagree with capitalism, are unlikely to ever support alternative approaches within the notion. However, as Bieler (2013) implies, at present a total move beyond capitalism is unrealistic. This relates back to chapter three where neoliberal approaches to development, and more specifically sustainable development, were considered and critiqued. It is easy to make the criticism that the neoliberal approaches to development do no more than tinker at the margin of the economic system which caused the problem, and the same can be said of inclusive forms of capitalism. Yet to realists, something viable is better than unrealistic theoretical dreams. Blowfield (2004: 67) notes that the starting point for any debate on how business relates to the wider society is to consider whether we accept the social, moral and economic dimension of global capitalism. For those who do accept this, attempts can be made to modify and improve the nature of capitalism and, more specifically, the relationship between businesses and the poor. To Harrison (2001: 40):

the argument is no longer about the relative merits of capitalism or socialism, but about what kind of capitalism is most appropriate for ‘development’ and how much political control is required to expedite the process.

Business’ engagement in development does not require a radical shift (Blowfield, 2008: 24). As the business-poverty framework shows, it can lead companies to rethink their relationships without undermining them (ibid). It may be harder to argue that business might co-opt development than make the case that business as a development agent mirrors the established norms of the predominant development discourse (ibid).

Reflecting on the criticisms presented by Hilary regarding the relationships between businesses and NGOs, the independence of the conservancy-affiliated organisations comes into question. For example, to what extent are they a function of the marketing departments of the tourism partners' companies? Within this case study there are varying degrees of affiliation. For example, Kicheche Community Trust is managed by the wife of a co-owner of Kicheche Camps, and Basecamp Foundation is the sister organisation to its commercial entity Basecamp Explorer, with the former owning shares in the latter. Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust is more independent as it has its own board which has minimal representation and control by tourism partners, despite their financial support.

One way in which the camps fundraise for their partner trust or foundation is through market-based philanthropy approaches such as cause-related marketing or other forms of consumptive philanthropy (approaches discussed by Holmes, 2012). This is where the consumption of certain goods is linked to a philanthropic donation in recognition of the market as a powerful means to solve the world's problems (ibid). The \$5 donation made on behalf of each OMC client is an example of this, as the consumption of staying at a camp in OMC is linked to a philanthropic donation to OOMT. Žižek (2009: 35) sees such actions as a component of 'cultural capitalism' whereby capitalism produces goods whose consumption is claimed to bring deeper purpose and meaning to life. In other words, to do good and make capitalism responsible, with the effect of reducing discontent with capitalism and allowing its continuation (ibid).

It is important to question whether this relationship with commercial entities is necessarily negative. Critics may argue that the independence of development organisations is vital to ensure that the greatest needs are targeted as opposed to initiatives that are the most strategic commercially by being cheap, simple to undertake and most effective in communication and marketing. However, as discussed in the conclusion of chapter five, with more inclusive participation ensuring that the voices of civil society are heard, communities' needs could be prioritised above those of the funders. Although this is dependent upon the communities having the power to demand this, whether via a concrete partnership

agreement or a bargaining chip such as secure land tenure. Ansari et al. concur that: “BoP empowerment can only occur when businesses and governments include communities as equal partners within a collaborative process of co-evolution” (2012: 833).

It could also be argued that ‘meeting the greatest needs’ and solving development is not the responsibility of business. As discussed in chapter four, the majority of stakeholders stated that development should be undertaken by the state. But as this is not seen to be happening by residents, these expectations are then transferred onto other actors present and active in the area. Within partnerships, these communities can push their partners for more and more. From the business perspective, regardless of the commitment to responsible inclusive capitalist approaches, there will be limits as to how far a business can go and the resources that it can put towards development. Expectations of NGOs and communities may exceed beyond these limited resources within companies. Similarly, there are limits to the degree to which livestock can be incorporated into the conservancies before they have too large an impact on the product for the tourism partners to accept. Further, corporations may have unrealistic expectations regarding the potential benefits of inclusive business approaches (McFalls, 2007).

With businesses entering the development push, how far should they go? And who decides this? As concluded in chapter five, the failure to bring these expectations in line with each other can lead to misunderstandings and negative perceptions of efforts by businesses if they fail to meet the anticipated outcomes. However, it is important to note that the criticisms of community projects in chapter five were not based on insufficient resource allocation but rather inefficient allocation and limited comprehensive community involvement, matters that are much more easily addressed.

This issue of who, within the heterogeneous entity of ‘community’, is participating and benefiting has been largely ignored within inclusive business discussions. This research, concurring with other tourism studies (including Brohman, 1996; Goodwin, 1998; Walpole and Goodwin, 2001; Thompson and Homewood, 2002), found that community representation and participation in meetings is almost exclusively by

male community leaders. Also, there is evidence of their benefiting disproportionately by utilising the power given by conservancies for their own benefit, and financially, through camp bed night fees. As their voices are the only ones regularly heard by the NGOs and businesses within the partnerships, only their opinions and perceived needs are heard. This problem is not exclusive to inclusive capitalism approaches, as aid and development in general can be elite-captured, particularly those initiatives that are community-based (Platteau, 2004).

8.1.5 Transparency and Accountability

Although some companies are mindful of poverty, at present the conditions under which business engages in poverty alleviation are rooted in self-interest. There is a narrow perspective on what they are to be accountable for and to whom; incentives to be more rigorous are lacking (Blowfield, 2008: 27). There are two key ways in which accountability can occur. The first is the creation and enforcement of binding international regulations and national legislations which hold companies to account for their practices overseas (Blowfield, 2004: 66). The second is a variety of pressures contributing to voluntary standards which emerge as a 'sector conditioned morality' (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006). Linking back to the previous discussion on balancing expectations, this notion reflects a minimum level of expectation from civil society on the one hand, and a ceiling level acceptable to an industry on the other (ibid). Blowfield (2008: 27-8) emphasises the importance of accountability as without it:

there will always be a randomness and unpredictability to business' interpretation of its responsibilities, leaving open the possibility that for all of the justification for business to be a development agent, it will remain a development maverick.

Blowfield (2004: 67) and Responsible BoP (2012) suggest that critics, such as Christian Aid, are not against capitalist involvement in development *per se*, but are concerned to see increased regulation, transparency and accountability. For example, although Karnani (2009: 40) criticises a focus on the poor as consumers, he does advocate the use of the free market system for development. His condition for this is that states should impose some limits on markets to prevent the exploitation of the poor and provide basic services such as infrastructure, public health and education.

Again this emphasises that business cannot be expected to solve development issues alone.

As a result of minimal independent impact assessments of inclusive business practices: “to date success has been measured in terms of the instrumental benefit for companies, not the developmental benefit for communities” (Blowfield, 2008: 25). Countering this, in recent years there has been a proliferation of accreditation schemes. These include the Global Reporting Initiative, AccountAbility, Accounting for Sustainability, The B Team, B Corp and the Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS). These organisations aim to redefine success in business (B Corps, 2014) and facilitate responsible investing (GIIRS, 2012). Tourism partners within the conservancies are beginning to gain certification from these organisations. Asilia Africa, for example, is in receipt of a high rating from both the GIIRS and B Corp (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2014).

On a smaller scale, whilst Blowfield (2008: 25) believes that the poor may participate but do not have the power to hold others to account for the outcomes, this case study suggests that given the correct context, ‘the poor’ can hold a significant amount of power. The case study of the conservancies presented in this thesis has shown that landowners and surrounding communities do have some power in holding the conservancies and their affiliates to account. Conservancy landowners are an indispensable partner within the conservancy concept, and more broadly, contentment within neighbouring communities is essential. Further, the Maasai Mara is such an iconic product,¹⁰⁶ especially when it comes to marketing, that tourism partners are less able to shift to another area where the communities may have fewer demands. In light of this, landowners have been able to negotiate lease agreements and the communities continually request assistance with development initiatives and grazing access. Although power imbalances between the community representatives and the tourism partners undoubtedly remain, a certain degree of accountability is being achieved. If this can be maintained and enhanced, communities having

¹⁰⁶ The Maasai Mara is termed a product here because the name of the location is packaged as a commodity to sell to the tourists. This product includes the landscape, wildlife and the Maasai people and stereotypical interpretations of their culture. It has been manufactured and then repackaged over the decades.

sufficient power to hold the corporations accountable for their actions can go a long way to address the regulatory problems that are the most frequently cited criticism of inclusive capitalism.

Furthermore, businesses can push their competitors to advance the inclusivity of their business approach. If socially orientated entrepreneurs find a viable way to demonstrate social returns, they may influence other competing companies that limit their accountability to internal rationalisation (Blowfield, 2008: 27). This can be seen within the case study as the way in which, if one tourism partner decides to start an additional initiative, for example by taking school children on game drives, others quickly follow suit.

The aim of adopting an inclusive capitalism approach is to reduce the negative and increase the positive impacts emanating from a business. The influx of responsible businesses within the Mara has increased the amount of money entering development work locally, both directly and also through the creation of new NGOs that funnel both internal and external donations. Yet business actions are not primarily an approach to development, and it is unsurprising if it has shortcomings in this regard (Blowfield, 2008). Perhaps the involvement of the private sector should be seen as an addition to the development agenda, rather than a replacement.

As evidenced in this chapter, there has been a proliferation of terminology referring to private sector involvement in businesses, and there is a wide variety of ways in which it is being approached. The conservancies within the study site are an example of inclusive capitalism, and they are acting as development agents. The conformation of this case study to these notions is even stronger given their lack of recognition of issues such as elite capture or the evenness of benefit distribution. Whilst companies could argue that their responsibility is to deliver benefits and should not concern themselves with its distribution, if a long and fruitful partnership with the beneficiaries is desired these issues must be given careful consideration.

Newell and Frynas (2007) point out that by understanding any shortcomings we can ask how they can be overcome and thus in turn begin to answer questions about what kind of development agent business could be. By recognising the problems brought

by a lack of rigorous accountability, which enables companies to make claim without any independent verification, solutions are beginning to emerge in the form of global accreditation schemes. Ecotourism has faced similar criticisms: a lack of agreement regarding its definition and a lack of accreditation resulted in green-washing, making the concept tokenistic (Honey, 2002). Here also, sector specific certification schemes now enable consumers to make informed decisions. It has also been shown that in certain contexts, the poor themselves can hold businesses to their responsibilities – if these can be agreed upon and if the poor have sufficient power. There are still uncertainties. For example, it is unknown how the movement towards inclusive business will be influenced by the influx of foreign direct investment from countries such as China and India and the different types of relationships that may emerge as a result (Blowfield, 2008: 27; Kolk et al., 2013).

8.2 Neoliberal Conservation

Development is not the only notion integrated within the conservancy concept that is being influenced by capitalist ideals and approaches. As outlined in chapter two, the conservancies are a public-private partnership, developed as part of the neoliberalisation of nature, with conservation at its heart. This section will build upon the introduction to neoliberal conservation from the beginning of the thesis, examine how it relates to conscious capitalist approaches for development, and assess how the findings within this thesis relate to the concept.

Within the study site, businesses are attempting to bring development to the local communities as well as financing conservation. To those who include environmental aspects within their definition of development,¹⁰⁷ these two components may be inseparable. To others they are contradictory. Just as recognising the potential in the bottom of the pyramid exemplifies capitalist expansion by providing new areas for money making, conservation is also providing new areas within which money can be made (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Holmes, 2012).

The introduction of new actors in environmental governance through neoliberal approaches to conservation reduces the responsibility of the state and increases that

¹⁰⁷ As discussed in chapter three, the notion of sustainable development was particularly popular amongst tourism partners, others in the tourism industry and NGOs.

of private individuals and civil society (Holmes, 2012: 192). This “private indirect government” (Mbembe, 2001) results in “the privatisation of sovereignty” (Ferguson, 2006) within which sovereignty becomes highly decentralised and fragmented (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 439). As discussed in chapter four, whilst Ferguson (1994) concludes that state involvement in development intervention in Lesotho increases its bureaucratic state power, the minimal role of the state in development within the study site potentially represents a reduction in state power, sovereignty and legitimacy. Considering that the conservancies and their affiliated organisations are widely perceived to be the main development actors, this power, sovereignty and legitimacy is partially transferring to these organisations. As control over both conservation and development interventions are transferred from the state to private entities through the conservancies, this privatisation of sovereignty is compounded.

By emphasising the financial value of land and carefully calculating the putative losses from not harming the environment, easements represent a clearly neoliberal conservation strategy of developing new ways of financially valuing nature and using market mechanisms to conserve it (Morris, 2008). If calculated accurately, leasing land can be a rational business decision, considering the compensation received as well as the likely increase in land value (Holmes, 2012: 192). If money can be earned by those leasing the land through conservation-friendly practices, such as conservancies, the payment of easements to landowners can also be a rational business decision.

In a diversion from rational business decisions and market principles, I have stressed throughout this thesis that in spite of compensation in the form of direct payments and social community projects, the traditional livelihood of pastoralism remains critically important to communities within the study site. In several instances it was implied by community members that no amount of money would compensate for the loss of this livelihood. Igoe and Croucher (2007) documented a similar case in Tanzania where local people were being targeted for conservation easements in exchange for leaving their land open for wildlife, but the easements could not adequately compensate people who depended on access to that land for their livelihood. This exemplifies McAfee’s (2012) argument that theoretical claims

underpinning ideas such as ‘opportunity costs’ are only possible through the faulty assumption that the values of ecosystem services can be reduced to fungible quantities by means of market or quasi-market pricing. As has been seen in this thesis, particularly in chapters six and seven, in some instances the value of ecosystem services is difficult, if not impossible, to calculate. The sustained importance of some cultural aspects, such as pastoralism, to the Maasai extends beyond economic logic. In such instances, the power dynamics within the partnership become critical so that the importance of non-economic dimensions, such as local livelihoods, can be incorporated into the structure. An example of this is the development of grazing schemes within the study site. In other words:

Market-driven approaches to conservation could work if local people hold exclusive rights to their land and the capacity to negotiate directly and effectively with potential investors. Of course in such cases, they would also be free to withhold their land from business ventures as well as choosing not to make it available for biodiversity conservation (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 446).

Many of the criticisms faced by neoliberal conservation directly mirror those previously discussed in relation to business’ involvement in development, and many reflect criticisms of capitalist approaches more generally. Just as Hilary (2013) criticised the partnering of NGOs and corporations, Holmes (2012: 193) is concerned about the involvement of business people on the boards of environmental NGOs. He fears that this may allow them to define conservation in ways which are not just friendly to capitalism generally, but also to their companies in particular (*ibid*). Similarly, Edwards (2008) and Holmes (2012: 189) suggest that the positive sheen gained by capitalist actors involving themselves with good causes may also distract from the negative consequences of capitalism, or make them seem justifiable. In addition, as philanthropists will choose causes, approaches and locations that reflect their own personal interests and ideologies rather than consider wider visions of societal need, creating “private visions of public good” (Raddon, 2008: 38).

Neoliberal conservation, like neoliberalism, is fundamentally an uneven project and applied with differential rigour across space (Brockington and Duffy, 2010: 479). Due to the logics of neoliberalism and capitalism, certain places are more desirable than others. In the context of conservation, those with structures which encourage

conservation enterprise (such as clear property rights or a rolled-back state) and those containing nature which is more amenable to being transformed into a commodity, are particularly desirable (Holmes, 2012: 201). Ecosystems like savannahs with tourist-popular endangered animals are favoured over environmentally important, but less commercially appealing, areas such as mangroves. Despite this recognition of the differential impact that neoliberal conservation can have upon place, there is not yet any consideration of the effect of place on neoliberalism. Given the globalised nature of the world this may seem unimportant, but with the introduction of Africapitalism bringing geographical and patriotic elements into business-development discussions, this gap within neoliberal conservation literature is noteworthy.

In conclusion, whilst Brockington and Duffy (2010: 481) see chasms opening up between the positive rhetoric of neoliberal conservation and its actually existing consequences, this thesis has presented a case study in which market solutions to conservation are being carried out. It is not suggested that the Mara Conservancies are working perfectly, and the concluding chapter will examine many threats to their sustainability, but at present they do exemplify a working case study whereby conservation is self-supporting as the result of a neoliberal approach. As discussed, even within the context of neoliberal conservation, it is not always possible to rely solely on economic assessments of environmental services, especially when culturally emotive livelihoods such as pastoralism are involved. It is only with the participation of the local communities and the inclusion of non-monetary factors that fruitful partnerships can be worked towards.

The bottom line is that neither protectionist conservation nor neoliberal economic development *needs to benefit the rural poor* in order to thrive (Brockington 2003: emphasis in original). This is where environmentally and socially responsible businesses can step in and expand capitalism into new areas where there is money to be made. Simultaneously, conservationists are adopting capitalist strategies, motives and structures as the best way to get things done in a capitalist world (Holmes, 2012: 200). Neoliberal conservation aims to move beyond the world of win-win solutions to a world of win-win-win-win-win-win-win solutions that benefit: corporate

investors, national economies, biodiversity, local people, western consumers, development agencies, and the conservation organisations that receive funding from those agencies to undertake large interventions (Grandia, 2007). Despite this aim, as with development, business cannot be expected to be solely responsible for conservation. As has been shown, any impact of business on conservation will be uneven geographically and may not necessarily target the greatest environmental crises. But this is not to say that neoliberalism cannot be beneficial for conservation in certain contexts, as the conservancies demonstrate.

8.3 Relative Benefits of Business' Involvement in Development

This chapter introduced inclusive capitalism and its related concepts and then highlighted similarities with neoliberal conservation approaches. The relative costs and benefits of using capitalism to meet development goals, as opposed to more conventional means, will now be considered. This will begin with an overview of the rationale behind favouring private sector involvement on an international and national scale, before focusing down to the study site.

A change occurred in the 1980s in which thinking moved away from the central role of the state in development (Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002: 1). NGOs filled this void but the involvement of the private sector has increasingly come to be seen as more efficient, productive and conducive to economic dynamism (ibid). Critics of foreign aid programmes have long argued that the continuation of poverty reflects government failure (Boone, 1996), advocating the need for alternative approaches. Harrison (2001: 41) suggests this governmental failure may be due to governments in many developing countries lacking the competency to carry out some policies, however well thought out they may be. This may be the result of poorly developed markets or infrastructures, a lack of highly skilled human resources, or corruption within state functionaries (ibid). For example, in testing predictions for aid effectiveness, Boone (1996) finds that international aid given directly to states does not significantly increase investment, nor benefit the poor (as measured by improvements in human development indicators); it does, however, increase the size of the government.

This declining confidence in the state as a development agent has coincided with a growth in private investment. Deregulation, the central role of business in economic growth, and private sector delivery of development functions (including utilities, health and education), have all served to broaden the array of expectations society has of business (Blowfield, 2008: 3). According to Schulpen and Gibbon (2002: 1), the general consensus in development thinking follows a relatively simple logic:

- (a) poverty reduction is the main objective of development;
- (b) central to development is economic growth;
- (c) economic growth is best achieved through the private sector; and
- (d) government has a role to play in making the private sector flourish and ensuring that growth contributes to poverty reduction.

As point (d) emphasises, despite neoliberal approaches promoting the private sector as an integral part of development strategies, the government still has a central role to play in the process (Harrison, 2001: 40; Briedenhann and Wickens, 2004: 78; Arthur, 2006). It is charged with creating a more enabling environment for private businesses but also providing businesses with support and protection (ibid).

Kenyan policies have not been particularly supportive of initiatives like conservancies that are proliferating across the country. Conservancies are now acknowledged as a land use and form of conservation by the 2013 Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, but the government continue to charge stamp duty,¹⁰⁸ high fees for the registration of land within conservancies (I 47, 104), and tax conservancy payments (I 81). At the same time as these charges are being imposed on conservancies, competing land uses such as agriculture are given incentives such as subsidies and loans (I 104). Dickson Kaelo (ibid), the CEO of KWCA, believes that policies are not yet overtly supporting conservancies, despite positive sounds coming from the current administration, for two reasons. First, the Wildlife Act is still new and has therefore not yet been fully implemented (ibid). Secondly, he thinks that the government is currently concentrating on poaching and do not recognise the role that conservancies can play in addressing this problem (ibid). Making a simple procedure for creating and running conservancies is not yet their priority (ibid).

Duncan Green, senior strategic advisor for Oxfam, notes:

¹⁰⁸ When registering conservancy land leases the government demands stamp duty cumulative for the 15 year length of the lease, paid up front (I 104).

the idea that private-sector investment is good and aid is bad, as some advocates of this theory have said, is completely ahistorical... if you look at any other country that is developed, it's involved a relationship between the private sector and the state (cited by Hirsch, 2013).

Supporting this, Schilpen and Gibbon (2002: 1) suggest that following a period of major disillusionment regarding the role of the state in development in the 1980s, both public and private sectors began to be considered to have distinctive but complementary roles to play. However, as has been discussed, even within partnerships, entities must continue to hold each other to account – especially civil society.

One criticism of donors supporting private sector in development is the promotion of exports or investments in which the donor has a vested interest (Schulpen and Gibbon, 2002: 10). For example, DANIDA¹⁰⁹ supported the Danish company Grundfos in their attempt to launch private water points in Kenya (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2011). Similarly, the concept of microfinance emerged from initiatives by Accion International and the Grameen Bank, which wanted to provide economic opportunities to poor people looking to start small businesses (Blowfield, 2013: 175). Although such strategic approaches can lend to criticism, it is logical and a more effective use of resources to support initiatives that are familiar and to which specialised knowledge and assistance can be given. In other words, conservancy-affiliated organisations would be more able to facilitate a wildlife conservation education programme than, say, a dental clinic.

As previously noted, Blowfield (2008: 14) states that the idea of business as a solution centres around the belief that “business can consciously invest in ways that are simultaneously commercially viable and beneficial to the poor”. In the same context, philanthrocapitalism argues that incorporating capitalist strategies such as markets and profit motive into approaches to address the problems of the world will make for a more successful outcome (Holmes, 2012). This is because including a profit motive leads to more investment, efficiency and innovation; the potential to make money from doing good will attract interest from the private sector and thus more money for development (Bishop and Green, 2010). More specifically,

¹⁰⁹ Danish International Development Agency

philanthrocapitalism argues that successful capitalist individuals and organisations are ideal philanthropists and are better at ‘doing good’ than government or NGO officials (Edwards, 2008; Bishop and Green, 2010; Scott et al., 2011).

From a development practitioner perspective, Ashley (2009: 6) suggests that the motivations for embracing private sector involvement include: assistance in delivering development impacts at scale; creating a more sustainable impact for the poor, and; making better use of the complementary skills (or comparative advantage) of business and civil society. This builds upon recognition of weaknesses to date and the realisation that government-driven poverty reduction strategies are insufficient (ibid). At the most basic level, the private sector is simply too large and closely integrated within most developing economies to ignore (ibid). Development benefits accruing from business involvement have been contextualised using the conservancies’ case study throughout this thesis.

In his interview for this research, Dr Lindkvist (I 31) discussed the relative benefits of the conservancies’ involvement in development. Being from a non-for-profit background he admitted that he was initially sceptical of the concept but he has seen:

When it [business] works, it is very powerful. It is raw in its way of just generating and if you can harness that in proper agreements and judicial systems, governance structures, I do believe that it is the way forwards (ibid).

Comparing the conservancies with his knowledge and experience of working in NGOs, Lindkvist (ibid) highlighted that these latter actors use a small time perspective as budgets and strategies work in 2-4 year slots after which they enter a new strategy process and the perspective changes. This is in line with a point made by Mosse (2005) that within development agencies, dominant policy models and priorities are frequently changing which in turn influences the perceived success of initiatives. As a consequence of this time framing, Lindkvist noted: “we have seen quite a few NGOs come and go over the years, very few actually stay” (I 31). In contrast, he argued that BCFK was able to build up trust by being present over a long period of time because of its commitment to the area through the relationship with its corporate sister, Basecamp Explorer (ibid).

The conservancy managers also had opinions regarding development emanating from business. OMC manager Rob O’Meara suggested that if development is to be self-

supporting, it is vital that it has a capitalist element (I 81). Naboisho Conservancy manager Justin Heath agreed that the private sector can accomplish a lot, both in terms of conservation and development and because of this he believed that the government was beginning to pay attention to this approach (I 76). He noted that prior to seeing what impact business approaches like Safaricom's M-Pesa could have in Kenya, the government felt threatened by the private sector but this was no longer the case¹¹⁰ (ibid). Justin also argued that an advantage of businesses, such as those involved in the conservancies, participating in development was:

We are on the ground, we have a deeper understanding of what is needed here... I see a lot of NGO cars in Narok, but what are they doing there? They are not out here (ibid).

Negative aspects of utilising business for development and conservation have been presented in the form of criticisms throughout this chapter. In summary these include: the requirement for self-benefit to initiate action; corporations determining what constitutes societal good (which may differ to that of the society); unrealistic expectations; and, most commonly, a lack of regulation, transparency and accountability. Another consequence of the business approach to development is that business goes down as well as up (Ashley, 2009: 7). Further, collaborative partnerships between actors also have their own consequences. Without accountability, private companies may be able to co-opt their partner organisations, turning governments or NGOs consciously or unconsciously into their representatives (as discussed by Prieto-Carrón et al., 2006: 985-986). This can in turn reduce accountability further by silencing those who would previously have been the critics, consciences and routes of social feedback for these corporations. More broadly, those who fundamentally disagree with capitalism continue to critique the foundations of these attempts, regardless of how "conscious", "inclusive" or "sustainable" capitalism may become.

The main outstanding question regarding this case study is the sustainability of the conservancies and the businesses upon which they depend. As expectations between

¹¹⁰ Although, as previously noted, DFID was involved in the development of the M-Pesa scheme, it is now widely seen as a business.

the different stakeholders have not been clearly outlined or understood, pressure is building from all sides, and the future is uncertain. This issue will now be examined.

At present it is difficult to draw broad conclusions about the effectiveness of inclusive capitalism as a development agent. As Ashley (2009: 7) points out, work on assessing whether inclusive business is delivering a sustainable impact is only just beginning. This thesis will start filling in this broad literature gap, and takes it a stage further by recognising that community heterogeneity and gender dimensions have been largely ignored within this alternative capitalism literature. To inclusive capitalism, the focus has been on benefiting “the poor” and it has not broken down who, within this abstract category, the beneficiaries are. In addition, to date there has been a focus on multi-national corporations and trans-national corporations (see London and Hart, 2004; McFalls, 2007). Although the role of small-medium enterprises in economic growth is well documented, their role as development agents is only gradually being discovered (Blowfield, 2008: 16). As discussed, in all instances, there are specific criteria and contexts influencing the likelihood of businesses taking on the role of a development agent.

The literature framework created in chapter two has formed the backbone to this research and how empirical findings relate to this literature has been referred back to throughout the thesis. One key feature presented in table 2.1 remains: an examination of the conservancies’ sustainability.

8.4 The Sustainability of the Conservancies

The research findings presented in this thesis represent a snapshot in time of the impact that OMC and Naboisho Conservancies are perceived to have upon development within the 2011-2014 period. Chapter two touched upon how historical events have shaped and influenced the present, and chapters three to eight assessed and analysed the present day. This section will now look to the future and discuss the extent to which the conservancies are sustainable. Unsustainability of ventures was one of the six key threats preventing community-based tourism from having a positive development impact introduced in chapter two. This is largely the result of the competitiveness of the tourism industry, high costs involved, weak local

capacities and inadequate support by donors and NGOs (Lapeyre, 2010). In Kenya, political insecurity and increasing competition from Tanzania are additional factors.

It is important to consider the sustainability at the end of this thesis. Even though a positive relationship between the conservancies and development has been suggested at present, this is of limited importance if the conservancies themselves are not feasible in the long-term. This analysis will be comprised of discussions based on ten key threats currently facing the conservancies. These are:

1. Reductions in tourist numbers
2. Increasing land values
3. Land use change around the conservancies
4. Decreasing tolerance of wildlife
5. Unsatisfied community members and increasing demands
6. Increasing livestock numbers
7. Unsupportive policies
8. Lack of financial transparency
9. Political hijacking
10. Population growth

8.4.1 Reduction in Tourist Numbers

The first threat to the conservancies to be considered is a reduction in tourist numbers. Tourism is closely linked to political stability in that if instability occurs – as with the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007-8 – tourist numbers drop rapidly. Tourists have been discouraged by recent terrorist attacks, especially those that affect tourists including the 2013 attacks on Westgate and a tourist vehicle in Mombasa. Gerard Beaton (I 102) predicted that tourist numbers in 2014 will be 20% down on 2013 because of the Westgate attack. This estimation was prior to the increased warnings in May 2014 in British and American travel advisories regarding terrorist threats on the Kenyan coast, and so it is likely that the annual figures will reduce further. Simultaneously, the tourism sectors in other African countries are rapidly developing, increasing Kenya's competition in attracting tourists. Without sufficient tourist numbers, tourism partners will struggle to continue paying the fixed rents, and this could result in the collapse of the initiative. For example, up to September 2014,

Eagle View Camp failed to pay its annual \$50,000 fee to Koiyaki Guiding School for the preceding 18 months (anon 11, 20).

8.4.2 Increasing Land Values

Within the Mara land prices are increasing very rapidly. Immediately following subdivision, one acre could be purchased for KES 2-4,000 (\$23-46) (I 85), but in 2013 one acre near a main road would demand a price of at least KES 60,000 (\$690). Given continuing demand from outside investors, as well as internal population growth, this rapid increase is expected to continue. For the conservancies to endure in the long-term, their rental payments should match the rate of growth of land values. However, as discussed above, tourism numbers are not increasing at this same rate and at present are decreasing. If the tourism partners are not able to keep pace with the increases in land values, it will be very hard to convince landowners to re-commit once the current 15-year leases expire around 2024-2025. This is vital for neoliberal conservation as they must be able to realise the present and projected market value of the nature in which they live (Child, 2000).

Even before the leases come up for renewal, there are fears that the tourism partners will not be able to maintain the pre-agreed increases in lease payments. As noted in chapter seven, an 8% compound increase per year is very high. One informed source (anon 3) suggested that, given the combination of current rate increases and tourist number predictions, the tourism partners may not be able to meet their commitments within the next couple of years – unless business picks up substantially. In recognition of this, several large conservation NGOs, including WWF, AWF and TNC, are currently in dialogue with stakeholders in the Mara. Tourism partners hope that they may be able to relieve some pressure off them (anon 11), but this would remove the self-sustainability aspect of the conservancies.

8.4.3 Land Use Change Around Conservancies

As has been touched upon in chapters two, six and seven, there are increasing land use changes around the conservancies. Wheat farming is rapidly encroaching and now borders Lemek Conservancy, just 12km from the study site. In addition, there is increasing urbanisation in the communities on conservancy borders, exemplified by the creation of a substantial centre in Olesere over just 18 months. The construction

of fences is another major problem for the sustainability of conservancies, as they restrict the free-movement of wildlife on community land. This is widely considered essential for the biodiversity of the conservancies (Homewood et al., 2009; Reid, 2012). Ironically, conservancies encouraging pastoralists to keep fewer high-quality livestock is exacerbating the construction of fences. Due to their expense, owners want to ensure that these livestock have high-quality grass to themselves in the form of *olokeri*. It is expected that the land use value analysis undertaken in chapter seven will now be able to inform decisions regarding land use.

8.4.4 Decreasing Tolerance of Wildlife

Chapter six discussed the perception held by some conservationists that the communities bordering the conservancies are increasingly intolerant of wildlife. This is problematic for the sustainability of the conservancies; if communities kill lions that cross onto the community land, the number of lions seen by tourists within the conservancies will quickly decrease. This would in turn reduce the desirability of the tourism product. At present, Naboisho Conservancy and its camps advertise that they have “one of the highest lion densities in Africa” (Kicheche Camps, 2012; Mara Naboisho Conservancy, 2012; Asilia Africa, 2014; Basecamp Explorer, 2014; Encounter Mara Safari Camp, 2014; Hemingways Expeditions, 2014). Yet, as the conservancies are not fenced and wildlife is free roaming, this is dependent upon community tolerance. This research suggests that any decrease in tolerance may be the result of inequal benefit distribution. When no one benefited from wildlife (before the neoliberalisation of nature), there was no issue; the problem has arisen as some people are benefiting from wildlife whilst others think that they are not (anon 20). Neoliberal approaches are inherently uneven in this regard. However, even conservancy landowners who receive rental incomes sometimes kill wildlife (I 80), suggesting that benefit levels may not yet be perceived to be sufficiently high to compensate for the costs of living with wildlife. In addition, population growth and an increasing density of settlements on conservancy borders are increasing human-wildlife conflict (ibid).

8.4.5 Unsatisfied Community Members and Increasing Demands

As has been discussed at length in this thesis, the conservancies and their affiliated organisations are beginning to recognise the importance of dispersing benefits widely in order to satisfy both landowners and neighbouring communities more generally. Although some individuals are already inherently against the conservancies, it is expected that the popularity of conservancies may decline in the coming years if they do not see adequate increases in benefits. As just noted in threat two, it is likely that there will be a point in the near future when land lease payments will not be favourable in relation to land values. Already some conservancy landowners complain that the payments are too low to be significant. With regard to conservancy benefits in the form of community development projects, the chairman of OOMT (I 75) explained:

Unless the tourism operators recognise that they have displaced a large number of people and show them that they are sensitive to their needs and pay for development, there will always be a huge conflict and the conservancy will disappear because there will be more and more Maasai living on the edge looking in and saying why are we doing this, we get no benefit from this. I think the community development programs are the only way to mitigate this risk. You will never eliminate it but you can allow the communities to appreciate the values of the conservancy otherwise they will want their land back (ibid).

For the tourism partners, spending on community initiatives can be recouped to a certain extent through the creation of responsible reputations, access to impact investing options, accreditation awards and subsequently an increase in business, with the correct marketing (see chapters four and eight). However, if the communities keep demanding more and more benefits, there is going to be a breaking point whereby it is not strategic for the businesses to do more. In other words, the businesses would not get any additional benefit by spending on community initiatives. If this critical point is reached it could lead to a stalemate and resultantly bring down the partnership. This is especially problematic as, the more that the conservancies and their affiliates become involved in development initiatives, the more that is expected of them (see chapter four). Communities stated that development is the responsibility of the conservancies because that is who they see acting; as a consequence, communities now take their demands to conservancy organisations. Another contributing factor to this problem is the lack of agreement

regarding the extent of the responsibilities of the camps, conservancies and their affiliated organisations. There is no consensus regarding their geographic scope or the type of initiatives that they should be involved in.

8.4.6 Increasing Livestock Numbers

In a similar sense, as livestock numbers are increasing due to support from conservancies, the number of livestock permitted to have access to the grass banks will have to be restricted in the near future. Because of the livestock numbers using the grazing scheme, and high herbivore wildlife densities,¹¹¹ in 2013-2014 it proved extremely difficult for the conservancy management – especially in Naboisho – to put aside grass banks for the dry seasons. This was despite higher than average rainfall. Consequently, if a drought were to hit the Mara in the coming seasons, there would be no emergency grass bank. The Maasai in Koiyaki are known to have followed a boom-and-bust pattern over the years with livestock numbers depending upon rainfall and disease (Lamprey and Reid, 2004). However, a drought occurring would now also have a devastating impact upon the conservancy concept, specifically the relationship between the parties involved. Although it is recognised that livestock numbers using the grazing schemes need to be limited, now that neighbouring communities have become accustomed to extensive grazing access, trying to refuse these demands and limit grazing access is likely to result in mass dissatisfaction. In turn, this could also threaten the conservancies.

Compounding the problem of livestock numbers and availability of grass banks within the conservancies is access to the national reserve. The MMNR has always been an important grazing resource during times of drought, during which a blind eye is turned. Over the last few years, households have begun to rely on using the reserve to feed their cattle at all times, regardless of seasonality (Butt, 2011). Bedelian (2014: 237) found that 66% of households in Koiyaki have used the reserve within the last year. Towards the end of 2014, rumours began to spread of the MMNR becoming much stricter regarding grazing within its borders. The governor of Narok County, is Ole Tunai. One of his main political opponents is Francis

¹¹¹ For example as a result of the fencing and encroachment of agriculture, the Loita wildebeest migration now calves within the study site instead of the Loita plains. This significantly increases the herbivore population.

Nkoitoi, who also ran for governor. Within the conservancies in Koiyaki, all of the committee members are supporters of Nkoitoi, and the conservancies form his power base. The rumours say that Ole Tunai has realised that he can put enormous pressure on the conservancies, and thus his political opponent, by closing grazing within the reserve.

8.4.7 Unsupportive Policies

As noted in chapter eight, the Government of Kenya has, to date, not been overtly supportive of conservancies. The new Wildlife Act recognises the conservation of private land as a land use, and community members as wildlife managers. Dickson Kaelo notes that, whilst things are now improving with this act, it does not operationalise everything (I 104). The CEO of the Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association (ibid) also notes that the government is not giving any incentives for landowners to choose conservation over other land use options and does not provide an enabling environment for those wanting to create or be part of a conservancy. At the same time, they are subsidising competing land use options such as agriculture (ibid).

8.4.8 Lack of Financial Transparency

As the conservancies and tourism partners do not provide access to their finances, many people see the high prices charged to guests and, being unaware of all of the costs involved, assume that the tourism partners are making a large profit from the arrangement. One male informant in Olesere (FG1) said:

To me, I don't see what the conservancies have brought to us because they are just businessmen who are out to fill their pockets because to us what we are eating is small. If a tourist goes to a camp they pay a lot of money and the money that we get from that is only small. And so I do not see the role of the conservancies in development.

Councillor Ketuyo (I 30) concurred saying: "they [the conservancies] are only for their profit, that is the problem... They are giving them [the landowners] peanuts. It is very very little yet they are earning a lot." This problem is not restricted to the Mara. In his newspaper article in *The East African*, Mbaria (2007) criticises Porini for paying a minimal amount to the communities in Eselenkei. His accusations were based on looking up the price that tourists pay to stay at the camp, without any consideration of the costs involved in operating camps or running a conservancy. If

all tourism partners were able to provide access to some of their finances, for example the amounts received, spent on employment, lease payments, marketing etc. – perhaps on a website – then criticisms of this secrecy could be dispelled.

8.4.9 Political Hijacking

Another threat facing the conservancies is political hijacking. As has been discussed, the community members who are given the largest voice and degree of control over the running of the conservancies are largely the political and societal elite. History shows the political dimension of conservation in the Mara to be strong; it was the main cause of the breakdown of the previous associations (Thompson et al 2009). Using the same leaders and them having the greatest power therefore inevitably makes conservancies political (Bedelian, 2014: 244). Within conservancies, financial payments are now direct transfers to the landowners, preventing interference – with the exception of landowner community funds. However, it is common for these committee members and community liaison officers to try to utilise their positions within the conservancies for political advantage. Examples of this include influencing grazing access and the distribution of community projects. This is particularly problematic for Olare Orok and Motorogi Conservancies. This relates closely to Mwangi's (2005: 62-63) finding in Eselenkei. He purports that "traditional power structures seem to hinder community involvement in the decision-making process." In response, he recommends the democratisation of these traditional structures to prevent a top-down approach (ibid).

8.4.10 Population Growth

The exponential population growth in the Mara is, in my opinion, the biggest long-term threat to the conservancies, and yet one that is receiving minimal attention. One of the dangers resulting from this population increase is the proliferation of conservancy landowners, increasing the complexity and reducing the viability of the model. If one landowner has 10 sons, when he dies, the plot is fragmented through being divided into 10 parts. The result of this is that the rental income will also be divided by 10. If a landowner now considers his KES 18,000 (\$200) monthly rental income insignificant, what are his 10 sons going to think of KES 1,800 (\$20)? In addition to this causing widespread dissatisfaction of benefits (threat five),

population growth is also a contributing factor to threats two (land values), three (land use change), four (decreasing tolerance of wildlife) and six (increasing livestock numbers). Despite this, population growth and contraception are hot topics in the area and ones that NGOs avoid. The only work on family planning that I came across during the research period was the outreach work in women's groups. However, during a follow-up with one of the camera project participants (CP 13) from this group, she explained that, even though the women see the value in reducing family sizes, it is the men who make that decision. She explained: "Maa men still want us to have as many children as possible" (ibid). I did not come across any work on family planning being undertaken with men. Conservancy manager Justin Heath (I 76) noted that he has informally tried to talk about contraception with his rangers, as the treatment of STIs is a continual problem, but they just laughed at him.

8.5 Concluding Discussion

This chapter has presented arguments pertaining to a move towards more conscious and inclusive forms of capitalism. It has highlighted ways in which this is able to influence poverty alleviation and development as well as conservation. Where appropriate, links have been made to the findings presented in the preceding chapters relating to the conservancies case study.

Although there are many ways in which the development outcomes emanating from the conservancies could be improved, given the discussions within this chapter it is deemed that this case study does exemplify inclusive capitalism as the tourism partners are acting as development agents. Given the commitment by the actors involved to ensure that development takes into account the importance of place and the greatest need of the residents, such as the importance of Maasai culture and their dominant livelihood – pastoralism, the term Africapitalism is deemed most appropriate. This term goes beyond broad conscious capitalism approaches by including an Africonsciousness within capitalism, bringing back the importance of place into capitalism so that it prioritises Africa and Africans.

Neoliberalism is inherently uneven; therefore, any benefits resulting from this approach will also be unevenly distributed. The implication of this is that a business approach, no matter how inclusive, can never become the sole answer to the

development problem. But as stressed, development has not suddenly become the responsibility of business (Ashley, 2009: 7). This is not to say that businesses cannot assist and have a positive impact in certain contexts. Importantly, this research contributes to the literature on private sector in development by documenting that, from a local perspective, small and medium enterprises can have a positive causal relationship with development. Also, the private sector has the potential to improve the sustainability and efficiency of development in Africa as well as its quantity and dispersal. Moreover, this is done in a way that promotes entrepreneurship and self-sustainability rather than reliance on external actors.

There are criticisms of the motivations behind private sector in development approaches, but no development actions are without their own agenda. Religious organisations often have evangelical goals, NGOs must appease their funders and bilateral institutions inherently support their own country's interests - as highlighted through the DANIDA example. Business does not act in a vacuum and cannot be expected to solve all of societies' problems. What has been under investigation in this chapter is the extent to which it can contribute and why the choice is made to do so.

With regard to threats preventing conservancies from contributing to development discussed throughout this thesis, section 8.4 has shown that the conservancies in the Mara are facing multiple threats to their sustainability. Unless the conservancies, their affiliated organisations and other influential actors – such as the state – can address these threats, the lifespan of the conservancies are under threat. This is a critical factor because in turn it threatens any development impact that they are perceived to be having. Unless the sustainability of the conservancies can be secured, all of the development outcomes discussed throughout this thesis become equally threatened. On this sobering note, attention will now turn to the conclusion.

9 Conclusion

This conclusion to the thesis will summarise the key findings by returning to the three research questions and their sub-points as well as the literature framework. It will then assess how this thesis has contributed to knowledge, before concluding.

9.1 Key Findings

The three research questions, and sub-questions, that this thesis has aimed to answer are:

1. How do stakeholders within the study site understand the term “development”?
2. What is the perceived relationship between the conservancies and development?
 - a. (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?
 - b. Why are they doing this?
 - c. Does this affect society evenly
3. How does this research relate to literature on sustainable forms of capitalism, including Africapitalism?

Throughout the thesis, responses to these three research questions have highlighted linkages with the literature framework developed in chapter two. As a reminder, the key features of this are noted in table 9.1, along with the chapter in which each issue was considered.

Table 9.1 Key Features within the Literature Framework

Key Features within the Literature Framework	Chapter Considered
Inconsistent definition of development	3
Little attention paid to the subjectivity and non-Western perspectives of impacts	3
Who are the actors who want to get involved in this area? Are traditional development actors as heavily involved in areas linked to conservation?	4,5
Motivation - is conservation or development prioritised? What are the motivations of the different actors involved?	4,5
Are there clear links between benefits and conservation goals? In actions, beliefs or perceptions?	4,5,6,7,8
What are the implications of nature becoming a commodity from which benefits are expected? Does this change how 'nature' is treated?	4,5,6,7,8
Quantity and distribution of benefits	5,6,7
What are the trade-offs and hard decisions needed between conservation and development?	5,6,7
What are revenues from conservancies being used for? Have livestock numbers changed since the creation of the conservancies? Are there any 'conservation backfires'?	5,6,7
How do access restrictions affect traditional resource users?	6
How can pastoralism survive on subdivided land with a rapidly increasing population?	6
Have conservancies heeded calls for greater incorporation of livestock and changed their approach to pastoralism? How are their policies regarding grazing perceived by conservancy stakeholders?	6
Do conservancies have a differential impact on the elite/non-elite, members/non-members and different genders?	7
Degree of participation or control by communities	7
What are the power relations between stakeholders? Who are the power brokers and how did they attain these positions? Do they benefit disproportionately? Are societal inequalities increasing?	7
How do general criticisms of capitalism reflect upon this case study?	8
Does this case study exemplify conscious capitalism and Africapitalism? If so, what can be learnt from this case study for these fields?	8
How sustainable are the conservancies in the Mara?	8

In order to summarise the key findings, concise answers to the research questions will now be assembled from the body of the thesis. How these relate to the literature framework will also be discussed.

9.1.1 Research Question One

One of the threats that could potentially prevent the conservancies in the Mara from having a positive impact upon development is how the term development is interpreted. Definitions of development can be very restrictive, with economic benefits often receiving the most attention (Telfer, 2002: 339). Kontogeorgopoulos et

al. (2013: 2) caution that the measurement of success is subjective, controversial and ‘depends largely on one’s perspective and expectations’. Current models are “overly reliant on Western ‘experts’ and development agencies and that far too little attention has been paid to local and non-Western perspectives and knowledge” (Le et al., 2012: 362). Addressing these concerns, the subjectivity of what development is, and how ‘success’ is interpreted from the perspectives of people on the ground, directly affected by the conservancies, have been at the heart of this thesis. The first research question was designed to address this issue.

Chapter three analysed the multiplicity of interpretations of development from stakeholders within the study site. Although categories were not homogenous in their understandings, it was clear that different stakeholder groups have differing interpretations of development. From this analysis, three key components from the multiple definitions were identified by their frequent inclusion across stakeholder categories. These became the development indicators. These were: meeting basic needs through community projects; livelihoods, specifically pastoralism; and economic implications.

Although these three components were selected as indicators because the majority of different stakeholders highlighted their importance, there were differences in prioritisation between stakeholder groupings. Those affiliated with the tourism industry emphasised the economic aspects, environmental conservation and meeting basic needs. It is perhaps unsurprising to note that these three features broadly cover the most direct ways in which the camps and the conservancies influence development. In other words, within the interpretation of development put forward by the tourism industry is the inherent suggestion that the conservancies are having a positive impact upon development. Within communities, women and youth strongly emphasised the need to address education, health and water problems, as well as stressing the importance of capacity building. Both men and women prioritised the security of ensuring the continuation of their livelihoods as well as the need for direct economic benefits.

The findings of chapter three strongly suggest that the distribution of conservancy benefits needs to expand well beyond those of an economic nature as within the

study site, development is perceived to be more than economic advancement. Although financial capital is often perceived to be paramount within a Western understanding of development, many participants in this research, especially community members, valued other aspects as much, or even more so. Exemplifying this, they often noted that non-economic benefits of the conservancies, such as grazing, are more important than financial payments. This concurs with Snider's (2012) findings from the Mara.

The main implication of definitions differing between stakeholders is that actions undertaken by one actor with the intention of being development may not be seen as such by other stakeholders. If development actors desire positive responses to their efforts, they must be aware of the different ways in which development is understood and the nature of the development paths that are desired by heterogeneous communities.

9.1.2 Research Question Two

In order to address the second research question, which focuses on perceptions of the relationship between conservancies and development, chapters four to seven analysed the impact of conservancies on the three key development indicators identified in chapter three. This research question examined the distribution of benefits to community members, the equality of this, and the motivations behind these actions. Each of the three sub-points of research question two will now be discussed.

9.1.2.1 (How) are the conservancies impacting upon development?

Chapter four assessed which actors are involved in development within the study site and whether traditional development actors are as involved in conservation areas. Having found that conservation and tourism based entities are at the forefront of development work within the study site, chapter five focused on their impact upon meeting basic needs through community development projects, chapter six pastoralism and chapter seven examined economic implications. These chapters broadly found that the conservancies are *trying* to positively impact development by:

- Assisting with coordinating and funding community development projects;

- Securing and supporting the dominant livelihood through grazing schemes, and;
- Increasing household income through rental payments, employment, and other revenue generating activities.

Despite this general positive finding with regard to how the relationship between conservancies and development are perceived, research participants highlighted many criticisms of conservancy practices. This thesis has identified multiple ways in which the conservancies' development impact could be improved and enhanced. The main complaints given were that benefits are insufficient and access to essential resources is restricted. Regarding benefits, landowners complained that payments were too low to compensate them for the loss of being able to use their land, and those with land outside of the conservancies complained that they did not receive payments despite having wildlife disperse onto their land. Employment is perceived to be riddled with favouritism and nepotism, and many people either did not acknowledge indirect benefits or claimed that they were not aware who was responsible for these (as detailed in chapter four regarding community projects).

Regarding community projects, chapters four and five highlighted that greater unity and collaboration is needed between development actors, especially those affiliated with conservancies. Greater coordination with members of the local communities from all demographics and an area-wide planning approach would also improve the efficiency and outcome of such initiatives. To avoid jealousy between communities, it is important to ensure that projects are not concentrated in a few villages and that greatest needs are considered. On an even more basic level, just ensuring that community members are aware of the link between projects – such as boreholes and clinics – and the conservancies would improve people's perception. This mirrors Mwangi's (2005: 61) finding from Eselenkei that a general lack of awareness and information was a key factor hindering community support for conservancies.

Participants suggested that, in their opinions, not all conservancy landowners, employees and other income earners are utilising their incomes in ways that directly benefit their families. Cited beneficial expenditures were paying school fees, covering medical bills or building a more permanent homestead. As chapters five and

six detailed, for many households, the increase in cash income is predominantly used to decrease the number of livestock that need to be sold each month to meet the same expenditures. Whilst over time this has the effect of increasing the family's herd, and thus wealth base, it also has potential negative environmental implications.

Conservationists, conservancy management and tourism stakeholders believe that the high livestock densities, now constrained following land subdivision, represent a risky investment which simultaneously threatens the very resource that provided the money to buy the livestock. In other words, conservancies financially benefiting individuals are endangering their own sustainability by increasing livestock densities on their borders. Whether this is a 'conservation backfire' (Langholz, 1999: 52) or not depends upon whether the conservancy grazing schemes can absorb and provide for this increase in cattle. Any increase in goat numbers, however, would certainly have negative environmental implications, as the conservancies cannot cushion these animals.

It is uncertain whether it is the conservancies' responsibility to influence spending habits of their beneficiaries. However, given the impacts that spending habits are having, it is in the long-term interest of both conservancies and landowners to ensure that the source of this income is not threatened. It is vital that for the full benefits of conservancy-affiliated initiatives to be appreciated, and thus of use in increasing the positivity of conservancy perceptions, positive outputs need to be translated into positive outcomes. The discoveries discussed in chapter 5 reveal that a more detailed analysis of perceived development successes resulting from community-based tourism initiatives are essential. What may seem like success from the surface may not be as beneficial as expected in terms of outcomes. This emphasises the importance of the participatory ethnographic approach taken, as it is vital to examine how outputs are perceived by community members who live with them, as opposed to how they appear to an outsider passing through.

The vast majority of research participants acknowledged that conservancies have been increasing the extent to which they incorporate livestock and attempts have been made to increase the participation of pastoralists in decision-making regarding grazing access. As a result of these changes, criticisms of grazing access in

conservancies made by Butt (2011), Osano et al. (2013) and Bedelian (2014) are no longer as valid as when they were made. Despite these changes, the most common complaint made by community members was still that the conservancies threaten the dominant livelihood – pastoralism – by restricting access to grazing by traditional resource users (see chapter six). Although conservancies are supporting pastoralism to a certain extent through the creation of grass banks, as acknowledged by some pastoralists, many community members maintain that the conservancies restrict grazing and consequently are not wanted. One of the key issues here is that the conservancies emerged concurrently with land subdivision. As a result, many pastoralists, especially elderly individuals who have not seen other individualised areas, do not recognise that grazing and movement over other peoples land would have become restricted regardless of the presence of conservancies. Those who believe that the conservancies are supporting pastoralism point out that, in a sense, the conservancies are actually moving back towards more communal land tenure and communal grazing. As such, they believe, they are creating a survival tactic for the livelihood that would otherwise struggle on the subdivided land of today.

The land use comparison analysis undertaken in chapter seven produced new and revealing findings regarding the economic benefit of conservancies. At present some landowners perceive that the land rental payments from conservancies are too low when compared to other options such as agriculture, and consequently deliberate changing land use. This analysis revealed that when a broader appreciation of money entering the area as a result of the conservancies is adopted, as opposed to sole consideration of individual rental payments to the landowners, land use values converge. Recognition that not all of the land within the study site is suitable for wheat farming would push conservancies ahead of agriculture in terms of which land use produces the highest net returns. Further, quantification of the extent to which conservancies support pastoralism would increase this land use value further.

As is to be expected from a heterogeneous society, perceptions of the role that the conservancies are having upon development varied greatly. These perceptions are also not static and change over time. Temporal changes are largely in line with the quantity of perceived benefits that are being received, and how these weigh-up

against perceived costs. For example community opinions about the conservancies, conservation and wildlife were dependent upon perceptions of the benefits received in return. This concurs with Whelan's (1991) conclusion that for a successful project, benefits for the host communities must outweigh costs. This finding also reflects Büscher and Dressler's (2012: 368) conclusion that through neoliberal conservation the 'emphasis is shifting from local constructions of nature *by* communities to what nature should mean *for* communities in terms of commodity resources and capitalist markets'. This commodification is changing how nature is seen by communities resulting in increasing demands for payment for its use, through PES. Although it is important to note that these payments are not just those of an economic nature. As previously discussed, access to grass banks for grazing was considered one of the most important benefits of conservancies. If land owners and surrounding community members are not satisfied with the quantity or distribution of the benefits offered in exchange for the use of *their* nature, they will take this out on the environment, wildlife or other components of the conservancy concept. This expectation of payment (in whatever form) is a dramatic change from more traditional Maasai conceptualisations of nature.

Changes in perceptions of the conservancies in response to an increase in grazing access, as well as recognising the role of conservancy-affiliated organisations in community projects, are two examples of the fluid nature of opinions. It was especially interesting to find that many individuals who were critical of some aspects of the conservancies still identified ways in which they are having a positive impact upon development. A looming question emanating from the evident fluidity of perceptions about conservancies, and conservation more generally, is what impact any reduction in benefits will have. Pretty and Smith (2004) suggest that even if actions change at the time of benefit receipt, if people's beliefs or conservation perspectives are not altered then they are likely to revert back to previous ways if benefits reduce or cease. It is even possible that perceptions and actions may worsen following the cessation of benefits as communities and individuals will have become accustomed to receiving compensation for the use of their nature. For example once people are aware of the value of their land and its flora and fauna, if these payments or other benefits cease, they could hold the nature ransom by threatening to destroy it

or its wildlife unless payments return or are increased. This is a cost of the commodification of nature; once it is given a value, what happens if that value is not or cannot be met?

9.1.2.2 Why are they doing this?

Chapter four broke down the motivations behind the levels of involvement of different development actors within the study site. The development actor matrix within the study site is perceived to differ from those involved elsewhere in Maasailand and Kenya. Despite the majority of communities stating that the main responsibility of development should lie with the government and elected political leaders, they are not perceived to be living up to this. Religious organisations are also seen to be comparatively absent, and communities are taking a relatively passive role in development. This apparent ‘absence’ of traditional development actors is extremely noteworthy. Within this context, alternative actors are currently involving themselves in developing Koiyaki, especially those affiliated with the conservancies. There is no simple explanation for the present development actor matrix in the Mara. Many factors, including those of a geographical, historical, political and cultural nature, are likely to be influential. The motivations behind development actor’s actions are also of critical importance to understand. Finally, it is suggested that the neoliberal model upon which the conservancies are based may be altering the dynamic of those who are involving themselves in development, as well as the power dynamics between these actors.

Although it is an area that is often neglected in studies of tourism’s developmental impact (Wiebe, 2011), philanthropic tourists are increasingly becoming major actors within the study site. As discussed in chapter two, conservancies and their affiliated organisations have dual objectives in that they seek win-win outcomes for both conservation and development (Muradian et al., 2010; Bedelian, 2014). This results in multiple complexities as projects have to make hard decisions and trade-offs between these two objectives (McShane et al., 2011; Bedelian, 2014: 16). Further, the neoliberal component of conservancies means that business sustainability is an additional objective. This triple conservation-development-business motivation will result in different trade-offs and different approaches adopted in comparison to those

with alternative motivations, for example seeking political support or evangelical reasons. The key difference between this case study of the Mara conservancies and conservation or tourism initiatives that are not perceived to benefit development (including those discussed in chapter two), is this third motivational objective; business sustainability. Given the importance of place in the conscious capitalist approach adopted by the conservancies, chapter eight determined that Elumelu's term *Africapitalism* was most appropriate. Due to the privatised nature of land tenure and the subsequent structure of the conservancy concept, there is an inherent need for conservancies to win and maintain community support so as to ensure the sustainability of their businesses. As Dickson Kaelo stressed: "there is a business interest in doing this development, and so where people own the land, tourism can become a development actor" (I 48). In spite of the multiple prevailing threats to sustainability discussed in section 8.4, the nature of the conservancies also encourages the stakeholders in the conservancies to do everything they can to ensure their sustainability, given the investment that each has made.

It is not only conservancy members who need appeasing. Non-conservancy members neighbouring the conservancies are also able to discreetly demand benefits. Murphy (2013: 153) details the rationale behind this:

Tourism, like no other industry, relies on the goodwill and cooperation of local people because they are part of its product. Where development and planning do not fit in with local aspirations and capacities, resistance and hostility can raise the cost of business or destroy the industry's potential altogether.

The tourism partners are acutely aware of this threat. At any time, if the neighbouring communities become dissatisfied with the initiative, they could invade the conservancies with their livestock at a level that management could not control, block roads crossing private land, kill wildlife or destroy the camps. If the conservancy product is to survive, both the landowners and the local communities more generally need appeasing. Consequently, the tourism partners are beginning to recognise the importance of ensuring that benefits are dispersed beyond just the conservancy landowners. This is the predominant aim of the grazing schemes and community projects.

The neoliberal nature of the conservancies inevitably means that new actors will be introduced. This results in less responsibility for the state and more for private individuals and civil society (Holmes, 2012: 192). This ‘private indirect government’ (Mbembe, 2001) refers to the decentralisation and fragmentation of sovereignty (Igoe and Brockington, 2007: 439). Ferguson (1994) found that state involvement in development intervention in Lesotho expanded the extent and reach of “bureaucratic state power”. In contrast, the relatively minimal role of the state in both conservation and development initiatives in the study site represents a reduction in state power, sovereignty and legitimacy. Prior to the creation of the conservancies, communities were reliant on the state for assistance; to attain this, people felt they had to beg politicians (I 87). As a result, some political leaders now see conservancies as competition because “they can’t win people’s minds like they used to” (ibid). As conservancy-affiliated organisations are now largely perceived to be the main development actors, the power brought by this involvement in development interventions – discussed by Ferguson – is ultimately being handed to private entities.

9.1.2.3 Does this affect society evenly?

Economic benefits emanating from conservancies are the most socially unequal as they benefit individuals rather than communities. As a result, inequalities in the distribution of conservancy benefits, and therefore inequalities in the impact of the conservancies on development, are most prominent in those of an economic nature. Although receipt of the rental payments is determined by land allocation, the varying degrees of power (and thus participation) held by individuals also influence the quantity of economic benefits received. As commonly occurs in tourism fuelled development, elite members of the local communities maintain positions of authority and attain more benefits (De Kadt, 1990: 30), leading to an increased social stratification (Stronza, 2001). Elite members of society simultaneously own more land, due to influencing the land committee or buying land that comes up for sale, and have the greatest degree of participation by sitting on conservancy committees. Compounding this, it is these same individuals who are often the ‘lucky’ ones to have a camp on their land and thus receive the large additional bed-night fees. Without regular elections the accountability of these appointed individuals to the

landowners whom they are supposed to represent is questionable. Also, given the homogenous nature of these voices, they cannot claim to represent society more broadly.

The existing favourable agreements between these individuals and the tourism partners mean that neither party want to accept the widening calls from landowners for their representatives to be changed. Likewise, corruption by these individuals – such as controlling and acquiring money from community landowner funds – is swept under the carpet. This is especially true when large donors show interest in supporting the area as the Maasai community leaders' presence is deemed important for showing the conservancies' community-based approach. In such instances, indiscretions are quickly forgotten.

Non-conservancy members and women need to be given a voice within conservancies. Although they do not own land in the conservancies, decisions made also affect these demographics. This finding concurs with Bedelian (2014: 253) who concluded: "more attention needs to be paid to the socio-political processes of who gets to participate in such initiatives and who gets left out." In response to my Masters research highlighting the extent to which women and youth were excluded from the conservancies, OOMT and BCFK began an outreach project targeting these strata of society. Whilst this has made the first steps towards filling this gap, more can still be done. Suggestions made to camp managers and NGO workers at the end of the Ph.D. research period have led to the initiation of a beadwork project for women, providing a market for their produce within the conservancy camps and beyond. Early signs indicate that this has the potential to be a significant source of income for the women, without the requirement of owning land. Young men, however, still feel disconnected from the conservancies. Other than through employment, many youths feel that they are unable to capture benefits because of their lack of land ownership. Given that it is this demographic who are most commonly responsible for the killing of wildlife and burglaries in camps, benefit distribution within this sector requires further consideration.

This study has confirmed that PES can disproportionately benefit the wealthier members of society creating or reinforcing power asymmetries amongst those

involved (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Kronenberg and Hubacek, 2013; Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014). The politics of wildlife revenue control in the Mara continues to be intense and conflictual (Thompson and Homewood 2002; Thompson et al 2009; Bedelian, 2014: 127). These elite conservancy members receive the highest benefits, but unlike under previous models, they do not ‘eat’ all of the revenue. Although it was not allocated fairly, the privatised nature of land tenure results in significant benefits being shared with community members in a more equitable way than previous attempts in the Mara, including access to resources (as predicted by Osano et al., 2013). Although not perfect, through conservancies, the distribution of benefits has improved. Now ordinary landowners are assured of directly receiving their lease payments, grazing access is open to all and the creation of specific audited organisations to oversee community projects has blocked corruption channels.

9.1.3 Research Question Three

Research question three assessed how this research relates to literature on sustainable forms of capitalism, including Africapitalism. This chapter also assessed the sustainability of the conservancy concept within the context of this case study.

Neoliberalism is inherently uneven; therefore, any benefits resulting from this approach will also be unevenly distributed. As a result, a business approach can never become the sole answer to the development problem, regardless of how inclusive, sustainable or conscious it is. This is not to say, however, that businesses cannot assist and have a positive impact upon development in certain contexts. Business does not act in a vacuum and cannot be expected to solve all of societies’ problems. This research contributes to the literature on private sector in development by documenting that, from a local perspective, small and medium enterprises can positively contribute towards development. Men in Enooronkon (FG 8) summarised:

The conservancy has appeared, and it is good. When drought comes we can access grass easier because of the conservation of grass in the conservancy. And also now because of the conservancy, people are no longer cutting down the trees there and as a result we get more rain... We are also now getting facilities in our villages and our sons are being employed... It is also a business to make money but it is helping everyone. So those are our opinions about the conservancy.

There are criticisms of the motivations behind private sector in development approaches, but as noted, no development actions are without their own agenda.

Given the commitment by the actors involved in the conservancies to ensure that development takes into account the importance of place and the greatest need of the residents, such as the importance of Maasai culture and their dominant livelihood – pastoralism, the term Africapitalism is most appropriate to this case study. This term goes beyond broad conscious capitalism approaches by including an Africonsciousness within capitalism, bringing back the importance of place into capitalism so that it prioritises Africa and Africans. This will be elaborated upon below when discussing the contribution of this thesis to knowledge within the business world.

With regard to the potential of unsustainability preventing community-based tourism from contributing to development (as discussed by Lapeyre, 2010), section 8.4 discussed the multiple ways in which the sustainability of the conservancies under investigation is under threat. Six of the ten threats identified in section 8.4 are the result of population growth. It is deemed that this is the singular greatest threat to the sustainability of the conservancies, and their resultant development impact.

9.2 Contribution to Knowledge

There are three different audiences that this thesis has targeted: academia, the business world and stakeholders within the study site. Each of these will now be discussed in turn.

9.2.1 Academia

Snider (2012: 210) concluded his thesis by appealing for new innovative measures of non-economic benefits emanating from tourism, as defined by the host community. Instead of adopting a Western definition focusing on economic aspects, this research was guided by how the stakeholders themselves define development. This is especially important because stakeholder groupings and individuals understand the concept of development, and how the conservancies are interacting with this, very differently. If development indicators from international development institutions had been used, the findings would not have been as relevant to the study site and

would not represent how those within this specific context understand development. This case study is especially timely and valuable given the newness of the conservancy concept in this ecosystem, uncertainty regarding its development impact (Thompson et al., 2009: 108) and the evocativeness of the Mara-Serengeti ecosystem.

Another contribution that this research has made to academia is an expansion of the use of visual ethnography. This research has shown that using children's drawings and photographs to visualise how individuals perceive development can be very successful and effective. Not only did this eliminate educational barriers to participation and draw in shy contributors, it proved to be an extremely useful tool for initiating discussions. In particular, female camera participants and shy schoolchildren became more confident by participating in these participatory projects.

9.2.2 Business

Chapter eight examined the bigger implications of this thesis' findings beyond the realms of conservations and tourism to the business world more generally. Despite all of the excitement surrounding the potential contribution that business could make as a development agent, there is little information about what has been achieved (Blowfield, 2007; Hamann, 2007; Blowfield, 2008). More specifically, the information that is available tells us little about the real outcomes for the poor (Blowfield, 2008: 20). The challenges associated with delivering benefits, such as uneven distribution and elite capture, are rarely discussed or included in inclusive business strategy literature (ibid: 22). Using the case study of OMC and Naboisho Conservancies, this research has contributed to addressing this research gap.

This thesis also highlighted the relevance of the new concept 'Africapitalism'. This was initiated by Tony Elumelu in the banking sector of Nigeria, but comprises very few examples to date. This research has developed the notion by expanding its scope beyond that of the banking sector and has exemplified that Africapitalism is not dependent upon country nationals, or even African citizens. Within this case study, the tourism partners that are most passionate about ensuring that the conservancies have a positive development outcome are those who have personal connections to the

area, but this is not necessarily represented by their nationality. Inclusive capitalism literature (including Ashley, 2009: 7) states that, as yet, there is insufficient data to draw conclusions about its effectiveness as a development agent. This thesis is an attempt to start filling in this broad literature gap and takes it a stage further by recognising that community heterogeneity and gender dimensions have been largely ignored. In addition to the academic merits of this, there are useful practical business applications of these findings. Chapter eight brought together different fields of study, furthered concepts, and provided a new insightful case study, both in terms of industry and locale.

In several places this thesis has questioned the extent of the responsibility that the conservancies have for development, how far should this go, and who decides. No answers to these questions have been found, but they are not exclusive to this example, or even this industry. They can be extrapolated to all businesses. When a business engages in the development sphere, what is the extent of their responsibility and how far does this go temporally and geographically? This would be an interesting area of potential future research given the current gap in both tourism and conservation literature, as well as that of inclusive business strategies more generally.

9.2.3 Study Site

It is anticipated that one of the main beneficiaries of this research will be the stakeholders within the study site. This has been in my mind throughout this whole process. In addition to producing a strong academic thesis, my intention and hope has been that these findings will be useful to the conservancies and their stakeholders.

As noted in the introduction, the strengths of this research are rooted in the emphasis on interpretive paradigm and qualitative methodology, in which voice is given to local people as well as other stakeholders. This study has aimed to provide a broader view of stakeholders' understandings and perceptions of the conservancies' role in development, as opposed to earlier works in the Mara. A key strength is enhancing the focus beyond the loudest voices to include those who are often excluded. This research engaged with a multitude of stakeholders and each of these can use this thesis to learn about the perceptions and opinions of their counterparts.

More specifically, it is anticipated that chapter three will raise awareness of the contrasting definitions of development, and will thus inform the development actors of the need to match desires and actions more closely. The surprising findings in chapter six regarding estimated livestock per capita ratios will also be of great interest to those involved in the grazing schemes and livestock management in Koiyaki. Further, I expect that the comprehensive approach taken in the economic analysis of the conservancies' land use value will inform future land use deliberations. Finally, for those who have decision-making power within the conservancies, it is hoped that this thesis will unveil some of the weaknesses within the concept in a practical and constructive way, allowing them to be considered, addressed, and improved upon.

9.3 Concluding Thoughts

With regard to the aim of this thesis – to examine the relationship between the Koiyaki Conservancies and development – it is concluded that perceptions are fickle and change easily over time. This is based upon how perceived benefits are thought to weigh-up against perceived costs. The thesis has gone to great lengths to include the voices of those who may not traditionally be the first to be heard, and as a result a wide variety of opinions are represented – as is expected from heterogeneous communities – this opinion is far from universal. For those who believe that the conservancies are having a positive impact upon development this is based upon conservancies assisting with community development projects, supporting pastoralism through grazing schemes and increasing household income. It is unknown whether such positive perceptions of conservancies, that are accompanied with a more positive view of conservation and wildlife more generally, would remain if benefit streams were to reduce or cease (as discussed by Pretty and Smith, 2004). It is suggested, however, that perceptions could even worsen in comparison to the baseline prior to conservancies if the benefits dry up.

A multifaceted approach to development that does not purely focus on economic aspects is essential. Within the study site, development is perceived to be holistic. This thesis has highlighted that there are many ways in which the development impact of each of these three benefit streams examined – basic needs, livelihoods and

economic implications – could be improved. As previously stressed, belief that the conservancies are positively impacting upon development should not be interpreted as equal satisfaction with the conservancies more generally. Even those who expressed that they did not like the conservancies and wished that they were not there still noted some ways in which they were benefiting upon development. Yet for these people, the benefits did not outweigh the costs.

Many community members, like the elder in Mpuuani (FG 22) responsible for the quote at the very beginning of the thesis, are still waiting to see what benefits the conservancies will bring before making up their minds about the initiative. There are other stakeholders, including politicians, who believe that the conservancies do nothing for development and are just another way for white people to exploit the riches of the Maasai. These individuals would like to see the conservancies fold. Discontent is not the only threat currently facing the conservancies, as discussed in section 8.4, and they remain very fragile. Simultaneously, this thesis has shown that there is great potential for the conservancies to stimulate and facilitate development in the local area, so long as their sustainability can be assured.

This case study exemplifies that, given the right conditions, conservancies and other business sectors can ‘do good’ whilst making money, as purported by Porter and Kramer (2011). The implications of this are broad and wide-reaching. They push those working in development to rethink the potential role of the businesses. Given its nature, the private sector has the capability to increase the efficiency of development, as well as its magnitude and dispersal. It is essential, however, that measures are put in place to ensure that businesses are not exploitative of those that they state they are assisting. In this instance, it is secure land tenure and a partnership agreement between the landowners and the tourism partners that ensures that power and control are shared, and thus a positive developmental impact can be established. What this case study shows is that the concept of Africapitalism expands beyond Nigeria and beyond the banking sector. If non-Africans conducting businesses in conservancies in Kenya can contribute towards development, what is stopping other businesses in other sectors across the continent following suit?

Bibliography

- Adams, J. S. and T. O. McShane (1992). The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation Without Illusion. New York, Norton.
- Adams, W. and D. Hulme (2001). Changing Narratives, Policies and Practices in African Conservation. African Wildlife and Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation. D. Hulme and M. Murphree. Oxford, James Currey: 24-37.
- Adams, W. M., R. Aveling, D. Brockington, B. Dickson, B. Elliott, J. Hutton, D. Roe, B. Vira and W. Wolmer (2004). "Biodiversity conservation and the eradication of poverty." Science **306**: 1146-1149.
- Adams, W. M. and J. Hutton (2007). "People, parks and poverty: political ecology and biodiversity conservation." Conservation and Society **5**(2): 147.
- Agrawal, A. and C. C. Gibson (1999). World Development **27**(4): 629.
- Akwiri, J. (2013). Kenya expects higher tourism revenues, arrivals in 2013. The Standard.
- Alexander, J. and J. McGregor (2000). "Wildlife and politics: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe." Development and Change **31**(3): 605-627.
- All Africa. (2011). "Editorial. Nigeria: Africapitalism." Retrieved 02/02/14, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/201112300649.html>.
- Amaeshi, K. (2013). Africapitalism: a philosophy for sustainable business in Africa? The Guardian: 30/07/13.
- Amaeshi, K. (2013). "Africapitalism: Unleashing the Power of Emotions for Africa's Development?" Retrieved 20/02/14, from <http://africanarguments.org/2013/10/02/africapitalism-unleashing-the-power-of-emotions-for-africas-development-by-kenneth-amaeshi/>.
- Amaeshi, K. (2014). Inclusive Business Strategies MBA Course. University of Edinburgh.
- Anderson, D. and V. Broch-Due, Eds. (2000). The Poor are not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa. Oxford, James Currey Publishers.
- Andrade, G. S. and J. R. Rhodes (2012). "Protected areas and local communities: an inevitable partnership toward successful conservation strategies?" Ecology and Society **17**(4): 14.
- Ansari, S., K. Munir and T. Gregg (2012). "Impact at the 'bottom of the pyramid': the role of social capital in capability development and community empowerment." Journal of Management Studies **49**(4): 813-842.
- Arnstein, S. R. (1969). "Ladder of Citizen Participation." Journal of the American Institute of Planners **35**(4): 216-224.
- Arsel, M. and B. Büscher (2012). "Nature™ Inc.: Changes and Continuities in Neoliberal Conservation and Market-based Environmental Policy." Development and Change **43**(1): 53-78.
- Arthur, P. (2006). "The State, Private Sector Development, and Ghana's" Golden Age of Business"." African Studies Review **49**(1): 31-50.
- Ashley, C. (2009). Harnessing Core Business for Development Impact. London, ODI.
- Ashley, C. and J. Mitchell (2005). "Can tourism accelerate pro-poor growth in Africa." ODI Opinion paper(60).

- Ashley, C. and D. Roe (2002). "Making tourism work for the poor: strategies and challenges in southern Africa." *Development Southern Africa* **19**(1): 61-82.
- Asilia Africa. (2014). "About Naboisho." Retrieved 23/04/14, from <http://naboisho.asiliaafrica.com/About.aspx>.
- B Corps. (2014). "What are B Corps?" Retrieved 27/1/14, from <http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps>.
- Baktygulov, S. and R. Raeva (2010). *Creating value for all: Community-based tourism*. New York, United Nations Development Programme.
- Balint, P. J. and J. Mashinya (2006). "The decline of a model community-based conservation project: Governance, capacity, and devolution in Mahenye, Zimbabwe." *Geoforum* **37**(5): 805-815.
- Banerjee, A. and S. Mullainathan (2010). *The shape of temptation: Implications for the economic lives of the poor*, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Banerjee, A. V. and E. Duflo (2007). "The economic lives of the poor." *The journal of economic perspectives: a journal of the American Economic Association* **21**(1): 141.
- Barnes, M. L. and P. Eagles (2004). "Examining the relationship between ecotourists and philanthropic behaviour." *Tourism Recreation Research* **29**(3): 35-38.
- Barrett, C. B., A. J. Travis and P. Dasgupta (2011). "On biodiversity conservation and poverty traps." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* **108**(34): 13907-13912.
- Basecamp Explorer. (2014). "Mara Naboisho Conservancy." Retrieved 23/04/14, from <http://www.basecampkenya.com/wildlife/mara-naboisho-conservancy>.
- Basecamp Foundation (2011). *Basecamp Review: Sustainable Destination Development - through responsible tourism*. Nairobi, BCFK.
- Beardsworth, A. and A. Bryman (2001). "The wild animal in late modernity The case of the Disneyization of zoos." *Tourist Studies* **1**(1): 83-104.
- Bedelian, C. (2012). *Conservation and Ecotourism on Privatised Land in the Mara, Kenya: The Case of Conservancy Land Leases*. *Land Deals Politics Initiative Working Papers*. R. Pointer, LDPI. **9**.
- Bedelian, C. (2014). *Conservation, tourism and pastoral livelihoods: Wildlife Conservancies in the Maasai Mara, Kenya*. Ph.D., University College London.
- Behnke, R. H., I. Scoones and C. Kerven (1993). *Range ecology at disequilibrium : new models of natural variability and pastoral adaptation in Africas savannas*. London, ODI.
- Bendell, B. (2013). "Inkopa OlMaasai: The History of the Maasai." Retrieved 19/04/14, from <https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/2062290740/inkopa-olmaasai-the-history-of-the-maasai>.
- Berger, D. J. (1996). *The Challenge of Integrating Maasai Tradition with Tourism. People and Tourism in Fragile Environments*. M. F. Price. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons: 175-197.
- Bernard, H. R. (2006). *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Lanham, Altamira Press.
- Bianchi, R. V. (2002). *Towards a New Political Economy of Global Tourism. Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues*. R. Sharpley and D. J. Telfer. Clevedon, Channel View Publications: 265-299.

- Bieler, A. (2013). "Book Review: The Poverty of Capitalism." Retrieved 03/02/14, from <http://plutopress.wordpress.com/2013/11/15/book-review-the-poverty-of-capitalism/>.
- Birrell, I. (2010). Before you pay to volunteer abroad, think of the harm you might do. *The Guardian*.
- Bishop, M. and M. Green (2010). *Philanthrocapitalism: How giving can save the world*. New York, Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Blaikie, N. W. H. (2000). *Designing social research: the logic of anticipation*. Malden, MA., Polity Press.
- Blowfield, M. (2004). "CSR and development: is business appropriating global justice?" *Development* **47**(3): 61-68.
- Blowfield, M. (2007). "Reasons to be cheerful? What we know about CSR's impact." *Third World Quarterly* **28**(4): 683-695.
- Blowfield, M. (2008). *Draft: Business, Corporate Responsibility and Poverty*. Geneva, UNRISD.
- Blowfield, M. (2013). *Business and Sustainability*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Blowfield, M. and C. Dolan (2010). "Fairtrade Facts and Fancies: What Kenyan Fairtrade Tea Tells us About Business' Role as Development Agent." *Journal of Business Ethics* **93**(2): 143-162.
- Boas, T. C. and J. Gans-Morse (2009). "Neoliberalism: from new liberal philosophy to anti-liberal slogan." *Studies in Comparative International Development* **44**(2): 137-161.
- Bolwell, D. and W. Weinz (2008). *Reducing poverty through tourism*. Geneva, International Labour Organization.
- Bond, P. (2006). "Global governance campaigning and MDGs: From top-down to bottom-up anti-poverty work." *Third World Quarterly* **27**(2): 339-354.
- Boone, P. (1996). "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid." *European economic review* **40**(2): 289-329.
- Boyd, C., R. Blench, D. Bourn, L. Drake and P. Stevenson (1999). *Reconciling Interests among Wildlife, Livestock and People in Eastern Africa: A Sustainable Livelihoods Approach*. London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
- Briedenhann, J. and E. Wickens (2004). "Tourism routes as a tool for the economic development of rural areas—vibrant hope or impossible dream?" *Tourism Management* **25**(1): 71-79.
- Brockington, D. (1998). *Land Loss and Livelihoods. The impacts of eviction on pastoralists moved from the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania*. Ph.D., University College London.
- Brockington, D. (2002). *Fortress Conservation: the Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania*. Oxford, James Currey.
- Brockington, D. and R. Duffy (2010). "Capitalism and conservation: the production and reproduction of biodiversity conservation." *Antipode* **42**(3): 469-484.
- Brockington, D., R. Duffy and J. Igoe (2008). *Nature unbound: conservation, capitalism and the future of protected areas*. London, Earthscan.
- Brockington, D. and K. Homewood (1996). *Wildlife, Pastoralists and Science: Debates Concerning Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania. The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment*. M. Leach and R. Mearns. London, James Currey: 91-104.

- Brohman, J. (1996). "New Directions in Tourism for the Third World." Annals of Tourism Research **23**(1): 48-70.
- Brown, C. P. and J. P. Lassoie (2010). "Institutional choice and local legitimacy in community-based forest management: lessons from Cameroon." Environmental Conservation **37**(3): 261-269.
- Bryman, A. (2004). The Disneyization of society. London, Sage.
- Bryman, A. (2004). Ethnography and Participant Observation. Social Research Methods. A. Bryman. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Bulte, E. H., D. Rondeau and Brown (2005). "Research and Management Viewpoint: Why Compensating Wildlife Damages may be Bad for Conservation." Journal of Wildlife Management **69**(1): 14-19.
- Burns, P. (1999). "Paradoxes in planning tourism elitism or brutalism?" Annals of Tourism Research **26**(2): 329-348.
- Buscher, B. and W. Dressler (2012). "Commodity conservation. The restructuring of community conservation in South Africa and the Philippines." Geoforum **43**: 367-376.
- Büscher, B., S. Sullivan, K. Neves, J. Igoe and D. Brockington (2012). "Towards a synthesized critique of neoliberal biodiversity conservation." Capitalism Nature Socialism **23**(2): 4-30.
- Business Monitor International. (2014). "Kenya Tourism Report Q2 2014." Retrieved 21/04/2014, from <http://www.marketresearch.com/Business-Monitor-International-v304/Kenya-Tourism-Q2-8056325/>.
- Butcher, J. (2011). "Can ecotourism contribute to tackling poverty? The importance of 'symbiosis'." Current Issues in Tourism **14**(3): 295-307.
- Butler, R. W. (2001). "Seasonality in tourism: Issues and implications." Seasonality in tourism: 5-21.
- Butt, B. (2011). "Coping with Uncertainty and Variability: The Influence of Protected Areas on Pastoral Herding Strategies in East Africa." Human Ecology **39**(3): 289-307.
- Butt, B. (2012). "Commoditizing the Safari and Making Space for Conflict: Peace, Identity and Parks in East Africa." Political Geography **31**(2): 104-113.
- Butt, B., A. Shortridge and A. M. G. A. WinklerPrins (2009). "Pastoral Herd Management, Drought Coping Strategies, and Cattle Mobility in Southern Kenya." Annals of the Association of American Geographers **99**(2): 309-334.
- Cameron, J. (2005). Focusing on the focus group. Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography. I. Hay. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Carter, E., W. M. Adams and J. Hutton (2008). "Private protected areas: management regimes, tenure arrangements and protected area categorization in East Africa. ." Oryx **42**(2): 177-186.
- Cavaye, A. L. M. (1996). "Case study research: a multi-faceted research approach for IS." Information Systems Journal **6**(3): 227-242.
- Cerroni-Long, E. L. (1994). "Insider and Outsider Perspectives in the Study of Ethnicity: The Case of the Italian American." Ethnic Forum **14**: 121-138.
- Chambers, E. (2000). Native Tours: The Anthropology of Travel and Tourism. Chicago, Waveland Press.
- Chambers, R. (1993). Challenging the Professionals: Frontiers for Rural Development. London, Intermediate Technology Publications.

- Child, B. (2000). Application of the southern African experience to wildlife utilization and conservation in Kenya and Tanzania. Wildlife conservation by sustainable use. New York, Springer: 459-467.
- Chomsky, N. (1999). Profit over people: neoliberalism and global order. New York, Seven Stories Press.
- Cleaver, F. (2001). Institutions, agency and the limitations of participatory approaches to development. Participation: The New Tyranny? B. Cooke and U. Kothari: 36-55.
- Collett, D. (1987). Pastoralists and Wildlife: Image and Reality in Kenya Maasailand. Conservation in Africa. D. M. Anderson and R. Grove. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 129-148.
- Connell, J. H. (1978). "Diversity in tropical rain forest and coral reefs." Science **199**: 1302-1310.
- Cornwall, A. (2003). "Whose Voices? Whose Choices? Reflections on Gender and Participatory Development." World Development **31**(8): 1325-1342.
- Courtney, C. (2009). An Investigation into the Extent to which Activities in Olare Orok Conservancy, Narok District, Kenya, Conform to 'Ecotourism'. M.Sc., University of Edinburgh.
- Courtney, C. (2012). CMMF Baseline Survey Report, Basecamp Foundation Kenya.
- Cowen, M. and R. W. Shenton (1996). Doctrines of development. London, Routledge.
- Cravatte, C. and N. Chabloz (2008). "Enchantment and solidarity: Which dream does 'fair tourism' sell?" Tourist Studies **8**(2): 231-247.
- Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. Thousand Oaks CA, Sage Publications.
- Croes, R. and M. Vanegas (2008). "Cointegration and Causality between Tourism and Poverty Reduction." Journal of Travel Research **47**(1): 94-103.
- Crook, C. (2005). "The good company." The Economist **22**(2005): 3-18.
- De Kadt, E. (1990). Making the Alternative Sustainable. Sussex, Institute of Development Studies.
- Duffy, R. (2002). A Trip Too Far: Ecotourism, Politics, and Exploitation. London, Earthscan Publications.
- Duffy, R. (2006). "The Politics of Ecotourism and the Developing World." Journal of Ecotourism **5**(1&2): 1-6.
- Duffy, R. (2010). Nature Crime: how we're getting conservation wrong. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Duffy, R. (2013). "The international political economy of tourism and the neoliberalisation of nature: challenges posed by selling close interactions with animals." Review of International Political Economy **20**(3): 605-626.
- Earnshaw, A. and L. Emerton (2000). The economics of wildlife tourism: theory and reality for landholders in Africa. Wildlife Conservation by Sustainable Use. H. H. Prins, J. G. Grootenhuys and T. T. Dolan. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers: 315-334.
- Easterly, W. (2006). The white man's burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. London, Penguin.
- Edwards, M. (2008). Just another emperor?: The myths and realities of philanthrocapitalism, Demos: A Network for Ideas & Action.

- Elumelu, T. (2012). Not Your Parents Giving: Leveraging All Sectors for Change. Global Philanthropy Forum: Towards a New Social Contract, Washington DC.
- Elumelu, T. (2013). "Tony Elumelu outlines the case for Africapitalism." Retrieved 06/02/14, from <http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/tony-elumelu-outlines-the-case-for-africapitalism/26501/>.
- Elumelu, T. O. (2013). "Africapitalism: The Path to Economic Prosperity and Social Wealth." Retrieved 06/02/14, from <http://www.heirsholdings.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Africapitalism-Path-to-Economic-Prosperity-and-Social-Wealth.pdf>.
- Encounter Mara Safari Camp. (2014). "Mara Naboisho Conservancy." Retrieved 23/04/14, from <http://www.encountermara.com/conservation/mara-naboisho-conservancy>.
- Eshun, G. (2010). Ecotourism Development in Ghana: A Postcolonial Study with Focus on Boabend-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary and Kakum National Park. PhD, University of Leicester.
- FAO (1974). Handbook on human nutritional requirements. Nutritional Studies 28. Rome, FAO.
- Fennell, D. and D. Weaver (2005). "The ecotourism concept and tourism-conservation symbiosis." *Journal of Sustainable Tourism* **13**(4): 373-390.
- Ferguson, J. (1994). The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press.
- Ferguson, J. (2006). Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order. Durham, Duke University Press.
- Ferraro, P. J. (2011). "The future of payments for environmental services." *Conservation Biology* **25**(6): 1134-1138.
- Ferraro, P. J. and S. K. Pattanayak (2006). "Money for nothing? A call for empirical evaluation of biodiversity conservation investments." *PLoS biology* **4**(4): e105.
- Ferreira, S. L. (2011). "Balancing people and park: Towards a symbiotic relationship between Cape Town and Table Mountain National Park." *Current Issues in Tourism* **14**(3): 275-293.
- Fleming, J., J. Mahoney, E. Carlson and J. Engebretson (2009). "An ethnographic approach to interpreting a mental illness photovoice exhibit." *Archives of psychiatric nursing* **23**(1): 16-24.
- Foster, V. and C. Briceno-Garmendia (2010). Africa's Infrastructure: a time for transformation. Geneva, World Bank Publications.
- Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Boston, Pitman.
- Galaty, J. G. (1999). "Grounding pastoralists: law, politics, and dispossession in East Africa." *Nomadic peoples* **3**(2): 56-73.
- Garikipati, S. (2008). "The Impact of Lending to Women on Household Vulnerability and Women's Empowerment: Evidence from India." *World Development* **36**(12): 2620-2642.
- Garrod, B. (2003). "Local Participation in Planning and Management in Ecotourism: A Revised Model Approach." *Journal of Ecotourism* **2**(1): 33-53.

- Gauthier, D. A. (1993). Sustainable Development, Tourism and Wildlife. Tourism and Sustainable Development: Monitoring, Planning, Managing. J. G. Nelson, R. Butler and G. Wall. Waterloo, Department of Geography: 97-109.
- Geertz, C. (1994). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. Readings in the philosophy of social science. M. Martin and L. C. McIntyre. Massachusetts, MIT Press: 213-231.
- GIIRS. (2012). "What GIIRS Does." Retrieved 27/1/14, from <http://giirs.org/about-giirs/about>.
- Global Environment Facility. (2011). "Private Sector Partnerships: The GEF Earth Fund." Retrieved 26/3/14, from <http://www.thegef.org/gef/node/1293>.
- Gold, R. (1958). "Roles in Sociological Field Observations." Social Forces **36**: 217-223.
- Goldman, M. (2001). "Constructing an environmental state: Eco-governmentality and other transnational practices of a 'green' World Bank." Social Problems **48**(4): 499-523.
- Goldman, M. J. (2011). "Strangers in Their Own Land: Maasai and Wildlife Conservation in Northern Tanzania." Conservation & Society **9**(1).
- Gomm, R. (2008). Observing Naturally Occurring Events. Social Research Methodology: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 268-294.
- Goodwin, H. and R. Santilli (2009). Community-based tourism: A success? (ICRT Occasional Paper No. 11). International Centre for Responsible Travel.
- Goodwin, H. J. (1998). Tourism, Conservation and Sustainable Development: Case Studies from Asia and Africa-7786iied, IIED.
- Government of Kenya. (2005-6). "Kenya Open Data Initiative." Retrieved 13/11/13, from <https://www.opendata.go.ke/>.
- Government of Kenya (2007). Kenya Vision 2030. Nairobi, Government Press.
- Grandia, L. (2007). "Between bolivar and bureaucracy: the Mesoamerican biological corridor." Conservation and Society **5**(4): 478.
- Gray, N. (2002). "Unpacking the Baggage of Ecotourism: Nature, Science and Local Participation." Great Lakes Geographer **9**(2): 113-123.
- Griffith, A. I. (1998). "Insider / Outsider: Epistemological Privilege and Mothering Work." Human Studies **21**: 361-376.
- Grime, J. P. (1973). "Competitive exclusion in herbaceous vegetation." Nature **242**: 344-347.
- Groves, P. (2003). Insider, Outsider, or Exotic Other? Identity, Performance, and Postcritical Ethnography. Black Women in the Field: Experiences Understanding Ourselves and Others Through Qualitative Research. G. G. Generett and R. B. Jeffries. Cresskill, New Jersey, Hampton Press Inc: 103-115.
- Halderman, J. M. (1989). Development and Famine Risk in Kenya Maasailand. Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley.
- Hamann, R. (2007). "Introduction: Is Corporate Citizenship Making a Difference." Journal of Corporate Citizenship **2007**(28): 15-29.
- Hammersley, M. and P. Atkinson (1995). Ethnography. London, Routledge.
- Hanna, K. S., D. A. Clark and D. S. Slocombe (2008). Introduction. Transforming Parks and Protected Areas: Policy and Governance in a Changing World. K. S. Hanna, D. A. Clark and D. S. Slocombe. New York, Routledge: 1-12.

- Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science **162**: 1243-1248.
- Harrison, D. (2001). Tourism and Less Developed Countries: Key Issues. Tourism and the Less Developed World: Issues and Case Studies. D. Harrison. Oxon, CABI: 23-46.
- Harrison, P. (2001). Good Pasture and Paying Guests: Prospects for Symbiosis of Pastoralism and Wildlife Tourism at Il Ngwesi Group Ranch, Kenya. MSc, SOAS.
- Harvey, D. (2007). "Neoliberalism as creative destruction." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science **610**(1): 21-44.
- Hawkins, D. E. and S. Mann (2007). "The world bank's role in tourism development." Annals of Tourism Research **34**(2): 348-363.
- Hemingways Expeditions. (2014). "Sustainable Naboisho Conservancy." Retrieved 23/04/14, from <http://www.hemingways-expeditions.com/2011/09/the-groundbreaking-sustainable-naboisho-conservancy/>.
- Hesslerová, P. and J. Pokorný (2011). Effect of Mau Forest Clear Cut on Temperature Distribution and Hydrology of Catchment of Lakes Nakuru and Naivasha: Preliminary Study. Water and Nutrient Management in Natural and Constructed Wetlands. J. Vymazal, Springer Netherlands: 263-273.
- Hilary, J. (2013). The Poverty of Capitalism: Economic Meltdown and the Struggle for What Comes Next. London, Pluto Books.
- Hirsch, A. (2013). 'Africapitalism' promises new model of African self-empowerment. The Guardian, 26/02/13.
- Hodgson, D. L. (2001). Once intrepid warriors: Gender, ethnicity, and the cultural politics of Maasai development. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Holmes, G. (2012). "Biodiversity for Billionaires: Capitalism, Conservation and the Role of Philanthropy in Saving/Selling Nature." Development and Change **43**(1): 185-203.
- Homewood, K. (2008). Ecology of African Pastoralist Societies. Oxford, James Currey.
- Homewood, K. (2012). Group Session Discussion. Payment for Ecosystem Services and Climate Change Adaptation Workshop. ILRI, Nairobi.
- Homewood, K., P. Chenevix Trench and P. Kristjanson (2009). Staying Maasai? Pastoral Livelihoods, Diversification and the Role of Wildlife in Development. Staying Maasai? Livelihoods, Conservation and Development in East African Rangelands. K. Homewood, P. Chenevix Trench and P. Kristjanson. New York, Springer: 369-408.
- Homewood, K., E. Coast and M. Thompson (2004). "In-migrants and exclusion in East African rangelands: access, tenure and conflict." Africa **74**(4): 567-610.
- Homewood, K., K. H. P. Kristjanson and P. Chenevix Trench (2009). Family Portraits - Mara. Staying Maasai? Livelihoods, Conservation and Development in East African Rangelands. K. Homewood, K. H. P. Kristjanson and P. Chenevix Trench. New York, Springer: 69-76.
- Homewood, K., P. Kristjanson and P. Chenevix Trench (2009). Changing Land Use, Livelihoods and Wildlife Conservation in Maasailand. Staying Maasai? Pastoral Livelihoods, Diversification and the Role of Wildlife in Development. K. Homewood, P. Chenevix Trench and P. Kristjanson. New York, Springer: 1-42.

- Homewood, K. M., E. Coast, S. Kiruswa, S. Serneels, M. Thompson and P. Trench (2006). Maasai Pastoralists: Diversification and Poverty. Pastoralism and Poverty Reduction in East Africa: A Policy Research Conference. International Livestock Research Institute.
- Homewood, K. M. and W. A. Rodgers (1991). Maasailand Ecology: Pastoralist Development and Wildlife Conservation in Ngorongoro, Tanzania. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Honey, M. (2002). Ecotourism and certification. Washington D.C., Island Press.
- Honey, M. (2008). Ecotourism and Sustainable Development: Who Owns Paradise? Washington D.C., Island Press.
- Hoole, A. F. (2010). "Place – Power – Prognosis : community-based conservation, partnerships and ecotourism enterprise in Namibia." International Journal of the Commons 4(1): 78-99.
- Hoole, A. F. and F. Berkes (2010). "Breaking down fences: Recoupling social–ecological systems for biodiversity conservation in Namibia." Geoforum 41(2): 304-317.
- Hughes, D. M. (2006). From Enslavement to Environmentalism: Politics on a Southern African Frontier. Seattle, University of Washington Press.
- Hughes, L. (2006). Moving the Maasai: A colonial misadventure. Basingstoke UK, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hughes, R. and F. Flintan (2001). Integrating conservation and development experience: a review and bibliography of the ICDP literature, London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Hulme, D. and M. Murphree (2001). Community Conservation in Africa: An Introduction. African Wildlife and Livelihoods. D. Hulme and M. Murphree. Oxford, James Currey.
- Hutton, J., W. M. Adams and J. C. Murombedzi (2005). "Back to the barriers? Changing narratives in biodiversity conservation." Forum for Development Studies 32: 341-370.
- Igoe, J. and D. Brockington (2007). "Neoliberal conservation: A brief introduction." Conservation and Society 5(4): 432.
- Igoe, J. and B. Croucher (2007). "Conservation, commerce, and communities: the story of community-based wildlife management areas in Tanzania's northern tourist circuit." Conservation and Society 5(4): 534.
- International Monetary Fund (2011). World Economic Outlook Database April 2011. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx>.
- Jandreau, C. (2012). Integrating knowledge systems for participatory monitoring of wildlife and rangeland conditions in the Maasai Mara ecosystem, Kenya
- . Thesis proposal, University of Manitoba.
- Johnson, G. A. (2011). "A child's right to participation: Photovoice as methodology for documenting the experiences of children living in kenyan orphanages." Visual Anthropology Review 27(2): 141-161.
- Jones, S. and G. Carswell (2004). Agents and Approaches in Environment and Development. Environment, Development and Rural Livelihoods. London, Earthscan: 93-103.
- Kaelo, D. (2009). Discussion with Dickson Kaelo. Koiyaki Guiding School, Koiyaki, 23/04/09.

- Kaelo, D. (2009). OOC Presentation. Sarova Mara Game Camp, Masai Mara National Reserve, 3rd April 2009.
- Kaigil, J. (2009). Discussion with James Kaigil, Former Group Ranch Representative. Olare Orok Conservancy, 09/04/09.
- Kamau, S. (2014). Tough times ahead for EA tourism as insecurity scares visitors away. The East African.
- Kapoor, I. (2004). "Hyper-self-reflective development? Spivak on representing the third world "other"." Third World Quarterly **25**(4): 627-647.
- Karnani, A. (2007). "The Mirage of Marketing to the Bottom of the Pyramid: How the Private Sector Can Help Alleviate Poverty." California Management Review **49**(4): 90-111.
- Karnani, A. (2009). "Romanticizing the poor." Stanford Social Innovation Review **7**(1): 38-43.
- Khanal, B. R. and J. T. Babar (2007). Community based ecotourism for sustainable tourism development in the Mekong Region. Hanoi, CUTS Hanoi Resource Centre.
- Kicheche Camps. (2012). "Mara Naboisho." Retrieved 23/04/14, from <http://kicheche.com/conservancies/naboisho>.
- Kiss, A. (1990). Living with Wildlife: Wildlife Resource Management with Local Participation in Africa. Washington D.C., World Bank.
- Kiss, A. (2004). "Is community-based ecotourism a good use of biodiversity conservation funds?" Trends in Ecology and Evolution **19**(5): 232.
- Knowles, J. N. and D. P. Collet (1989). "Nature as myth, symbol and action: notes towards a historical understanding of development and conservation in Kenyan Maasailand." Africa **59**(04): 433-460.
- Kolk, A., M. Rivera-Santos and C. Rufin (2013). "Reviewing a Decade of Research on the "Base/Bottom of the Pyramid"(BOP) Concept." Business & Society **Forthcoming: published online before print**.
- Kolk, A. and R. van Tulder (2006). "Poverty alleviation as business strategy? Evaluating commitments of frontrunner Multinational Corporations." World Development **34**(5): 789-801.
- Kontogeorgopoulos, N., A. Churyen and V. Duangsaeng (2013). "Tourism success factors in community-based tourism in Thailand: The role of luck, external support, and local leadership." Tourism Planning and Development **11**(1): 106-124.
- Kosoy, N. and E. Corbera (2010). "Payments for Ecosystem Services as Commodity Fetishism." Ecological Economics **69**(6): 1228-1236.
- Kramer, M. and J. Kania (2006). "Changing the game: leading corporations switch from defense to offense in solving global problems." Stanford Social Innovation Review **1**: 22-29.
- Kronenberg, J. and K. Hubacek (2013). "Could payments for ecosystem services create an "ecosystem service curse"? ." Ecology and Society **18**(1): 10.
- KWCA. (2014). "About KWCA." Retrieved 28/08/14, from <http://kwcakenya.com/page/about>.
- KWCA. (2014). "Conservancy Statistics." Retrieved 28/05/14, from <http://kwcakenya.com/>.

- Lacey, G., V. Peel and B. Weiler (2012). "Disseminating the voice of the Other: A Case Study of Philanthropic Tourism." Annals of Tourism Research **39**(2): 1199-1220.
- Lamprey, R. (1984). Maasai impact of Kenya savanna vegetation: a remote sensing approach. PhD, University of Aston-in-Birmingham, UK.
- Lamprey, R. and R. S. Reid (2004). "Expansion of human settlement in Kenya's Maasai Mara: what future for pastoralism and wildlife?" Journal of Biogeography **31**: 997-1032.
- Langholz, J. A. (1999). "Exploring the effects of alternative income opportunities on rainforest use: insights from Guatemala's Maya Biosphere Reserve." Society & Natural Resources **12**: 139-149.
- Langholz, J. A. and W. Krug (2004). "New forms of biodiversity governance: non-state actors and the private protected area plan." Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy **7**: 1-21.
- Lanza, A., A. Markandya and F. Pigliaru (2005). The economics of tourism and sustainable development, The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics and the Environment.
- Lapeyre, R. (2010). "Community-based tourism as a sustainable solution to maximise impacts locally? The Tsiseb Conservancy case, Namibia." Development Southern Africa **27**(5): 757-772.
- Le, T.-A., D. Weaver and L. Lawton (2012). Factors influencing the performance of community- based tourism in the semi-periphery of Viet Nam: A resident pverspective from Ta Van Village. CAUTHE - Council for Australian University Tourism and Hospitality Education, Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre.
- Leach, M. and R. Mearns (1996). Challenging Received Wisdom in Africa. The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment. M. Leach and R. Mearns. Oxford, James Currey: 1-33.
- Leach, M., R. Mearns and I. Scoones (1999). "Environmental entitlements: dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management." World development **27**(2): 225-247.
- Lee, C.-K. and K. Seyoung (1998). "Measuring earnings inequality and median earnings in the tourism industry." Tourism Management **19**(4): 341-348.
- Levine, A. and G. Wandesforde-Smith (2004). "Wildlife, markets, states, and communities in Africa: looking beyond the invisible hand." Journal of Wildlife Law and Policy **7**: 135-142.
- Linnay, J. (2013). Opportunities and Limitations of (Social) Entrepreneurial Approaches: A Case Study of the Recycling Sector in Cape Town, South Africa. M.Sc., Queen's University, Canada.
- London, T. and S. L. Hart (2004). "Reinventing strategies for emerging markets: beyond the transnational model." Journal of international business studies **35**(5): 350-370.
- Manyara, G. and E. Jones (2007). "Community-based Tourism Enterprises Development in Kenya: An Exploration of Their Potential as Avenues of Poverty Reduction." Journal of Sustainable Tourism **15**(6): 628-644.
- Manyara, G. M. (2006). Tourism development and poverty alleviation: rhetoric of reality: a case study of Kenya. PhD, University of Wales.

- Mara Naboisho Conservancy. (2012). "Wildlife found in the Maasai Mara Naboisho Conservancy." Retrieved 23/04/14, from <http://www.maranaboisho.com/page/wildlife/index>.
- Marshall, K. (2014). "Optimizing the use of breed types in developing country livestock production systems: a neglected research area." *Journal of Animal Breeding and Genetics* **131**(5): 1-12.
- Mat Som, A. P. (2005). *Community Involvement in Ecotourism*. PhD, University of Strathclyde.
- Matarrita-Cascante, D. (2010). "Beyond growth: Reaching tourism-led development." *Annals of Tourism Research* **37**(4): 1141-1163.
- May, L. A. (2013). "IRIN. Briefing: Devolution to Transform Kenya." Retrieved 12/05/14, from <http://www.irinnews.org/report/97726/devolution-in-kenya>.
- Mbaiwa, J. (2011). "The effects of tourism development on the sustainable utilisation of natural resources in the Okavango Delta, Botswana." *Current Issues in Tourism* **14**(3): 251-273.
- Mbaria, J. (2007). *The Myths of Ecotourism*. The East African.
- Mbembe, J.-A. (2001). *On the postcolony*. Oakland, University of California Press.
- Mburu, J. (2002). *Factors Influencing Landowner's Participation in Wildlife Co-Management in Kenya*. 9th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP). Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.
- Mburu, J., R. Birner and M. Zeller (2003). "Relative importance and determinants of landowners' transaction costs in collaborative wildlife management in Kenya: an empirical analysis." *Ecological Economics* **45**(1): 59-73.
- McAfee, K. (2012). "The contradictory logic of global ecosystem services markets." *Development and Change* **43**(1): 105-131.
- McCabe, J. T. (1997). "Risk and uncertainty among the Maasai of the Ngorongoro conservation area in Tanzania: A case study in economic change." *Nomadic Peoples* **1**: 54-65.
- McCarthy, J. (2005). "Devolution in the woods: community forestry as hybrid neoliberalism." *Environment and Planning A* **37**(6): 995-1014.
- McFalls, R. (2007). "Testing the Limits of Inclusive Capitalism." *Journal of Corporate Citizenship* **2007**(28): 85-98.
- McShane, T. O., P. D. Hirsch, T. C. Trung, A. N. Songorwa, A. Kinzig, B. Monteferri, D. Mutekanga, H. V. Thang, J. L. Dammert, M. Pulgar-Vidal, M. Welch-Devine, J. Petter Broius, P. Coppolillo and S. O'Connor (2011). "Hard choices: making trade-offs between biodiversity conservation and human well-being." *Biological Conservation* **144**(3): 966-972.
- Merriam, S. B., J. Johnson-Bailey, M. Lee, Y. Kee, G. Ntseane and M. Muhamad (2001). "Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider / Outsider Status Within and Across Cultures." *International Journal of Lifelong Education* **20**(5): 405-416.
- Merton, R. K. (1972). "Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge." *American Journal of Sociology* **78**(1): 9-47.
- Middleton, J. (1992). *The World of Swahili: An African Mercantile Civilisation*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

- Mihalic, T. (2002). Tourism and Economic Development Issues. Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues. R. Sharpley and D. J. Telfer. Clevedon, Channel View Publications: 81-111.
- Mitchell, J. and C. Ashley (2010). Tourism and poverty reduction : pathways to prosperity. London, Earthscan.
- Mitchell, J. and P. Muckosy (2008). "A misguided quest: Community-based tourism in Latin America." ODI Opinion paper **102**.
- MNLP. (2013). "Annual Report June 2012-July 2013." Retrieved 17/09/13, from <http://www.mnlp.org>.
- Morris, A. W. (2008). "Easing conservation? Conservation easements, public accountability and neoliberalism." Geoforum **39**(3): 1215-1227.
- Moscardo, G. (2008). Building community capacity for tourism development: Conclusion. Building community capacity for tourism development. G. Moscardo. Wallingford, CAB International: 172-179.
- Mosse, D. (2005). Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. London, Pluto Press.
- Mowforth, M. and I. Munt (2009). Tourism and sustainability: Development, globalisation and new tourism in the third world. New York, Routledge.
- Mtapuri, O. and A. Giampiccoli (2014). "Towards a comprehensive model of community-based tourism development." South African Geographical Journal **2014**: 1-15.
- Muradian, R., E. Corbera, U. Pascual, N. Kosoy and P. May (2010). "Reconciling theory and practice: an alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for environmental services." Ecological Economics **69**(6): 1202-1208.
- Murombedzi, J. C. (1999). "Devolution and stewardship in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme." Journal of International Development **11**: 287-293.
- Murphy, E. and R. Dingwall (2001). The Ethics of Ethnography. Handbook of Ethnography. P. Atkinson, A. Coffey and S. Delamont. London, Sage: 339-351.
- Murphy, P. E. (2013). Tourism: A community approach. London, Routledge.
- Mwangi, D. W. (2005). A Case Study Analysis on the Social Impact of the Ecotourism Project in Selenkei Ranch, Amboseli, Kenya. MA, University of Witwatersrand.
- Mwangi, E. (2006). "The footprints of history: Path dependence in the transformation of property rights in Kenya's Maasailand." Journal of Institutional Economics **2**(2): 157-180.
- Mwangi, E. (2007). "The puzzle of group ranch subdivision in Kenya's Maasailand." Development and Change **38**(5): 889-910.
- Mwangi, E. (2007). "Subdividing the commons: Distributional conflict in the transition from collective to individual property rights in Kenya's Maasailand." World development **35**(5): 815-834.
- Mwirigi, M. C. (2010). The role of microcredit projects in economic empowerment of women: a case of LEWA Wildlife Conservancy, Kenya. MA, University of Nairobi.
- Naguran, R. (1999). Community Based Tourism in KwaZulu Natal: Some Conceptual Issues. Ecotourism Development in Eastern and Southern Africa. D. G. Reid. Harare, Zimbabwe, Weaver Press.

- Nash, D. (1989). Tourism as a form of Imperialism. The Anthropology of Tourism. V. L. Smith. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press: 37-52.
- Nelson, F., B. Gardner, J. Igoe and A. Williams (2009). Community-based conservation and Maasai livelihoods in Tanzania. Staying Maasai? K. Homewood, P. Kristjanson and P. Trench. New York, Springer: 299-333.
- Nestel, P. S. (1986). "A society in transition: development and seasonal influences on the nutrition of Masai women and children." Food and Nutrition Bulletin 8: 2-18.
- Neumann, R. P. (1998). Imposing Wilderness: Struggles Over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Newell, P. and J. G. Frynas (2007). "Beyond CSR? Business, poverty and social justice: an introduction." Third World Quarterly 28(4): 669-681.
- Ngunyi, R. N. (2009). Ecotourism and Sustainable Development in Kenya. PhD, Sun Yat Sen University.
- Norton, A. (1996). "Experiencing nature: The reproduction of environmental discourse through safari tourism in East Africa." Geoforum 27(3): 355-373.
- Norton-Griffiths, M. (1996). "Property rights and the marginal wildebeest: an economic analysis of wildlife conservation options in Kenya." Biodiversity & Conservation 5(12): 1557-1577.
- Norton-Griffiths, M. (2007). "How many wildebeest do you need?" World Economics 8(2): 41.
- Norton-Griffiths, M. and M. Y. Said (2010). The future for wildlife on Kenya's rangelands: an economic perspective. Wild rangelands: conserving wildlife while maintaining livestock in semi-arid ecosystems. J. du Toit, R. Kock and J. Deutsch. Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: 367-392.
- Norton-Griffiths, M., M. Y. Said, S. Serneels, D. Kaelo, M. Coughenour, R. Lamprey, M. Thompson and R. S. Reid (2008). Land Use Economics in the Mara Area of the Serengeti Ecosystem. Serengeti III: Human Impacts on Ecosystem Dynamics. A. R. E. Sinclair, C. Packer, S. A. R. Mduma and J. M. Fryxell. London, University of Chicago Press: 379-416.
- Notenbaert, A. M. O., J. Davies, J. De Leeuw, M. Said, M. Herrero, P. Manzano, M. Waithaka, A. Aboud and S. Omondi (2012). "Policies in Support of Pastoralism and Biodiversity in the Heterogeneous Drylands of East Africa." Pastoralism 2(14): 1-17.
- Novelli, M. and A. Hellwig (2011). "The UN Millennium Development Goals, tourism and development: the tour operators' perspective." Current Issues in Tourism 14(3): 205-220.
- Novelli, M. and A. Scarth (2007). "Tourism in Protected Areas: Integrating Conservation and Community Development in Liwonde National Park (Malawi)." Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development 4(1): 47-73.
- Nyariki, D. M., A. W. Mwang'ombe and D. M. Thompson (2009). "Land-Use Change and Livestock Production Challenges in an Integrated System: The Masai-Mara Ecosystem, Kenya." Journal of Human Ecology 26(3): 163-173.
- Nyariki, D. M., Mwang'ombe, A.W. & Thompson, D.M. (2009). "Land-Use Change and Livestock Production Challenge in an Integrated System: The Masai-Mara Ecosystem, Kenya." Journal of Human Ecology 26(3): 163-173.

- Oba, G., N. C. Stenseth and W. J. Lusigi (2000). "New Perspectives on Sustainable Grazing Management in Arid Zones of Sub-Saharan Africa." BioScience **50**(1): 35-51.
- Ogutu, J., N. Owen-Smith, H. P. Peipho and M. Said (2011). "Continuing wildlife population declines and range contraction in the Mara region of Kenya during 1977-2009." Journal of Zoology **285**(2): 99-109.
- Ogutu, Z. A. (2002). "The Impact of Ecotourism on Livelihood and Natural Resource Management in Eselenkei, Amboseli Ecosystem, Kenya." Land Degradation & Development **13**: 251-256.
- Olson, D. H. (1977). 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' Views of Relationships: Research Studies. Close Relationships: Perspectives on the Meaning of Intimacy. G. Levinger and H. L. Raush. Amhurst, University of Massachusetts Press: 115-135.
- Osano, P. M., M. Y. Said, J. de Leeuw, N. Ndiwa, D. Kaelo, S. Schomers, R. Birner and J. O. Ogutu (2013). "Why keep lions instead of livestock? Assessing wildlife tourism-based payment for ecosystem services involving herders in the Maasai Mara, Kenya." Natural Resources Forum **37**(4): 242-256.
- Parnwell, M. (2002). Agropolitan and Bottom-up Development. The Companion to Development Studies. V. Desai and R. Potter. London, Arnold.
- Pink, S. (2013). Doing visual ethnography. London, Sage.
- Platteau, J. P. (2004). "Monitoring elite capture in Community-Driven development." Development and Change **35**(2): 223-246.
- Porter, M. E. and M. R. Kramer (2011). "The big idea: creating shared value." Harvard Business Review **89**(1): 2.
- Prahalad, C. K. (2009). The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, Revised and Updated 5th Anniversary Edition: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits. New Jersey, FT Press.
- Pretty, J. N. (1995). "The Many Interpretations of Participation." Focus **16**(1): 4-5.
- Pretty, J. N. and D. Smith (2004). "Social capital in biodiversity conservation and management." Conservation Biology **18**: 631-638.
- Prieto-Carrón, M., P. Lund-Thomsen, A. Chan, A. N. A. Muro and C. Bhushan (2006). "Critical perspectives on CSR and development: what we know, what we don't know, and what we need to know." International Affairs **82**(5): 977-987.
- Rabe, M. (2003). "Research Reports: Revisiting 'Insiders' and 'Outsiders' as Social Researchers." African Sociological Review **7**(2): 149-161.
- Raddon, M.-B. (2008). "Neoliberal legacies: Planned giving and the new philanthropy." Studies in Political Economy **81**.
- Reid, D. G. (1999). Defining Ecotourism. Ecotourism Development in Eastern and Southern Africa. D. G. Reid. Harare, Zimbabwe, Weaver Press: 29-38.
- Reid, R. S. (2012). Savannas of our birth : people, wildlife, and change in East Africa. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Reid, R. S., M. Rainy, J. Ogutu, R. L. Kruska, K. Kimani, M. Nyabenge, M. McCartney, M. Kshatriya, J. Worden, L. Ng'ang'a, J. Owuor, J. Kinoti, E. Njuguna, C. J. Wilson and R. Lamprey (2003). People, Wildlife and Livestock in the Mara Ecosystem: the Mara Count 2002. Nairobi, International Livestock Research Institute.

- Responsible BOP. (2012). "From the Debate: Conclusions drawn by seven panellists from the world of business, strategic management and development policy who participated in an Oxford University debate on May 3rd (2012) about the merits of risks of the Bottom of the Pyramid approach." Retrieved 8/1/14, 2014, from <http://responsiblebop.com/2012/08/>.
- Reto-o-Reto (n.d.). Conservation in Kitengela: Keeping land open for people, livestock and wildlife. Reto-o-Reto Policy Brief 1.
- Riley, M. and A. Ladkin (2002). Tourism employment: Analysis and planning. Clevedon, Channel View Publications.
- Robson, J. and I. Robson (1996). "From shareholders to stakeholders: critical issues for tourism marketers." Tourism Management **17**(7): 533-540.
- Roe, D., N. Leader-Williams and D. B. Dalal-Clayton (1997). Take only photographs, leave only footprints: The environmental impacts of wildlife tourism. London, IIED.
- Roe, D. and P. Urquhart (2001). Pro-poor tourism: harnessing the world's largest industry for the world's poor. London, IIED.
- Rogers, E. (2012). Critical Artistic Response to Environmental Neocolonialism Embedded in Wildlife Conservation. Masters, University at Buffalo.
- Rosenbaum, P. and D. Rubin (1983). "The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects." Biometrika **70**: 41-55.
- Russel, D. and C. Harshbarger (2003). Groundwork for Community-based Conservation: Strategies for Social research. Landham MD, AltaMira Press.
- Russell, D. E. H. (1995). Incestuous Abuse: Its Long Term Edffects. Pretoria, Human Science Research Council.
- Rutten, M. (1992). Land Reform in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. The Diversity of Development. A. van Naerssen, M. Rutten and E. Zoomers. Assen, Van Gorcum.
- Rutten, M. (2002). Parks beyond parks: genuine community-based wildlife eco-tourism or just another loss of land for Maasai pastoralists in Kenya? Issue paper no. 111. London, International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Rutten, M. (2004). Partnerships in community-based ecotourism projects: experiences from the Maasai Region, Kenya: volume 1. ASC Working Paper: 57. Leiden, African Studies Centre.
- Saarinen, J., C. Rogerson and H. Manwa (2011). "Tourism and Millennium Development Goals: tourism for global development?" Current Issues in Tourism **14**(3): 201-203.
- Sachs, J. (2006). The end of poverty: economic possibilities for our time. London, Penguin.
- Savory, A. (1988). Holistic Resource Management. Washington DC, Island Press.
- Sawaya, F. (2008). "Capitalism and Philanthropy in the (New) Gilded Age." American Quarterly **60**(1): 201-213.
- Sayagie, G. (2013). Chinese top list of Mara park tourists. Daily Nation.
- Sayialel, K. (2009). Interview with Kipeen ole Sayialel. Maji Moto, Narok District, 29/04/09.
- Scheyvens, R. (2002). Tourism for Development: Empowering Communities. London, Pearson Education Ltd.

- Schubert, S. F., J. G. Brida and W. A. Risso (2011). "The impacts of international tourism demand on economic growth of small economies dependent on tourism." *Tourism Management* **32**(2): 377-385.
- Schulpen, L. and P. Gibbon (2002). "Private sector development: policies, practices and problems." *World Development* **30**(1): 1-15.
- Scoones, I., Ed. (1995). *Living with Uncertainty: New Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa*. London, Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Scoones, I. (1996). Policy Polemics and Pasture in Southern Africa. *The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment*. London, James Currey: 34-53.
- Scott, L., J. D. Williams, S. M. Baker, J. Brace-Govan, H. Downey, A.-M. Hakstian, G. R. Henderson, P. S. Loro and D. Webb (2011). "Beyond Poverty: Social Justice in a Global Marketplace." *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing* **30**(1): 39-46.
- Sebele, L. S. (2010). "Community-based tourism ventures, benefits and challenges: Khama Rhino Sanctuary Trust, Central District, Botswana." *Tourism Management* **31**(1): 136-146.
- Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Seno, S. K. and W. W. Shaw (2002). "Land tenure policies, Maasai traditions, and wildlife conservation in Kenya." *Society & Natural Resources* **15**(1): 79-88.
- Sharpe, B. (1998). "First the Forest: Conservation, Community and Participation in South-West Cameroon." *Africa* **68**(1): 25-45.
- Sharpley, R. (2000). "Tourism and Sustainable Development: Exploring the Theoretical Divide." *Journal of Sustainable Tourism* **8**(1): 1-19.
- Silverman, D. (2006). *Ethnography and Observation. Interpreting Qualitative Data*. D. Silverman. London, Sage: 65-108.
- Simanis, E., S. Hart and D. Duke (2008). "The base of the pyramid protocol: Beyond "basic needs" business strategies." *Innovations* **3**(1): 57-84.
- Simpson, M. C. (2009). "An integrated approach to assess the impacts of tourism on community development and sustainable livelihoods." *Community Development Journal* **44**(2): 186-208.
- Sinclair, A. R. E. (2008). Integrating Conservation in Human and Natural Ecosystems. *Serengeti III: Human Impacts on Ecosystem Dynamics*. A. R. E. Sinclair, C. Packer, S. A. R. Mduma and J. M. Fryxell. Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 471-489.
- Sindiga, I. (1994). "Employment and Training in Tourism in Kenya." *Annals of Tourism Research* **5**(2): 45-52.
- Snider, R. T. (2012). *Land Tenure, Ecotourism and Sustainable Livelihoods: 'Living on the Edge' of the Greater Maasai Mara, Kenya*. PhD, University of Waterloo.
- Songorwa, A. N. (1999). "Community-based wildlife management (CWM) in Tanzania: Are the communities interested?" *World development* **27**(12): 2061-2079.
- Sonne, J. (2010). *The Role of Tourism in Poverty Reduction in Elmina, Ghana*. PhD, University of Bedfordshire.
- Sorlie, E. B. (2008). *The Establishment of Wildlife Conservancies in the Mara: The Case of Olare Orok Conservancy*. MA, University of Oslo.

- Southgate, C. R. J. (2006). "Ecotourism in Kenya: The Vulnerability of Communities." Journal of Ecotourism **5**(1-2): 80-96.
- Spear, T. and R. Waller (1993). Being Maasai: Ethnicity and Identity in East Africa. Oxford, James Currey Publishers.
- Spiegel, A. D. and A. M. Mehlwana (1997). Family as a Social Network: Kinship and Sporadic Migrancy in the Western Campe's Khayekutsha. Co-operative Research Programme on Marriage and Family Life. Pretoria, Human Science Research Council. **Report HG/MF-31**.
- Staddon, S. (2014). 'So what kind of student are you?' The ethics of 'giving back' to research participants: Experiences from fieldwork in the community forests of Nepal. Fieldwork in the Global South: Ethical Challenges and Dilemmas. J. Lunn. Oxon, Routledge: 249-261.
- Stern, C., J. Lassoie, D. Lee, D. Deshler and J. Schelhas (2003). "Community participation in ecotourism benefits: the link to conservation and perspectives." Society & Natural Resources **16**(5): 387-414.
- Stronza, A. (2001). "ANTHROPOLOGY OF TOURISM: Forging New Ground for Ecotourism and Other Alternatives." Annual Review of Anthropology **30**(1): 261-283.
- Stronza, A. (2007). "The economic promise of ecotourism for conservation." Journal of Ecotourism **6**(3): 210-230.
- Suansri, P. (2003). Community-Based Tourism Handbook. Bangkok, Responsible Ecological Social Tour (REST).
- Swift, J. (1996). Desertification: Narratives, Winners and Losers. The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment. M. Leach and R. Mearns. London, James Currey: 73-90.
- Talbot, L. H. (1973). Ecological Consequences of Rangeland Development in Maasailand, East Africa. The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development. M. T. Farvar and J. P. Milton. London, Stacey.
- Telfer, D. J. (2002). Conclusion: Tourism and Development. Tourism and Development: Concepts and Issues. R. Sharpley and D. J. Telfer. Clevedon, Channel View Publications: 338-348.
- Telfer, D. J. and R. Sharpley (2008). Tourism and Development in the Developing World. Oxon, Routledge.
- The Safari and Conservation Co. (2011). "Shompole Closure." Retrieved 15/04/15, 2015, from <http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=880cdf0559552a47e4929f0ba&id=0c41fa86a8>.
- The Star. (2014). "Four Men Deny Burning Sh46 Billion Lodging." Retrieved 17.09.14, 2014, from <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-188837/four-men-deny-burning-sh46-billion-lodging>.
- Thompson, D. M., S. Serneels and E. F. Lambin (2002). Land use strategies in the Mara ecosystem: A spatial analysis linking socio-economic data with landscape variables. Linking People, Place, and Policy. New York, Springer: 39-68.
- Thompson, D. M., S. Serneels, D. Ole Kaelo and P. Chenevix Trench (2009). Maasai Mara - Land Privatisation and Wildlife Decline: Can Conservation Pay Its Way? Staying Maasai? Pastoral Livelihoods, Diversification and the Role of Wildlife in Development. K. Homewood, P. Kristjanson and P. Chenevix Trench. New York, Springer: 77-114.

- Thompson, M. (2002). Livestock, cultivation and tourism: Livelihood choices and conservation in the Masai Mara buffer zones. PhD, University College London.
- Thompson, M. and K. M. Homewood (2002). "Entrepreneurs, Elites, and Exclusion in Maasailand: Trends in Wildlife Conservation and Pastoralist Development." Human Ecology **30**(1): 107-138.
- Thompson, M. and K. M. Homewood (2002). "Entrepreneurs, Elites, and Exclusion in Maasailand: Trends in Wildlife Conservation and Pastoralist Development." Human Ecology **30**(1): 107-138.
- Thomson, J. (1885). Through Masai Land: A journey of exploration among the snowclad volcanic mountains and strange tribes of Eastern Equatorial Africa. Being the narrative of the Royal Geographical Society's Expedition to Mount Kenia and Lake Victoria Nyanza 1883-1884. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company.
- Thrane, C. (2008). "Earnings differentiation in the tourism industry: Gender, human capital and socio-demographic effects." Tourism Management **29**(3): 514-524.
- Tignor, R. L. (1976). The colonial transformation of Kenya: the Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939. Princeton and Guildford, Princeton University Press.
- Tosun, C., J. T. Dallen and O. Yuksel (2003). "Tourism growth, national development and regional inequality in Turkey." Journal of Sustainable Tourism **11**(2-3): 133-161.
- Twyman, C., J. Morrison and D. Sporton (1999). "The final fifth: Autobiography, reflexivity and interpretation in cross-cultural research." Area **31**(4): 313-325.
- UN News Centre. (2003). "Annan launches new UN-private sector alliance to fight poverty, AIDS, illiteracy." Retrieved 15/1/14, from <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=7834&Cr=millennium&Cr1=goals> - .UuOfsXlFDmI.
- UNDP. (2012). "Creating Value for all: Strategies for Doing Business with the Poor." Retrieved 8/1/14, from <http://www.undp.org/content/rwanda/en/home/library/poverty/creating-value-for-all---strategies-for-doing-business-with-the-/>.
- UNWTO (2006). UNWTO's declaration on tourism and the millennium goals: Harnessing tourism for the Millennium Development Goals. Madrid, UNWTO.
- Waithaka, J. (2004). "Maasai Mara—an ecosystem under siege: an African case study on the societal dimension of rangeland conservation." African Journal of Range and Forage Science **21**(2): 79-88.
- Wall, G. (1997). "FORUM: Is Ecotourism Sustainable?" Environmental management **21**(4): 483-491.
- Wall, G. (1997). Sustainable Tourism - Unsustainable Development. Tourism Development and Growth: The Challenge of Sustainability. J. J. Pigram and S. Wahab. London, Routledge: 33-49.
- Wallace, G. and A. Russell (2004). "Eco-cultural tourism as a means for the sustainable development of culturally marginal and environmentally sensitive regions." Tourist Studies **4**(3): 235-254.

- Waller, R. (2000). Pastoral poverty in historical perspective. The Poor are Not Us: Poverty and Pastoralism in Eastern Africa. D. M. Anderson and V. Broch-Due. Oxford, James Currey: 20-49.
- Walpole, M. J. and H. J. Goodwin (2001). "Local attitudes towards conservation and tourism around Komodo National Park, Indonesia." Environmental Conservation **28**(2): 160-166.
- Wang, C. C. (1999). "Photovoice: A participatory action research strategy applied to women's health." Journal of Women's Health **8**(2): 185-192.
- Wang, C. C., J. L. Cash and L. S. Powers (2000). "Who knows the streets as well as the homeless? Promoting personal and community action through photovoice." Health Promotion Practice **1**(1): 81-89.
- Western, D. (2009). Foreword: The Future of Maasailand, Its People and Wildlife. Staying Maasai? Livelihoods, Conservation and Development in East African Rangelands. K. Homewood, P. Kristjanson and P. Chenevix Trench. New York, Springer: v-viii.
- Western, D., S. Russell and I. Cuthill (2009). "The status of wildlife in protected areas compared to non-protected areas of Kenya." PLoS One **4**(7): 6140.
- Whelan, T. (1991). Ecotourism and its Role in Sustainable Development. Nature Tourism: Managing for the Environment. T. Whelan. Washington DC., Island Press: 3-22.
- Wiebe, L. A. (2011). Tourist Philanthropy, Disparity and Development: The Impacts of Tourists' Gift-giving on Developing Communities. Master of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo.
- Wilkie, D. S., G. A. Morelli, J. Demmer, M. Starkey, P. Telfer and M. Steil (2006). "Parks and people: assessing the human welfare effects of establishing protected areas for biodiversity conservation." Conservation Biology **20**(1): 247-249.
- World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2011). "Grundfos LIFELINK,." Retrieved 4/2/14, from <http://www.wbcsd.org/Pages/EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID=14112&NoSearchContextKey=true>.
- World Travel and Tourism Council. (2014). "Tourism for Tomorrow Awards: Asilia Africa." Retrieved 27/1/14, from <http://wttc.org/tourismfortomorrow/winners-finalists/2014-winners-finalists/asilia-africa/>.
- Wrong, M. (2010). It's our turn to eat. London, Fourth Estate.
- Wunder, S. (2008). "Payments for environmental services and the poor: concepts and preliminary evidence." Environment and Development Economics **13**: 279-297.
- Yunis, E. (2009). Ecotourism: An effective and sustainable way for tackling poverty. Progress, opportunities and challenges. World Ecotourism Conference, Vientiane, Laos.
- Zetterlund, S. (2013). "Mama Zebra Memorial Fund." Retrieved 1/11/13, from <http://www.mamazebra.com>.
- Žižek, S. (2009). First as tragedy, then as farce. London, Verso.

Appendix 1. Focus Groups (FG)

Ref	Village	Men/women	Participants	Date	Facilitator
1	Olesere	Men	6	25/3/12	Resian Letoluo
2	Olesere	Men	9	7/4/12	Resian Letoluo
3	Olesere	Women	15	24/3/12	Resian Letoluo
4	Olesere	Women	13	29/3/12	Resian Letoluo
5	Olesere	Women	16	30/3/12	Resian Letoluo
6	Olesere	Women	11	9/4/12	Resian Letoluo
7	Olesere	Women	3	2/4/12	Resian Letoluo
8	Enooronkon	Men	7	21/4/12	Resian Letoluo
9	Ng'amuriak	Women	12	17/4/12	Resian Letoluo
10	Enooronkon	Women	14	18/4/12	Resian Letoluo
11	Enooronkon	Women	5	19/4/12	Resian Letoluo
12	Ng'amuriak	Women	8	20/4/12	Resian Letoluo
13	Enooronkon	Women	3	2/5/12	Resian Letoluo
14	Mbitin/Nkirgir	Men	8	25/5/12	Resian Letoluo
15	Mbitin	Women	8	18/5/12	Resian Letoluo
16	Mbitin	Women	19	21/5/12	Resian Letoluo
17	Nkirgir	Women	12	23/5/12	Resian Letoluo
18	Endoinyo e Rinka	Men	7	13/10/12	Lorna Serseri & Dominic Sakat
19	Endoinyo e Rinka	Women	40	14/10/12	Lorna Serseri
20	Olkuroto	Men	23	27/10/12	Lorna Serseri
21	Olkuroto	Women	7	28/10/12	Lorna Serseri
22	Mpuaai	Men	9	25/11/12	Lorna Serseri
23	Mpuaai	Men	6	2/12/12	Lorna Serseri
24	Osilale	Men	5	2/2/13	Lorna Serseri
25	Osilale	Women	8	1/2/13	Lorna Serseri
26	Nkoilale	Men	3	7/2/13	Lorna Serseri
27	Nkoilale	Women	5	8/2/13	Lorna Serseri
28	Eor Olkimaita	Women	6	12/2/13	Lorna Serseri
29	Olesere	Women	6	15/10/13	Dominic Sakat

Appendix 2. Interviewees (I)

	Participant Details		Interview / Discussion Details				
	Name	Position	Style	Recorded ?	Date	Place	Language
1	Anna Banyard	Dig Deep programme manager	SSI ¹¹²	N	4.12.11	KGS	English
2	Anna Banyard	Dig Deep programme manager	SSI	N	17.1.12	Olesere	English
3	Ron Beaton	OOMT & KGS founder	SSI	N	30.1.12	OMC	English
4	Eche, Nina and Zarek Cocker	Encounter Mara Camp managers and operations manager	SSI	N	6.2.12	Naboisho	English
5	Justin Heath	Naboisho Conservancy manager	ID ¹¹³	N	8.2.12	Naboisho	English
6	Patrick and Johanna Strömvall	Kicheche Valley Camp, Naboisho, managers	SSI	Y	8.2.12	Naboisho	English
7	Kokoo Soit	Elderly grandmother	ID	N	20.3.12	Olesere	Maa (translated by Resian Letoluo)
8	James Kaigil	Assistant manager, OMC	SSI	Y	21.3.12	OMC HQ	English
9	Paul Murero	Teacher at the Oltopesi Cultural Centre, representative of the Catholic Church and Lemek resident	SSI	Y	13.9.12	Naboisho	English
10	Dominic Sakat	Trained guide and assistant for the Mara Naboisho Lion Project	ID	N	22.9.12	Olesere	English
11	Dominic Sakat	Trained guide and assistant for the Mara Naboisho Lion Project	ID	N	3.10.12	Olesere	English
12	Robert Oigo	Head teacher of Olesere Primary School	SSI	Y	11.10.12	Olesere	English
13	Teriano Soit	Local University Student	SSI	Y	12.10.12	Olesere	English
14	Lorna Seseri	Research assistant	ID	N	16.10.12	Aitong	English
15	Garry Cullen	Managing Director of Hemingways Ol Seki Camp, Naboisho	SSI	Y	16.10.12	Naboisho	English
16	Helen Schutte	Co-manager of Asilia Naboisho Camp	SSI	Y	17.10.12	Naboisho	English

¹¹² Semi structured interview

¹¹³ Informal discussion

17	Nashiploni Pesi	Lady in Endoinyo e Rinka who invited us for tea	ID	N	18.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	Maa (translated by Lorna Serseri)
18	Mechanica Lolkumum	Community Leader	ID	N	18.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	Maa (translated by Lorna Serseri)
19	Wilson Ntirra	Deputy Head Teacher Endoinyo e Rinka	SSI	Y	18.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
20	Michael Rakwa	Safari guide and resident in a village visited by clients from Ol Seki	SSI	Y	19.10.12	Olesere	English
21	Gerard Beaton	Country manager for Asilia Africa	SSI	Y	21.10.12	Naboisho	English
22	Naisuyasui Lolkumum	Solar mama who went to India to train as a solar technician	SSI	Y	21.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	Maa (translated by Lorna Serseri)
23	Juma Sampuerrap	Nurse practitioner CMF	SSI	Y	21.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
24	Gert Bomhof	Former tourist who set up Stichting Nkoilale	SSI	Y	21.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
25	Erik Ranja	Co-founder Better World Canada	SSI	Y	21.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
26	John Sankok	Director of CMF Health Ministries	SSI	Y	21.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
27	Øyvind Aadland and Priscilla Serukka	Secretary General and Regional Director of Stromme Foundation	ID	Y	23.10.12	Olesere	English
28	Ron Beaton	OMT & KGS Founder	ID	N	26.10.12	OOC	English
29	Penina Taki	Community Based Facilitator for Basecamp Foundation's microfinance project	SSI	Y	28.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
30	Councillor Ole Ketuyo	Councillor	SSI	Y	28.10.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
31	Lars Lindkvist	Executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation	SSI	Y	1.11.12	Naboisho	English
32	Nathaniel Robinson	Manager of Olare and Motorogi Trust	ID	N	2.11.12	Talek	English

33	Lars Lindkvist	Executive chairman of Basecamp Foundation	Pres. 114	N	2.11.12	Talek	English
34	Roelof Schutte	Co-manager Naboisho Camp	ID	N	7.11.12	Naboisho	English
35	Dickson Kaelo	Co-founder of KGS, community leader, PhD student, previously Basecamp Foundation's project manager	ID	N	11.11.12	Narok	English
36	Nathaniel Robinson	Manager of Olare and Motorogi Trust	SSI	Y	13.11.12	OOMT HQ	English
37	Debra Kaigil	Community Based Facilitator for Basecamp Foundation's microfinance project	SSI	Y	25.11.12	Mpuuai	English & Swahili
38	David Kerempe	Head teacher of Talek Primary School	SSI	N	27.11.12	Talek	English
39	Lincoln Njiru	African Impact Project Manager	SSI	Y	29.11.12	KGS	English
40	Peter Koya	Community Health Officer, CMF	SSI	Y	31.11.12	Olesere Clinic	English & Swahili
41	Willy Loigero	Endoinyo e Rinka Head Teacher	SSI	Y	3.12.12	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
42	James Maina	Assistant manager of Ol Seki Camp, Naboisho	SSI	Y	6.12.12	Naboisho	English
43	Francis Sakat	Maternal Child Health Officer at the CMF Clinic in Talek	SSI	Y	7.12.12	Talek	English
44	Mike Kahiga	Instructor at KGS	SSI	Y	11.12.12	KGS	English
45	Simon Nkoitai	Administrator at KGS	SSI	Y	11.12.12	KGS	English
46	Joseph Mpoe	Project Co-ordinator	SSI	Y	11.12.12	KGS	English
47	Allan Earnshaw	Chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust	ID	N	18.1.13	Nairobi	English
48	Dickson Kaelo	Co-founder of KGS, community leader, PhD student, previously Basecamp Foundation's project manager	SSI	Y	22.1.13	KGS	English
49	Sarah Liriam	Outreach Worker for Basecamp Foundation focusing on women's microfinance groups	SSI	Y	23.1.13	KGS	English
50	Kijoolu Soit	Neighbour in Olesere	ID	N	26.1.13	Olesere	Maa (translated by Lorna Serseri)
51	Irene Yiele	Head teacher at Loigero Primary School	SSI	N	28.1.13	Mpuuai	English
52	Daniel Tasere	Head teacher at Naserian Primary School	SSI	N	28.1.13	Osilale	English & Swahili
53	David Lang'at	Head teacher at Mara Hills Academy	SSI	N	30.1.13	Mpuuai	English

¹¹⁴ Presentation

54	Fred Mpooya	Head teacher at Olkuroto Primary School	SSI	N	30.1.13	Olkuroto	English & Swahili
55	Rubin Njapit	Community Health Worker at Koiyaki Community Clinic	SSI	Y	30.1.13	Talek	English
56	Svein Wilhelmsen	Founder and MD of Basecamp Explorer and founder of Basecamp Foundation	ID & SSI	Y	2.2.13	Naboisho	English
57	Nathaniel Robinson	Manager of Olare Motorogi Trust	ID	N	3.2.13	OOMT HQ	English
58	Ben Skelton	Director of Dig Deep	SSI	Y	3.2.13	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
59	Vincent Simpiri	Nurse	SSI	Y	4.2.13	Endoinyo e Rinka	English
60	John Omae	Head Teacher at Mbitin Primary School	SSI	N	4.2.13	Mbitin	English & Swahili
61	Moses Parayio	Deputy Head Teacher at Nkoilale Primary School	SSI	Y	6.2.13	Nkoilale	English
62	Grace Naisinya	OMT's outreach worker focusing on conservation education in schools	SSI	Y	6.2.13	KGS	English
63	Lorna Serseri	Research Assistant	ID	N	8.2.13	Olesere	English
64	Nelson Kirrokor	Manager of Nkoilale Community Development Organisation, trained guide and OOC land committee member	SSI	Y	8.2.13	Nkoilale	English
65	Koya Family	Host homestead for clients from Naboisho Camp	SSI	N	9.2.13	Enooronkon	English
66	Ali Mohammed	Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources	ID	N	9.2.13	Enooronkon and Naboisho	English
67	Noombarbali Soit	Community Based Facilitator for Basecamp Foundation's microfinance project	SSI	Y	10.2.13	Olesere	English
68	Lorna Serseri	Research Assistant	ID	N	12.2.13	Olesere	English
69	Allan Earnshaw	Chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust	SSI	Y	19.2.13	Nairobi	English
70	Greg Monsen	Kicheche Co-owner	SSI	Y	20.2.13	Nairobi	English
71	Nathalie Leen	Kicheche Community Trust	SSI	Y	20.2.13	Nairobi	English
72	Sean Anderson	African Encounter East Africa General Manager	SSI	Y	21.2.13	Nairobi	English
73	Adrian Maarschalk	African Encounter East Africa Operations Manager	SSI	Y	21.2.13	Nairobi	English
74	Jake Grieves-Cook	Owner of Porini	SSI	Y	22.2.13	Nairobi	English
75	Terry Davidson	Chairman of OMT Board	SSI	Y	22.2.13	Nairobi	English

76	Justin Heath	Manager of Naboisho Conservancy	SSI	Y	1.3.13	Naboisho	English
77	Emma and Darren Geary	Managers of Kicheche Bush Camp, OOC	SSI	Y	2.3.13	OOC	English
78	Cath Heath	Consultant for Basecamp Foundation	SSI	Y	3.3.13	Naboisho	English
79	Dominic Sakat	Trained guide and assistant for the Mara Naboisho Lion Project	SSI	Y	15.3.13	Olesere	English
80	Niels Mogensen	Manager of Mara Naboisho Lion Project	SSI	Y	16.3.13	Olesere	English
81	Rob O'Meara	Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy	SSI	Y	18.3.13	OMC HQ	English
82	Lorna Buchanan-Jardine & Richard Pye	Managers of Mara Plains Camp, OOC	SSI	Y	22.3.13	OOC	English
83	Geoffrey Mulwa	Manager of Kempinski Olare Camp, OOC	SSI	Y	23.3.13	OOC	English
84	Dominic Koya	Naboisho Conservancy Community Liaison Officer	SSI	Y	25.3.13	Enooronkon	English
85	Rusei ole Soit	Community Leader in Olesere	SSI	Y	25.3.13	Olesere	Maa (translated by Dominic Sakat)
86	John Sengeny	Chairman of Naboisho Conservancy's Land Committee and Headteacher of Aitong Primary School	SSI	Y	26.3.13	OOMT HQ	English
87	Daniel Sopia	Mara Representative for the National Conservancies Forum, new OMT Community Facilitator and Morotogi Landowner	SSI	Y	26.3.13	OOMT HQ	English
88	Harry Maina	Temporary Manager of Porini Lion Camp and Gold Safari Guide	SSI	Y	27.3.13	OOC	English
89	Annette Bulman	General Manager Basecamp Explorer	SSI	Y	29.3.13	Naboisho	English
90	Garry Cullen	Managing Director of Hemingways Ol Seki Camp, Naboisho	ID	N	3.9.13	Naboisho	English
91	Gay Cullen	Operations Director of Wells Fargo and PRI-Kenya secretary	ID	N	3.9.13	Naboisho	English
92	Afitap Shams Kartaloglu Hawksford	Repeat volunteer at African Impact Volunteer Project	ID	N	7.9.13	Naboisho	English
93	Kasmira Cockerill	Secretary for MMWCA and research coordinator	ID	N	7.9.13	Motorogi	English

94	Rusei Ole Soit	Community Leader in Olesere	ID	Y	8.9.13	Olesere	Maa (translated by Dominic Sakat)
95	Resian Letoluo	Former research assistant, now OOMT outreach worker	ID	N	9.9.13	OOMT HQ	English
96	George Vaulkhard	Administrator of OOMT	ID	N	9.9.13	OOMT HQ	English
97	Lorna Buchanan-Jardine	Manager Mara Plains Camp	ID	N	11.9.13	OOMT HQ	English
98	Justin Heath	Manager of Naboisho Conservancy	ID	N	11.9.13	Naboisho	English
99	Allan Earnshaw	Chairman of Kenya Wildlife Trust	ID	N	12.9.13	Predator Hub	English
100	George Vaulkhard and Lorna Buchanan-Jardine	Administrator of OOMT and manager of Mara Plains Camp	ID	N	12.9.13	OOMT HQ	English
101	Rob O'Meara	Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy	ID	N	15.9.13	OOC HQ	English
102	Gerard Beaton	Country manager for Asilia Africa	ID	N	19.2.14	Naboisho	English
104	James Kaigil	Assistant Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy	ID	N	28.2.14	OMC HQ	English
103	Rob O'Meara	Manager of Olare Motorogi Conservancy	ID	N	10.3.14	OMC HQ	English
104	Dickson Kaelo	CEO of KWCA	SSI	N	6.9.14	Nairobi	English
105	Niels Mogensen	Chief Project Officer for Mara Lion Project	ID	N	27.9.14	Naboisho	English

Appendix 3. Camera Participants (CP)

	Name	M/F	Area
1	Nooretet Yiale	F	Olesere
2	Nkoeki Mwatata	M	Olesere
3	Kimanyisho Sikona	F	Olesere
4	Nasha Rakwa	F	Olesere
5	Simon Taki	M	Olesere
6	Nkaate Kuya	M	Enooronkon
7	Noosokon Kaleku	F	Enooronkon
8	Nesiamo Kuya	F	Enooronkon
9	Faith Kereto	F	Enooronkon
10	Dennis Lepore	M	Enooronkon
11	Nairurari Karkar	F	Mbitin
12	Nasuju Naurori	F	Mbitin
13	Noormiseyieki Mpooya	F	Nkirgir
14	Mary Solol	F	Mbitin
15	Milton Karkar	M	Mbitin
16	Mechanica Lolkumum	M	Endoinyo e Rinka
17	Nashiloni Pesi	F	Endoinyo e Rinka
18	School children	M&F	Endoinyo e Rinka
19	Anna Matany	F	Olkuroto
20	John Miyion	M	Olkuroto
21	Entajiri Sananka	F	Mpuaa